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Abstract
This thesis analyses the late sixteenth-century and early seventeenth-century literature of
warfare through the printed works of English, Welsh and Scots soldiers. The introduction
analyses the relationship between modem historiography and the early-modem published
works. The first chapter through analysis of over forty works explores the dramatic increase
in printed material on many aspects of warfare, the diversity of authors, the adaptation of
existing writing traditions and the growing public interest in military affairs. There follows an
extensive discussion in the second chapter on the categorisation of soldiers, which argues that
soldiers' works are under-used evidence of the developing professionalism among military
leaders at various levels and which challenges the traditional view that all combatants from the
British Isles fighting voluntarily in Europe were mercenaries. The thesis has consequently
been able to clarify the terminology associated with soldier categorisation, an issue about
which historians have, to date, been imprecise. The third chapter explores the motivation of
soldiers, and through the analysis of autobiographical material the thought process behind an
individual's engagement with an army is investigated, the results of which provide compelling
information that sheds light on the relevance of significant personal factors such as religious
belief and the concept of loyalty. The fourth chapter assesses the narratives of soldiers and the
fmer details of their experience, an enquiry that greatly assists in understanding the formidable
difficulties that were faced by individuals charged with both administering an army and
confronting an enemy. Throughout, the study considers the limited use historians have made
of these primary sources, attempts to place the material into sub-genres within the military
bibliography listed in the appendices, and concludes that the information contained within
these works should form a larger element within current historiography. The thesis thus
attempts to reassess early-modem warfare by focussing on the published works of soldiers.
The conclusion highlights the various types of soldier and how each type viewed his
commitment to war, while it also considers the impact of published early-modem material on
domestic military capability, the 'art of war', and the position of soldier-authors within the
historical debate.
3Transcription
Most contemporary quotes are from original printed material; texts therefore are reasonably
standardized when compared with manuscripts. I have generally not shown authors' italics in
quotes, as this seldom aids comprehension and can lead to confusion; on rare occasions I have
italicized for emphasis, but where this is done it is declared in the footnote. I have
consistently replaced 'v' with 'u,' 'f with's,' 'i' with 'j' and 'vv' with 'w' where this is
appropriate, and where a consonant (usually 'n' or 'm') is not shown but represented by an
accent on the preceding vowel I have replaced the accent with the consonant (e.g. 'the'
becomes 'then'). Likewise, the use of 'PO is replaced with 'ss,' and 'ye,' printed vertically, I
have reproduced as 'the'. I have amended punctuation where to leave it unchanged would
serve to confuse; where this is done it is explained in the accompanying footnote. Names of
places and people have been anglicised where there is common early modem usage that
remains today, for example Flushing for Vlissingen, otherwise today's native spelling has
been used for clarity. If! am unsure of the town an early-modem commentator is referring to,
I have retained his spelling in my text, but if it can be recognized I have given it a modem
spelling when not in inverted commas denoting the original speaker.
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5Introduction
This thesis concerns the experience of early-modem English, Welsh and Scots
soldiers and the contribution the written works of these soldiers can make to historians'
understanding of the wars of the period. It identifies a distinct period of protracted warfare
in Europe, which was recorded by the participants and published for public consumption in
the British Isles. Books were printed on many aspects of warfare, from news reports and
narratives to instructions and orders, and by many types of authors, from life-long soldiers
to part-time theorists. This material collectively presents a rich and varied historical
source largely overlooked by historians due to concerns over veracity. Traditionally
historians have focussed on the top-down study of warfare mainly through state documents
and diplomatic correspondence, concerned with strategy and policy, whereas this thesis is
concerned with the analysis of soldiering from the perspective of the participants.
Assessing continuity and change in the early-modem period specifically through
the use of soldiers' works is an unusual approach. These primary sources have until now
made only a small contribution to historical research even though they contain a great deal
of information. Such works were a new phenomenon when they appeared. Contemporary
late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century demand for the printed material of soldier-
authors indicates a growing general and keen interest in military affairs, although
identifying readership is problematic. There is a close relationship between the advent of
continuous protracted warfare and the burgeoning appetite for military literature, fed by the
substantial increase in output from the printing presses. This correlation strongly suggests
that closer analysis of the material is warranted. It will be argued that both the narrative
and debates of the period are suitably captured in these works and that they add a plethora
of detail often ignored in favour of more 'official' sources.
Historiographically, the perspectives of the nineteenth century were challenged in
the latter part of the twentieth. Over the last few years historians have debated various
aspects of both the situation in the British Isles and the wider European context. This
chapter traces those debates, engages with them critically and exposes gaps in some of the
arguments.
6The historiographical background
A great deal has been written on a period that includes the Spanish Armada, the
transition from Tudor to Stuart monarchies, the French Wars of Religion, the Eighty and
Thirty Years' Wars and the Personal Rule of Charles I. This chapter will explain the
trajectory of traditions of historical writing about warfare engaged in by British soldiers. It
will reveal gaps in the scholarly literature indicating the need for a fuller review of primary
sources using an alternative approach.
Warfare was endemic throughout the entire period. It was hardly a novel
phenomenon, but the extended duration characteristic of early modem conflicts had a
profound effect on the development of soldiers and the 'military art' that set it apart from
preVIOUSeras. England, Wales and Scotland, collectively referred to as 'Britain'
throughout this thesis,' provided many men to fight abroad in what could be seen as
somebody else's war thus their consistent labelling by contemporaries and historians as
'mercenaries'. England and Wales were politically homogeneous, and the Welsh soldiers
encountered in this study certainly considered themselves subjects of the English monarch.
The Welsh appear to have been very much part of the English political and religious
nation, despite the retention of their own language and the rank and file remaining, to a
large extent, monoglot. While their officers were educated in England or at English
speaking schools and migrated to England and the English army, there is evidence that
Welsh companies existed as stand-alone units in Europe.i a display of a sense of 'nation'
but possibly also due to their inability to communicate outside their own lines except
through an officer. Scotland was an independent state, and continued to be so despite
sharing their monarch with England from 1603. They also shared with English and Welsh
comrades the experience of warfare, fighting, for the most part, on the side of the
Protestantism that all three nations embraced. The Irish were a case apart, in the main
fighting for the Catholic cause.' and as such they remain outside the scope of this already
broad thesis. However Ireland as a theatre of war is relevant. The nature of warfare there
1 Used more as a geographic term of convenience than a political statement. While this may be contentious,
it is worth noting that one academic feels comfortable in referring to 'the United Kingdom' of 1612: Anna
E.C. Simoni, 'A Present for a Prince', in J.A. van Dorsten, ed., Ten Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations
(Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1974), p.51. Charles Carlton noted 'there is no clear word to defme the
relationship between the various parts of the United Kingdom', Going to the Wars: The Experience of the
English Civil Wars, 1638-1651 (London: BCA, 1992), p.2, n4. Steven Ellis discussed the issue of
'Westminster-centred' British history: "'Not mere English": The British Perspective, 1400-1650', History
Today, 38:12 (1988: Dec), pp.41-48.
2 Robert Monro, Monro, his expedition with the worthy Scots regiment (London, 1637), I, p.82.
3 See, for example, Grainne Henry, The Irish Military Community in Spanish Flanders, 1586-1621 (Dublin:
Irish Academic Press, 1992).
7was significantly different from that of continental Europe." However, along with other
European theatres, it formed part of the British soldier's collective experience.
The period defined chronologically
The period under study begins with the first unofficial deployments of English and
Welsh volunteers to the Low Countries in the early 1570s. It extends through the
deployments to the Low Countries and France in the 1580s and 1590s, to the involvement
of men, including Scots, in the Low Countries and Germany during the first decades of the
seventeenth century prior to the English Civil War. The experience of Ireland and the
Elizabethan and Stuart amphibious expeditions are relevant to the analysis for the sake of
completeness, although these aspects of warfare are in some ways peripheral to the main
activity in the Netherlands, France and Germany. The period has been frequently divided
by historians into late Elizabethan, early Stuart and pre-Civil War sub-periods and treated
as individual epochs. Nevertheless it can be seen as a continuum of military activity and
development. Set between a lull in Elizabethan European military engagement in the
1560s and the withdrawal of voluntary combatants from European warfare in order to
conduct the Civil Wars in the 1640s, it is an identifiable period through which for the first
time in several decades a domestic 'art of war' was engendered.
Early Tudor precursor: English warfare in Scotland and France
Works about the period 1509-1558 have advanced historians' knowledge of the
.nature of English warfare down to Elizabeth's reign. They reveal that it was characterised
by the quasi-feudal method of recruitment under aristocratic leadership, the use of
mercenaries in substantial numbers to augment this recruitment, and enormous financial
cost for little visible gain. The reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI and Mary I witnessed
sporadic warfare against the perennial English enemies, Scotland and France. As a result
4 'Gaelic weapons and tactics were outmoded. They lacked the equipment to conduct a successful
siege ... Their horsemen rode without stirrups and were therefore unable to couch a lance', but 'Gaelic chiefs
were very adept at exploiting the local terrain: large armies found no-one to fight, or faced a series of
ambushes, and small armies were beaten'; Steven G. Ellis, 'The Tudors and the origins of the modem Irish
states: a standing army' , in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery, eds., A Military History of Ireland
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.118. For the unique nature of warfare in Ireland see also
J. Michael Hill, 'Gaelic Warfare 1453-1815', in Jeremy Black, European Warfare 1453-1815 (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1999), and James Michael Hill, Celtic Warfare 1595-1763 (Edinburgh, John Donald, 1986),
p.18.
8Elizabeth I inherited military and economic weakness.i Campaigns included the 1544
capture of Boulogne and subsequent loss in 1550,6 invasions of Scotland in 1542 and 1547
with subsequent, final withdrawal in 1551 and, perhaps most significant of all, the loss of
Calais in 1558. The total cost of this came to an estimated 3.4 million pounds, a staggering
sum for the period, and was accompanied by popular discontent in England." Henry VIII
was responsible for creating the conditions of. war with both France and Scotland that
Somerset and Mary inherited, and he committed the largest slice of public money to his
expeditions when compared with the latter two. He has been considered a monarch who
had 'a hunger for martial glory' and who 'aspired to be a second and greater Henry V'. 8 If
this was so his war aims were significantly different from Elizabeth's, whose singular
focus, regardless of her varying ideas on strategy, was to repel would-be invaders. This
view of Henry has recently been challenged by Luke MacMahon, who argued that the
taking of Boulogne would expand the territory of the Calais Pale and thus was strategically
sound thinking and not purely conceived out of the King's quest for chivalric honour,"
Tactically the English had been successful in Scotland at Solway Moss, Leith, and later at
Pinkie, and in France at Boulogne, but strategically could not sustain enduring operations
on an extended line of communication, a situation not dissimilar to the experience of the
Hundred Years War.IO The period under study in this thesis is one of continuous warfare,
albeit sustained with fluctuating scope and under changing political conditions, whereas
the warfare experienced by British soldiers in the earlier decades of the sixteenth century
was sporadic where the only career combat soldiers were the foreign mercenaries.
MacMahon views these mercenaries, and the much smaller English permanent units that
formed the King's bodyguard and coastal and border garrisons, as the only 'professionals'
involved in these conflicts. II
5 Paul EJ. Hammer, Elizabeth's Wars: War, Government and Society in Tudor England. 1544-1604
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.5.
6 A military endeavour similar to the capture and subsequent sale of Tournai earlier in Henry's reign. ibid,
r.17; C.G. Cruickshank, The English Occupation of Tournai (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).
Hammer, Elizabeth's Wars, p.43.
8 Ibid, p.lO.
9 Luke MacMahon, 'Chivalry, Military Professionalism and the Early Tudor Army in Renaissance Europe:
A Reassessment', in D.J.B. Trim, ed., The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism
(Leiden: Brill, 2003), p.208.
10 Traditional views include: H. Miller, Henry VllI and the Eng/ish Nobility (Oxford, 1986); G.J. Millar,
Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, 1485-1547 (Charlottesville, Va, 1980). For a revisionist perspective:
James Raymond, Henry VIII's Military Revolution: The Armies of Sixteenth-century Britain and Europe
(London: LB. Taurus, 2007).
11 MacMahon, 'Chivalry, Military Professionalism and the Early Tudor Army', p.184.
9The developing professionalism during Elizabeth's reign (from the 1570s) IS
therefore directly connected to the growing permanence of soldiers in the field, and in this
regard the English would be experiencing the same professional development as other
European narions.F After the outbreak of the Dutch Revolt, soldiers although not part of
formal standing armies could nevertheless be employed for prolonged periods in a way that
would not have been possible prior to the concurrent warfare in the Netherlands and
France, and subsequently, in the seventeenth century, the Netherlands and Germany. Their
view of chivalry, though, may have been closer to Henry VIII than Elizabeth I, as will be
demonstrated in this thesis.
Elizabethan warfare
Traditionally historians emphasised the many difficulties of waging war in this
period and portrayed a generally negative view of both the organising efforts of central
government and the performance in the field of the soldiers that government employed.
Writing before the First World War, Fortescue referred his readers to the satire of
Shakespeare, believing 'fraudulent' Falstaff, 'swaggering' Pistol, 'rascally' Bardolph, and
the 'damnable rogue' Parolles to be accurate reflections of the poor state of English
arms.13 Similarly Henry Webb believed, through Shakespeare, that 'many Elizabethan
captains showed a propensity for exquisite uniforms while their soldiers went almost
bare';" In 1946 C.G. Cruickshank presented a detailed analysis of how the Elizabethan
army was recruited and deployed, including sections on rations, equipment, uniforms and
the medical service. IS He considered the inheritance of the Tudor military organisation by
Elizabeth to have been a medieval feudal army with no legal recourse to the press and no
mandate to send the locally-recruited men abroad," but during her reign, and due to the
considerable military challenges posed by the King of Spain, much.effort was invested in
producing a cost-effective modem deployable force.!" However, factors such as the abuse
of office by local officials and the fraudulent behaviour of company captains, muster
officials and merchants (all of whom contributed to 'the universal corruption of the age' 18),
coupled with the inclination to enlist 'rogues and vagabonds' with their tendency to
12 Ibid, p.210.
13 J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol I (London: Macmillan, 1910), p.140.
14 Henry J. Webb, 'Falstaff's Clothes', Modern Language Notes, Vol. 59, No.3, March 1944, p.162.
IS C.G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp.48; 60; 71; 118.
161bid, pp.S-7.
17 For instance, in modernizing weaponry from bow to firearms, ibid, p.60.
181bid, p.81.
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desert.l" adversely affected the efficiency of the resultant forces. Notwithstanding this
negative perspective, while he sympathised with the conclusions of earlier historians such
as Firth, Fortescue (who did point out that war had become 'a profession'j") and Oman
with their emphasis on the overall inefficiency of the army, and agreed with Neale
regarding incompetence and corruption as the main evils affecting it,21 Cruickshank did
point out the considerable efforts made by the Crown and Privy Council and some of the
successes they had of curbing corruption.f It is noteworthy that Cruickshank drew most
of his information from various state papers with comparatively few references to
contemporary soldiers.
Later twentieth-century historians continued to view the period as poorly
administered and identified the causes of what they saw as English incompetence in the
field. In 1970 Charles Wilson painted a bleak picture in the Low Countries of 'miserable'
soldiers deployed from the British Isles, 'often half-naked, invariably unpaid, ill-led and
discontented' who 'knew and cared nothing about the causes or objects of the war in which
they were entangled'. 23 Of the protagonists themselves 'few fought with any ideological
relish or religious fervour', 24 and failure on the field of battle resulted from 'the casual
insouciance of sixteenth-century warfare'. 2S The blame for much of this incompetence fell
directly to the 'dictatorial and self-contradictory' Queen Elizabeth.i" responsible through
her prevarications for Spanish victories up to and including the fall of Antwerp. There are
some glimpses of future themes, for instance the Veres are regarded as symbols of the
'steady professionalism' of English commanders.j" but this is a throwaway line and the
subject of 'professionalism' is not discussed in any detail. The age is believed to be one of
'casual' warfare.j"
Wilson looked to Belgian and English archives for his research on English
involvement in the Dutch Revolt as well as several historians' accounts in Dutch, French
and English. There are only three references to soldiers' printed work, two from Sir Roger
191bid, p.8-10.
20Ibid, p.l35.
21Ibid. p.l31.
22 For examples, ibid, pp.63; 76; 135. .
23 Charles Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands (London & Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1970), pJ.
24 Ibid, p.50.
25 Ibid, p.68.
26Ibid, p.92.
271bid, p.l13.
28Ibid, p.116.
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Williams' The Actions of the Low Countries (London, 1618) and one from Vere's
Commentaries (London, 1657), and a discussion on the developing expertise of English
soldiers is confined to a footnote.j" In the same vein Howell Lloyd carried out a study of
the Rouen campaign 'based largely upon primary sources', mainly Burghley's papers. He
concludes from these that the early modem state was not capable, through structure, ethos
and conflicting interests, of executing a cohesive strategy and operational plan.3o
The information on the militia indicates that many administrative difficulties were
experienced at home as well as abroad. Lindsay Boynton's review of the home defence
county forces showed that the militia drew experienced soldiers from, and sent
inexperienced soldiers to, the Netherlands and underlined the accepted necessity for the
conduct of training." From 1573 training was a requirement based on the progression to
firearms and the growing military 'professionalism', which acknowledged the concept of
'skilled manoeuvre' over 'massive impact'. Expensive, difficult to organise and of limited
effect, Boynton portrayed the militia as a section of the English military that, like its
deployed expeditionary counterpart, was a drain on scarce financial resources and a source
of considerable resentment. 32 Problems included difficulties with logistics, the resistance
to professional soldiers from socially high-ranking individuals and the categorisation of
those soldiers by contemporaries as 'mercenaries' .33 The lack of standardisation in
weapons and their increasing complexity was another issued shared with expeditionary
forces." Boynton noted the 'enormous spate of military books' that influenced the theory
of war in England,3S but he nevertheless used information gathered mainly from state
papers.
C.H. Firth was unequivocal: he considered the military developments of the
English Civil War to be 'the evolution of an efficient army out of chaos'. Although
writing about the parliamentary army of the 1640s and 1650s, Cruickshank considered his
291bid, pp.112/3, n12, 16, 17. Only Vere's Commentaries are mentioned in 'A Note on Sources', p.l57.
30Howell A. Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign 1590-1592: Politics. Warfare and the Early-Modern State
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p.191. Lloyd did draw some material from Sir Roger Williams, A Briefe
Discourse of Warre (London, 1590).
31 Lindsay Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), pp.153; 162; 166.
32Ibid, pp.140-2.
33Ibid, p.181.
34Ibid, p.239; 257.
35 Ibid, pp.13; 90-1.
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strong comments on the Elizabethan war effort worthy of quotation: 'The military system
which the Tudors bequeathed to the Stuarts was completely inefficient' .36
Wallace T. MacCaffrey changed the perspective by looking at the Queen's long-
term policy as successful despite short-term military defeat, and this signalled a revised
approach to Elizabethan warfare. In the early 1990s he presented the paradox of naval and
military stalemate and frustration leading to the eventual success of Elizabeth's war policy.
The Queen as reluctant war leader had always maintained limited aims. She did not seek
to destroy her Spanish enemy but just keep him from her territory whilst neutralising any
potential future threat from erstwhile allies such as France, the old enemy whom she never
fully trusted. Military stalemate would ensure no threatening power stepped into a power
vacuum caused by the military collapse of any major participant, and that had been
achieved by the time she died.37
Recently historians have followed MacCaffrey's lead and tended to emphasise the
success of raising and deploying armies despite the many structural and fmancial
difficulties and formed a school of thought that challenged traditional arguments. In 1994
John Nolan produced an article which argued that the centralised administration allied with
entrepreneurial enterprise represented a fundamental alteration of the state, brought about
solely through the response to war, and overturned previous historical judgements on the
efficacy of the Elizabethan state to produce and deploy an army:
Altogether, Elizabeth's 'army' more than adequately filled its role as an instrument
of the government's foreign and domestic policies. Could even these limited
demands have been effectively met by a corrupt, archaic army supported by a
totally moribund military system? The answer to that question, I believe, must be
'no' ... 38
Further to this, in 2003 Paul Hammer suggested that the development of
Elizabeth's forces had achieved considerable progress. From the 'utter mismatch' against
Spain in the 1560s by the end of the reign Sir Walter Ralegh could lament not having
36 C.H. Firth, Cromwell's Army (Uckfield: Naval &Military Press, from a facsimile c.19l1), p.l;
Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army p.l31.
37 Wallace T. MacCaffrey, Elizabeth 1: War and Politics 1588-1603 (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 1992), p.ll.
38 John S. Nolan, 'The Militarization of the Elizabethan State', The Journal of Military History, 58, 1994,
pp.391-420, quote p.393.
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'beaten that great empire to pieces." Hammer stressed positives over negatives: the
English army did experience mutinies, such as at Ostend in 1588, but nothing close to the
endemic mutinies in the Spanish Army of Flanders, and this would indicate that the
captains, much maligned by Cruickshank, rather than consistently fleecing their men were
far more inclined to look after them.40 Senior commanders were plunged into considerable
personal debt in their efforts to support their soldiers, and their competence as military
leaders and positive contribution to Dutch successes in the field is presented in marked
contrast to the Cruickshank and Firth perspective." Rather than focus on the recruitment
of poor quality individuals, Hammer noted the employment of a 'high number of veterans
and gentlemen volunteers' and considered the stout performances at the tactical level in
sharp contrast to the stalemate at the strategic.42 Elizabethan England, he maintained,
developed to 'match international "best practice'", and he challenged the 'excessively
negative assessment' made by previous historians." In two articles in 1997 Hammer
focused on the Cadiz expedition to expose aspects of Elizabethan war-related political
issues. Cadiz showed 'all that was good and all that was very far from perfect in
Elizabethan military practice' ,44 and he posited that rather than a rush for glory it may well
have been a carefully planned operation based on sound intelligence, and this idea was
based on the uncovering of a previously-ignored document. 45 That Cadiz 'produced a
body of documentation ... unequalled ... for any other Elizabethan venture' is interesting in
itself.46 However, for the purposes of this thesis, the interest lies in the discussions on the
'personal point-scoring over honour' and how that concept sat closely to booty, discussed
in Chapter Three below.47 Also relevant is the importance of print to revealing to a
contemporary audience how the operation was conducted and the political manoeuvrings
in its aftermath."
Hammer's research had taken him to the same government source documents as
previous historians, but he also considered the many recent secondary accounts that have
been produced, as shown in his 'Select Bibliography of Modern Sources'; he did not draw
39 Hammer, Elizabeth's Wars, p.l.
40 Ibid, p.170-4.
41Ibid,pp.128-9; 171; 178.
421bid, p.195.
43Ibid, pp.259-60.
44 Paul E.J. Hammer, 'New Light on the Cadiz Expedition of 1596', Historical Research, 70, 1997, p.182.
45Ibid, p.189.
46 Paul E.J. Hammer, 'Myth-making: Politics, Propaganda and the Capture of Cadiz in 1596', Historical
Journal, 40,1997, p622.
471bid, pp.623; 639.
48Ibid, pp.626, 026; 628; 631-3; 636; 640.
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from soldiers' accounts." While the approach of MacCaffrey and Hammer reached an
alternative conclusion, that Elizabeth was often successful in achieving her military
objectives and that those objectives have been misunderstood, they nevertheless remain
traditional top-down perspectives.
The Thirty Years' War
As the conflicts in France and the Netherlands waned, events in the Empire opened
up new employment opportunities for soldiers. By the twentieth century, historians were
beginning to question the accuracy of the traditional belief that the Thirty Years ' War had
decimated the population throughout, specifically, Germany and retarded its growth and
development for two centuries. General accounts of the Thirty Years' War attempt to
cover a vast array of political and military events over an extended geographical area,
incorporating a plethora of archival records in many languages, and many thousands have
been printed since the seventeenth century. Writing before the Second World War, C.V.
Wedgwood advised caution regarding the 'popular myth' that resulted in misleading
'exaggerated views' on the long-term effects of the war and attempted a re-balancing, and
also concluded that despite the presence of so many foreigners 'Germany's tragedy was
ultimately her own,.50 But she came under fire from J.V. Polisensky in 1971, who
considered that she presented the war 'as a portrait gallery of rulers, statesmen, diplomats
and generals, who ... controlled the destinies of Europe'r" Whereas Wedgwood focussed
mainly on Germany, the Czech Polisensky researched the effects of the war in Bohemia
and Moravia, areas he believed to have been neglected by historians and to have suffered a
wider, deeper and longer legacy of destruction than Germany.52
Historians have chiefly focussed upon the impact of this war. The debate over the
level of destruction polarised between those who took the view that more often than not
personal interest regarding compensation lead to exaggerated claims,53 against the
49 Hammer, E/izabeth 's Wars, pp.290-300. For a recent perspective on global warfare during the Tudor
period see Jeremy Black, War in the World: A Comparative History, 1450-1600 (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011).
so C.V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years' War (London: Pimlico, 1938), pp.7; 522.
SI J.V. Polisensky, The Thirty Years War, trans. Robert Evans (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1971), p.l O.
S2 Ibid, pp. 244-53.
S3 Robert Ergang, The Myth of the All-Destructive Fury of the Thirty Years War (Pocono Pines, PA: 1956);
S.H. Steinberg. The Thirty Years War and the Conflict for European Hegemony 1600-1660 (New York:
1966); Gerhard Benecke, 'The Problem of Death and Destruction in the Thirty Years War: New Evidence
from the Middle Weser Front,' European Studies Review 2 (1972): 250.
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traditional view that the war generated wholesale misery on an unprecedented scale.54
Herbert Langer, in his oft-quoted illustrated account from 1980 in which he considered the
war to be part of 'a far-flung mesh of economic and political relations in Europe and
overseas', believed that the picture of devastation created by contemporary accounts 'is not
an accurate one,.55 John Theibault concluded that rather than looking to extort local
authorities, the rhetoric of death and destruction in the war was produced as a result of the
sufferings of the populace. That rhetoric may have reflected reality and was not
necessarily fabricated, but it changed as the depredations worsened.56 Quentin Outram
analysed the mortality and demographic losses resulting from the war, querying the
methodology of others, and considered factors such as fertility, emigration, mortality
through battle (although the fatalities 'were too few to account for much') and disease
(notably plague). He looked at the way that the war itself could have contributed to an
increased mortality over that to be expected through 'normal' cycles of disease and hunger
through harvest failure, and discerned three 'models': 'synergy', 'hunger' and
'transmission' that assisted in marking a correlation between the war and mortality.57 A
2007 article by David Zhang et al suggested a correlation between meteorological
conditions and increased mortality during the Thirty Years' War, which showed the drop
in temperature experienced in Europe to coincide with the timing of the war.58 The
multitude of European debates up to the end of the Thirty Years' War and beyond was
covered in Volume IV of the New Cambridge Modern History from 1970. This
publication considered the economic, political, scientific, religious and military issues, as
well as developments in the field of drama, across Europe before dealing with Spain,
Germany, Sweden, France and the Low Countries individually. 59
This thesis contends that all of these topics, including the weather, are covered in
detail in the writings by soldiers from th e British Isles who participated in the conflict and
54 Gunther Franz, Der Dreissigjahrige Krieg und das Deutsche Volle,4thedition (Stuttgart: 1979); Gustav
Freytag, Bilder aus der Deutschen Vergangenheit, Vol. 3 Aus dem Zeitalter des gro~n Krieges (Leipzig:
1888).
ss Herbert Langer, The Thirty Years' War (Poole: Blandford Press, 1980), p.lO.
56 John Theibault, 'The rhetoric of death and destruction in the Thirty Years War', Journal of Social History,
Vol. 27, No.2 (1993), pp. 271-290.
57 Quentin Outram, 'The Socio-Economic Relations of Warfare and the Military Mortality Crises of the
Thirty Years' War', Medical History, 2001, Vo1.45, pp.151-184.
58 David D. Zhang, Peter Brecke, Harry F. Lee, Yuan-Qing He, and Jane Zhang, 'Global climate change,
war, and population decline in recent human history', inProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
December 4,2007, Vol.l04, No. 49, pp.l9214-19219.
S9 J.P. Cooper, ed., The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume IV: TheDecline of Spain and the Thirty
Years War 1609-1648159 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
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recorded their experience, and that much of that record was available in print during the
conflict, which has not been edited or amended since.
In 1997 Geoffrey Parker produced a collection of essays that by design covered
wider subject matter than Germany and the years 1618-1648. The Mantuan war, Swedish
campaigns in Poland, the Donauworth incident of 1607 and the demobilisation agreements
of 1650 were believed to impact on the main issues discussed within the subject of the
Thirty Years' War. Through the inclusion of these events, outside the time-frame of the
book's title and geographically further afield than the battlegrounds of the Empire, the
difficulty of allocating accurate time and space labels to a complex military matrix is
manifest. Parker included an extensive and very useful bibliographical essay. Also
noteworthy is the essay by Christopher Friedrichs, 'The war and German society', which
relates to the discussion on the level of destruction, referred to above." Klaus Bussmann
and Heinz Schilling aimed to 'consolidate the present state [1999] of research on the epoch
of the Thirty Years' War'. They were 'concerned with the historical interconnections
between state, church and society'. The war was shown from various national perspectives
(in addition to the Empire, essays are included on Denmark, Switzerland, Venice, France,
Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, Catalonia and Portugal). The role of religion was also
considered, and the impact of war on the daily lives of both soldiers and civilians. This
work does not, however, draw directly from the experience of soldiers through analysis of
their recorded material.61
A concise, focussed and acclaimed argument on what and who constituted the main
issues of and protagonists in the war was published by Ronald Asch, who saw the war as
Empire-centric and not part of a greater European crisis.62 The most recent revisionist
account by Peter Wilson concurred with Asch (despite the misleading title of his book) and
emphasised three key distinctions from many previous accounts: the war was related to
other concurrent conflicts yet remained separate and as such it was the war of the Empire;
the war was not primarily religious; the war was not inevitable.f'' The book was recently
acclaimed by Daniel Riches, who believed it 'promises to transform the way the war is
60 Geoffrey Parker, ed., The Thirty Years' War (London: Routledge, Second Edition 1997).
61 Klaus Bussman and Heinz Schilling, eds., 1648: War and Peace in Europe, 3 vols (MUnster/OsnabrOck,
1999).
62 Ronald G. Asche, The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-48 (Basingstoke:
Palgrave, 1997).
63 Peter H. Wilson, The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2009).
17
taught' as it 'slowly, carefully and patiently' unpacked 'the various layers of its causes,
course and effects'. 64 Wilson followed this publication with a collection of primary
source documents, overwhelmingly civilian in nature with only a handful of soldiers'
accounts. He also included an up-to-date (2010) guide to recent publications on the Thirty
Years' War that corrects the omission of a bibliography in The Thirty Years War:
Europe's Tragedy.6s
The early-modern military continuum
This thesis identifies a discernible period that links military activity, and several
histories consider the continuity of warfare rather than focus on specific conflicts. A
number of historians cover both the Elizabethan and early Stuart periods, although often
reaching back to the early sixteenth or late fifteenth centuries or carrying forward into the
British Civil Wars or the conflict between France and Spain. This is a reflection of the
difficulty in accurately assessing and dating the factors that impacted on the development
of warfare and the advances in weaponry and tactics. In 1961 Sir John Hale, one of the
first 'revisionist' historians of the period, produced an anthology of contemporary printed
works, the earliest of which dates from 1513 and the latest 1639, in which he wrote of a
'revolution' in military affairs." The selection is a very small representation of printed
works when compared to Appendices 1 to 4 of this thesis. In a later essay he described the
period from 1559 to 1610 in negatives: 'it was not a period of achievement, it was not in
any real sense a period of transition' , and notes that armies contained 'malcontents from all
classes' who fought from inefficiently conceived plans that were the result of an absence
of strategy.f" A collection of essays in the 1980s addressed the period stretching from
1450 to 1631 and covered a range of topics including Italian fortifications, officer training
(with its implication towards professionalization of the armies in which trained officers
served) and contemporary reactions to war.68 Two years later he defined the period from
1450 to 1620, during which he described a 'military reformation' in Europe with the
64 Daniel Riches, 'A New Paradigm for Studying the Thirty Years War', German History, Vol. 29, No 1,
2011, pp.l02-7.
65 Peter H. Wilson, ed., The Thirty Years War: A Sourcebook (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
Another recent sourcebook., with fewer documents and lacking the discussion of Wilson's, is Trynje
Helfferich, ed., The Thirty Years War: A Documentary History (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett,
2009).
66 JoR Hale, The Art of War and Renaissance England (Washington, DC: Folger Library Press, 1961).
67 J.R. Hale, 'Armies, Navies and the Art of War', in R.B. Wernham, ed., The New Cambridge Modern
History: Vol. Ill. The Counter-Reformation and Price Revolution 1559-1610 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1968), pp. 171-208.
68 J.R. Hale, Renaissance War Studies (London: Hambledon, 1983).
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secularisation of the 'ideology' of chivalry, the effects of the widespread use of firearms
and the emergence of permanent, synonymous with professional, forces."
In recent years the revisionist trend continued, but with a more positive reading of
many aspects of the early modem military system. Focussing on the English, in 2001
Mark Fissel produced a work that extends from Henry VIII through to the start of the
English Civil War, and included analysis of military action in France, Scotland and
Ireland. Fissel maintained that 'the English mastered logistics well, fielded large numbers
of men in spite of a hybrid recruitment system, had good tactical sense, handled their
artillery expertly, and enjoyed a superior sense of morale' and that 'in general, from 1511
to 1642, they achieved success on their own terms'. Fissel interpreted the military events
of the period to reflect a developing English art of war, born out ofa will to survive within
their self-conscious geographic isolation and an ability to adapt and master the various
modes of warfare: siege craft, the cavalry charge, amphibious assault, guerrilla warfare
and set-piece battles.7o Focussing on the siege, a major characteristic of early modem
warfare and its adjunct, artillery, in 1979 Christopher Duffy surveyed Europe. This
included Italy (1530-1600), France (1513-1660), the Netherlands through the Eighty
Years' War, England and Ireland during the British Civil Wars, the Baltic and the Ottoman
Empire."
In an essay of 2011 David Lawrence laid out the changes to historiography in an
effort to consolidate the latest literature on the period. He discussed the historians who in
the 1980s and 1990s challenged the idea of a 'decaying and moribund military tradition'
with the view that the English art of war was in-step with the European pace-setters and
that English officers were motivated by 'confessional zeal, honour and economic
hardship'." An older, but invaluable work describing the mechanics of soldiering in
Germany from the economic perspective is that of Fritz Redlich, which viewed military
leaders as 'both functionaries and businessmen' as a reflection of the major task of
organising and administering an army, or part thereof;"
69 J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450- 1620 (Phoenix Mill: Sutton, 1998), pp. 37; 46;
127.
70 Mark Charles Fissel, English Warfare 1511-1642 (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 47; 282.
71 Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare (London & New York: Routledge, 1979).
72 David R. Lawrence, 'Reappraising the Elizabethan and Early Stuart Soldier: Recent Historiography on
Early Modem English Military Culture', History Compass, 9/1, 2011, pp.l6-33.
73 Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force: A Study in European Economic and
Social History. 2 vols (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964-5).
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Viewing warfare from the other side, as it were, Geoffrey Parker first presented an
in-depth study of the Spanish Army of Flanders (1567-1659) in 1972 with a Second
Edition appearing some thirty years later.?" This was a work on 'historical mechanics',
which analysed the technical, economic and fiscal aspects of the Spanish war effort in the
Low Countries." He observed the general increase in the size of European armies and the
transformation in their role and nature to predominantly infantry forces engaged in siege
warfare (noting the reduction in the size and effect of the cavalry), itself the result of the
introduction of a new style of defence works, the trace italtennel" Parker discussed how
the army was assembled from various locations in the Spanish empire, the logistics of
deploying along 'extended lines of communication, how the army was maintained in the
field (specifically targeting the problems of supply and pay, or lack of it, and how this lead
to mutiny), and the many problems encountered both strategically and at the tactical level.
Although many soldiers from the British Isles served in the Spanish Army of Flanders, the
focus of this book is not on them." However, it is seminal in its treatment of the
organisation and administration of early-modem land forces. It is noteworthy that, despite
eventual (albeit partial) defeat, the Spanish 'prodigious efforts' and 'awesome
determination' resulted in 'impressive organisational achievements [which] surpassed the
capabilities of most other European states', and the conclusion that Geoffrey Parker drew
is that the eventual failure was 'essentially political'. 78 In 1995, with the early modem
period re-classified 'baroque', Parker produced an essay giving a synopsis of the European
soldier, which placed him within a collective alongside eleven other elements that formed
contemporary society.79
In 2006 Roger Manning produced an account of the chronological development of
British arms ranging from 1585 through to 1702, which he terms the formative years of the
'British Army'. The work covers the conflicts in Ireland and the Netherlands, the
expeditions both Elizabethan and Stuart, and the Civil Wars in Britain, before extending
74 Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Second Edition, 2004).
75 Ibid, p. xiii.
761bid, pp. 3-9.
77lbid, pp. 24; 231.
78 Ibid, pp. 224-6.
79 Geoffrey Parker, 'The Soldier', in Rosario Villari, ed., Baroque Personae (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1995).
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into the periods of Restoration and Glorious Revolution.t" This is one of several works of
Manning that provide material for discussion in this thesis.
'Modem' warfare, according to Jeremy Black, began in Italy during the period of
war between 1494 and 1529, during which time the use of gunpowder weapons
'contributed to a remarkable period of tactical experimentation' that saw the effective
combination of infantry, cavalry and artillery. That this was a development from the
Burgundian methods of the 1470s would indicate that confident accurate dating of the start
of the period is problematic. Indeed, he states that the period he has identified was neither
'radically different' to the previous era nor 'crucial to the development of modem
warfare' .8) Although he claims to move away from the 'war and society' aspect of
military history and concentrate on the 'operational character and military dynamic' of
warfare, he nevertheless considers cultural, social and political factors. In a broad
approach to early modem warfare, he also considers naval developments, the military
revolution debate and European expansion.f
The 'military revolution' debate
A debate relevant to a thesis concentrating on the experience of soldiering is that
initiated by Michael Roberts. His argument centred mainly on tactical reforms (based on
smaller infantry units in linear formations and changes in the use of cavalry) introduced by
Prince Maurice of Orange in the Netherlands and Sweden's Gustavus Adolphus in
Germany, and he christened these developments the 'military revolution'. 83 This idea was
taken up and expanded, in period and theme, by Geoffrey Parker. Parker's initial
scepticism, shown in an article of 1976, made way for a full-blown theory in the late
1980s, which was widely supportive of Roberts' original theory but added as an alternative
explanation to changes the trace italienne system of fortifications and the resultant siege
80 Roger B. Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army 1585-1702 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006). For a more recent account of a wider period, see Charles Carlton, This Seat
of Mars: War and the British Isles 1485-1746 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011).
81 Sir Charles Oman had previously identified 1494 as the start of an epoch, a sixteenth century wherein
'everything is changed': A History of The Art Of War In The Sixteenth Century (London: Methuen, 1937),
pp.5/6. .
Jeremy Black, European Warfare, 1494-1660 (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. xr; 70.
83 Two published works expounded the theory: Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution. 1560-1660
(Belfast: Queen's University Press, 1956); Michael Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus: A History of Sweden
1611-32.2 vols (London: Longman, Green, 1958).
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warfare this effective defensive architecture produced.f" He also viewed this military
revolution as the drive behind European global expansion and thus accorded it a primary
position in world history." The debate continued and was to some extent consolidated in
1995 by Clifford Rogers, who gathered together a number of key historians and published
their opinions, which challenged aspects of the Parker theory, in one volume.86
Despite the fact that in 200 I John Childs pronounced the debate on the 'military
revolution' dead as an historical theory as he considered it 'stale and tired', 87 it still
continued." David Eltis sought to bring the 'revolutionary' aspects of military change
forward to the sixteenth century, claiming his theory to be 'quite independent' of Roberts
and Parker.89 According to Eltis, military training and organisation 'underwent profound
changes' driven solely by improvements in firearms, and this was an advent of the
sixteenth not the seventeenth century and thus occurred prior to Maurice and Gustavus."
Generalisations regarding either century can attract criticism: for instance, when
comparing differences between the earlier and later Tudor periods a degree of caution is
advisable. It is notable that the largest Elizabethan armies, those deployed in Ireland under
Essex and Mountjoy, were only half the size of the army commanded by Henry VIII in
France in 1544, even though the growth of armies has been seen as a characteristic of the
'military revolution' of later years." In the same vein, although many of the English
troops in the earlier period were armed with bills and longbows, the arquebus had been
84 On siege fortifications, in addition to Parker and Duffy (above), see: J.R. Hale, Renaissance Fortification:
Art or Engineering? (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977), and James D. Tracy, ed., City Walls: The Urban
Enceinte In Global Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). For an example of siege
stalemate, see James B. Wood, The king's army: Warfare, soldiers, and society during the Wars of Religion
in France, 1562-1576 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.29-37.
8S Geoffrey Parker, 'The "Military Revolution" 1560-1660 - a myth?', Journal of Modem History, XXVI
(1976); Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
86 Clifford J. Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early
Modem Europe (Boulder: Westview, 1995).
87 Derek Croxton, 'A Territorial Imperative? The Military Revolution, Strategy and Peacemaking in the
Thirty Years War', War in History, 1998,5(3). John Childs, Warfare in the Seventeenth Century (London:
Cassell, 2001), p.23.
88 Frank Tallett and DJ.B. Trim, eds. European Warfare, 1350-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,2010). MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, The dynamics of military revolution 1300-2050
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Jeremy Black, 'Was there a Military Revolution in Early
Modem Europe?', History Today, Jul. 2008, Vol. 58 Issue 7, pp.34-41. Black has recently stated that 'the
nature and extent of military change in the period 1550-1660 has been exaggerated', and has placed early-
modem warfare within a wider cultural setting: Jeremy Black, Beyond the Military Revolution: War in the
Seventeenth-Century World (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p.l90.
89 David Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe (New York: Barnes &Noble, 1995),
p.6. See also Thomas F. Arnold's 'very real sixteenth-century military revolution'; 'War in Sixteenth-
Century Europe', in Black, European Warfare, p. 35.
90 Eltis, Military Revolution, p.43.
91 Hammer, Elizabeth's Wars, p.6.
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introduced by this stage and the move towards firearms was under way.92 The impact of
gunpowder, technical changes in weaponry and the relationship between warfare and the
evolution of the state are all aspects of the historiography of this period, whether it is
termed revolutionary or not, and has been the subject of much discussion."
The debates on the 'military revolution' tend to reverberate, as the authors un-pick
the narrative produced by a previous generation of historians." They have considered
whether or not events were consistent with the theory, for instance how the destruction of
the 'new model' Swedish army by the conservative Spanish tercios at Nordlingen fits into
the discussion on the advantages of changing tactics.95 There are isolated references to
early-modem military publications, for instance Roberts' reference to Davies' The Art of
War, Parrott's use of de Gheyn's Exercise of Arms and Turner's Pallas Armata, and
Parker's use of Digges' Stratioticos, Barwick's Breefe discourse and Cruso's Militarie
instructions for the cavallrie." This sporadic usage is sufficient to indicate the debate
exists within early-modem literature. This thesis, unusually, will view the debate from the
material presented by the actual participants.
92 Ibid, p.29.
93 Bert S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder. Technology and Tactics
(Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1997). Brenda Buchanan, ed., Gunpowder: The
History of an International Technology (Bath: Bath University Press, 1996). Harald Kleinschmidt, 'Using
the Gun: Manual Drill and the Proliferation of Portable Firearms', The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63,
No.3 (Jul., 1999), pp.601-629. Kelly DeVries, 'Gunpowder Weaponry and the Rise of the Early Modem
State', War in History. 1998,S (2), pp.127-145. Kelly DeVries, 'Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs:
Towards a Redefinition of "Effectiveness" in Premodern Military Technology', War in History, 1997,4 (4),
pp.454-470. A.R. Hall, Ballistics in the Seventeenth Century: A Study in the Relations of Science and War
with Reference Principally 10 England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952). Thomas Esper,
'The Replacement of the Longbow by Firearms in the English Army', Technology and Culture, 6:3 (1965:
Summer), pp.382-393. William R. Thompson and Karen Rasler, 'War, the Military Revolution(s)
Controversy, and Army Expansion: A Test of Two Explanations of Historical Influences on European State
Making', Comparative Political Studies, 1999, 32: 3, pp.3-31.
94 To take the example of one of the first to engage in the debate: Geoffrey Parker, 'The "Military
Revolution" - A Myth?', in Rogers, Military Revolution Debate. pp.37-54, who discussed the work ofG.N.
Clark, C. Oman, C. Nordmann (French), L. Andre (French), W. Hahlweg (German), M.A. Ladero Quesada
(Spanish), J.W. Wijn (Dutch) and others. Itmust, however, be stated that Parker did make use of Sir Roger
Williams and Thomas Churchyard in this essay.
95 David A. Parrott, 'Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War: The Military Revolution', in Rogers,
Military Revolution Debate, p.227.
96 Michael Roberts, 'The Military Revolution, 1560-1660', in Rogers, Military Revolution Debate, p.15, nl0:
a marginal discussion on whether armies marched in step. Parrott, 'Strategy and Tactics' inRogers, Military
Revolution Debate, p.229, n13: discussion on the distinction between arquebus, musket and caliver; ibid,
p.232, n3S, 37: on the use of the pike. Geoffrey Parker, 'In Defence of the Military Revolution', in Rogers,
Military Revolution Debate. p.339, n6, where he states 'I have perused several tracts from the 1590s' and
uses Digges and Barwick for a discussion on ballistics and, p.348, n48, quotes Cruso's comments regarding
siege warfare.
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Scotland and early-modern European warfare
Scotland provided many soldiers for continental armies during the period under
review. Historians such as Elizabeth Bonner and Hugh Dunthome underline the
independent status of Scotland in relation to England, with Bonner stressing the combined
French and Scottish efforts 'against their common enemy: England'. 97 However, she
represents the case prior to 1560 and before the significant lull in English warfare noted
above. Hugh Dunthome chose to emphasise the divide between the two nations, stating
that the States of Holland insisted 'English and Scots contingents were kept quite separate
and usually as far away from each other as possible', and that William Cecil saw Scots
involvement in the Netherlands as a danger to England." Despite the desire of these
historians to emphasise the undoubted differences, there was, in fact, much common
ground between Scotland and England. Cultural, linguistic, religious and political
similarities existed that enabled relationships to develop from the 1570s between soldiers
from England and Scotland fighting in the same theatre of war on the same side, and this
fledgling 'Britishness' is a significant aspect of the military experience that matured
concurrently on both sides of the border and one that is reflected by contemporary writers,
the main sources for this thesis, such as Robert Monro and Sir Roger Williams.
There are a number of general works on Scotland and the Scottish European
diaspora during this period, containing information that helps explain the proportionately
high numbers of Scots found in European armies." There are also a number of works that
focus on Scottish military activity. J.D. Mackie, in 1915, used the work of Sir Walter Scott
as a starting point to investigate the 'Scottish soldier of fortune', 100 and as such used the
autobiographical accounts of Robert Monro and Sir James Turner as his primary sources,
97 Elizabeth A. Bonner, 'Continuing the "Auld Alliance" in the Sixteenth Century: Scots in France and
French in Scotland', in Grant G. Simpson, ed., The Scottish Soldier Abroad 1247-1967 (Edinburgh: John
Donald, 1992).
98 Hugh Ounthome, 'Scots in the Wars of the Low Countries, 1572-1648', in Grant G. Simpson, ed.,
Scotland and the Low Countries, 1124-1994 (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1996), pp.111I4.
99 For instance, J.~. Mackie, A History of Scotland (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964); Tom Steel, Scotland's
Story (London: Fontana/Collins, 1984); Stanislaw Seliga and Leon Koczy, Scotland and Poland: A Chapter
of Forgotten History (Scotland (location and publisber unspecified), 1969); Michael Lynch, ed., The Oxford
Companion to Scottish History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Alexia Grosjean and Steve
Murdoch, eds., Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period (Leiden: Brill, 2005).
100 J.~. Mackie, 'Dugald Dalgetty: and Scottish Soldiers of Fortune', Scottish Historical Review, Vol. XII,
No. 47, Apri11915, p.224; Sir Walter Scott, A Legend of Montrose (London: Constable, 1819).
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augmented by secondary works by Grant, Fortescue, Fischer, and Mackay.i'" In this
article Mackie discusses the changes in battlefield tactics following the introduction of the
arquebus and the innovations of Gustavus Adolphus, of whom he observes 'his reforms are
to a large extent only modifications of existing systems' .102 Mackie states unequivocally
of Monro 'it is true he was a mercenary',103and concludes that Scots soldiers 'were greedy
and pedantic, but they were also brave and efficient and in their own way honourable
too' .104 This article, despite its age, is still relevant in its quest for the quintessential
characteristics of the 'mercenary' from the British Isles fighting abroad. I will consider
carefully his descriptions but look to re-balance 'greedy' with 'demand for subsistence', to
replace 'pedantic' with 'pedagogic', to underline the bravery and efficiency of these
soldiers and to stress their honour as more universal than merely 'in their own way'.
Mackie also produced an article, in 1914, this time drawing largely on state papers,
outlining the position of Scotland regarding the Spanish naval threat to England.los
Although perhaps over-stating his case (he saw Scotland as 'the hinge upon which these
world-politics turned' 106),he nevertheless shows the shift of alliances that moved Scotland
closer to England, and no doubt Scots soldiers closer to their English counterparts.l'"
In an article produced in the mid-1980s Ross Bartlett looked at the Scottish soldier
abroad exactly mirroring the period of this thesis.108 He showed that from 1572 the Scots
were as concerned as the English that the fight of 'true Christians' against the 'devellishe
and terrible Counsall of Trent' may have encroached onto home soil. 109He also attempts
to defme 'mercenary', but does not mark the difference between those Scots mercenaries
of the fifteenth century and those in the later period, a subject that I will discuss in
101 Monro, Expedition; Sir James Tumer, Pallas armata (London, 1683); James Grant, Memoirs And
Adventures Of Sir John Hepburn: Knight. Governor Of Munich, Marshall Of France Under Louis Xlll, And
Commander Of The Scots Brigade Under Gustavus Adolphus, Etc (Edinburgh and London: William
Blackwood, 1851); Fortescue, History of the British Army; T.A. Fischer, Scots in Germany (Edinburgh:
Schulze, 1902) and Scots in Sweden (Edinburgh: Schulze, 1907) (Fischer also produced Scots in Eastern and
Western Prussia (Edinburgh: Schulze, 1903»; John Mackay, An Old Scots Brigade; History of Mackay's
Regiment. 1626-1634 (Tonbridge: Pallas Armata, 1991 Edn).
102 Mackie, 'Scottish Soldiers of Fortune', p.227.
103 Ibid, p.23S.
104 Ibid, p.237.
105 J.D. Mackie, 'Scotland and the Spanish Annada', Scottish Historical Review, Vol. XII, No. 45, October
1914, pp.I-23.
106 Ibid, p.l.
107 For relations between Scotland and England at this juncture see also Ruth Grant, 'The making of the
Anglo-Scottish alliance of 1586,' in Julian Goodacre and Alasdair A. MacDonald, eds., Sixteenth-Century
Scotland: Essays in Honour of Michael Lynch (Leiden: Brill, 2008).
1081. Ross Bartlett, 'Scottish Mercenaries In Europe, 1570-1640: A Study In Attitudes And Policies',
Scottish Tradition, Vol. XIII, 1984-85, pp.15-24.
109lbid, p.17.
2S
depth.!" His research on the recruitment methods, government control (or lack thereof)
and the numbers raised is informative; tension caused between England and Scotland due
to Scots soldiers passing through to English ports is noteworthy. III Alf Aberg's article of
1990 about Scots soldiers in Swedish armies during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
notes combined units of 'English and Scottish foot-soldiers'. 112 Aberg writes of Scotland
providing 'possibly as many as 30,000 officers' to Gustavus Adolphus, but this cannot be
correct and he must surely mean volunteer soldiers.l" showing that terminology continues
to be problematic when dealing with this period. The issue is thoroughly discussed in
Chapter Two. 114
Historians such as Steve Murdoch have focussed in the last decade on Scots
involvement in European wars. In 2001 he brought together a number of essays by various
historians on aspects of the Thirty Years' War from a Scots perspective, including Josef
Polisensky on Scots involvement in the Bohemian War, Matthew Glozier on the Scots in
French and Dutch armies, and William Brockington on Robert Monro.!" Murdoch's
publication of 2003 examined the relationship between Britain and Denmark, and follows
the line that 'foreign relations were not, in fact, conducted in England's interests, but in the
interests of the house of Stuart' with a heavy Scots influence.l'" This is interesting in light
of Scots soldiers' commitment to the wider Stuart house, as discussed in Chapter Three
below through Robert Monro's work. Part One of Murdoch's book looks at Scottish
diplomacy, and is of little direct relevancy to this thesis, but Part Two analyses Scots
within the Danish military establishment and is therefore of interest. Alexia Grosjean
produced, in 2003, a work that looked at the relationship between Scotland and Sweden.i'"
Chapters One through Three are relevant, in that they assess the impact and influence of
110 Ibid, p.16.
III Ibid, p.19.
112 Alf Aberg, 'Scottish Soldiers in the Swedish Armies in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', in Grant
G. Simpson, ed., Scotland and Scandinavia 800-1800 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1990), p.91.
113 Ibid.
114 There are a number of older works that are still relevant and have been republished due to modem, cheap
technology. John Mackay produced a history of Mackay's regiment from its inauguration in 1626 to its
destruction in 1634. Mackay stated he was 'greatly indebted' to Robert Monro's Expedition and had taken
much from his work, thus he is one historian who trusted the contents of a soldier's narrative: Mackay, An
Old Scots Brigade. James Grant pieced together the 'adventures' of Sir John Hepburn from a variety of
sources and published in 1851: Adventures of Sir John Hepburn. James Ferguson edited an extensive
volume of papers, drawn and translated from the Rijks Archief in The Hague, relating to Scots in the service
of the Netherlands: James Ferguson, ed., Papers illustrating the history of the Scots Brigade in the service of
the Netherlands 1572-1782 (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1899; BiblioBazaar Edn).
us Steve Murdoch, ed., Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648 (Leiden: Brill,2001).
116 Steve Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603-1660 (East Linton: Tuckwell
Press, 2003), p.9.
117 Alexia Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance: Scotland and Sweden 1569-1654 (Leiden: Brill,2003).
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Scots in the Swedish army and their contribution before and during the Thirty Years' War.
David Worthington viewed the war from the other side of the fence, looking at Catholic
Scots and their loyalties.I''' He has studied Scots involvement with the Habsburgs in
Spain, the Spanish Netherlands and the Holy Roman Empire, and includes an Appendix of
which Scots served in Habsburg armies during the Thirty Years ' War.
In the main these historians have looked to traditional sources. Ross Bartlett drew
largely from the Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, while Alf Aberg looked to the
narrative of previous historians.!'" Dunthome relied mainly on Ferguson's collection (see
note 114 above) although significantly bemoans the lack of a Monro, Williams, or
Hexham, commenting that his only source for a Scot in the Low Countries was LithgoW.120
Overall there has been a recurring, though surprisingly sparse use made of Monro, who
represents an invaluable source for both Scottish and British perspectives. James Fallon
studied Scots soldiers in the service of Denmark and Sweden, and validates the Expedition
of Monro as 'unquestionably' the 'major work' of the period. Despite this observation,
Fallon looked at other manuscript and printed sources, with particular emphasis on the
archives of Denmark and Sweden. He looked at recruiting methods, the historical impact
of the Scots deployment in the service of Denmark and Sweden and the experience of
serving abroad. Interestingly he regards the 'considerable' number of relevant letters
available to be 'extremely disappointing' regarding the value of the information they
yielded.12I I shall place Monro's account amongst those of the Welsh and English and
argue they collectively provide a rich source of informative material.
Biographies
Both historians and literary critics have explored the genre of biographies produced
by early-modem authors, although soldiers rarely feature. It has been suggested that while
the main purpose of life-writing by such biographers was exemplarity, contemporary
rhetoric may have worked to adjust the reality of the subject.122 Mayer and Woods' essays
discussed the theory of biography and the aim and effect of biographers. They highlight the
118 David Worthington, Scots in Habsburg Service, 1618-1648 (Leiden: Brill,2004).
119 M . I F' ham y ISC er's Scots in Sweden.
120 Dunthome, 'Scots in the Wars of the Low Countries', p.l08.
121 James A. Fallon, 'Scottish Mercenaries in the Service of Denmark and Sweden 1626-1632', PhD Thesis,
University of Glasgow, 1972, pp.13, 21
122 Thomas F. Mayer and D.R. Woods, eds., The Rhetorics of Life-Writing 1nEarly Modern Europe: Forms
of Biography from Cassandre Fidele to Louis XlV (University of Michigan, 1995), pp.I-26.
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fact that historians must use contemporary life writings with considerable caution. In a
rare discussion of military biography, Adriana McCrea's essay looked at Greville's
account of Sir Philip Sidney and concluded 'the so-called Life scarcely qualifies as a "life"
at all' .123Modem historians also surveyed the period through the tool of biography. One
that provided information for this thesis due to its relevance of subject and thorough
research is the account of the Vere brothers, Francis and Horace, by Clements Markham
written in the late nineteenth century.124 The work was floridly composed, and presented
the two subjects as great heroes of the English-speaking world. Sir Francis, who claims
most of Markham's attention, is portrayed as 'the first great English general in modem
history', and Sir Horace ably 'further developed' the school his older brother founded.12s
At times Markham engaged in a spat with his American counterpart Motley, who held a
lesser opinion of Vere.126 Tracy Borman's treatment of Francis Vere 'attempts to fill at
least part of the void created by historiography'. 127Her reappraisal shifted the emphasis
from his pivotal military role as a general in the Netherlands, which she posited had been
over-stated by Markham and Vere himself, and looked to re-balance by enhancing his role
in the political sphere.128Her argument is somewhat unconvincing. Vere's contribution to
the Netherlands war effort, and hence concurrently to the English art of war, remains to be
re-assessed.
There are several more recent biographical accounts of soldiers from the period.
Mountjoy, the most successful of Elizabethan military commanders, drew the attention of
two biographers. Cyril Falls and Frederick Jones both used similar sources: a combination
of state papers, correspondence and liberal use of the memoirs of Fynes Morison,
Mountjoy's secretary.129 John Nolan looked at the career of Sir John Norris, and it is
noteworthy that although a prominent commander Norris rarely features in this thesis.
This is because Nolan gathered much of his information from the Calendars of State
123 Adriana McCrea, 'Wbose Life Is It, Anyway? Subject and Subjection in Fulke Greville's Life Of Sidney',
in Mayer and Woods, Rhetorics of Life- Writing, p. 299.
124 Clements R. Markham, The Fighting Veres: Lives of Sir Francis Vere, General of the Queen's Forces in
the Low Countries, Governor of the Brill and of Portsmouth, and of Sir Horace Vere, General of the English
Forces in the Low Countries, Governor of the Brill, Master-General of the Ordnance. and Baron Vere of
Tilbury (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Seale & Rivington, 1888).
125 Ibid, p.iv.
126 Ibid, see 'Motley' in Index to gauge the extent of the argument.
127 Tracy Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands, 1589-1603: A re-evaluation of his career as Sergeant
Major General of Elizabeth I's troops', PhD thesis, University of Hull, 1997.
128 Ibid, p.259.
129 Cyril Falls, Mountjoy: Elizabethan General (London: Odhams, 1955), p.9; Cyril Falls, Elizabeth's Irish
Wars (London, 1950); Frederick M. Jones, Mountjoy J563-/606: The Last Elizabethan Deputy (Dublin:
Clonmore and Reynolds, 1958), p.1 o.
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Papers, the Acts of the Privy Council and other state papers, and took Churchyard's
translation of van Meteren' s A True Discourse of Succeeding Governors and Civil Wars in
the Netherlands (London, 1602) largely as a contemporary biography of Norris. We know
little of the warfare in which Norris was engaged from the man himself.130 Norris would
be excellent subject matter: a convinced Protestant (and possible Calvinist crusader), 131
who gathered significant experience of warfare in Ireland where he developed a fierce
reputation,132 as well as in the Netherlands and Brittany, he also invested in the 'private
enterprise' of Elizabethan military campaigns.P'' He was at various stages a 'gentleman
volunteer', a 'freelance adventurer', a 'mercenary commander', a 'military entrepreneur'
and a 'General of English royal forces', 134and the categorisation of soldiers is one of the
concerns of this thesis. However, while his career is seen by Nolan as 'a true mirror of the
evolution of the state he served', 135Norris himself did not write his experiences down (as
far as I am aware) and certainly did not publish them, and so cannot feature as a subject for
review in this thesis. Little is known of the 'life' rather than the 'career' ofNorris.136
Paul Hammer studied the political career of the Earl of Essex, a significant figure in
the politics and military events of the 1590s. Historians have traditionally regarded Essex
as at best a lightweight, at worst an incompetent; Nolan saw him as a 'glorified juvenile
delinquent'!" Hammer, through extensive reading of manuscript and printed sources,
'the fullest possible range of surviving evidence', 138sees Essex as neither, but as a serious
and youthful military aristocrat in a Court of senescent civilian councillors of lower social
rank, as 'a man of great ability and dogged commitment'. 139 Essex saw himself as a
soldier, and Hammer argued that Essex 'constructed his whole life around the conspicuous
cultivation of "virtue'", and as such he must feature in the discussion on chivalry which
forms a large part of the debate on professionalism, introduced below.l40
130 John S. Nolan, Sir John Norreys and the Elizabethan Military World (Exeter: University of Exeter,
1997), p. 241-3.
131 Ibid, p. 12.
1321bid, p. 27.
133Ibid, p. 20.
134Ibid, p. 243.
135Ibid, p. 245.
136 Ibid, p. 240.
137 Paul EJ. Hammer, The Polarization of Elizabethan Politics: The Political Career of Robert Devereux.r Earl of Essex. 1585-1597 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.4-5; Nolan, Sir John
Norreys, p.241.
138 Hammer, Polarization of Elizabethan Politics, p.xi.
1391bid, p.404.
140 Ibid, p.20.
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There are a number of English Civil War generals who underwent a military
apprenticeship in the European wars that have attracted a biographer's attention.l'" While
the English Civil War is beyond the scope of this thesis, the discussion of honour, acute in
that war, and the application of military professionalism were developed by men who had
served in Europe as soldiers or lived with a backdrop of European war in the British Isles.
Fairfax was portrayed by John Wilson as a national hero who required rescuing from under
the shadow of Cromwell, while Andrew Hopper presented a more balanced view, and
shows, albeit briefly, the connections between Ferdinando and Thomas (both veterans of
the Dutch wars) and the Vere family.142 P.R. Newman produced a biographical dictionary
of Royalist officers, from which can be seen the European warfare experience of
several,143and the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography gives information on the most
significant Civil War officers and their apprenticeship in Europe, such as George Monck,
Sir Jacob Astley, Henry Gage, Philip Skippon and Sydenham Poyntz. For an English
language biography of a European soldier, the seminal work on the great generalissimo
Wallenstein by Golo Mann is relevant.r" as is the more recent version by Geoff
Mortimer.i" These biographers have focussed on individuals within their military
context, whereas this thesis considers the military experience through multiple life stories
and draws conclusions about soldiers and the army in general from those accounts.
Self-writing: diaries, autobiographies, and spiritual autobiographies
The focus of this thesis is the writings of soldiers and their desire to publish and
reach a wider audience. Historiographically, there has been no rush to base studies on this
source material. There is a body of work that discusses early modem self-writing in
141 Although this was not a formal, recognised trade apprenticeship, for a thorough discussion of which see
Joan Lane, Apprenticeship in England, 1600-1914 (London: UCL Press, 1996).
142 John Wilson, Fairfax: A Life of Thomas, Lord Fairfax, Captain-General of all the Parliament's forces in
the English Civil War, Creator & Commander of the New Model Army (London: John Murray, 1985), p.I,
Andrew Hopper, 'Black Tom ': Sir Thomas Fairfax and the English Revolution (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2007), pp.15-7. There are also modem biographies on, for example, Sir William Waller,
Lord Goring, and Prince Rupert: J. Adair, Roundhead General: A Military Biography of Sir William Waller
(London: Macdonald, 1969). Florence S. Memagalos, George Goring (1608-1657) (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2007). Patrick Morrah, Prince Rupert of the Rhine (London: Constable, 1976); George Malcolm Thomson,
Warrior Prince: Life of Prince Rupert of the Rhine (London: Martin Seeker & Warburg, 1976).
143 P.R. Newman, Royalist Officers in England and Wales. 1642-1660: A Biographical Dictionary (New
York: 1981).
144 Golo Mann, Wallenstein, His Life Narrated, trans. Charles Kessler (London: Andre Deutsch, 1976).
145 Geoff Mortimer, Wallenstein: The Enigma of the Thirty Years War (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan:
2010).
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general or 'self-fashioning' as Stephen Greenblatt phrased it in 1980.146 In 2002 Randolph
Starn saw these 'new senses of the self as a product of the Renaissance that' grew out of a
preoccupation with models and types in antiquity, in nature, in the mind, or in a heaven of
archetypes'. A combination of 'humanist pedagogy', Protestant principle with its
emphasis on the individual, and the developing concept of 'civilised behaviour' all
contributed to the growth of self-fashioning.if This was not an entirely new view, as Paul
Delaney had written in 1969 that an innovation of the Renaissance was 'the rise of a more
relativist concept of historiography' that, unlike the people of the Middle Ages, the
'development of a sense of perspective of the past' contributed to humanist thought and
through it to self-writing.148 Michael Mascuch looked at social mobility and middling
self-identity, which he believed, through 'a rhetoric of chivalry', a 'remarkably
homogeneous' group of writers could be discerned. The 'middle sort' dominated
autobiographical discourse, and the occupational category of 'clergy and professionals'
formed the largest group, with 'profession' described as 'lawyer, medical doctor, teacher,
don, actor or military officer'. Overall the assessment is negative, in that these writers are
believed to have displayed a lack of individual ambition and, against a back-drop of
spiritual corruption with human destiny understood in providential terms, rather than
looking to better themselves in terms of material gain were preoccupied with the fear of
familial decline and fall. The conditions required for these authors to produce
autobiographies was a combination of writing skill (restricted to some 30 per cent of the
male population) and access to time and place, and their motivation, rather than
individualistic was out of concern for the welfare of their family, for which they felt an
almost over-powering burden of responsibility.l'" Elaine McKay surveyed early modem
English diaries and found that, although the highest number were produced by clergymen
supporting the view that the growth of diaries was connected to the growth of
. Protestantism, the largest combined grouping was that of soldiers and sailors. ISO This is
explained through the acknowledgment by the individual that he was engaged in
'something momentous', in events that would pass into history and that therefore merited
146 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980).
147 Randolph Starn, 'The European Renaissance', in Guido Ruggiero, ed., A Companion to the Worlds of the
Renaissance (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp.45-48.
148 Paul Delaney, British Autobiography in the Seventeenth Century (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1969), p.6.
149 Michael Mascuch, 'Social mobility and middling self-identity: the ethos of British autobiographers,
1600-1750', Social History, 20 (1995), pp. 45-61.
150 Elaine McKay, 'English diaries: gender, geography and occupation, 1500-1700', History, 90:298 (2005),
pp.191-212.
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recording and, possibly, justifying. This theory though is largely attributed to the
civilian-turned-soldier of the English Civil War, and therefore may not fit the early-modem
professional soldier and is one of the problems of having such a wide window extending
two hundred years. All soldiers' diaries, though, 'may have been conceived as a last
testament of the days leading up to his death' .
Occupation/Status Number of Diaries
[Military (Sailor & Soldier combined) 41]
Minister 40
Government official 39
Sailor 22
MP 22
Scholar 20
Soldier 19
Local government 16
Landlord 13
TradesmanlMerchant 13
Lawyer 11
IYeomanIFarmer 9
Doctor 8
Servant 6
Astrologer 3
Criminal 3
Midwife 1
Theatre owner 1
Total 246
Table 1: Diaries by Occupation/Status 1500_1700151
151 Reproduced from ibid, p.201.
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Religion was central to much of the 'ego literature' of the period, and Tom Webster
and others date the 'puritan diary' to the middle of Elizabeth's reign. There followed in
the 1580s a 'steady stream of protestant devotional manuals' produced from diaries of the
godly giving daily direction 'and evidence of diaries kept from the early years of the
seventeenth century is abundant'. 152 Margaret Spufford argued that individuals from the
bottom end of the social scale could produce spiritual autobiographies, as even the poorest
children had access to some form of education until they were absorbed into the workforce.
Reading was the basic skill learned as early as age five, while writing was a skill to which
not all who had learned to read progressed. Yeoman's sons could rightfully aspire to
attend grammar school until about age fourteen, and some of the wealthier in that social
group would attend university, although that highest level of education remained mainly
the domain of the gentry. The premature death ofa father could see the son slide down the
social and educational scale.153 Ralph Houlbrooke maintains a full electronic bibliography
of works that discuss or use diaries and autobiographies.P'
This thesis looks at the collective experience of soldiers through multiple life
stories produced by soldiers involved in combat and military deployments. Through this
evidence conclusions are drawn about service in an early-modem army.
Religion and eschatology
Historians have discussed the motivation for soldiers to leave home and fight
abroad and have focussed on religion. ISS In Elizabethan England there was a perceived
threat of invasion, not only from the would-be all-conquering 'universal monarchy' of
Spain, but also from a general Catholic conspiracy to crush Protestantism. In 1984
Malcolm Thorp wrote that in the early years of the reign in the main Elizabethans, and
Cecil in particular, believed that 'the forces of Antichrist were allied together and that
Protestantism was in danger', Hence the conception of the 'crucial buffer zones' of France
and the Netherlands with the belief that were these areas to fall the Spanish would
IS2 Tom Webster, 'Writing to redundancy: approaches to spiritualjoumals and early modem spirituality',
Historical Journal, 39, I (1996), pp.33-56.
IS) Margaret Spufford, 'Fist steps in literacy: the reading and writing experiences of the humblest
seventeenth-century spiritual autobiographers', Social History, Vol. 4, No.3, (Oct., 1979), pp.407-43S.
154 http://www.firstpersonwritings.eulgreatbritainlgreatbritain_project.htm
ISS As a thematic overview: ' ...apocalyptic visions acquired a special reality and urgency at times of political
and religious crisis ... [such as the] Armada crises ... the Thirty Years War ... the Irish Rebellion .. .'; Paul
Christianson, Reformers and Babylon: English apocalyptic visions from the reformation to the eve of the
civil war (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 1978), p.247
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'forthwith invade England'. Although there was a degree of 'wishful thinking' and an
inability 'to distinguish between fact and fiction', there was nevertheless a strong belief in
a threatening conspiracy between the pope, the king of France and the king of Spain which,
combined with 'a collective apocalyptic outlook', resulted in the formation of a defensive,
patriotic but ultimately optimistic policy to stand firm against aggressors.P" Williamson,
Cunningham, Grell and Trim have all viewed the period and its wars through an
apocalyptic or at least a religious lens.
Arthur Williamson argued that European expansion in the early modem period was
viewed largely as an apocalyptic phenomenon. The vast empire of Charles V was seen by
many as 'the Last World Empire' as prophesised, and this eschatological perspective of
Habsburg domination persisted through the sixteenth and into the seventeenth century.
Ranged against them were France and Britain (through a union of Scotland and England),
possibly together at one stage in a Gallo-Britannia alliance. The Dutch were also engaged
in the struggle 'within the framework of the Protestant apocalyptic'. This Fifth Monarchy
view is seen through the writings of George Buchanan, Philip Sidney, Francis Bacon and
William Alexander, and the theme is that the British drive was to end, but not to replace,
Habsburg Catholic expansion.P"
Contemporary representation of soldiers and warfare
Historians of literature have made a contribution to our knowledge of early-modem
warfare and soldiering. Andrew Gurr believed that from roughly the time of the Armada,
and due to that epic event and the conflict in the Netherlands, 'for more than ten years wars
and stories of wars were the main meal on the broad platforms of the [London]
amphitheatres,' and his comment on the military nature of the plays' subject matter is
supported by his research into contemporary journals.158 Such dramatic coverage would
indicate, and in tum would have encouraged, a strong contemporary interest in military
156 Malcolm R. Thorp, 'Catholic Conspiracy in Early Elizabethan Foreign Policy'. The Sixteenth Century
Journal, Vol. IS, No.4, 1984, pp.431-448.
157 Arthur H. Williamson, 'An Empire to End Empire: The Dynamic of Early Modern British Expansion'.
Huntingdon Library Quarterly, Vol.68, No.I-2, 2005, pp.227-256. Other works contributing to the
discussion on eschatology and fighting for religion include Andrew Cunningham and Ole Peter Grell, The
Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); David Trim, 'Fighting
"Jacob's Wars". The Employment of English and Welsh Mercenaries in the European Wars of Religion:
France and the Netherlands, 1562-1610', PhD thesis, University of London, 2002.
IS8 Andrew Gurr, Playgoing in Skakespeare's London (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987),
p.l32.
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affairs. That war was a popular theme for the London stage from the mid-1580s is readily
acknowledged by Patricia Cahill, who investigated the modernity of warfare in Elizabethan
drama and the inherent difficulty within the populace of understanding the trauma of
combat. She accepted the period to be one 'when military science emerged as a modern
discipline,' and included contemporary military authors such as Clayton, Williams, Barret,
Rich, Garrett, Churchyard, Gascoigne, Ive and Barwick, as well as modern historians such
as Hale, Eltis, Hammer, Boynton, Cruickshank, Fissel, MacCaffrey, Nolan, Wernham,
Roy, Parker, Manning and Trim in her extensive research. In so doing, she brought
\
together literary criticism and historical debate in a work that complements the study of
warfare, and how ordinary people understood it, in the Elizabethan period.159
Patronage
No study of early-modern warfare or soldiering should neglect the subject of
patronage, 'that network that bound together the whole political community and insured
the smooth functioning of the state machinery,.I60 In 1986 Mervyn James, using the
example of the Earl of Cumberland, described the changing relationship between lord and
tenant during the reign of Henry VIII, as feudal bonds began to erode and with them the
accompanying formal military agreement for a vassal or mesne tenant to follow his lord
into battle.161 This erosion had initially been created by the policies of Henry VII, and it
was to the crown that many mesne lords began to tum. Simon Adams argued that Henry
VID, as a consequence of his 'blunder' into a bankruptcy-inducing war with Scotland and
France, lost this patronage initiative, and the military patronage system was re-forged
which relied upon aristocratic patronage for military leadership.162 He also argued that,
during the reign of Elizabeth, Protestantism became a driving factor, fusing with the
political dimension that culminated in the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1585, with aristocratic
patronage controlled by the Earl of Leicester and, following his death, his stepson the Earl
of Essex. It is worth noting that contained in the household accounts of Leicester are
records of 'those gentlemen and noblemen whom, together with their retinues, Leicester
159 P.A. Cahill, Unto the Breach: Martial Formations, Historical Trauma and the Early Modern Stage
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). She was not the first to compare Shakespeare's plays with the
works of early-modem soldier-authors: Paul A. Jorgensen, Shakespeare's Military World (Berkeley and
London: University of California Press, 1956).
160 MacCaffrey, Elizabeth I, pp.543, 548.
161 Mervyn James, SOciety, Politics and Culture: Studies in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), pp.152-158.
162 Simon Adams, 'The English Military Clientele 1542-1618', in Charles Giry-Deloison and Roger Mettam,
eds., Patronage et Clientelismes 1550-1750 (Lille: Universite Charles de Gaulle-Lille IIIIInstitut Francais du
Royaume-Uni, Collection Histoire et Litterature Regionales, 10, 1995).
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summoned to accompany him in September 1585 ... and were then formed into companies
to constitute the 1,000 cavalry of the English contingent as provided for under the treaties
of Nonsuch'v'f"
David Trim also considered the issue of patronage in his thesis. He noted the lack
of any noble patron of Captain Edward Chester in the Netherlands in the early 1570s,l64
and that Chester was not the only captain dealing directly with the Dutch without using
'patrons acting as middle men'.165 Patrons nevertheless played a significant role at this
time, with not only Leicester but also his brother Warwick, Sir Francis Walsingham and
Sir Francis Knollys prominent. 166 The Earl of Pembroke was of crucial importance to the
recruiting effort of 1572.167 However, as time passed the 'professional' soldiers in the
employ of the Dutch had less reason to bow to the influence of aristocratic patrons, as the
relationship between Sir Francis Vere and the Earl of Essex shOWS.168 Below the
aristocracy, though, many gentlemen held retinues and fielded licensed or unlicensed
retainers and affinity county connections remained a critical factor in the recruitment of
units and individual officers.l'"
The relationship between chivalry and professionalism
Closely allied to a discussion of the role of patronage is a consideration of the
growth of professions and professionalism in the military. If men owed their preferment to
patronage, was there room for profession, expertise and promotion by merit? There has
been debate over what constituted a 'profession' in the early modem period and whether,
or to what extent, soldiers constituted a distinct, trained and therefore professional body.
Rosemary O'Day has discussed the three 'leamed' professions of priest, lawyer and
physician, which were relatively new as distinct groups having developed out of the
humanist philosophy driving the Renaissance and the Reformation.V'' While she does not
163Simon Adams, ed., Household Accounts and Disbursement Books of Robert Dudley. Earl of Leicester.
1558-1561. 1584-1586, Camden Fifth Series, Volume 6, Royal Historical Society (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), p.23.
164Trim, 'Fighting "Jacob's Wars"', p.l27.
165Ibid, p.129.
166lbid, p.137.
167Ibid, pp.261-2.
168Ibid, p.184, although this may have depended on whether or not the aristocrat's star was rising or falling.
1691bid,pp.269; 274.
170Rosemary O'Day, The Professions in Early Modem England. 1450-1800: Servants of the Commonweal
(Harlow: Longman, 2000).
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include soldiers in her discussion, she does identify characteristics that could be used in a
debate on military professionalism:
If a profession is defined as a body of people who offer a service to clients on the
basis of expertise; who ground their expertise and authority in a body of
theoretical knowledge as well as practical skill; who claim a monopoly; who
follow a code of ethics in performing their services; who have an internal
organisation which disciplines its members; and who have a large degree of
autonomy in their work, then this definition can usefully be ap~lied to the
professions we study, to highlight these features of their development.' }
Itmay be that other groups can be discerned using these criteria, such as schoolteachers,
which are added to O'Day's list (although she sees them as not fully-fledged).}72
A number of historians have recently discussed to what extent the soldier identified
as a professional. Ian Roy noted the difficulty in categorisation, and stated that many of
the qualifying criteria that applied to doctors and lawyers did not apply to soldiers and
sailors. However, he maintained that there were other considerations that set military
officers apart and identified them as a distinct body. These included the consequences of
failure, which could be fatal and which no other profession attracted, as well as the special
place a soldier traditionally held in relation to the monarch. This 'warrior class' of
aristocracy and landed gentry 'were distinguished above all by their actual or potential
leadership in war, at the side of the King'. Although this feudal arrangement had decayed
by the reign of Henry VIII, the code of chivalry and its accompanying rules of honour
continued to regulate the behaviour of the landed elite. By the later sixteenth century the
long period of peace and cautious financial management in government, added to the
changing face and growing complexity of warfare, resulted in a diminishing role for the
amateur whose claims to command were based on a combination of high birth and
tradition. Warfare had advanced from the 'art' of those skilled with horse and sword to the
'science' of emerging phenomena such as massed infantry and siege artillery, and those
decreasing numbers of the nobility who entered the military world sporadically in search of
honour found they were unqualified for the task. Roy sees the later Elizabethan period and
the expeditions of the 1620s as formative years in the progression of the English military,
through their European experiences fighting with or against the best soldiers of the age,
J7I Ibid. p.ll.
I72lbid. p.20; David Cressy, 'A Drudgery of Schoolmasters: the Teaching Profession inElizabethan and
Early Stuart England' inWilfrid Prest, ed., The Professions in Early Modern England (London, New York &
Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987).
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into a distinct occupational group, and to an extent this occurred through the development
of several attributes, which could include:
... its own status, derived from the competent exercise of its vocation - its function
- rather than its association with the landed elite, its own career structure, its own
internal regulation - 'the laws of war' - and some regard for itself as an honourable
calling - what might be called its esprit de corpS.173
Chivalry was the domain of the aristocratic element of English society, and this in
itself could be viewed as a threat to the Tudor 'civilising process'. Deborah Shuger argued
that the 'aristocratic warrior ethos', wherein violence was endemic, was atavistically
barbaric and at odds with the developing agrarian, peaceful and increasingly wealthy civil
society which was underpinned by a work ethos and the rule of law. Although she placed
the debate in Ireland, citing the works of Edmund Spenser (A View of the Present State of
Ireland (London, 1596» and Sir John Davies (A Discovery of the True Causes Why Ireland
Was Never Entirely Subdued (London, 1612», she believed 'the Irish tracts ... do not just
concern Ireland but implicitly offer a drastic critique of the whole aristocratic culture of
honor'.174 David Trim believes that early modem armies were driven by the dominant
ideology of Christian aristocratic chivalry. A number of historians have further analysed
the growth of professionalism across Europe and its relationship with chivalry.17s David
Trim believes earlier work to be important but out-dated;176he attempted to define what
'profession' meant and suggested criteria that, if met, would indicate an emerging
professional over an amateur or mercenary force. Roger Manning also engaged in this
debate, but argued a harder line that the chivalric ethos hindered the progression to
professionalism, stating 'the martialist's concept of honour had nothing to do with
Christian morality, and he cared not about military victory or defeat or the achievement of
stated military objectives' .177He continued this line in two later essays: in 2006 he made
the somewhat contradictory statement regarding the Dutch army:
173 Ian Roy, 'The Profession of Arms', in Prest, Professions in Early Modern England, pp. 183; 187.
174 Deborah Shuger, 'Irishmen, Aristocrats, and Other White Barbarians', Renaissance Quarterly, Vo1.50,
No.2, 1997, ppA94-525.
175 Trim, The Chivalric Ethos. pp.I-30.
176 R. Barber, The Knight and Chivalry, Second Edition (Woodbridge, Suffolk: 1995); M. Keen, Chivalry
(New Haven and London: 1984); M. Strickland, War and Chivalry: The Conduct and Perception of War in
England and Normandy 1066-1217 (Cambridge: 1996); M. Feld, 'Military Professionalism and the Mass
Army',Armed Forces and Society 1, (1975), no.I, pp.I9I-2I4; M. Feld, 'Middle-Class Society and the Rise
of Military Professionalism: The Dutch Army I589-1609',Armed Forces and Society 1, (1975), no.4,
fRAI9-42. . .
Roger B. Manning, Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), p.79.
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At the heart of these Maurician reforms were standards of professional competence
that reflected a system of merit under which officers and men were judged by
results rather than social status - although the officer corps remained aristocratic
and continued to be motivated by a chivalric ethos.178
In 2007 he argued that a revival of chivalric martial culture retarded acceptance of the
'military revolution' in British armies. The span of his discussion extends from the late
sixteenth century through to the beginning of the eighteenth, but is not presented in a
chronological order making it difficult to discern anyone period and its unique conditions
from another, or to gain any sense of progression or development.i"
One notable change to the historiography can be discerned. Later historians
expressed the view that itwas, in fact, largely the gentry, albeit often their younger scions,
who deployed on military operations rather than the indigent poor, so the social
composition of armies has been revised. The important issue of professionalism is the
essence of Chapter Two, with the emphasis on how the serving soldiers viewed their status
and compares that view with the modern debates of historians. Chapter Three draws
conclusions on the motivating factors that enabled the formation of military units and their
engagement with the enemy and how that may have affected professionalism.
The impact of printing
The introduction and progress of the printing press is well known,180although its
impact is often assumed rather than analysed.!" Printed books were initially restricted to
certain types of subject matter, often religious in nature, but by the end of the sixteenth
century the first printed news reports, precursors to the newspaper, were beginning to
circulate. The period of protracted European warfare witnessed a sharp increase in printed
178 Roger B. Manning, 'Prince Maurice's School of Wars: British Swordsmen and the Dutch', War &
Society, Vol. 25, No. I,May 2006, pp.l-19, quote p.2.
179 Roger B. Manning, 'Styles of Command in Seventeenth Century English Annies', The Journal of Military
History, Vol. 71, No.3, 2007, pp.671-699.
180 Frederick W. Hamilton, A Brief History of Printing in England: A Short History of Printing in England
from Caxton to the Present Time (Chicago: United Typothetea of America, 1918, General Books edition),
pp.4-12. Jeremy Black, The English Press 1621-1861 (Phoenix Mill: Sutton,2001). Elizabeth L.
Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983), which is an abridged and later version of The Printing Press as an Agent of Change:
Communications and cultural transformations in early-modern Europe, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979).
181 E" tei Pri . RI'isens em, rinting evo ution, p.3.
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material and largely fed the news reports. 182 The table below shows the volume of printed
military books of all categories and represents a synopsis of the data taken from
Appendices 1 to 4.
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* Appendix 4. Includes Dr. Watts' pamphlets of the 1630s, Appendix 1 Serial 144.
Table 2: Military Books up to 1642
To put these figures into perspective: as a rough guide to the total number of books
published in a year on all subjects, the Stationers' Company registered some 150 titles each
year throughout the period. As some of these were not printed while other titles were
printed but not registered, an educated guess has given an average of 200 a year between
1576 and 1640. Copies could run at between 1250 and 1500 per edition. Taking these
figures, during the peak decade for military book sales (1590s) a possible 96,000 copies
could have been produced and circulated.l'" This would indicate that a considerable
proportion of the reading public were interested and to an extent therefore educated in the
martial affairs of the period. Those able to read were a growing body as the printing press
fed its own demand by producing material that directly impacted on education and
therefore literacy rates, creating more potential customers for its products. Printed
manuals of instruction for teachers coupled with the Protestant ethic of education as 'a tool
of conversion' saw widespread investment in learning; one such manual by Edmund
182 • brid U' .J. Raymond, Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cam n ge niversrty
Press,2003). B. Dooley, and S. Baron, eds., The Politics of Information in Early Modern Europe (London
and New York: Routledge,2001).
183 David Cressy, Literature and the Social Order: Reading and writing in Tudor and Stuart England
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.47. Rosemary O'Day, Education and Society 1500-
1800: The socia/foundations of education in early modern Britain (London and New York: Longman,
1982), p.67.
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Coote, The English Schoolmaster, went through twenty-six editions between 1596 and
1656, with a final edition as late as 1704.184
Much initial public interest in Europe's wars would have been gratified through the
availability of printed news, a development not restricted to England as Peter Wilson noted
the production and distribution of the first newspapers in the Empire from 1608.185David
Randall dated 1620 as the first surviving English language newspaper (coranto), although
the first generation of 'mass' printed news dates from the 1570s, by no coincidence the
time of the informal entry of British soldiers into the war with Spain in the Netherlands.
Randall considered the difficulty of authentication and credibility in news reports. He
looked at 'the rhetoric of the news' and the way the news was written, read and
transformed as standards of credibility developed, and observed the existence of the
specific sub-genre of military news. He categorised the transmission of news in one of
four mediums: oral, ritual ('conveyance ... by sign or action'), written and printed, and
noted the impact of the evolution of printed military reports in English. By the late
Elizabethan and early Stuart period 'the printing of hundreds of copies of a single report
year by year replaced the traditional condition of news scarcity with a condition of news
plenitude,.186 Randall also expressed the view that, given the comparatively limited
numbers of Englishmen serving in armies, much of the experience of warfare came to
England 'filtered through texts', and that the new genre of 'news report' conveyed a great
deal of the information. Much of the news was foreign, translated and marketed by 'a
thoroughly "amphibious" class of men' out for profit, so generally it lacked a pronounced
domestic political edge. Rather than politics, it was 'the era's endemic providentialism'
that served both profit-minded publishers and anti-Catholics, both of whom were looking
for a large audience, and this formed the root of his argument, although the use of 'fortune'
and 'providence' as turns of phrase was also considered.187 What can be drawn from this
when placed in the context of British soldiers fighting abroad, is that material about those
soldiers was in huge demand and so it follows that reports written by them (see comments
on Sir Roger Williams' Newes in Chapter One) and their accounts of their campaigns
would also have been potentially in great demand. News reports from the Elizabethan era
184 O'Day, Education, pp.43; 46-7.
185 P wu• 1 SOn, The Thirty Years War, pp. 824-7.
186 David Randall, Credibility in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Military News (London: Pickering and
Chatto, 2008), pp. 1-19; 85; 87.
187 David Randall, 'Providence, Fortune, and the Experience of Combat: English Printed Battlefield Reports,
circa 1570-1637', Sixteenth Century Journal, XXXV/4, 2004, pp.l053-1077.
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can be seen in Appendix 1,188 while Appendix 4 captures many of the corantos of the
Thirty Years' War.
Barbara Donagan challenged the view that the contemporary emphasis of peace in
England against the ravages of war-tom Europe made England a military backwater. She
argued that, in fact, the English, through the experience of a 'significant body' of soldiers
and the production of a literature of war, were indeed prepared for war when it arrived in
1642. Through the consumption of' accounts of travel, military narratives, atrocity stories,
training manuals, lives and precepts of great soldiers', both printed works and manuscripts,
supplemented by 'private' and 'regular newsletters', topical printed sermons and soldiers'
printed memoirs, all informed a nation eager to consume such material. The preparation of
men for war owed 'as much to the written word' as any practical training.!" and this thesis
analyses the written word of soldiers as part of the contribution to that preparation.
David Eltis claimed that sixteenth-century printed works had a profound impact on
the 'military revolution', 190 and this contrasts with the view of James Raymond who
believed in the efficacy of manuscript for the spread of military professional
development.l'" David Lawrence has considered these two contrasting views, and to him
the point remains moot."? However printed material was subject to a higher level of
scrutiny than manuscript works, and what was sanctioned to roll off the presses for general
consumption and what was disallowed by a vigilant, active government in the name of
social order has been subject to some analysis.193 Annabel Patterson contends that it was
the interpretation of texts rather than the raw subject matter that was central to censorship,
a changing code that allowed or disallowed material. How that code developed was a two-
way street between government and authors, who discussed its boundaries and application.
'Complex pysches' balanced state-censorship and self-censorship to produce works where
the intention was so deeply encoded as to be veiled, with authors often building an
188 See, for instance, Serials 4; 6; 7; 8.
189 Barbara Donagan, 'Halcyon Days and the Literature of War: England's Military Education before 1642',
Past and Present, No. 147, 1995, pp.65-100. See also her War in England 1642-1649 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), Chapter 3, 'Military Educations', pp.33-61.
190 Eltis, Military Revolution, pp.137-9.
191 Raymond, Henry VIII's Military Revolution, p.3.
192 Lawrence, 'Reappraising the Elizabethan and Early Stuart Soldier', p.17.
193 F.S. Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England. 1476-1776 (Urbana, 1952); Charles Gillett, Burned Books:
Neglected Chapters in British History and Literature, 2 vols. (New York, 1932); Lawrence Hanson.
Government and the Press, J 695-1763 (London, 1936); Donald Thomas, A Long Time Burning: The History
of Literary Censorship in England (London, 1969); Leona Rostenberg, The Minority Press and the English
Crown: A Study in Repression, 1558-1625 (Niewkoop, 1971).
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ambiguity into texts that subsequent readers interpreted after their own fashion (and
Sidney's Arcadia, or at least Greville's interpretation of it, is used as an example of
thiS).194
Research questions and method
The early-modem soldier from the British Isles fought out the religious and
political issues of his age through proxy war in foreign lands, sometimes with and
sometimes without his government's sanction. The experience of such soldiers has to be
seen in the context of several factors. Firstly the extensive, logistically complicated and
expensive warfare in which he was involved. This drove the sharp increase in the number
of printed works reflecting the growing thirst for information regarding military matters.
Other factors such as inflation, population growth, and a patronage system vying with the
novelty of an increasingly professional military establishment added to the mix, along with
apocalypticism and an underlying eschatology.
It is the printed literature produced by soldiers who fought during this extended
period that provides the heart of this thesis and defines the period. That period extends
from the print explosion concurrent with the English deployments to the Netherlands until
the start of the English Civil War. Manuscript documents continued to be produced during
this period, but for limited distribution among those who could afford them compared to
the mass-production of cheap, printed information that rolled off the presses.!" Printed
information was viewed by far more people, it informed a wider cross-section of society,
and it did so relatively quickly. Itwas more reliable than word of mouth, in that it held a
consistent line that was not mutable through its onward transmission; the integrity of the
information may have lacked a thorough verification process, but this did not weaken
demand.
One of the core questions posed in the thesis is: what are the methodological
problems involved in using soldier's published writings? The other is: when taken from
194 Annabel Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation: The Conditions of Writing and Reading in Early
Modern England (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), pp. 3-43.
195 Harold Love, Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993); H.R. Woudhuysen, Sir Philip Sidney and the Circulation of Manuscripts 1558-1640 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996).
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soldiers' printed accounts and manuals what is the view of the period's military
development? Supplementary questions include: is it a consistent view over the period
and between the various accounts? How much of soldiers' commentary has been taken,
ignored or manipulated since publication? How was it received by contemporaries? How
have historians balanced these works with state documents and official correspondence? Is
the picture different when seen through their printed material when compared to other
sources?
Here the works of historians and their sources have been considered, preparatory to
an analysis of the printed works produced by soldiers and a consideration of what gaps are
left in, or possible distortions made to, current historiography. The overall method has
been to educe certain themes through which to consider the mentality of the soldier: his
religion, his economic position, his political stance, his loyalty and concept of honour, his
motivation to fight (generally a selection of one, or combination of several of the previous
factors), his thoughts on 'Britain', Europe and general world-view; his experience of war
and how this effected his attitudes. An attempt is made to show how the results of this
detailed analysis help to modify the existing historiographical debates.
The historiography of the period to date is largely based on state papers,
correspondence between key personalities, and other manuscript sources. A top-down
approach has been adopted. The works of the soldiers themselves form only a small
portion of the evidence, sporadically drawn upon by cautious historians aware of the
potential SUbjectivity and inaccuracies of personal reports, even though as this thesis
argues there were many works published containing myriad detail.
There are few historians who have taken a bottom-up perspective. In.2002 Geoff
Mortimer adopted a particular method for his re-assessment of the Thirty Years' War. He
analysed personal accounts from a range of occupations. He included only two soldiers,
one of whom was Robert Monro, and his main thrust was to consider the validity and
worth of the documents studied. Having weighed the balance between Monro's
'romanticism' and his attempt to 'keep close to the facts' he concluded Monro probably
wrote the 'unvarnished truth'. 196 Bernhard R. Kroener looked at the living conditions of
196 GeoffMortirner, Eyewitness Accounts of the Thirty Years War 1618-48 (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2002), p.163.
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soldiers in the Thirty Years' War, but he did so entirely through the works of other
historians.l'"
This thesis argues that soldiers' own experience of warfare is both a valid subject in
its own right and an important contribution to the historian's knowledge of other issues.
While some historians have employed soldiers' printed and manuscript writings, they have
generally done so in the service of a history of central administration, policy making or
strategy. The genre of soldiers' published writings is explored in detail in the chapters that
follow. The various types of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century publication are discussed
in Chapter One, and these are the core sources for the thesis. Appendices 1 to 4 contain
tabular lists of the various soldiers' writings, the data that created Table 2 above, showing
the rise in printed works as the art of war developed and reflecting growing public interest
in military affairs. Each chapter reflects upon how the research helps to elucidate or
modify conclusions reached by historians thus far. Over and above that, the chapters
consider how far these printed works can be used as a way into the experience of the early
modem soldier.
197 Bernhard R. Kroener, "'The Soldiers are Very Poor, Bare, Naked, Exhausted": The Living Conditions
and Organisational Structure of Military Society During the Thirty Years' War', Bussman and Schilling,
1648, pp.285-291.
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Chapter One
The published works of soldiers
Introduction
This chapter surveys and analyses the works of a military nature published, in the
main, by men who served in the conflicts of the period. However, not all authors of military
works were soldiers, and there is an intellect versus experience aspect that will be investigated
here. I The chapter will review the literary conventions of the period, the typology and
traditions of military writing, as well as the rhetorical devices employed. It will consider the
genres inwhich the works can be categorised, the target audience, the reasons why the soldiers
sought publication, to whom the works were dedicated and why, and the accuracy and
reliability of the subject matter. It will also discuss the methodological problems facing the
historian attempting to answer these questions.
Historians have already investigated military works of the period but they have done so
in order to expose and explore their didactic function. Several publications were textbooks.i
which attempted to bridge the training gap that existed prior to the creation of formal military
academies.' In 1900 Maurice lD. Cockle published, in chronological order, a list of printed
military books produced up until 1642.4 His list of English publications forms the core (but
not the entirety) of the tables at Appendices I to 3, which show the increase in military
publications from the 1570s until the onset of the English Civil War. The graph in Chapter
One draws its data from these appendices and shows the number of printed works that were
1 'Elizabethans were ... familiar with the controversy between the book-soldier and the soldier who obtained his
knowledge of warfare through experience'; Henry J. Webb, 'The Military Background in Othello', Philological
Quarterly, 30 (1951), p.47.
2 For example Robert Barret addressed all 'gallant minded young gentlemen' for whose 'instructions have these
discourses bene principally penned'; Robert Barret, The Theorike and Practike of Moderne Warres (London,
1598).
3 'Education abroad had religious and political dangers, but a number of English experiments with academies on
the French model. ..were made from Elizabeth I's reign onwards. In 1635 the Museum Minervae was established
under royal patronage by Sir Francis Kynaston The Museum's curriculum reflected the need for scientific as
well as classical studies and its course included military studies ...The fortunes of the Museum declined with
those of its royal patron'; 'Private Education from the Sixteenth Century: Developments from the 16th to the early
19th century', in J.S Cockburn, H.P.F. King and K.O.T. MacDonnell, eds., A History of the County of Middlesex:
Volume 1:Physique, Archaeology, Domesday, Ecclesiastical Organization, The Jews, Religious Houses,
Education of Working Classes to 1870, Private Educationfrom Sixteenth Century (London: Oxford University
Press, 1969), pp. 241-255.
4 Maurice J.D. Cockle, A Bibliography of English Military Books up to 1642 and of Contemporary Foreign
Works (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, 1900 - General Books edition).
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produced in the decades up to and including 1642, reflecting at a glance the increased public
interest in military affairs as the European wars impacted on the psyche of the population.
Henry J. Webb discussed a number of printed military works in his publication of
1965, S drawing attention to the influence of Frontinus," Onosander," Vegetius" and, discussed
below, Caesar, as the authority of classical antiquity permeated early modem military
thought. 9 Foreign authors such as Machiavelli," Porcia, 11 and Fourquevaux," were also
translated into English, and several English writers drew on classical or contemporary foreign
works without necessarily declaring their source; a table of foreign translations is shown at
Appendix 2. Directly and indirectly, the English art of war during this period developed out of
foreign commentary, coupled with the experience gained by British soldiers earned for the
most part in foreign armies. The exception to this was Ireland, a theatre of war that retained
its own characteristics and was largely free of foreign influence." Webb considered the
works of Thomas Digges, Barnaby Rich, Sir John Smythe and Thomas Styward, all advocates
to some extent of the Graeco-Roman model. He also considered those who held a more
modem view such as William Garrard (with Robert Hitchcock), Sir Roger Williams and
Humfrey Barwick. Webb also examined the works of Matthew Sutcliffe, Robert Barret and
Giles Clayton, and the growing expertise in artillery through the work of Thomas Smith and
William Bourne. He analysed the structure and weapons of both the infantry and the cavalry,
and devoted a chapter to military medicine and surgery through the works of William Clowes,
George Baker and Thomas Gale. His emphasis, though, was on the didactic aspects of these
works and the debates the authors engaged in; the experience of warfare was not his focus, and
he breaks off at the death of Elizabeth.
5 Henry J. Webb, Elizabethan Military Science: TheBooks and the Practice (Madison, Milwaukee and London:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1965).
6 Sextus Julius Frontinus, The Strategemes, Sleyghtes, andpolicies ofwarre, trans. Richard Morrison (London,
1539).
7 Onosandro Platonico, Of the Generall Captaine, and of his office, trans. Peter Whitehome (London, 1563).
8 Flavius Vegetius, TheFoure bookes of Flavius VegetiusRanatus, briejlye contayninge aplaine forme, and
perfect knowledge of Martialpolicye.feates of Chivalrie, and whateverpertayneth to warre, trans. John Sadler
(London?, 1572). See also Henry J. Webb, 'The Elizabethan Translation ofVegitius' De Re Militari', Modern
Language Notes, Vol. 56, No.6, December 1941, pp.605-6.
9 Webb, Military Science, p.6.
10 Niccolo Macchiavelli, TheArte ofwarre, trans. Peter Whitehome (London, 1560).
11 Count Giacomo Porcia, Thepreceptes ofwarre, trans. Peter Betham (London, 1544).
12 Raimond de Beccarie de Pavie, Sieur de Fourquevaux, Instructions/or the warres, trans. Paul Ive (London,
1589).
13 There were two exceptional incursions by the Spanish at Smerwick (1579) and Kinsale (1601). For the
characteristics ofIrish warfare see Introduction, p.6, n3.
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The period and purpose of this thesis are different. The chronology extends into the
seventeenth century and the thesis gauges the changes and consistencies in the experience of
warfare as well as how military philosophy developed. A list of authors with their primary
and, where applicable, secondary occupations is shown at Appendix 1.
This chapter will consider narratives of participants' experience and manuals produced
for the guidance of others, focussing on accounts that describe personal experience and which
reflect the views held by individuals. This is in marked contrast to those modern historians
who have largely invested in state papers and correspondence to assess the events of the
period. The work of historians who have specifically and deliberately targeted written
narratives, such as 1.X. Evans, William S. Brockington, Jr and A.T.S. Goodrick, has been
helpful." Their work is evaluated in more detail below.
The continuing relevance of manuscript during the print revolution
Scholars have shown that printed works have to be set in the context of continuing
manuscript circulation. Despite the boom in printing, the production and circulation of
manuscripts continued throughout the period, and efforts have been made to identify and
collate the works produced. IS Manuscript newsletters continued to be written, in tandem with
the printed corantot" and a discrete business of 'scribal publication' formed around their
production that may have seen the distribution of several hundred copies from a single
manuscript. 17 Also in considerable demand were short political texts such as speeches or
'discourses' by prominent individuals. These were known as 'separates', contemporarily
referred to as 'pocket manuscripts' (collections of which became 'compilations'), and were
also produced and distributed in large quantities.l" While 'unscrupulous scriveners' could
14 J.X. Evans, ed., The Works of Sir Roger Williams (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972); William S. Brockington, Jr,
ed., Monro. His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment called Mac-Keys (Westport, Connecticut and
London: Preager, 1999); A.T.S. Goodrick, ed., The Relation ofSydenham Poyntz (London: Royal Historical
Society, 1908).
IS Peter Beal, Index of English literary manuscripts, i: 1450-1625 (London, 1980); Index of English literary
manuscripts. ii: 1625-1700 (London, 1987-93).
16 These are listed at Appendix 4. That many show the Elector Palatine's coat of arms on the title page would
indicate they reflected 'partisan political opinion'; The Politics of Information in Early Modern Europe, ed. by
Brendan Dooley and Sabrina A. Baron (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p.18.
17 Harold Love, Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),
pp.v; 11.
181bid, p.13.
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exploit this demand by quickly producing their own inaccurate and hastily penned versions for
a quick financial return, nevertheless the authors themselves would often be involved, directly
or through an agent, in the circulation of their own speeches." Other prose and poetical
works across the spectrum of early modem writing were found in manuscript form. Thus it is
clear a 'manuscript culture' existed alongside the expanding print culture,20 so therefore
differences between the two must have kept the former in healthy business (until well past
beyond the window of this thesis) despite the visible success of the latter. It is probable that a
major factor in the survival of manuscript was that it could contain information that would be
unwise to declare in print, so an air of secretiveness accompanied the manuscript transmission
of news." There was also immediacy to manuscript production that placed it at an
advantage over print. 22 Even though the system implied a smaller distribution when compared
to print, a newsletter writer could build a network of subscribers who would pay to receive the
information they had gathered, and if the clientele base grew large enough (and it may have
risen to several hundred) additional clerks would be employed to keep pace with demand.23
Production of copies of an original manuscript could be considered 'publication' as
this is a potentially separate and different process to 'printing'. 'Publication' as defined by
Love is 'the movement from a private realm of creativity to the public realm of consumption',
and can be achieved by means other than printing, such as the performance of a play.24
Therefore manuscript texts that had passed through the deliberate process of copying and
distribution in order to supply a demand, rather than manuscripts that had been edited in
preparation for printing or held deliberately on restricted distribution for private consumption,
could also be considered 'published'. Contemporary speech acknowledged this, for example
the Earl of Essex claimed of his Apology that he had not 'published either in print or in
writing,.25 As previously noted, it may have been that manuscript was chosen over print
specifically because its distribution could be controlled (although it could, of course, be copied
19 Ibid, p.lS.
20 H.R. Woudhuysen, Sir Philip Sidney and the Circulation of Manuscripts 1558-1640 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), p.3.
21 Woudhuysen, Sir Philip Sidney, p.12. 'For in a letter [writers] might be bolder than they durst in print', Duke
of Newcastle to Charles I, quoted in Sabrina A. Baron, 'The guises of dissemination in early seventeenth-century
England: News inmanuscript and print', in Dooley and Baron, The Politics of Information, p.42.
22 Several reasons for the retention of manuscripts over print are presented by Woudhuysen, Sir Philip Sidney,
gp.3S7/S.
3 Love, Scribal Publication, p.10/11.
24 Ibid, p.36.
2~ Woudhuysen, Sir Philip Sidney, p.IS.
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and re-distributed without the author's permission or knowledge). Likewise, a manuscript
could be considered 'unpublished' if it was deliberately retained within a tightly specified
circle, perhaps because the material was contentious or because it was kept within a family.26
Studies show the wide ranging subject area that manuscript production and distribution
covered." and it is only to be expected that, as soldiers contributed to the expanding print
culture, so they would be found circulating manuscript material. Tracing the history of the
relationship between manuscript and print publication of particular soldiers' texts is certainly
relevant to this thesis. Sir Francis Vere's memoirs were not printed until 1657, forty eight
years after his death, and were accompanied by comment from other contributors: Sir John
Ogle,28 Henry Hexham'", Sir Robert Naunton and the editor, William Dillingham. Additional
comment was included from Sir Clement Edmondes." These contributions made the
publication a work about Vere that incorporated his memoirs, rather than Vere's memoirs per
se.31 How relevant the printed work was to the reading public in 1657 is outside the scope of
this thesis. What is relevant is that the memoir clearly had circulated widely in manuscript
form. According to Love's paradigm it had been 'published', in that the author had lost
control over its onward distribution. It was transferred from the private to the public domain
while in manuscript form. It was then posthumously printed as part of a compilation by a later
editor, the Cambridge academic William Dillingham. Dillingham was only loosely connected,
if at all, with the original circle of distribution: he describes himself as the friend of the
dedicatee Horace Townshend, great nephew of Vere.32 The parliamentarian general Philip
Skippon,33 who had served under Vere's brother Horace, had a copy of the manuscript, as did
members ofVere's extended family." It may have been that Vere intended publication but
for his premature death; the truth of that will never be known, but the fact remains that the
26 Love, Scribal Publication, pp.39; 43. Love gives the example of Donne's Biathanatos, a treatise on suicide,
and Dudley North's poems copied by his widow for her children.
27 Wallace Notestein and Frances Relf, Commons debates for J 629 (Minneapolis, 1921) looked at political
separates and newsletters; Love studied parliamentary proceedings, verse miscellanies, plays and poetry;
Woudhuysen was interested in Sidney the poet rather than Sidney the soldier.
28 Vere's second in command.
29 Vere' s page.
30 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (henceforward ODNB): Sir Clement Edmondes was with Vere at
Nieuwpoort, his family had connections with the Veres and he had dedicated his translation of Caesar's
Commentaries of 1600 to Vere.
31 William Dillingham, ed., The Commentaries of Sir Francis Vere (Cambridge, 1657).
32 Ibid, 'The Epistle Dedicatory.'
33 ODNB: Philip Skippon.
34 ODNB: Sir Francis Vere.
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memoir reached an audience that could be considered the 'selective' distribution of the
'manuscript culture'. Some of the contributors' comment also circulated in manuscript: Sir
Robert Naunton's Fragmenta Regalia was completed in 1634,35 one year before the author's
death, and was distributed in manuscript but not published until 1641.36 On the other hand
Ogle, who died one year prior to publication of The Commentaries, nevertheless appears to
have written his piece especially for Dillingham." Hexham may possibly have done so too, as
his account of the siege of Ostend does not feature elsewhere although he was dead by 1650.38
It is therefore important to note that while the information contained within the Dillingham
work was produced by contemporaries, three of whom were eye witnesses to key events, and
is of significant interest to a study of early modem military narratives, only parts of it could
have influenced contemporaries, and only those on the limited manuscript distribution.
Manuscript pieces were then 'compiled' into a printed edition decades later." Dillingham's
manuscript research is a reflection of the mechanism of manuscript culture. D.J.B. Trim's
biography of Vere states that Dillingham originally saw a copy 'in the possession of Philip
Skippon," but this is not entirely accurate. Dillingham saw 'a copy of it in a library of a
friend, which had either been transcribed from, or at least compared with another in the
owning and possession of Major-General Skippon'. Dillingham, having found 'some
imperfections and doubtful places' in that copy, then looked for other copies, believing it
'improbable that they would all stumble at the same stone'. That is, he looked to compare
several copies to seek out errors in transcription. He compared his copy with the copies of the
Earl of Westmorland and Lord Fairfax, and fmally brought into his possession the original,
borrowed from its owner the Earl of Clare." Thus the distribution of manuscript: an original,
copied (but with each copy unique) and distributed to a tightly restricted network, further
copied with additional transcription errors to create a secondary level of distribution
presumably without original authority.42 Dillinghamprinted the work as he believed that, as a
35 ODNB: Sir Robert Naunton.
36 Sir Robert Naunton, Fragmenta Regalia, or Observations on the late Queen Elizabeth, Her Times and Favorits
(London, 1641).
37 ODNB: Sir John Ogle.
38 ODNB: Henry Hexham,
39 For a similar occurrence see Love's analysis of Note stein and Relph's work on parliamentary printed material
taken from available manuscript works in 1629 in Love, Scribal Publication, p.16.
40 ODNB, s.n. Vere.
41 Dillingham, Commentaries, 'To the ingenuous Reader.'
42 It is worth noting that not all printed copies were the same either, and Anna Simoni makes this point. Anna
E.C. Simoni, 'A Present for a Prince', in J.A. van Dorsten, ed., Ten Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations (Leiden:
Leiden University Press, 1974), p.55.
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manuscript, it was 'concealed in obscurity'." The compilation that Dillingham published in
print portrayed an image that the original close circle of recipients and their descendants
would have approved.t' even though it has produced critical debate since."
Another source document for this thesis that was not printed during the lifetime of its
author is the memoir of Sydenham Poyntz. This was published only in 1908, following the
discovery of the original manuscript in the Paris Bibliotheque Nationale written in Poyntz's
handwriting.t" Poyntz's account of his experience of war in Europe, his Relation, was
apparently not intended for publication. He maintained that he wrote it because it was 'desired
by many of my frends', although this was a trope of the period and standard practice." This
internal evidence suggests a degree of sincerity regarding the subject matter. If he had
intended to embroider the facts he would perhaps have presented a far more impressive picture
of himself than he has done. These factors seem to imply legitimacy, and his comments
regarding his conversion to Catholicism, problematic material that was to plague him later in
life, would appear to support that view. However, although we can discount fmancial or
political gain as motives for writing, his account is nevertheless rambling and at times
factually unreliable, and drifts from a disjointed, subjective and inaccurate account of the
decisions of princes and generals to action on the ground in the first person. As Goodrick, the
editor of the Relation observes, 'at Breitenfeld, Liltzen and Nordlingen, he is an
unimpeachable authority', and that 'wherever Poyntz was an eyewitness... he is an authority,
and a professional authority'. 48 By the time he became a Parliamentarian general he had
dismissed any thoughts of Catholicism, presenting himself as 'an Elder of the Dutch church'
and 'constant...in the Reformed Protestant Religion.'49 While this may have been true at that
time, clearly it had not always been the case, as he had stated in his memoir somewhat
unequivocally:
43 Dillingham, Commentaries, 'To the ingenuous Reader.'
44 Woudhuysen, Sir Philip Sidney, p.386.
4S Tracy Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands, 1589-1603: A re-evaluation of his career as Sergeant
Major General of Elizabeth I's troops', PhD thesis, University of Hull, 1997.
46 Goodrick, Relation, p.43.
47 Ibid, pA5. Autobiographical publication was generally deplored rather than admired. Exceptionally it was
acceptable for soldiers to publish, but they still felt obliged to state a reason for writing, see for example Robert
Monro below (note 87) and Barnaby Rich, who wrote 'at the request of some of my dearest friends' in his
Farewell to Militarie Profession (London, 1574), 'To the Readers in generall',
48 Goodrick, Relation, pp.5; 7.
49 Sydenham Poyntz, The Vindication Of Colonel General Poyntz (London, 1646).
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At length they [a party that included a Franciscan friar] broke with mee which was the
true Religion, which they proved to be no other, than that which is commonly called
Papistry and their reasons were so strong joyned with such wonderfull humility and
charity towards mee, that I could not chose but admit of it and follow their advise
therein which was to bee made a member of that holy Church and wherein Gods grace
I mean to dy ... so
Poyntz's high rank in the Parliamentary army suggests that his work was not widely
distributed in manuscript form. It is more probable that the memoir had at most very limited
distribution, and that, as he says in his Vindication, the reason suspicion was cast upon him
was 'because I served the Emperour against the Duke of Saxony' .SI Indeed, works composed
in manuscript could allow an author to wriggle free of awkward implications whereas the
more permanent medium of a printed account could be far more difficult to shrug off. Love
says of Andrew Marvell that he was able to dismiss accounts of his Cromwellian past because
certain works remained only in manuscript.Y Poyntz's Relation features as a source for this
thesis where the experience of soldiers involved in combat is relevant, such as Chapter Five,
but it clearly has to be disregarded as a contemporary influence.
The use of narrative from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
Historians have tended to be dismissive of the worth of contemporary narratives, not
least due to the frailties of human memory, but in fact they can be made to yield much that is
of value. Simon Adams has stated that 'literary sources and contemporary narratives' are
'notoriously inaccurate'. S3 Geoffrey Parker, exposing a falsehood of Grimmelshausen, warns
against using prose works as historical evidence, while Fritz Redlich uses such works with the
caveat that they are useful when used 'appropriately', and considers Grimmelshausen to be of
'the highest value' as 'our most reliable contemporary witness,.s4 The need to keep
information in context is true of other forms of written primary source material: letters are
SO Goodrick, Relation, p.S4.
S) Poyntz, Vindication.
S2 Love, Scribal Publication, p.63,
S3 Simon Adams, 'Tactics or Politics? "The Military Revolution" and the Habsburg Hegemony, 1525-1648', in
John A. Lynn, ed., Tools of War: Instruments, Ideas and Institutions of Warfare, 1445-1871 (Urbana & Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1990), pp.30; 48, nl l. The inaccuracy can be interesting in itself, as it could suggest
the absence of clear lines of communication within the army.
S4 Geoffrey Parker, Europe in Crisis 1598-1648 (London: Fontana, 1979), pp.336-7, although Parker uses
Grimmelshausen in his essay 'The Soldier', in Rosario Villari, ed., Baroque Personae (University of Chicago
Press, 1995), p.40; Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and his Work Force: A Study in European
Economic and Social History (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964-5), pp.l46-7, 359.
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often written with a particular aim in mind that can exaggerate or minimise any given
scenario, and when Geoffrey Hudson reviews the petitions of ex-servicemen he warns that
they must be read 'to a certain extent, as a form of fiction' .ss In effect this all amounts to the
same thing: contemporary comment has to be used advisedly, even sceptically, but it has
considerable value when properly and carefully used and interpreted and placed in context.
Such works belong to different categories and raise different issues. Grimmelshausen may
have borrowed Sir Philip Sidney's description of the battle of Wittstock without citing the
appropriate reference, but Sidney had experience of warfare, and the carnage of one battle is
probably not dissimilar to another but for the matter of scale. Simplicissimus is, after all, a
novel, declared by the author as such, albeit replete with the author'S, and apparently others',
life experiences.S6 The problem for the historian in such cases will always be that of
disentangling fact from fiction. The veracity of more traditional sources such as state papers
and official reports could also be questionable; letters may not reveal a great deal.57 What of
soldiers who claimed to write, not out of their imagination and in order to impress an audience
through neat prose, but through their own accountable experience? Are their memoirs true
reflections of the actions, the courage and the toil (perhaps the avarice and debauchery) of the
soldiers? Sir Roger Williams commented: 'it is a shame for a souldier to write lesse than
truth'. 58 Williams' editor believed that soldiers were more reliable than other commentators,
remarking that when evidence is conflicting 'as a rule we should look to the soldier - to the
man of action, who is on the spot'. 59 Vere carried the visible wounds of many close
encounters and the testimony of other eye witnesses to support his narrative, as did Williams
and Monro. In Poyntz's memoir the sacrifice of accuracy in terms of time and place can be
accepted when in its stead are found reflections of the experience of early modem combat.60
ss Geoffrey L.Hudson, 'Ex-serviceman's Own Stories in Early Modem England', in Roberta Bivins and John V.
Pickstone, eds., Medicine. Madness and Social History: Essays in Honour of Roy Porter (Basingstoke and New
York: Pal grave Macmillan, 2007), p.l 06.
S6 Johann Grimmelshausen, The Adventures of Simplicius Simplicissimus (1668), trans. by Mike Mitchell
(Sawtry: Dedalus, 1999), pp.176-7.
S7 'The amount of valuable information found [in more than 500 letters written by Scottish soldiers] proved
extremely disappointing', James A. Fallon, 'Scottish Mercenaries and in the Service of Denmark and Sweden
1626-1632', PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 1973, p.21.
S8 Sir Roger Williams, The Actions of the Low Countries (London, 1618), p.80.
59 Goodrick, Relation, p.5.
60 While Adriana McCrea found Greville's Life of Sidney in part a subjective glorification of Sidney and others,
she states •... when Greville describes various episodes involving Sidney but witnessed by him ... the drama of
those moments is captured, the past comes alive ... ', Adriana McCrea, 'Whose Life Is It, Anyway? Subject and
Subjection in Fulke Greville's Life of Sidney', in Thomas F. Mayer and D.R. Woods, eds., The Rhetorics of Life-
Writing in Early Modern Europe: Forms of Biography from Cassandre Fidele to Louis XIV (University of
Michigan, 1995), p.307.
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State documents rarely expose the historian to the grim reality of battle, probably because
there was little call for such detail in the corridors of power. To a public thirsting for news the
experience of war was no doubt of compelling interest, even if the finer detail may have been
subject to unverifiable sources and guesswork, as shown in the following section.
Authority and legitimacy
Historians need to establish the authoritativeness and accuracy of soldiers' writings. A
number of problems have to be faced. One major drawback to relying on personal accounts is
that, in a largely illiterate society, only a small proportion of the soldiery was able to write so
the pool of opinion is shallow. Contemporary reference to the common people, the rank and
file, is usually identified by use of the plural, for instance the 'German mercenaries' who were
considered unreliable, or 'silly simple Italians'." These are collectives for a nation and a
military group, whereas to describe an individual as a 'soldier' is to immediately give him, and
the profession, a status: a person below the owning class would not require an individual
identity.62 Even if a lowborn private soldier had been educated in his village and was literate,
a situation that was entirely plausible if not particularly common, there would have been no
market for his view. Therefore all the accounts were produced by those who were, or who had
claimed to have been born into, the social position of 'gentleman' and could therefore be seen
as authoritative/" So these authors, in the act of publication, claimed both authority and
legitimacy.
Having a pedigree and an undisputed status would enhance the credibility of an author
still further. Of the main authors studied, at least four of them knew or claimed to know the
princes for whom they fought. Robert Monro related at least two occasions where he
61 Robert Monro, Monro His Expedition With The Worthy Scots Regiment (Called Mac-Keyes Regiment) levied in
August 1626 (London, 1637), II, p.IS.
62 Monro 'rarely mentions anyone from the lower classes by name, finding the Scottish rank and file to be
"resolute and stout" of heart but unworthy of being cited as individuals;' Brockington, Monro, p.xxi.
63 There is considerable debate concerning who was and who was not a member of the gentry. The ME defmition
ofa gentleman was 'someone of noble birth', by the late sixteenth century it referred to an individual whose
wealth freed him from labour (OED). According to an MP from 1624, 'He that hath no property in his goods is
not free', and references to liberty and freedom in this period should be considered with that in mind; Christopher
Hill, The Century of Revolution (London: Routledge, 1980), p.38. Oliver Cromwell was born into a prominent
family but for a period dropped below the status of Yeoman, defined as: 'A man holding a small landed estate; a
freeholder below the rank. of gentleman' (OED). Peter Gaunt, Oliver Cromwell (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p.34.
Martyn Bennett, Oliver Cromwell (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2006), p.4. According to his biographer
Thomas Churchyard 'claims to have been a gentleman but there is no evidence of this': ODNB.
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disagreed with King Gustavus Adolphus during personal conversations with him, and
remarked that the King shared his quarters at Bemau and hosted him warmly 'houlding his
Arme over my shoulder' in Halle.64 Sydenham Poyntz tells us that Elector John George of
Saxony knew him well enough to have a nick-name for him,65 Sir Francis Vere was personally
well known to both Queen Elizabeth and Prince Maurice,66 and Sir Roger Williams was also
personally well known to the Queen and became a personal favourite of William the Silent
and was with him at his assassination." It is possible that Henry Hexham was personally
known by Prince Maurice and Prince Frederick-Henry. Vere and Williams were known
outside their immediate circle, famous in their own right and, by the time they retired, wealthy
men. Poyntz and Monro, despite their professional expertise that enabled them to claim high-
ranking appointments on return to the British Isles, struggled amid the fortunes of civil war to
make a name (or at least a good one) or a living. Hexham stayed within his comfort zone with
the Dutch, although his ability to articulate his experiences was rewarded with the publication
of more works than any other soldier.
Despite the advantages of literacy and the connections that many senior officers had in
their homeland, even if the majority of military leaders could write,68 it would appear that few
did so. Our archive of personal accounts is tiny when compared to the number of men who
actually fought. 69 Was it, nevertheless, representative of soldiers' experience? It is argued in
this thesis that whatever was printed or distributed widely in manuscript was the product of
experience from individuals whose basic credentials were sound even if some of their facts
may have been erroneous. To take an example: Sergeant Major Forbes, while serving in the
army of Gustavus Adolphus, claimed in a published letter to his father from Breitenfeld: 'I
write noe more unto you but that which I saw with my owne eyes'. His letter included force
64 Monro, Expedition, II, pp.l2;39;44;7S.
6S John George called him 'little Englishman'; Goodrick, Relation, p.S9.
66 Dillingham, Commentaries, pp.20; 69; 73.
67E rZT ks ....vans, vror. , pp.XX1l1;XXIV.
68 Not all could. The Scotsman Alexander Leslie, who attained the rank ofField Marshal in the service of
Gustavus Adolphus, was reputed to be illiterate. ODNB: Alexander Leslie.
69 Cf. Trim, 'Fighting "Jacob's War''', p.46: 'There is a remarkably large body of sources showing the common
soldier's viewpoint.' I take this to mean that of the available sources, which are few, many are from the ranks,
although his bibliography does not support that either, but I accept that there were a disproportionately high
number of gentlemen fighting.
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strengths.I" and these can be compared with the account of Robert Monro, who was also
present at the battle." Historians have differed in their statistics for this battle: Geoffrey
Parker quoted a variety of sources including Monro,72while for Peter Wilson the source for
his figures is unclear." All four are compared in Table 3 below. Forbes stressed 'this is the
truth of the great victorie',14 and there is no reason to doubt his presence at the battle even if
his figures have been challenged. Likewise Monro assured his dedicatee that his was 'a true
and simple narration', and to his readers he claimed he wrote 'with truth and simplicitie'."
Forbes Monro Parker Wilson
Imperialists 40,000 44,000 31,400 37,000
Swedes/Saxons 36,000 30,000 41,000 39,000
Imperialist Dead 10,000 8,000 Not stated 7,000
Swede/Saxon Dead Not reported 3,000 Not stated 2,100
Prisoners (Imperialist) 8,000 Not reported Not stated 9,000
Table 3: Battle of Breitenfeld 1631- Comparison of Figures
Both Forbes and Monro, according to Parker and Wilson, may have substantially
misrepresented their army's strength in relation to the enemy, portraying their force as facing
and overcoming superior opposition. Whether deliberately or unintentionally (troop numbers
are always difficult to estimate), this does not detract from the essence of the event on which
they are reporting: an over-whelming and significant victory for Gustavus Adolphus.
Similarly Poyntz, inaccurate on many details, believed he was part of Mansfeld's army of
30,000 facing Tilly with his force also of 30,000 at Dessau Bridge. In fact Wallenstein
70 John Forbes, A Letter Sent From Sarjent Major Forbes From The King of Swethens army to his reverend/ather
Mr. John Forbes. minister to the worshipful Company 0/Marchant Adventurers residing in Delft. touching the
great Battle/ought by Lypsick betweene the King of Swethen, the Duke of Saxons Army. and the Emperors Army.
and that commanded by Generall Tilly. 0/ the Catholique League the 7. 0/ September, 1631 (Amsterdam, 1631).
Of the 10,000 dead he stated 'most of them' were the enemy, without giving an actual breakdown.
71 Monro, Expedition. II, pp.63, 67.
72 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West 1500-1800, Second
Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.23.
73 Peter H. Wilson, The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2009), pp.472-47S.
7. Forbes, Letter. p.2. Dauvit Horsbroch, 'Wish You Were Here? Scottish Reactions to "Postcards" home from
the 'Germane Warres"', in Steve Murdoch, ed., Scotland and the Thirty Years' War. 1618-1648 (Leiden: Brill,
2001), p.250.
7S Monro, Expedition. Dedication to Elector Palatine; To The Reader.
57
defeated Mansfeld at Dessau, not Tilly, with a force of 14,000, Mansfeld's force being half
that size." These details are of course important, and it is part of the historian's task to
ascertain the accuracy of reports. But the human factor of individual experience is as much a
part of the overall picture as the statistics, and it is this element that has been largely ignored
by historians who have focussed on policy, strategy, and numbers, to the detriment of a fuller
understanding of events.
One should enter the caveat that both a printed and manuscript source may have been
written or amended after the events it recalls by the original author or a later editor, and this is
discussed below.
The primary source material for this thesis has been produced by Englishmen,
Welshmen and Scots. Authors include professional soldiers, mercenaries and short-term
volunteers who fought from the 1570s through to the 1630s.77 They may have been
motivated through religion, a major factor in both the Elizabethan struggle with Spain over
God's 'truth' and the 'religious war' in Germany.78 This motivation is expressed with passion
by men such as Hexham and Monro from later in the period but is noticeably absent in other
accounts such as those of Williams and Vere from the earlier stages of the Eighty Years' War.
Geffrey Gates is an Elizabethan exception, but his open friendship with the Catholic William
Blandy would indicate a balance to his zeal. 79 The behaviour of these men may have been
directed through a concept of loyalty which combined a sense of 'nation' (the state and/or
ruling house) amid a multi-national scenario where their 'national' regiment served either
directly under a foreign general or with British leadership but for a foreign prince or state.
This was bound in with their view of 'honour' and whether or not honour was, in itself and not
necessarily connected to a religion or loyalty to a monarch or patron, a driving force behind
serving. Also key to the legitimacy of their accounts would be their economic condition, that
76 Goodrick, Relation, pp.14, 47; Wilson, Thirty Years War, p.410, quoting two German historical accounts.
77 For definitions, see Chapter Two.
78 Paul J. Hammer, Elizabeth's Wars: War, Government and Society in Tudor England. 1544-1604 (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.SS. Robert Bireley, 'The Thirty Years' War as Germany's Religious War', in
Konrad Repgen, ed., Krieg und Politik 1618-1648 (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988), pp.85-106.
79 There is reason to believe fraternization between Catholics and Protestants was not particularly unusual. See,
for instance, the comments on the Earl of Essex's 'party' in Chapter Three. On the complexities of religious
belief see Debora Shuger, 'A Protesting Catholic Puritan in Elizabethan England', Journal of Bntish Studies,
Vol. 48, No.3, July 2009, pp.587-630.
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is whether they were in need of subsistence (payor plunder) or whether their involvement in
war included a personal financial outlay.
Not all the soldiers who left accounts of their military experience are reliable sources.
George Gascoigne fought in the Low Countries for two short periods prior to the Treaty of
Nonsuch, and has recorded his experiences, but his writings were unashamedly for profit and
it has been commented that his work 'reads like a sixteenth-century romance and contributes
very little to our knowledge of the age'." This view has been supported recently in an article
that noted his gross exaggeration of the deaths caused by the Spanish during the 1576 sack of
Antwerp." Despite these inaccuracies, it is nevertheless indicative of the growing public
interest in military affairs that he could seek to make a profit from printing such material. 82
The thesis has made some use of foreign sources. Christophle de Bonours was a
Walloon soldier who recorded his experience of the siege of Ostend, although his account was
not published until 1628, and not in Bnglish." Likewise the anonymous German soldier
(believed now to be one Peter Hagendorf) who recorded his experiences of the Thirty Years'
War was not published until 1993 and then only in German.f" I have made use of them
because they reflect the experience of war from the European viewpoint, an experience clearly
and unsurprisingly similar to that of the British soldiers. Additionally there are some quotes
from Anthonis Duyck, a Dutch civil servant on the march with Prince Maurice and Sir Francis
Vere, whose accounts not only show interesting aspects of the fledgling Republic's military
difficulties, but also how an early modem narrative on a military subject has been assessed as
honestly created and maintained."
It is important to assess an individual's reason for keeping a written record of his
experiences, because this may supply clues about the accuracy or otherwise of the account. Of
particular interest are those who claimed not to offer their work for publication and therefore
80 ODNB: George Gascoigne; Evans, Works, p.cxlv.
81 David Randall, 'Providence, Fortune, and the Experience of Combat: English Printed Battlefield Reports, circa
1570-1637', Sixteenth Century Journal, XXXV/4, 2004, p.l065.
82 George Gascoigne, The Spoyle of Antwerp (London, 1576).
83 Christophle de Bonours, Le Memorable Siege d'Ostende (Brussels: Jean de Meerbeek, 1628).
84 Ein Soldnerleben im Dreissigjdhrigen Krieg (Berlin: Academic Verlag, 1993). Peter H. Wilson, ed., The
Thirty Years War: A Sourcebook, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.167nl.
85 L. Mulder, ed., Joumaal van Anthonis Duyck, (s'Gravenhage: 1862-5).
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expected neither financial reward nor political gain. Of the printed sources used in this thesis,
some were posthumously published, indicating they did not write for financial gain." Monro
published during his lifetime and, even though a soldier of Christ and devoted to the house of
Stuart, probably did so for fmancial gain despite his claim to the contrary." If they wrote, and
if they published, they had a real or perceived audience. It is possible they could be
attempting to vindicate themselves from some blame, to encourage patronage for their own
advantage, or to discredit someone else. Such reasons, should they be conjectured or even
declared, would not necessarily indicate wholesale inaccuracies in their entire account.
Deciding whether or not an account is to be trusted is difficult. Some are in places
demonstrably incorrect because they can be checked against established 'facts' cross-
referenced from a number of other sources. In other cases there may exist a partiality to their
opinions that may be sufficient to cast doubt upon their objectivity. It is difficult to assess
why the Englishman Sydenham Poyntz decided to commit his memoirs to manuscript. As a
company-level infantry commander he had a middle-ranking view of events and he faced a
great deal of trouble had his Relation been published during his own lifetime because of his
comments on religion. This suggests that it may be an authentic account as far as its reliability
is concerned. No other reason presents itself for the expression of his view, loaded as it was
with risk, other than this particular aspect of his account was the truth.
On the other hand Sir Francis Vere, as a well-known general, could have anticipated a
wide and interested audience from which to make political gain, although he did not go to
print in his lifetime either. However, as Tracy Borman and David Trim both point out,
because an account is not published does not mean it did not circulate in manuscript. Clearly
the Vere account did, although to what end is not clear. Tracy Borman has concluded that it
was written with the aim of 'preserving (and indeed embellishing) his reputation for centuries
to come'. 88 Trim has suggested that it may have been written in order to instruct the younger
generation of military leaders, and if so it falls into the category of didactic military works
86 Posthumously published accounts include those of Sir Francis Vere, Sydenham Poyntz and Anthonis Duyck.
For discussion of their relative impartiality, see below.
87 Monro declared: ... .1wrote ...because I loved my Camerades ...I published them ...for my friends, and not for the
world, for which I care not ... ', Monro, Expedition, To the Reader. He may have published for fmancial gain;
Brockington, pp.xv n6; xvii; xxv. The book was re-published under the title The Scotch Military Discipline
(London, 1644).
88 Borman, Vere, p.32.
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begun by Machiavelli and produced throughout the period of this thesis.89 Vere wrote from a
position of command, if not the man in charge on the ground then very close to both Prince
Maurice and the ultimate paymasters, the States-General. Although he criticised his high
command, they were foreign and as he was not in a position to threaten their power, likewise
they could not jeopardise his retirement. Historians such as Motley and Borman regarded his
as an immodest account, and he an immodest man. That does not necessarily render either
account or man unreliable. Immodesty does not indicate untruth, and his accounts of Tumhout
and Nieuwpoort, written by one of the leading military figures in the Flemish area of warfare,
must warrant serious consideration. Within the Dillingham edition is an account of the 'parlie
at Ostend' written by Vere's lieutenant colonel, Sir John Ogle. This was a controversial
episode, where Vere entered into negotiations with the enemy involving the exchange of
'pledges'. Ogle, who was one of two 'pledges', gives us his explicit reason for recording the
event in writing:
Now because I was in some sort the onely instrument he [Vere] used in the managing
thereof, and best acquainted with all passages, I have (for the love lowe to truth, and
his memory) thought good to set down in writing, what I have heretofore delivered (by
their commandments), to the Lords the States-Generall in their Council-chamber, as
also sometime after that to the Prince Maurice of Nassau and the Earl William his
cozen, concerning this marter."
Ogle stayed loyal to Vere, thus contradicting the Meteren account that portrayed Vere as being
on the verge of handing over the city to the enemy, despite the pique Ogle expressed at Vere's
failure to mention him in the rescue of the general from underneath his dead horse at
Nieuwpoort." Also in the Dillingham work is an account of the siege of Ostend by Henry
Hexham, who must have been about sixteen at the time but even so very much involved in the
heat of the action:
General Vere perceiving the enemy to fall off, commanded me to run as fast as ever I
could to Serjeant-major Carpenter, and the Auditour Fleming, who were upon
Helmont, that they should open the West-sluce, out of which there ran such stream and
89 ODNB: s.n. Vere. Trim suggests a scholarly view was that 'Vere wrote a private work intended to aid the
military education of future English officers'.
90 Dillingham, Commentaries, p.l44. My italics; these two stated reasons may be in contention.
91 Ibid, p.106: ' .. .1cannot but wonder that it pleased him [Vere] not to make mention of me ..'; regarding
Meteren, pp. 144; 153.
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torrent down through the chanel of the West-haven, that upon their retreat it carried
away many of their sound and hurt men into the sea ... 92
The work is presented as a eulogy by those who saw Vere as a military hero, and his
nineteenth-century biographer Clements Markham used the Hexham passage above to
undermine the claim by Motley that it was Fleming who had conceived the plan to open the
sluice gate, not Vere. Those who are less convinced by the immodesty ofVere tend to believe
he laid claim to others' ideas, although the 'anti-parley' affair appears to have no other
contenders and was in itself a bold plan made by a man in de facto independent command."
Human memory is not sufficiently robust to recall experiences with complete accuracy.
Even in the space of a few months the chronology or detail of a series of many significant
events over a short time line, such as the course of a battle, may become distorted. Robert
Monro stated ruefully: 'no man doth remember the halfe of his owne actions, much lesse to
remarke the actions of others' .94 It is worthwhile to investigate whether insufficient memory
or purposeful design has altered the facts. Poyntz, we have noted above, left a rare and
absorbing account of his experiences in the Thirty Years' War and probably wrote soon after
them.9S It is safe to conclude that the events in which he was physically present have the ring
of truth about them, and his placing of an event in the wrong location, such as his account of
the battle of Nordlingen, 96 should not detract from the truth of his experience just because his
memory has failed to cite the action in the correct town. After all, it is indisputable that
Poyntz was a soldier who had seen a great deal of action, so the relation of his personal
experience, which significantly does not seek to over-state his leadership qualities or military
abilities, can be taken at face value. It is the information that eludes corroboration, and the
second-hand information that could well fall into the category of gossip, that has to be
considered with greater caution. Poyntz's opinions supporting the Catholic religion are the
most notable, given his later position as an elder of the Dutch Reformed Church, and his
comments in the 'Vindication' written several years later in a more charged political
92 Dillingham, Commentaries, p.l74. .
93 Clements R. Markham, The Fighting Veres: Lives of Sir Francis Vere, General of the Queen's Forces in the
Low Countries, Governor of the Brill and of Portsmouth. and of Sir Horace Vere, General of the English Forces
in the Low Countries, Governor of the Brill, Master-General of the Ordnance, and Baron Vere of Tilbury
(London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1888), p.328.
94 Monro, Expedition, p.70.
9S Goodrick, Relation, p.123, n5.
96 Ibid, p.116, n1.
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atmosphere, as they show how an individual can conveniently forget the past in order to avoid
apparent contradictions later. It is reasonable to conclude, even though beyond
historiographical proof, that Poyntz's zealous commitment to Presbyterianism that forced him
out of England after the Second Civil War was in part a counter-balance to his 'mistakes'
regarding Catholicism earlier in life.
Situations change; the case seldom remains unaltered. The memoirs of the Dutchman
Anthonis Duyck are of particular value because of his impartiality despite the passage of time.
He recorded what he saw, and his journals were not intended for publication and were not
edited later. The Scottish soldier Sir James Turner, on the other hand, wrote of his
experiences in the Thirty Years' War more than a decade after they had occurred, although it
is not his choice of an army in Germany that is the main political point but his choice on
leaving that theatre and coming home. Through his. account he has, as a later Royalist,
attempted to justify his joining the Covenanting army on return to Scotland." As for Poyntz,
as noted above, he later totally refuted his declared Catholicism during his time in Germany
and his friendship with prominent Catholics. As a Colonel-General in the Parliamentary army
he stressed his 'constant Profession ... in the Reformed Protestant Religion' through his
Vindication.98 The Vindication was published, the Relation was not, but was presumably
known by some. His Protestant credentials later in life cannot eradicate what he himself had
written of an earlier period, and it is beyond belief that he could have forgotten it. Poyntz, in
his Vindication, is an example of a man writing to change his past in order to protect his
future. And yet, because of rather than despite this religious anomaly, the value in a personal
account is manifest: we come to know something altogether curious about a man that we
would not otherwise have guessed. Additionally, and equally valuable, the experience of war
expressed by Poyntz is far clearer, in greater detail and expressed with more honesty and
human feeling than any comment in the State Papers. The issue of his religious dilemma is in
itself an interesting reflection of the spiritual-cum-political difficulties of the age. So the raw
portrayal of war gives us a vivid picture of early modem military life.
97 Sir James Turner, Memoirs ofhis own life and times. 1632-1670, ed. by T. Thomson, Bannatyne Club, 28
(1829), p.14.
98 p tz T?' di ,oyn ,,, In tcation.
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The 'military revolution' and the British 'art militarie'
There are several publications of the period produced by professional soldiers and
designed to instruct the uninitiated. This genre was becoming increasingly popular. There
were also armchair theorists, such as John Cruso, who reproduced and wrote several military
works. Although from Dutch extraction, Cruso had never served in the Low Countries wars,
confming his own experience to the local Norwich Militia. However, he is credited with
bringing modem Dutch military theory to English audiences." Authors such as Cruso were
viewed sceptically by soldiers like Humfrey Barwick who opined that experience was a
necessary prerequisite for authorship of military manuals: 'how can any man whatsoever he
be, know what he did never see?,IOO The answer was by adapting earlier works, usually
foreign, without necessarily acknowledging them. Thomas Norton's work on artillery was
taken largely from a Spanish original by Uffano, much to the chagrin of Francis Malthus who
accused Norton of claiming the Uffano work as his own. To be fair to Norton he had
acknowledged his debt to Uffano, and Malthus could be guilty of petty professional malice in
the same way that Norton had accused fellow gunner Thomas Smith of 'arch false
proportionality' a year before.i'" In the main such plagiarism was acceptable practice, and
experienced soldiers could be guilty of it as well as armchair theorists.I02 This manner of
combining original authors with contemporary comment leads to some difficulties in
categorisation. For instance Sir Clement Edmondes translated parts of Caesar's
Commentaries, but added so much of his own comment that it exceeds the word-count of
Caesar. As this renders the book something other than just a linguistic translation I have
placed Edmondes in Appendix 1 rather than Appendix 2.103 The practice of 'borrowing' and
adapting can also be seen in the section on 'Histories' below.
99 Cruso reproduced Du Praissac's The Arte ofWarre (Cambridge, 1639) and wrote Militarie Instructions for the
Cavallrie (Cambridge, 1632). ODNB: John Cruso.
100 Humfrey Barwick, A Breefe Discourse. Concerning the force and effect of all manual weapons of fire. and the
disability of the Longe Bowe or Archery. in respect of others of greater force now in use (London, 1592), p.4.
101 Thomas Norton, The Gunner Shewing The Whole Practice Of Artillery (London, 1628). Francis Malthus, A
Treatise Of Artificial Fire- Works Both for Warres and Recreation (London, 1629). Thomas Smith, The Art of
Gunnery (London, 1620).
102 Cockle, Bibliography, pp.7; 14; 79; 81 (Vox Militis); 88. Timothy R.W. Kubik, 'Is Machiavelli's Canon
Spiked? Practical Reading in Military History', The Journal of Military History, Vol. 61, No.1 (Jan., 1997),
ro}~ir Clement Edmondes, Observations. Upon The Five First Bookes Of Caesars Commentaries (London,
1600).
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The mathematician Leonard Digges' Stratioticos was edited and published by his son
Thomas, also a mathematician, in 1571, and reprinted in 1590. Thomas Digges followed it
with England's Defence, a treatise published to aid the repulse of the Annada in 1588, which
was reprinted in 1680. Mathematics and its usefulness in war, particularly in the construction
of defensive military fortifications, was another bi-product of the Renaissance and its classical
antecedent. The architecture of fortifications was an important aspect of the mainly defensive
war strategy of the period, as were logistic requirements of how to calculate volumes of
supplies.l'" But not all mathematicians were soldiers, and Thomas' experience of war,
obtained when he deployed to the Low Countries as muster-master to the Earl of Leicester,
proved to be an unhappy and frustrating one as he discovered that textbook theories did not
survive contact with his own forces let alone the enemy. lOS Paul Ive, on the other hand, was
very much a soldier, and an educated one. He translated Fourquevaux's Instructions for the
warres (London, 1589) out of French, and The Practice of Fortification (London, 1589) was
'his own work' and 'a product of experience and observation' .106 Ive believed that 'the
opinion of a Souldier who hath had experience of the defence, and offence, is to be preferred
before the opinion of the Geometrician, or Mason, who are inexpert, of the practices that an
enemie may put in execution,.107 Ive devoted his career to military engineering, for which
mathematics was an integral ingredient, but others were led by mathematics into military
service rather than the other way round. Thomas Digges was a geometrician and cosmologist
prior to military service, and the only works of the Flemish mathematician and military
engineer Simon Stevin to be translated and printed in English contained no military content.108
There were evident lessons to be gleaned from the development of increased firepower
through the adoption of disciplined tactics utilising gunpowder within European warfare.
Despite this there were those who resisted modernisation, and there were some who supported
104 J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620 (phoenix Mill: Sutton, 1998), pp.212-215.
105 Leonard Digges, Stratioticos (London, 1579). Thomas Digges, Englands Defence. A Treatise concerning
Invasion (London, 1680). ODNB: Thomas Digges. Adams, 'Protestant Cause', p.33.
106 Martin Biddle, 'Introduction' to Paul Ive, The Practice of Fortification: London. 1589 (Farnborough: Gregg
International, 1972), pp. ii-iii. ODNB: Paullve.
107 Ive, Practice of Fortification, pp.12-13.
1080DNB: Thomas Digges. Simon Stevin: Disme: the art of tenths (London, 1608), The haven-finding art
(London, 1599). The only military work of Stevin in English, The Art of Fortification, was translated in 1604
and remained in manuscript form; W.H. Schukking, ed., The Principal Work of Simon Slevin. Volume IV: The
Art of War (Amsterdam: C.V. Swets & Zeitlinger, 1964), p.34.
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retention of the bow over, or at least alongside, firearms.l'" Sir John Smythe, in his Certain
Discourses of 1590, urged the continued use of the bow, and this drew a strong response from
the soldier Humfrey Barwick, in his Breefe Discourse, and Sir Roger Williams in his A Briefe
Discourse of Warre, both of whom argued for archery to be acknowledged as obsolete and
firearms accepted as the only effective modem weapons.l'" This issue is discussed in Chapter
Four.
There were authors who were prepared to go beyond the single issue of musket over
bow. Robert Barret tells us that 'the warres and weapons are now altered,' and that the
English 'must accommodate our selves to the now used weapons, order, and time'.'!' Other
treatises were produced during this late Elizabethan period, most notably by the soldiers
William Garrard (posthumously), Giles Clayton and William Blandy.112 Such works
continued to be produced in the seventeenth century: the 'gentleman volunteer' Francis
Markham's Epistles of the 1620s and Captain Henry Hexham's influential Principles
published towards the end of the period but as a result of experience gained throughout it, as
well as Robert Ward's Animadversions, are examples.l"
Reasons for publishing
Establishing the motivation behind writing and publishing an account is of great
importance for several reasons: the prospect of pecuniary gain or of patronage potentially
influenced the works themselves. Audiences may shape the form and content of a work. In
fact, financial reward for writers rarely came as a direct consequence of printing. Even if the
109 Paul Scannell, 'From Bow to Musket: The Development of the Early Modern Personal Weapon,' in British
Army Review, No. 136, pp. 64-69.
110 Sir John Smythe, Certain Discourses. written by Sir John Smythe. Knight: Concerning the formes and effects
of divers sorts of weapons. and other verie important matters Militarie, greatlie mistaken by divers of our men of
warre in these dais; and chiefly, of the Mosquet, the Caliver and the Long-bow; As also. of the great sufficiency,
excellencie, and wonderful effects of Archers: With many notable examples and other particularities. by him
presented to the Nobilitie of this Realm, & publishedfor the benefite of this his native Countrie of England
(London, 1590). ODNB: Sir John Smythe.
111 Barret, Theorike, p.4.
112 William Garrard, The Arte of Warre, ed. by Captaine Hiehcock (London, 1591). Giles Clayton, The
Approoved order of Martiall discipline with every particular Offycer his office and dutie: with many other
stratagemes adioyning to the same (London, 1591). William Blandy, The Castle. or picture of policy (London,
1581).
113 Francis Markham, Five Decades of Epistles of Warre (London, 1622). Robert Ward, Animadversions of
Warre (London, 1639).
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book sold well and could be considered a success that would not result in greater reward for its
author. Booksellers were not generous with remuneration, rather expecting (to their own
advantage) that the subject matter served a greater cause than just financial gain for the author,
one such bookseller commenting in 1624:
Most of the best Authors are not so penurious that they looke soe much to theire gaine,
as to the good they intend Religion or State. They are too Mercenary that write bookes
for Money, and theire covetousness makes theire labours fruitles, and disesteemed.114
The dedication was more likely to effect payment in the form of a gift, in exchange for
the book, and here the printed article with its single dedication was out-matched by the
manuscript as each copy could be dedicated to a different patron. Cash was not necessarily
the response to these pleas to dedicatees; other material goods or preferment could be the
desired aim. I IS Dedications might establish or confirm a link with an important individual or
group. Whoever the dedicatee was, he (and on occasion she) would have been of some
influence, and the author could be seeking office or a pension, aiming for some political
advantage or just looking to mark the work with the prestige of a well-known and respected
figure.l" It was also possible that the relationship between author and patron was close and
that the latter bore the cost of publication. 117
Whether close or not, soldier-authors frequently dedicated their work to a prominent
and influential figure. Geffrey Gates dedicated his work to Edward Vere, Earl of Oxford,
perhaps because of a perceived acute Protestantism in the earl as the zealous Gates commented
'how necessary the exercise of Armes is' in part because 'our forefathers ...were given over to
superstition and Idolatrie'. 118 Many patrons had military connections and, unsurprisingly,
some dedicated their work to the Earl of Essex, the most martially inclined aristocrat, such as
Thomas Garrard (regarding the work of his 'very neere kinseman' William) and Matthew
Sutcliffe.I'" Thomas Churchyard dedicated a work to Edward Seymour, Earl of Hertford,
114 Love, Scribal Publication p.58.
lIS Ibid, p.60.
116 Simoni, 'Present for a Prince', p.51. See section on 'Patronage' in Introduction above.
117 Cockle, Bibliography, p.13.
118 Geffrey Gates, TheDefence of Militarie Profession (London, 1579).
119 Garrard, Arte of Warre;Matthew Sutcliffe, ThePractice, Proceedings, and Lawes ofarmes (London, 1593),
To the Reader.
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because he had served under the earl's father decades previously.F" Humfrey Barwick
dedicated his Breefe Discourse to Henry Carey, a powerful Privy Councillor with military
experience for whom Barwick could have worked in an unknown capacity at some stage.121
Henry Hexham dedicated his account of the siege of Breda to Henry Rich having received that
earl's 'gracious acceptance' of his previous publication, The Principles of the Art Military.
Hexham dedicated his account of the siege of s'Hertogenbosch to the English Merchant
Adventurers in Delft, giving an insight into his English connections in Holland.122 Gyles
Clayton dedicated his book and his sixteen years service in Ireland and the Low Countries to
Queen Elizabeth. However, not all soldier-authors sought patronage for their works. Sir John
Smythe, at odds with the modem art of war and increasingly alienated from the establishment,
rather vaguely dedicated his controversial work on the retention of archery to 'the Nobilitie of
the Realme ofEngland,.123 Captain Robert Markham boldly declined to name a patron for his
elegy on his late commander Sir John Burgh, but preferred to declare it 'Unto all Souldiers,
lac'd with noble skarres':
I will not Dedicat these weeping lines
Unto a Laughing Lord of Patronage,
That without Mourning habit richly shines
In gold, nor will I send a Pilgrimage
My sorrowes, brought a bed in this same Booke,
To be protected by a Ladyes Looke.124
Custom and rhetoric: understanding the works of soldiers
The methods that early modem soldiers used to collect and arrange their thoughts and
the manner in which they presented their material is central to our understanding of their
experience and knowledge. The use authors made of language requires some analysis, as
120 Thomas Churchyard, A TrueDiscourse Historicall, of the Succeeding Governors in the Netherlands. and the
Civill Warres there begun in the yeere J 565 (London, 1602).
121 Barwick, Breefe Discourse. Barwick describes himself as 'one of the meanest of a great number that are and
hath beene under your Lordships govemement', but he may be referring to Carey's appointment as 'Lord
~ovemour of Barwick'; pp.A2, A3.
22 Henry Hexham, A TrueAnd Briefe Relation Of TheFamous Siege Of Breda (Delft, 1637); A Historicall
Relation Of the Famous Siege of the Busse (Delft, 1630).
123 Smythe, Certain Discourses.
124 Robert Markham, TheDescription Of Tha;Ever ToBe Famed Knight. Sir John Burgh (London, 1628).
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some words and phrases have passed out of common usage or changed their meaning. False
modesty was a custom of the age, and even the supremely confident Sir Francis Vere declared
himself 'unworthy' to attend a council of war (yet not unworthy to disagree with his
commander).125 However not all the generalisations used by such writers can be passed off as
literary convention. For instance, Monro reports the enemy was 'put all to the sword, except
the Officers that were taken Prisoners' .126 This is more than an empty phrase, as there is
generally a clear distinction on whether the enemy were 'put to the sword', that is summarily
executed; forced to 'take service', that is absorbed into the victor's ranks; or allowed to march
away 'flags flying, bullet in mouth' at the completion of siege negotiations.F" On the other
hand, when authors speak of events they clearly had not witnessed, this may be considered the
passing on of dramatised gossip. When Poyntz speaks 'of Saxe-Wiemar's soldiers in
Regensburg 'reserving the Nunnes for their lust, and the fryars to abuse by dismembering
them &c. and deflowering the Nunnes upon their Altars', 128 he is not relating a first-hand
account, and he may be victim of the conditioning of the time - rumour was often more
terrible and therefore more frightening than reality. According to Hexham, Prince Frederick-
Henry fired 23,131 canon balls into Breda over a seven week period during the siege, after
which it surrendered. Such an accurate number is a reflection of either a very efficient stores
accounting system or, far more likely, Hexham's recourse to the classical method of quoting
seemingly accurate figures that fictionally fill the blank of an unknown quantity; he could not
know exactly how many balls were fired, but he wished to emphasise the point that it was a
great deal. 129 Individuals adopted the conventions and methods of their time, often borrowed
from a previous age as explained below, and a number of literary categories came off the
presses. Contemporary writing fell in to one of several genres.
War as art
Military writing had become increasingly popular, and a number of soldiers as well as
armchair theorists went to press. The Dutchman Jacob de Gheyn produced his
1250'11' h C .1 mg am, ommentanes, pp.8l, 85.
126 Monro, Expedition, II, p.l 0 I.
127 OED: Honour; 'honours of war' - privileges granted to a capitulating force, e.g., that of marching out with
colours flying.
128 Goodrick, Relation, p.120.
129 Hexham, Siege of Breda, Articles of Composition, p.16.
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Wapenhandelinghe in 1607, published in England as The Exercise of Armes in at least three
editions in 1607/8. This book, which included 117 engravings showing the drill movements of
soldiers handling muskets and pikes, proved an instant publishing success, being printed in
French, German and Danish as well as English and its native Dutch. The initial success of the
folio engraved editions of 1607 and 1608 was followed in 1609 and 1619 by the publication of
smaller, cheaper quarto editions."? This is testament to the popularity of military manuals
during this time, especially those reflecting the modem Dutch manner of warfare. 13I
A starting point for many who chose to publish on the subject of warfare, in terms of
style and content, was the writing of Machiavelli. His The Art of War reflected not only his
republican sympathies (which could be glossed over by the subjects of queens) but, more
importantly, consistently recommended the classical Graeco-Roman model, which was a
major feature of the Renaissance.132 His constant referrals to the Romans as having 'the best
armies that ever existed' and his belief that 'no activity among men today is easier to restore to
its ancient ways than the military', 133combined with his contemporary opinions, for instance
his belief that the Swiss were the best modem force. This produced a work with a didactic
style that influenced soldiers who could relate to its topics and attention to detail. 134 Not all
soldiers were convinced, however: Humfrey Barwick noted Machiavelli's limited military
experience and commented that 'Machiavel have set forth his whole knowledge ... [but] ... ifhe
had been a soldier he would never have done,.13S
Although Machiavelli died in 1527, the work was first published in English in 1560
and was widely read, not just in England but twenty-one editions in the sixteenth century
including translations into Spanish (1536), French (1546) and German (1623) secured a
130 Simoni, 'A Present for a Prince', pp.52; 55.
131 'Thus, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, manual drill was represented as a well-ordered pattern of
constrained behavior in which the infantrymen were drilled to handle their arms, to enact commanded movements
with precision by themselves and as part of a battalion, and to do so under the control of central institutions of
government'; Harald Kleinschmidt, 'Using the Gun: Manual Drill and the Proliferation of Portable Firearms'
The Journal 0/Military History, Vo1.63, No.3, (Jul., 1999), p.612.
132 Niccolo Machiavelli, TheArto/War(1521), trans. by Henry Neville (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2006 edition from
a 1674 translation). Felix Gilbert, 'Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War' , in Peter Pareto ed., Makers
o~Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p.21.
1 3Machiavelli, Art of War, pp.33, 164.
134 Machiavelli was an intellectual, not a soldier, who according to one historian had 'contempt for the military
vocation'; Maury D. Feld, The Structure of Violence: Armed Forces as Social Systems (Beverly Hills and
London: Sage, 1977), p.l84.
m Barwick, Breefe Discourse, pJO.
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European market and thus it became a universal reference book.!" It was presented as an
amicable dialogue between friends. This was a common device, characterising as it did the
works of Erasmus, More and Ascham for examples. It was also a feature of schoolboy
education with which the soldier-authors would have been extremely familiar. It was adopted
by Barret in his Theorike, by Hexham in Tongue-Combat and by Blandy and Gates in The
Castle. Machiavelli's subject matter expert Fabrizio, a mercenary commander, is asked many
questions on military topics and through his answers Machiavelli gives his views on
mercenaries, weaponry, plunder and the order and quartering of an army. Some seventeenth-
century writers shared his acceptance of the inevitability of war. Monro commented 'the
world is but a perpetuall warre',137 and Fabrizio's comment on loyalty and death ('for in what
man ought the country look for greater loyalty than in the man who has to promise to die for
her?,138) dovetails entirely with Monro's view.139
Machiavelli's stress on the best soldiers not being mercenaries, such as the Romans
and the Spartans from antiquity as well as the modern day Swiss, may seem to condemn the
presence of Monro and other Britons in foreign armies. However, it is Machiavelli's use of
the word mercenary that requires careful consideration: when he wrote, the Swiss were
forging a name for themselves as the most effective mercenary soldiers, in stark contradiction
of Machiavelli's view, but his city of Florence could not afford them.140 Many of the soldiers
about whom this thesis is concerned did not consider themselves as mercenary. This issue is
explored further in later chepters.!" Many early modem soldiers were volunteers and not
career soldiers, and so could and did return to their professions at home after a campaign, as
Machiavelli advocated in his support of the citizen soldier.
Fundamentally Machiavelli did not believe in 'progress' in the way it is understood
today. He regarded the direction of human society as cyclical and the exemplar as Graeco-
136 Gilbert, 'Machiavelli', p.27.1t also provided a backdrop to debates without being cited; see the chapter 'To
fortify or not to fortify? Machiavelli's contribution to a Renaissance debate', in J.R Hale, Renaissance War
Studies (London: Hambledon, 1983), p.196 and passim.
137 Monro, Expedition. I, p.52. Although such belief was on insecure ground in the Stuart era; Robert Ward, in a
dedication to his pacific Stuart king, speaks of 'this grim Monster (War) ... picking the golden Locke of
Tranquillity'; Animadversions, dedication to Charles I.
138 Machiavelli, Art of War, p.2.
139 See Chapter Two below.
140 Michael Mallett, 'Mercenaries', in Maurice Keen, ed., Medieval Warfare: A History (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), p.228.
141 See Chapter Two below for a definition.
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Roman. Thus, in his view, modem society should return to that standard of excellence from
the corrupt position it currently occupied. In this he reflected the essence of the Renaissance
which permeated the whole of western Europe with its belief in rebirth and regeneration rather
than the creation of novel methods and institutions. This would explain the curious
ambivalence of some early modem soldier-authors towards the introduction of firearms in
England, and the position of men such as Sir John Smythe in opposing change. Innovation
was generally viewed with suspicion, as it potentially threatened the political, religious and
economic status quo and could be seditious. Soldiers in the main ignored Machiavelli's
negative comments on firearms and artillery, as they did Sir John Smythe, because as practical
men they judged the effect gunpowder had on the enemy to be potentially greater than ancient
methods.142
While Machiavelli's The Art of Warwas influential in the military sphere, it was his
political writings that were widely read in England and elsewhere and won him notoriety.l"
This is reflected in some contemporary works of soldiers. Sir Roger Williams refers to
Catherine de Medici's interference with the French king as 'his Machiavell mothers
counsaille; who never cared what became of any estate or world to come ... Considering her
Machiavell humors, she was much to blame [for the St. Bartholomew's Day massacrej'r'"
The Walloon soldier De Bonours describes Vere's actions during the Ostend 'anti-parley' as
'Machiavellian' .145
Historical precedent was an obvious avenue down which to seek a standard in an age
that paradoxically discouraged innovation but acknowledged the changing nature of society.
As Christopher Hill commented: 'Men argued in terms of precedent because they could not
accept that they were facing novel problems'cl'" All knowledge, it was maintained, came
from God, giving any new idea dubious status. However, knowledge that came from the past
142 Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa, ed. and trans., The Portable Machiavelli (London: Penguin, 1979), pp. 26;
31; 480-3. See the discussion in this thesis on weapons and the impact of artillery in Chapter Four and also the
argument on soldiers' motivation to defeat the enemy in Chapter Three.
143 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. and trans. by Peter Bondanella (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
The book 'became, along with Castiglione's Book of the Courtier, the intellectual property of every well-read
European during the sixteenth century'; Bondanella and Musa, The Portable Machiavelli, p.17.
144W'II' A'1 lams, ctions, pp.3213.
14SD Be onours, Ostend, p.17S.
146 Hill, Century of Revolution, p.S2.
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could be considered divinely sanctioned.l'" There are many examples in the military texts of
this reverence towards antiquity. Monro uses excerpts from classical history to support many
of his 'Observations', calling on 'the wise Ancients' to underline his comments with parallel
lessons.!" For instance, his comments on the negative effects on discipline when soldiers are
under-employed are preceded by a quote from a prominent Roman:
Scipio said, we were most in danger when we wanted businesse, for while we want
businesse, and have no foe to awe us, we are readie to drowne in the mudde of vice and
sloathfulnesse. So our Regiment having laine six moneths in idlenesse and sloath,
eating and drinking, and sometimes doing worse, for lack of employment in our
Callings ... 149
Matthew Sutcliffe, an experienced soldier, used ancient precedent throughout his work,
declaring: ' .. .let us not disdaine to follow the examples of such great captaines, and wise men
in reforming our present errours, and disorders according to the true and loyall practice of
annes'. ISO This characteristic of the Renaissance period with its constant referral to the
Graeco-Roman era as authoritative, the acceptance of the classical as exemplar through the
military literature of the time, is consistent. Monro tells us of the action at Halle (Germany):
... we see his Majesty [Gustavus Adolphus] with clemency doth follow the example of
the ancient Romans, who, of all victories, thought that victory best, which least was
stained with bloud, having given quarters and service to three thousand Emperial
Souldiers, without drawing one drop of bloud.l"
Sir Roger Williams in his history, although with his focus very much on the tasks in hand, can
nevertheless slip in a reference to Alexander (on mutiny: 'as Alexander did his Parmenio'),
and his advice to military men despite its change of style makes one or two references to the
classical period. He asks, for instance, 'What caused Caesar to overthrow Pompey?,IS2 As
this knowledge of classical precedent was so much a part of contemporary education, it is
impossible to attribute this to Machievelli's influence.
147 Donald A. Neill, 'Ancestral Voices: The Influence of the Ancients on the Military Thought of the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', The Journal of Military History, Vol. 62, No.3 (Jul., 1998), p.489.
148 Monro, Expedition. I, p.19.
149 Ibid. I, p.46. Brockington comments: 'To validate his observations, Monro cited more than 25 classical and
medieval sources ... ', 'Monro: Professional Soldier', p.233.
ISO Sutcliffe, Lawes of Armes. p.B2.
lSI Monro, Expedition. II, p.74: Monro also contradicts this; see Chapter Three.
1S2 Williams, Actions, p.102. Sir Roger Williams, A Briefe Discourse of Warre (London, 1590), pp.4; 6.
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Caesar's Commentaries
It was an international convention to compare good soldiers to Julius Caesar. For
example Henri IV wrote to Elizabeth I of Sir Roger Williams: 'que les vostres montrerent tant
de valeur et de courage, qu'il n'est possible de mieulx faire qu'ils feirent, particulierement le
diet Sir Roger, qui feit acte d'un vray Cesar' .153 Following this Graeco-Roman trope, the
memoirs of Sir Francis Vere were styled as 'Commentaries' after those of Julius Ceasar,
though it is possible that they are closer to the French soldier Monluc, whose autobiographical
account of his military career appeared in French in 1592 although he, too, was writing in this
genre.IS4 Vere himself, with an almost indecent lack of preamble when compared with other
writers of his era, focuses entirely on the military engagements and his actions central to them
without distraction as, indeed, did Caesar. ISS Vere's editor half a century after the events,
William Dillingham, brought in Clement Edmondes, who made a comparison between Vere's
actions and those of Caesar, 156 and of whom Dillingham said 'found reason to borrow the best
lineaments of his [Caesar's] piece out of the actions of Sir Francis Vere'. Edmondes discussed
the combination of the 'opportunity of time' with the 'convenience of place' and 'an orderly
disposition of the means', the three of which were considered and used to good effect by
Caesar against the Gauls and in like manner by Vere against the Spanish at Nieuwpoort
(where Edmondes had served with Vere). As Caesar 'was indowed by nature with an
excellent promptitude and aptnesse to take opportunitie in any businesse', so Vere at
Nieupoort 'well knowing how much it imported the businesse of that day to hold a place of
such gain and advantage ... so all that were present were eye-witnesses both to the truth of his
conjecture, and the soundnesse of his judgement,.IS7
m 'Your people showed so much valor and courage, that it is impossible to do better, particularly Sir Roger, who
acted like a true Caesar'; Evans, Works, p.lxii.
154 The Commentaries of Messire Blaize de Montluc, Mareschal of France, trans. by Charles Cotton (London,
1674); ' .. .it may be that he [Vere] intended an autobiography modelled on the Commentaries of the distinguished
French soldier Blaise de Monluc, of which Vere would certainly been aware [in manuscript], rather than military
reflections based on the example of Caesar's Commentaries.' ODNB: s.n. Vere. Monluc states: 'The greatest
Captain that ever liv'd was Cesar, and he has led me the way, having writ his own Commentaries', p.2.
ISS Lindsay G.H. Hall, "'Ratio" and "Romanitus" in the "Bellum Gallicum'", in Kathryn Welch and Anton
Powell, eds, Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments (Swansea: The
Classical Press of Wales, 2009), p.17.
IS6 Edmondes' Observations were very popular and followed two previous translations by Tiptoft and Golding
(see Appendix 2). Henry J. Webb, 'The English Translations of Caesar's Commentaries in the Sixteenth
Century', Philological Quarterly, 28 (1949), pp.490-5.
IS7 Dillingham, Commentaries, pp.l12-117.
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So how close are Vere's 'Commentaries' to Caesar's? How similar the generals'
positions, how comparable the style? The opening lines after the title page in the Dillingham
work proclaim:
What Mars performed Mercurie doth tell,
None e're but Cesar fought and wrote so well.
Why may not then his Book this title carry,
The second part of Cesar's Commentary.
This would indicate a favourable comparison not only with the Roman general's leadership
but also with Caesar's writing ability. Caesar was regarded as an elegant stylist, at pains to
produce fine writing, and although he was presenting a positive view of himself to a specific
audience back home it was in the form of a clear, apparently factual military report written in
the third person typical of the period.IS8 Vere was also presenting himself as he wished to be
seen, although in the first person, and possibly exaggerating his personal influence on battles
and over the Dutch high command regarding strategic decision making for the sake of his
reputation and to counter the enmity that had built up with some soldiers that ranked above
him socially and who considered his attitude towards them as offensive; but with Vere there
was no political motive. Caesar was a far more political figure, with a great deal more at stake
outside the purely military arena. Arguably Caesar was more of a politician than a general, and
his consistent championing of the common people to the extent of promoting plebeian bravery
over upper-class cowardice was in contrast to Vere's notable lack of comment regarding his
soldiers and use of his connection to the Earl of Oxford. 159 Caesar is keen to share his success
with his soldiers, whereas Vere rarely remarks on his soldiers' abilities or commitment; they
are the recipients of his orders, and it is those orders that are the foundation of victory.l60
Caesar was very particular over which individuals he named in his accounts, and again this is
a reflection of the heightened political drama in Rome of which he was very much a part.161
158 Jane F. Gardner, <Introduction' to Julius Caesar, The Civil War, (London: Penguin, 1967), trans. by Jane F.
Gardner, p.29; see also pp.26; 27; 28. Welch and Powell, Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter, Introduction, pp,x-xi;
Hall, "'Ratio" and "Romanitus''', p.1S.
159 T.P. Wiseman, 'The Publication of De Bello Gallico', p.3, and Adrian Goldsworthy, "'Instinctive Genius";
The depiction of Caesar the general', in Julius Caesar as Artfol Reporter, p.194.
160 Hall, "Ratio" and "Romanitus"', p.12; Vere does describe his soldiers as <bold', but then censures them for
their 'greedinesse of spoil', Dillingham, Commentaries, pp. 38; 40. Sir Roger Williams notes this characteristic
of Caesar; Discourse, p.A3; he was nevertheless on good terms with Vere.
161 Kathryn Welch, 'Caesar and his officers', p.87.
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He was not beyond taking the credit for the actions of others.162 Likewise Vere appears to go
it alone in the Netherlands, but the accounts of the expeditions, particularly the Island Voyage,
contain several details of colleagues. Sir John Wingfield he describes as a 'right valiant
Knight', and Sir Samuel Bagnall he singles out 'for his especiall merit and valour'. He is
careful not to overtly criticise Essex, emphasising his defence of the earl to the Queen, and of
Raleigh's navigational error for which that admiral was court-martialled Vere makes the open
comment: 'whether of set purpose, or by mistake I leave others to judge,.163 Given that he
had fallen out with both men, he would appear to be stressing his impartiality towards them.
Magnanimity is not regarded as Vere's strong point, although it is feasible that his claims as
the architect of so many victories were, from his own perspective, honest reflections of events
and there are no denials in contemporary texts of his ability as a military leader. Vere is
regarded as having a high opinion of himself. David Trim suggests that even Dillingham,
through his comment that Horace Vere was too modest to write an account of his own actions,
implies that he believed Francis to be immodest. However this fails to take into account the
two previous occasions in the same preface where Dillingham referred to Vere's modesty.i"
Caesar was also accused of vainglory, but for him the stakes were much higher thus the
necessity to impress his personal greatness on the Roman public.16s A major difference
between the two was status. Caesar was generalissimo, second to no-one in his theatre of war
and answerable only to the Senate in Rome, to which he gave little credence, and to public
opinion, to which he gave a great deal.l66 Vere was a subordinate commander, attempting to
force his point of view on higher commanders, some with whom he had strained relations.
Vere had to separate the victories, which he presented as having engineered, from the less
successful enterprises, which he wished to show that others had allowed to fail. Compare his
accounts of the successful action at Nieuwpoort:
On the other side, I knew that without further succours their numbers would weary and
eat us up in the end. I therefore at once sent to the Frison-footmen of the vanguard to
advance, and to the Count Maurice to tell him how things stood, and to desire him to
162 Barbara Levick. 'The Veneti revisited'. in Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter. p.64. ODNB: Vere.
163 Dillingham, Commentaries. pp.36; 41; 52; 67.
164 Ibid. 'Epistle to the Reader'; ODNB.
165 Hall. "'Ratio" and "Romanitus ..••p.l7; Welch. 'Caesar and his officers'. p.91. Goldsworthy. 'Instinctive
Genius', p.l93.
166 Goldsworthy, 'Instinctive Genius', p.200.
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send me part of the horse and battle; and because I saw the enemy presse & gain upon
d I . [67our men more an more, sent again messenger upon messenger ...,
set against his comments regarding the much-criticized Island Voyage:
I must confesse, in this point I may be ignorant of some particulars, because things
were not done, as they were wont, by Council, or, if they were, it was but of some few,
to which I was not called. But in all likelihood there was willful mistakin~ in some to
hinder us of that rich prey, which God had sent as it were into our mouths. I 8
Neither general was particularly religious, with Caesar seemingly disinterested in religious
ritual or omen and Vere indifferent to the extent that he makes no comment at all on
religion.169 Caesar shows a high level of respect for the Gallic enemy, commenting that both
sides drew courage through 'love of honour and fear of disgrace', whereas Vere, possibly due
to the ethnic melting pots that formed all European armies, does not describe his enemy's
characteristics.F" In sum, there are similarities between the Commentaries, but Caesar was a
man writing for an immediate political impact, bending accounts to suit his purpose in the
manner of the propagandist, utilizing the written word to reveal 'not the truth but perhaps the
art' of the author. Vere, on the other hand, perhaps wrote ostensibly for the benefit of young
officers, his accounts a didactic offering to instruct others, but whatever his main reason his
memoirs would concurrently cement his reputation amongst the martial community.!" If
Vere wrote for the benefit of others then that would move him closer to Monluc, who stated
his instructional intent: 'the Captains who shall take the pains to read my Life, will therein
meet with Passages, that may be useful to them in the like Occasions,.I72 Commentaries as a
Renaissance literary genre are shown in Cotton's poem in the preface to the Monluc work
which highlights the influence of Caesar as comparator and Rome as military exemplar:
167 Dillingham, Commentaries, p.l 00.
168 Ibid, p.54.
169 Hall, "'Ratio" and "Romanitus"', pp.19; 21.
170 Louis Rawlings, 'Caesar's portrayal of Gauls as warriors'. in Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter, p.179. Vere's
lack of comment contrasts with Sir Roger Williams, who had great respect for the Spanish, with whom he served
for four years: Actions, p.82; Discourse, p.10-12, 29.
171 Hall, "'Ratio" and "Romanitus"', p.17; Welch, 'Caesar and his officers'. p.97; Levick, 'The Veneti revisited'.
p.g.62; 63; 65.
2 Monluc, Commentaries, p.l.
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Thus Caesar in his Tent at night;
The Actions of the day did write,
And viewing what h'ad done before,
Emulous of himself, yet more,
And greater things perform'd, until
His arm had overdone his will,
So as to make him almost fit
To doubt the truth of what he writ.
Yet what he did, and writ, though more,
Than ere was done, or writ before;
Montluc by thee, and thee alone,
Are parallel' d, if not outdone,
And France in Ages yet to come,
Shall shew as great a man as Rome.173
Travel writing and diarists
The Elizabethan age saw Englishmen travel far afield in search of trade and adventure,
and some of the writings these men produced were and remain of interest. Julia Schleck has
recently reviewed Richard Hakluyt's Principall Navigations of the English Nation (London,
1589),174 and in so doing has reminded us that 'evaluation is always culturally determined' .175
She contends that the work should not be taken at face value but was a published account
(several years after the events) of letters written by factors to manipulate the reader, initially
the Muscovy Company in London. The 'facts' of the voyage are less important than, and are
only constructs in support of, the 'moral lesson' .176 Contemporaries viewed such travel
writing with equal scepticism, one commenting 'that Travellers may lie by authority'. 177
Schleck advises caution when viewing the detail of Hakluyt's, and similar, travel accounts.
Travellers to Europe from Britain can be grouped into several categories. Clergymen,
dissenting Protestants as well as Catholics, merchants and their factors, tradesmen and their
wives; such people ventured to the Low Countries along with the many soldiers. Gentlemen
and members of the nobility, however, tended to avoid that area for their grand tour, preferring
173 Cotton, 'On the brave Mareschal de Montluc, and his Commentaries writ by his own hand', Monluc,
Commentaries. Preface.
174 Julia Schleck, '''Plain Broad Narratives of Substantial Facts": Credibility, Narrative and Hakluyt's "Principle
Navigations"', Renaissance Quarterly, No. 59, (2006), pp.768-794.
17S Schleck, 'Hakluyt', p.77!.
1761bid. p.782.
1771bid, p.789.
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the language, sophistication and high culture of France and Italy. There were exceptions, like
William Lithgow, who came to observe the sieges, or youngsters seeking an opportunity to
display their valour in the wars. It was fashionable throughout the period for gentlemen to
keep diaries; indeed it was encouraged as part of the education process, as was the visiting of
European cities or the sending of young men to stay with diplomats abroad for extended
periods. During the Elizabethan era the government kept close tabs on the movement of
people, presumably concerned over their susceptibility to proselytising Catholics or keen to
capitalise on their availability to carry out tasks on behalf of the state, but with the death of the
Earl of Salisbury this official obsession with private travel fades.!" The diaries tended to
follow a certain format, a mundane stereotype, describing the towns and cities the individuals
passed through, what they purchased, with whom they stayed (often other Englishmen unless
it was to learn a language).
At times the diaries of gentlemen become the accounts of soldiers. Thomas Raymond
served a short time in the army in the Low Countries, and others, such as John Evelyn (who
served an entire week as a volunteer with the States General) and Sir Edward Herbert, who
learned his manners in Paris prior to deploying to the Cleves-Julich crisis, recount their
military adventures as part of their grand tour.179 Likewise William Lithgow, who gave an
account of the siege of Breda from his own experience with Frederick-Henry's army although
he was in fact passing through the area as a traveller rather than in the Low Countries with the
specific intent of fighting. 180
Autobiography
This genre was, typically for the Renaissance, originally a product of Italy and
progressed throughout Europe at a varied pace. British autobiographies in the period covered
by this thesis, however, were still only just emerging, although some writers had included
178 For the introduction of passports into Europe see Valentin Groebner, Who are you? Identification. Deception
and Surveil/once in Early Modern Europe, trans. Mark Kyburz (Cambridge, Mass: Zone, 2007).
179 John Stoye, English Travellers Abroad 1604-1667: Their Influence in English Society and Politics (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), Revised Edition, pp.I-13; 171-198. Lawrence Stone, The
Crisis of the Aristocracy 1558-1641 (Oxford University Press, 1967), Abridged Edition, p.313-317.
180William Lithgow, A True and Experimental Discourse upon the beginning. proceding and Victorious event of
this last siege Of Breda (London, 1637). Hugh Dunthorne, 'Scots in the Wars of the Low Countries, 1572-1648',
in Grant G. Simpson, ed., Scotland and the Low Countries, 1124-1994 (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1996),
p.108.
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themselves among the characters of their fictional works.!" Thomas Whythome, a musician,
wrote what is alleged to be the first autobiography in 1576 for an unknown friend, and it was
not published until 1961.182 Half a century after Whythome wrote, the colourful Sir Kenelm
Digby disguised his autobiography as a work of fiction, but has been accused of altering some
facts to suit his purpose.183 Both Whythome and Digby had conducted a grand tour, so their
autobiographical accounts would no doubt have drawn on the notes they made during their
travels, thus the genres of travel writing, diary and autobiography are here intrinsically linked.
In the case of Digby, who also embarked on a naval expedition on the Elizabethan privateering
model, military memoirs are added. A sense of societal change and a concept of history,
manifest in the attitudes to classical civilisation noted above, were required for the initiation of
autobiography. This combined with the demise of the monastic scribes who since the
Reformation no longer recorded events in their chronicles. Unlike many of their medieval
ancestors, the early modem emphasis on education meant that gentlemen increasingly were
able to write, and were encouraged and inclined to do so. They often included notes on the
extended family of which they were part and its genealogy, and were inspired by the turbulent
political epoch in which they felt involved. That said, it was nevertheless frowned upon to
publish such works, except in the form of military memoirs that were considered acceptable.
The role of the individual was regarded as subservient to that of the state, the 'common weal,'
and only fighting for the 'cause' could justify the immodest flaunting of individual experience
over the national collective. An autobiography is, by definition, a history of an individual and
therefore was an affront to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century sensibilities, but much of the
peripheral information may be of interest to us, not least his own opinion of what and whom
he encountered. If an autobiography becomes in part a wider history of the author's era, a
history, the genre discussed below, may recall events in which the author was involved, and
both Sir Roger Williams' and Thomas Churchyard's accounts of the war in the Low Countries
sees a merging of the two; a history with autobiographical sections.l'"
181 Such as Thomas More in Utopia and Edmund Spenser as Colin Clout. Edward Berry, The Making of Sir
Philip Sidney (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 1998), p.3.
182 ODNB: Thomas Whythome.
183 Loose Fantasies, unpublished. Digby may have 'retouched the true picture' regarding his wife's reputation;
ODNB: Sir Kenelm Digby.
184 Paul Delaney, British Autobiography in the Seventeenth Century (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969),
pp.6-23; 118-21; 136-141.
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History
The writing of histories also had historical precedent, through ancients such as Tacitus,
Livy and Thucydides. Edward Grimeston edited 'out of the best authors that have written of
that subject' a history of the Netherlands.!" which although it begins long before our period
nevertheless gives an in depth account of the war up to 1608. It includes a graphic description
of the siege of Leyden, strategic comment on the Spanish decision to lay siege to Ostend, the
use of pigeon post and propaganda.l'" However Grimeston was a scholar not a military man.
The soldier Thomas Churchyard explains why he took Meteren' s Latin history of the
Netherlands for translation, and in so doing articulates in a neat paragraph the motivation
behind not only his reason for writing but also hints at the reason men went to war:
I found so great profunditie in the man and matter, chieflie because hee exactlie
(without adulation) wrote of martiall affaires, and exployts done by mightie
Govemours and valiant souldiers: that not onlie attained honour in the field (some of
them honourablie borne) but also wanne everlasting fame by their prowesse and
service. A while considering the consequences and worth thereof, I thought God
would be offended, my countrie dishonoured, and worthie men should be in time to
come forgotten and discouraged: whereon I took in hand to revive dead men and their
actions (for fames sake which all men shoot at) that time past and time present should
be so remembered ...
Churchyard combined a translator's skill with his own experience and knowledge to
underwrite the work as an authentic representation of his trade:
So in my great age [he was nearly eighty] I clapped on a youthful corage ... and stoutly
stept into the translation of Meteranus workes of Historia Belgica: but often falling
sick, and like to passe from the world, I called unto me one Richard Robinson, ... one
whom I might commanud [sic] and keepe a long while for this purpose, and who tooke
great paines (Ibeing sick) in the translation, and in writing the other Collections of this
booke: but my studie, knowledge, experience, and eye witness for all or most actions
in this book, perfected everie Eoint and peece of matter pertaining to the truth of al
here in this volume printed ... I 7
18S On the siege ofSluys, Grimeston 'quotes Williams' entire account verbatim'; Evans, Works, p.cxi.
186 Jean Francois Le Petit, A general/ historie of the Netherlands, ed. by Edward Grimeston (London, 1608).
Quote from title page; Leyden p.569; Ostend p.1263; pigeon post p.567; propaganda p.1278. There was another
edition in 1609, and in 1627 a 'Newly renewed, corrected' edition with 'Continuance from the yeare 1608 till the
~eare of our Lord 1617 by William Crosse'.
87 Churchyard, True Discourse, The Epistle Dedicatorie; my italics.
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Williams' Actions did not appear in print during his lifetime. It combines elements of
autobiography within a history which, like Meteren's history to Churchyard, the author felt
intimate with. The work is presented as a history, as it is not until page 56 that Williams
arrives in person, and he does not start to relate events in the first person until page 69, with
the arrival of Sir Humphrey Gilbert's regiment at Flushing. Contrasting entirely with Vere,
Williams at times changes from the third to the first person, leaving the reader unsure if
Williams was actually present during the action or recounting a secondary source.l" More
than twenty years since the death of Williams, and having had the manuscript for 'a long
time', Sir Peter Manwood gives three reasons for deciding to publish:
First to incite other men of Armes to imitate in like sort their great Master Julius
Caesar ... Secondly, to prevent least such worthy paines should either perish, or
hereafter be set forth by others as their own: a thing too much practiced by some, not
of meanest note. Lastly, to make this a meane of drawing the residue into light, which
happily sleepeth in the custodie of some other man. 189
What view of 'history' did these writers have or develop? Sir John Haywood, in a
preface to Actions, states that all histories require 'Order, Poyse and Truth', and warns 'yet for
divers causes it hapneth that in many, one of these doth faile'. Haywood, who appears less of
the Renaissance man in his low opinion of ancient works (denigrating the geography and truth
of Tacitus) but nevertheless shows familiarity with them, gives a short yet harsh critique of
past histories: 'Many living in these Artlesse ages, have stuffed their Stories with most
senselesse fictions; nothing better then country womens tales'. He criticises those who 'busie
themselves much in those things which the popular multitude doe applaud', and those who are
'strongly biasse in their affections ... omitting or defacing the solide truth'. He warns against
' ... those who upon hate, feare, or favour, either to some persons, or to their native countrey, or
to the religion which they prof esse, or for some other partiall respect, doe write Panegyrickes
or Invectives, rather than histories'. Of Williams he says: 'Amongst those few who have
written with knowledge, judgement, and sincerity, the Author of this Historie is to be
ranged ... Touching the Historie it selfe, it is faithfull and free' .190 Haywood at least believed
that a true account was the essence of history.
188 Evans, Works, p.xvi, n2.
189 Williams, Actions, The Epistle Dedicatory.
190 Williams, Actions, 'To The Reader'. Haywood seems to have been the editor: 'I have restored it so neere as I
could, both to the stile and meaning of the Authour'.
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Christian soldier
Some soldiers were keen to emphasise a zealous adherence to their faith and produced
prayer based works in the 'Christian Soldier' genre. There was a great deal of literature of this
type produced during the British Civil Wars, but it was evident before that period. Robert
Monro published, at the end of his Expedition, 'The Christian Souldier Going On Service His
Meditations'. In this work Monro merges actual warfare against an enemy with the allegory
of spiritual combat against evil. This allegorical approach had been previously presented by
writers such as Erasmus in his Enchiridion Militis Christian; (A Handbook of the Christian
Soldier) of 1533. Erasmus described the book itself as 'a kind of dagger' and in writing it had
followed Biblical tradition.!" St. Paul expanded on the metaphors of Isaiah:
Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the
deviL.Stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and having the
breastplate of righteousness, and your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of
peace; and above all, taking the shield of faith, wherewith ye shall be able to quench
the fiery darts of the wicked. And take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the
Spirit, which is the word ofGod.192
Let us therefore cast off the works of darkness, and let us put on the armour of light. 193
Monro uses the language of metaphorical combat when addressing God in his 'Meditations':
... thy coming unto Judgment is terrible, thy roaring is like a Lyon, and thy Sword a
consuming fire, no place can hide man from thy presence, thou seest the heart and the
Reines, no secret is hid from thee, and who can escape from thy vengeance? None,
except they repent. Lord therefore save me from that bitter death, and give me grace to
repent, that I may bewaile my misery, before I depart.
The battle, Monro emphasises, is God's and they are all His soldiers:
Lord therefore make us contemne and slight all things, for the love of Christ; altering
from vice to virtue, mortifying our lusts, that we may become Souldiers of Christ,
loving nothing so much as God and the salvation of our soule. 194
191 Timothy Hampton, Writing from History: The Rhetoric of Exemplarity in Renaissance Literature (Cornell
University Press, 1990), p.48. David L. Jeffrey, A Dictionary of Biblical Tradition in English Literature (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), p.S6.
192 Ephesians 6:11; 14-17.
193 Romans 13:12.
194 Monro, Expedition. p.218, III; V.
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He goes on to combine physical and spiritual combat:
When thy seest thy Camerade making ready, and fix against his enemies, girding his
loynes, that he may fight the more valiantly, then thinke with thy self, that is thy duty,
to put on the Spirituall Armour, and to gird thy loynes against Satan, the world and the
flesh, that thou mayst fight the spirituall combat, bridling thy riotous appetite, bringing
under the flesh, despising the worlds glory, be at no time altogether idle, but ever doing
somewhat for the publique welfare, discharging the duties of thy calling, beseeching
God for Christ thy Captaines sake, to pronounce thee happy, in the day of thy
appearance.I"
Monro believed that 'it is God that giveth victorie', 196and so it followed that the spiritual
effort of the soldiers should proceed in tandem with physical, military preparedness.
Editing and translations
It can be difficuIt to ascertain what influence the publisher, or some other editor, may
have had on a work. The stated author may not have written it at all. Evans explains that
Newes from Sir Roger Williams was not written by Sir Roger, but bore his name in order to
sell the pamphlet; it was simply a marketing ploy.197 Robert Ward claimed to have taken from
'the most approved Authors, ancient and modem, either in Greeke, Latine, Italian, French,
Spanish, Dutch or English,.198 What parts of his voluminous work can be attributed to whom,
regarding authorship or translation, is not clear, despite marginal notes attributing historical
examples to, for example, Plutarch, Sir WaIter Ralegh and Stowe.l99 Who contributed to his
extensive sections on fortification and artillery is not stated, but his list of equipment in the
section on artillery is too similar to Francis Markham's wording to be coincidental.P" For
works published after the death of the author the publisher or editor decided upon what
appeared in a printed work, and this mayor may not be an accurate portrayal of the author's
design. It is possible that Williams' Actions was re-written by Sir John Haywood although,
given that editors stress on the truth of the author's account (see above) this would seem
195Ibid. p.219, VIII.
1961bid.p.220, XII.
197Evans, Works, p.l54.
198W d,A' dv . fr ..ar ntma erstons, ontispiece,
1991bidpp.9,14,31.
200 Compare Ward, ibid, p.l08, with Francis Markham, Epistles, p.119. Ward published twelve years after
Markham's death, and seventeen years following the publication of Epistles.
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unlikely.P'' William Garrard's The Arte of Warre was edited by Captain Robert Hichcock,
who undertook 'to correct the faultes of the Booke' .202 To what extent Hichcock amended
Garrard's text is not known, but the work contains significant paragraphs of other English.
books such as Digges' Stratioticos, Styward's Pathwaie and lve's translation of
Fourquevaux.203 Dillingham, it has been noted, presented Vere as a heroic figure, augmenting
his subject's own words with others that supported the case. Works that have been translated
have also gone through an editing process. For instance Charles Cotton, the translator of
Monluc's Commentaries, having stated that it is better to have 'an ill Translation than none at
all', continued to explain the inherent difficulties of translation:
Such a one in plain truth is this; not that I am willing to confess I have much missed
the sense of the Author; but though elegant enough those times, 'tis a knotty piece in it
self, and though wrapt up in very good sense, yet writ by the rough hand of a Soldier,
and a rough one, and stuft up with old musty Proverbs (the mode of wit it seems at that
time) and such as we have not sometimes Proverbs of our own to render them by, and
to English a Proverb without a Proverb, is to make that unpleasant, and almost
unintelligible in one Language, that is queint and elegant in another; to repair which I
have in some places been necessitated almost to create Proverbs, or at least to render
his after a Proverbial way, to make them a little like the Original.?"
At times works could be taken completely out of the time in which they were written,
and potentially the context too, in order to draw a modem parallel or emphasise a
contemporary point. This was done consistently with classical works, discussed above, with
Shakespeare's plays and with the publication in 1651 of Fulke Greville's until then un-
published Life of Sir Philip Sidney, written about the Elizabethan age by a man who died in
1628 but which was seen as endorsing the concept of service to the state by the government of
the day, thus showing the development of republican propaganda.i'"
201 Robert B. Manning, Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), p.75n94.
202 Garrard, Arte ofWarre, To the reader.
203 Webb, Military Science, p.49.
204 Monluc, Commentaries, The Translator's Preface to the Reader.
20' Manning, Swordsmen, p.65; McCrea, 'Whose Life Is It, Anyway?', in Mayer and Woods, p.316.
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Conclusion
Soldier-authors produced works both in the style they inherited and in the new genre of
the times. These military writers, unprecedented until this period,206 combined foreign
experience with the foreign printed works which they adapted; hence they became
instrumental in creating the new 'art of war' in Britain.207 It has been shown that Henry
Hexham, William Blandy and Robert Barret used dialogue in the style of Machiavelli, and that
Monluc and Sir Francis Vere wrote in the ancient manner of Caesar's Commentaries.
Machiavelli, of course, had turned the focus of military discourse to the ancients, and the use
of Caesar was itself a reflection of the Renaissance belief in Graeco-Roman classical
precedent. Even modernists such as Sir Roger Williams were prone to use classical precedent
as authority on occasion (although Humfrey Barwick exceptionally did not). Educated full-
time soldiers knew the intellectual theory behind modem war while producing printed
practical guidance, thus Paul Ive was able to translate Fourquevaux and write his own treatise
on fortification. The burgeoning genre of autobiographylhistory as produced by Williams and
Thomas Churchyard in the late sixteenth century was continued in the early and mid-
seventeenth century by Henry Hexham, Robert Monro and, later, Sir James Turner. Such
works provided the reading public with an eyewitness source for the information on warfare
that they sought. Additionally, another new sub-genre of published military material came in
the form of textbooks; manuals that sought to bring knowledge of military organisation and
use of equipment (the new 'drill') to the landed classes, and there are examples of these in
Appendix 1.208 Thomas Proctor produced what has been referred to as the first technical
treatise on warfare in English,209 but Proctor was not a soldier and drew his information from
scattered sources. Others, notably Thomas Digges, emphasised the theoretical aspects of
warfare, which they supported with only limited if any practical experience. The soldier
Thomas Styward produced one work that went through three editions such was its popularity,
as it came at a time of growing concern over the Spanish threat and would have educated those
who were responsible through their social status for commanding the local militia. Robert
Barret and Gyles Clayton were soldiers who also wrote for the guidance of those ignorant of
206 There had been military treatises in manuscript, such as those produced by Thomas Audley, Robert Hare and
Henry Barrett, but not in response to the current crises, not in print, not in this number and not in a position to
espouse the 'modem' art of war. Eltis, Military Revolution, p.57.
201'Ib'd1 ,p.lOO.
208See, for example, Sir Clement Edmondes, The Maner of Our Moderne Training (London, 1600).
209 Cockle, Bibliography, p.38.
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war and yet who held military obligations come the day of reckoning with the enemy, which
even in 1598 'seemeth not far off .210 The debate on the nature of warfare, that is the retention
of traditional methods and equipment versus a developing, modem view of warfare, was
published through the traditionalist Sir John Smythe and the response his (supressed) work
drew from modernists Sir Roger Williams and Humfrey Barwick. Innovations were not
unheard of, with William Neade suggesting the combination of the bow and the pike as a new
hybrid weapon.i!' The creation of regular printed news instalments added a sense of
excitement and drama as the unfolding of events was reported if not as soon as they occurred
certainly shortly afterwards.
The influence of foreign writers is manifest through the works translated into English,
listed at Appendix 2. Additionally, many English authors were influenced by foreign works in
the production of their own material, such as Barnaby Rich (Machiavelli), Robert Norton
(Uffano), Robert Ward (several unstated), Robert Barret (also unstated),212 William Garrard
(Fourquevaux) and the English gunners who drew from Tartaglia without reference.i'!
Nevertheless, frequently they were able to edit the material of others with their own combat
experience to guide them.
There were some notable changes from the 1570s through to the 1630s. De Gheyn's
work of 1607, which showed in picture format the posture of soldiers when handling the
unwieldy musket, was the first of its kind and Hexham used this method in his work of 1637.
News, it has previously been shown, became a printed commodity widely circulated in the
seventeenth century from its sporadic start in the last decades of the sixteenth. From the
fascination with the siege of Ostend, which produced several works in English as well as those
translated from other languages.i" to the corantos of the Thirty Years' War,2IS news became
distinct from historical accounts due to the speed with which it was circulated. Christian
soldier prayers and advice were introduced in the later period as seen through the works of
Hexham and Monro.
210 Barret, Theorike, dedication to the Earl of Pembroke.
211 An idea supported by nobody but the King. William Neade, The Double-armed Man (London, 1625).
212 Cockle, Bibliography, p.63.
213 Henry J. Webb, 'The Science of Gunnery in Elizabethan England', Isis, Vol. 45, No.1 (May, 1954), p.16.
214 Appendix 1, Serials 28; 29; 30; 86. Appendix 2, Serials 45; 48. .
21S See Appendix 4.
87
Soldier-authors added to the increasingly popular genre of printed military books. The
appendices list the titles that appeared up until 1642, and show the wide variety of material
within that genre. Historians, government officials, mathematicians and militiamen all added
to the narratives and manuals produced by professional soldiers, but the experience of war,
discussed at length in Chapter Four, belongs to soldiers alone. What drove them to fight, and
to continue fighting in arduous conditions, is the focus of Chapter Three. Before these core
analyses are made. a breakdown of what sort of individual populated the ranks of
EnglishIW elsh and Scots contingents must be undertaken. Chapter Two will therefore
categorise the men who were enlisted, commissioned or forced into armies to fight away from
home, and challenge and re-appraise the nomenclature used by historians to date.
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Chapter Two
The categories of soldiers
Introduction
This chapter analyses the efforts of historians, who continue to struggle with the
terminology that best explains the categories into which soldiers should be grouped, and
suggests that a possible solution lies in a close reading of soldiers' own accounts. It
discusses the problems facing the historian who seeks to reconcile modern concepts and
terminologies with early-modern usage. It examines sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
phraseology, the language of the soldier as witnessed through his printed works, in order to
clearly specify into which category soldiers should be placed and how that category should
be described. Tudor and early Stuart society was highly stratified and, in order to
understand the relationship between soldiers, it is vital to categorise the military authors,
and soldiers generally, into the correct early modern grouping. Military units abroad
functioned to an extent as a society separated from that in England and Scotland. Inmany
ways this military society mimicked its parent but it also saw the promotion of individuals
into positions of authority that did not necessarily mirror their place in civilian society.
This occurred because enduring and unbroken European warfare produced experienced
soldiers who over time had learned their trade, were able to command men in difficult
circumstances, and were therefore promoted on merit. They experienced frequent clashes
with socially high-ranking 'amateurs', short-term visitors to the war zone who found that
their position in civilian society did not directly correlate with their authority and influence
in the army. Also' gentlemen' of lower social rank often occupied an indistinct position
within the chain of command, usually for limited duration, that could cause friction
depending on the individual, his commander, and the relationship between the two.
Visibility of these relationships, and with it a more accurate classification of soldiers, is
readily accessible through the printed works of early modern soldiers.
Professional soldiers: an early modern definition
The debate on what constituted an early modern profession has been discussed
above in the Introduction. In the context of this debate, it is pertinent to this thesis to
consider which individuals, or body of men, considered themselves 'professional', which
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'mercenary', and which 'amateur' and what they meant by each of these terms.' What
factors did they consider constituted a 'professional' soldier? How did he define himself,
and in what way did he distance himself from a mercenary'f
'Mercenary' in its modem-day form conjures up images of ex-Regular Army
soldiers, usually white, leading uneducated and over-armed locals, mainly black, in
borderless areas of poverty-stricken but mineral rich Africa. They risk their lives, perhaps,
but they have no cause other than personal gain, and are generally regarded with disdain by
the peace-loving majority in the country from which they are drawn who see any future
wars to be fought by regular, professional armies, governed by civilians and only deployed
after a due political process. Thus the 'mercenary' and 'professional' soldier are
categorised separately in the modem mind-set. 3 There has been a clouding of these terms
by historians when applied to early-modem soldiers. Sir John Hale blurs 'hired
professional mercenaries' with 'professional freelance', where the former may not in fact
have been mercenaries at all but the word 'freelance' in the latter would indicate
'mercenary' . He also plays down the fact that non-Spanish soldiers in the Army of
Flanders were for the most part subjects of the king, a status that would indicate neither the
king nor the soldiers themselves would have used the label 'mercenary'. 4
It is worthwhile to consider at this stage the development of medieval mercenaries
in order to better understand how they evolved into the early modem era, and to take a
glimpse at the 'particular pre-history' of the early modem profession of arms, as Ian Roy
phrased it.S Historians tend to move between discussion of military leadership to military
issues in general without pausing to clarify the difference. They are interested in those
individuals who led groups of soldiers, be they in companies, regiments or armies, and
1 Michael Hattaway argued that through a reading of 'the Shakespearean canon ... at the end of the sixteenth
century the age of the 'soldier' [chivalric] had passed and the age of the 'martialist' [professional] had
arrived'; 'Blood is their argument: men of war and soldiers in Shakespeare and others', in Anthony Fletcher
and Peter Roberts, eds., Religion, culture and society in early modem Britain: essays in honour of Patrick
Collinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.84.
2 'Profession: a vocation, a calling, esp. one requiring advance knowledge or training ... any occupation as a
means of earning a living', attributed to late Middle English. 'Mercenary: a person who receives payment
for his or her services; spec. a professional soldier serving a foreign power', attributed to early 16th century.
OED.
3 Few would regard the modem British Army as a mercenary force, although the status of the Ghurkhas has
often generated debate. It is also true that some present day governments, such as Zimbabwe and South
Africa, come perilously close to categorising their citizens serving in the British Army, as the result of a
Commonwealth recruiting drive, as mercenaries.
4 J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620 (Phoenix Mill: Sutton, 1998), pp.64; 70;
153.
S Ian Roy, 'The Profession of Arms', in Wilfrid Prest, ed., The Professions in early modem England
(Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1987), p.181.
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switch to discussion of the soldiers themselves leaving the edges blurred. In regard to the
status of the military as a profession, Ian Roy studied 'the position and progress of the
officers of the armed services during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries', even though
the term 'officer' also requires clarification as discussed below." Ian Roy has stated from
the outset that his discussion on whether or not the military should be considered a
'profession' is focussed on 'leadership in war'.' In the discussions of some other
historians, the subject of their focus is not always entirely clear, as will be seen below.
Rosemary O'Day has looked at the development of certain professions 'out of a
philosophy of life' driven by the sixteenth-century Renaissance and Reformation. She
contends that people entering the learned professions 'saw their work in terms of vocation,
service and commitment rather than simply earning a living'. 8 'While her discussion does
not include military leadership, it is clear from the printed works of soldiers that they too
regarded themselves as fighting for the 'commonweal'. 9 The military leaders who
committed their views to print (and they were all leaders, albeit at varying positions within
the military hierarchy) also regarded themselves as belonging to a distinct grouping with
what Ian Roy and others term an esprit de COrpS.IO
Michael Mallett, in his analysis of 1999, separated mercenaries from the paid
soldiery: 'It is the concept of fighting for profit, together with the gradual emergence of
'foreignness', which distinguishes the true mercenary...from the ordinary paid soldier,.11
Mallett contends that the creation of mercenary groups was as a result of 'the growing
sophistication of warfare' as the deployment of aristocratic cavalry came to be checked by
mass infantry, the use of which could result in the expansion of an army beyond the
capability of feudalism, and could storm cities and conduct sieges whereas the cavalry
could not. Although 'service for pay' can be traced back to the mid eleventh century, it
was the thirteenth century that witnessed the development of the infantry arm and by the
fourteenth century soldiers were generally paid but separated from the category of
6 Ibid, p.181. My italics.
'Ibid, p.184. My italics.
8 Rosemary O'Day, The Professions in Early Modern England: Servants of the Commonweal (Harlow:
Longman, 2000), p.2.
9 For instance: Robert Monro, Monro, His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment (called Mac-Keyes
Regiment) levied in August 1626 (London, 1637), I, p.60; II, p.62; II, p.ll1; Sir John Ogle in William
Dillingham, The Commentaries of Sir Francis Vere (Cambridge, 1657), p.147/159; Giles Clayton, The
Aprooved order of Martiall discipline (London, 1591), Epistle Dedicatory; Matthew Sutcliffe, The Practice,
Proceedings. And Lawes of armes (London, 1593), p.2.
10 Roy, 'Profession of Arms', p.187.
IIMichael Mallett, 'Mercenaries', in Maurice Keen, ed., Medieval Warfare: A History (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), p.207.
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'mercenary', which was a term reserved for 'the adventurer' and foreign 'specialist'. 12
Loyalty is an inevitable factor in any discussion on mercenaries, and it was a difficult issue
before the early-modem religious 'cause' provided a moral justification for serving a
foreigner. Machiavelli may have condemned the use of foreign soldiers but,13 while on
occasion foreign troops failed to engage the enemy through lack of pay," there were
nevertheless many examples of foreigners who, like Sir John Hawkwood in Florence, are
notable for their long service to one employer. Many proved themselves reliable in the
face of the enemy, sometimes more so than homegrown troops. As will be seen, these
observations are relevant to the discussion on both the categorisation of soldiers and their
motivation in the period. IS
A clear distinction between the paid professional and the mercenary is discernible
in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature, as will be seen through the printed works
of Sir Roger Williams, Francis Markham, Robert Monro and Henry Hexham.
Traditionally, mercenaries sold their services to the highest bidder and as such were
unreliable as their loyalty could not be guaranteed:
'Tis hard to trust a mercenary worth,
He's moulded new at every alteration;
Who does sell life, does sell his reputation.l"
Their use could undermine a prince's justification for involvement in a conflict as it could
be conjectured (by rhetoricians such as Machiavelli) that the employment of foreign
soldiers, rather than the enlistment of subjects, indicated a lack of genuine 'cause', thus
princes would 'Hire Mercenary Swizers and Souldiers to maintaine all unjust quarrels even
with Monarcbest.V Princes themselves could sell their and their men's military services:
12 Mallett, 'Mercenaries', pp.208-lS. A defming characteristic of the French Civil Wars, the Eighty Years'
War and the Thirty Years' War was the ability for foreigners to justify their involvement on ideological
wounds.
3 See Chapter One above.
14 For a brief synopsis of such occasions in the early modem period, see David J. B. Trim, 'Ideology, Greed,
and Social Discontent in Early Modem Europe: Mercenaries and Mutinies in the Rebellious Netherlands,
1568-1609', in Jane Hathaway, ed., Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective
(Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger,2oo1).
IS Mallett, 'Mercenaries', pp.219-229.
16 Charles Aleyn, The battailes of Crescy and Poictiers under the fortunes and valour of King Edward the
third of that name, and his sonne Edward Prince of Wales, named the Black (London, 1633). The word
'mercenary' could be used in a wider context than the purely military, for instance by Ben Jonson: 'I humbly
crave there be no credit given to this man's mercenary tongue', Vo/pone, Act 4, Scene 5; The Alchemist and
Other Plays, ed. by Gordon Campbell (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1995). p.84. See also the use of
'mercenary' to describe authors in the section 'Reasons for publishing' in Chapter One above.
17 John Davies, Humours heav'n on earth with the civile warres of death and fortune (London, 1609).
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Stout John of Heinault to King Philip's side
His forces brings, although so neere ally'd
To Englands King (as Uncle to the Queene)
And had by Edward highly honour'd beene.
He now had chang'd his faith, and for the gold
Of France, his mercenary valour sold. IS
It can be seen that involvement in others' wars could be difficult to justify prior to the
convenience of the religious cause, notwithstanding Michael Mallett's convincing
argument. Post-Reformation soldiers, however, were able to articulate a difference
between the professional and the mercenary foreigner. Sir Roger Williams' career shows
how carefully the term 'mercenary' should be defined in this period. Despite changing
sides and notwithstanding his 'greedy desires to travaile to see strange warres', Williams
still had no good comment to make regarding mercenaries and certainly did not consider
himself one, saying 'those that serves many, serves nobody,' and 'as for Mercenaries, we
know it by good experience, commonly they follow the best purse' .19 His attitude towards
mercenanes is best summed-up through his comments regarding his experience of
Germans:
... those flegmatique people will second nobody without money before hand, &
assurance to be payd monethly, especially being gaged to serve the weakest partie.
When they come into the field, they will endure neither hardnes or wants without
their due guilt. When they have joined battaile, they have often cryed guilt, hurled
their weapons from them, and suffered their enemies to cut them to pieces. I doe
perswade myself all Potentates and estates hyre them, onely fearing their enemies
would have them. Without doubt, if one side hath them, and not the other, likely it
is master of the field; they come in such multitudes of Horsemen, as no Christian
Nation besides is able to furnish. Else perswade your self 500 hundred [sic] of
either English, Scottish, Burgundians, Wallones, French, Italians, Albaneses,
Hungarians, Poles, or Spanish, is worth 1500 Amaines."
Williams' emphasis is on the mercenary's demand for payment above duty, which has to
be balanced and placed in context. Williams believed soldiers required and deserved to be
paid (he openly admitted he needed work as a soldier in order to earn money to live), but
he accepted that this would not be a regular income and that there would be times when a
soldier would have to fight without it. He despised those whose priority was money above
18 Thomas May, The victorious reigne of King Edward the Third written in seven bookes, The third Booke
(London, 1635).
19 Sir Roger Williams, A Briefe Discourse ofWarre (London, 1590), p.54; Sir Roger Williams, The Actions
of the Low Countries (London, 1618), pp.31; 127.
20 Williams, Actions, p.ll.
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all else, the profit factor stressed by Michael Mallett above, and believed that a Frenchman
would sooner lose a war than a day's profiteering. He commented: 'I durst not trust the
most of them further than I see them'. 21 He had experienced many hardships brought
about through lack of pay, and when necessary had written to the Privy Council in despair,
so he was well aware of the impact of lack of funds, but to him money was necessary in
order to survive, not to grow wealthy on.22 To this Welsh soldier the gulf between
professional and mercenary soldier was far wider than that between Protestant and
Catholic.
Without question, a mercenary was generally regarded with disdain. However
David Trim, despite clarifying and separating out those English and Welsh soldiers who
'demonstrated clear-cut commitment' and volunteered to fight abroad when not compelled
to do so by their government, nevertheless decided upon 'mercenary' as the nomenclature
to describe them collectively and individually.r' Trim states that 'modem and early-
modem definitional criteria differ; modem definitions are loaded with modem
preconceptions and must be deconstructed ... current defmitions are also difficult to apply
in practical terms', and yet curiously from this concludes 'I do not offer a prescriptive
definition of what constitutes a mercenary'. His use of the term is at odds with early-
modem usage, as he quotes Francis Markham's denial of the term (Markham commented
that 'voluntary Gentlemen have beene more diligent. ..then any mercenary Souldier
whatsoever') and concludes from this that 'they neither thought of themselves, nor were
thought of by contemporaries, as mercenaries'. 24 Trim has defined the subject of his thesis
clearly enough, but has elected to use his own definitions to describe the soldiers about
whom he writes. His 'key distinction' between 'the volunteer' and 'the mercenary' as
respectively 'an avocation' and 'a profession' is only true of some of the soldiers and,
notably, not Francis Markham. Indeed, in his study of the definition of the term
'mercenary', Trim has confused the terms as used by Markham and Williams. Indeed the
whole tenor of Trim's argument is that many of the soldiers he has decided to term
'mercenary' were not mercenary at all, by early modem or modem criteria, which makes
his choice of the term somewhat incongruous. An individual's grounds for fighting
21 Williams, Actions, pp.63; 127. J.x. Evans, ed., The Works of Sir Roger Williams (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1972), p.xliv.
22 Evans, Works, p.xx.
23 David J.B. Trim, 'Fighting "Jacob's Wars". The Employment of English and Welsh Mercenaries in the
European Wars of Religion: France and the Netherlands, 1562-1610', PhD thesis, University of London,
2002, pp.30; 74.
24 Ibid, p.59.
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dictated his status as a mercenary or otherwise, and he, and his contemporaries, would
have been well aware of the difference. The status and definition of a 'gentleman
volunteer' is discussed below in the section 'Rank and Status'.
Soldiers of whatever hue required payment, and because a soldier was paid this did
not categorise him automatically as a mercenary. As Mallett states, this had been the case
for at least two centuries.P One characteristic of a 'profession' is that no salary was
received for services rendered, instead the professional accepted a fee. A fee-receiving
soldier, though, would be the one senior commander who coordinated the force, the
'military enterpriser' discussed in depth by Fritz Redlich.26 Such men were paid an agreed
lump sum calculated to cover all of their costs. Examples are the Scot William Moncrieff,
who gathered a force of his countrymen at the request of the city of Danzig in 1577, and
the many Thirty Years' War commanders like the Englishman Sir Horace Vere and the
Welshman Sir Charles Morgan. If the fee proved to be insufficient, they had to cover the
excess themselves.r" Members of the force were paid out of the commander's, that is the
enterpriser's, fee. The exceptions to this were the amateur 'gentlemen' (discussed below),
who financed their own deployments, and no doubt because of this could find themselves
at odds with their chain of command.
Add to the opinion of Sir Roger Williams noted above the comment by Henry
Hexham on the English contingent under pay of the Dutch: 'who though they take pay, as
their owne, for meere necessitie (for who goeth to warfarre at his owne charge?) yet fight
freely, not with respect to money, but love and the Cause and the Countrey'. 28 This early
modem understanding of financial arrangements, and the definition of terms derived from
it, has been confused by modem historians. David Trim believes: 'The key factor defining
a mercenary was that he was paid, whether by another prince or state, or his own', 29 but
this is correct in neither a modem nor an early modem scenario. Sir John Hale's opinion
regarding pay sees the use of 'mercenary' justified when applied to soldiers recruited by a
contractor:
2S Mallett, 'Mercenaries', p.21S.
26 Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and his Workforce: A Study in European Economic and
Social History, 2 vols (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1964-5).
27 Ibid. pp.68, 199,254.
28 Henry Hexham, A Tongue-Combat, lately happening betweene two English Souldiers in the Tilt-boat at
Gravesend. the one going to serve the King of Spaine, the other to serve the States General of the United
Provinces (London, 1623), p.l04.
29 Trim, 'Fighting "Jacob's Wars'", p.78.
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Except for the gentlemen volunteers, because all soldiers fought for pay, it was not
the receipt of a wage that made a man a 'mercenary', or indifference to the faith or
cause he served in arms, but the size of the unit that comprised him ... and his
dependence not on a political authority but on a contractor who had negotiated his
own bargain with government. 30
This is also an insufficient definition. Monro for one would have disagreed with it because
although Lord Reay was his enterpriser, in that he recruited him and paid his wages at least
initially, he was also his regimental commander who deployed and fought alongside him
for the 'cause'. When Monro himself returned to Scotland to bolster his regiment's
depleted ranks he believed he was recruiting 'for the further advancement of the good
cause', not for his profit or the profit of his regimental 'owner'. 31 Most British soldiers of
the early modem period fought at least for the promise of pay. Few gave their services for
free, although some volunteers did and senior soldiers experienced substantial fmancial
loss. The Trim definition of 'mercenary' would cover the majority of British soldiers
serving in Europe prior to the British Civil Wars, and although there were those civilians
who disdainfully labelled all 'professional' soldiers as 'mercenaries' and contributed to the
grim reputation of military men,32 in the main a difference between the two terms is
maintained. Set against the fighting-for-profit definition sits ancient 'chivalry,' discussed
in Chapter Four. This ethos continued to hold an influential position in the mind-set of the
gentry. Visiting amateurs, or those given command through their social rank rather than
their experience or suitability, may well have diluted the mounting effort to increase
military efficiency through standardisation and professionalism in order to produce cost-
effective military success in support of foreign policy. But the professionals of the era still
held true to an ancient honour code; adherence to the code was not purely the bedrock
unique to gentlemen amateurs. The 'nobility' of the military was a notion that still under-
pinned the profession:
Those that in quiet states do sing ofwarre,
Or write instructions for the Martiall crue,
Must never think t'escape the envious jarre,
Of those, who wealth, not honour still pursue.
For they do feare least souldiers growing strong,
Commaund the pelfe which they have gathered long.33
30 Hale, War and Society, p.146.
31 Monro, Expedition, Dedication to Elector Palatine.
32 Sir John Smythe had little regard for those who fought in the Netherlands, referring to 'English, French
and other mercenaries' being the 'kind of men ofwarre those disordred warres of the Lowe Countries have
bred and brought forth.' Sir John Smythe, Certain Discourses, Concerning the formes and effects of divers
sorts of weapons (London, 1590), Proeme Dedicatorie.
33 Robert Barret, The Theorike and Practike of Moderne Warres (London, 1598), before p.l.
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Certainly in command appointments, from part-time generals like the Earl of Leicester
through to the company captains, individuals of high social rank continued 'in pursuit of
virtue and honour as well as booty', 34 amateurs replacing or subordinating more capable
officers because of their higher social position. 'What corrupted the discipline of the
Netherlanders?' asked Sir Roger Williams, providing the answer 'chieflie placing their
ignorant cousins and favorites to command'. 35 There were sufficient full-time soldiers,
though, particularly after having gained experience in the first few years of the Eighty
Years' War and the civil wars in France, to hold the force together through professional
leadership.
David Trim has discussed the relationship between professionalism and chivalry at
length, suggesting that there are certain traits, or 'markers', that enable modem
professionalism to be discerned. These markers are:
1. a discrete occupational identity;36
2. formal hierarchy;
3. permanence;
4. a formal pay system;
5. a distinctive expertise and means of education therein;
6. efficiency in execution of expertise; and
7. a distinctive self-conceptualization."
The difficulty with such neat categorisations is that they have been articulated in an age
where such criteria are standard for military service, but applied to an age in which no such
standardisation existed. It is plausible to argue, in relation to the seven markers, that in the
early modem period soldiers were easily identifiable; they all sat within a formal
pyramidal hierarchy; the wars lasted decades and so did armies; there existed a formal pay
system in all armies; skills were required to operate weapons and therefore training was
required; there was a drive for increased efficiency in the reforms of leaders such as
34 Robert B. Manning, Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), p.S.
3S Williams, Discourse, p.7.
36 Hale discusses the 'notion of the soldiery as constituting a separate element within society', War and
Society, p.l27.
37 DJ.B. Trim, ed., The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism (Leiden: Brill,
2003), p.6.
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Maurice and Gustavus and all soldiers identified with each other. However, it is equally
plausible to argue against such findings. It could be stated that soldiers were sometimes
indistinguishable from sailors, particularly senior officers who crossed between the titles of
admiral and general with apparent ease,38while some activities in the areas of intelligence,
medical practitioners, engineers including pioneers," and the varied trade groups that
would now fall loosely within the categories of logistics, all hovered on the periphery of
'soldiering' in contemporary parlance." The formal hierarchy may have existed at
company and regimental level, although the 'gentlemen adventurers' (see below) threw
that simple chain of command askew, and at higher levels of command personality,
nationality, religion, personal fealty and identification of the ultimate paymaster could
detrimentally distort the strategic aims." There were no standing armies of any significant
size, and soldiers faced the prospect of disbandment despite the continuance of war.42
Excepting the Dutch (by the 1590s), pay systems consistently collapsed leaving soldiers
destitute and reliant on plunder through spoiling the towns and countryside. Often soldiers
deployed having had little or no training," although it was required: six days for pike,
sixty for firearms according to one soldier." Many factors combined to reduce efficiency
despite the efforts of reforming leaders," and individuals served either for short-term
38 During the Cadiz expedition of 1596, Sir Francis Vere became soldier-turned-sailor and was 'much excited
and interested in a conflict the nature of which was quite new to him, "having till that time been a stranger to
actions at sea.'" Clements R. Markham, The Fighting Veres (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle &
Rivington, 1888), p.266. In Brittany, 'a substantial force of sailors served as infantry as well', John S.Nolan,
Sir John Norreys and the Elizabethan Military World (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), p.216.
39 See, for instance, Chapter Four below, section on pioneers.
40 Both the Spanish and the Dutch used coal miners from Liege to assist their engineering effort, while in
Britain during the civil wars English and Scots colliers adapted to military mining. Christopher Duffy, Siege
Warfare (London & New York: Routledge, 1979), pp. 64; 71; 147.
41 This is particularly true in the case of the Leicester expedition, where the strategic aims of the Englishman
and those of the States of Holland proved irreconcilable; F.G. Oosterhoff, Leicester and the Netherlands
1586-1587 (Utrecht: H&S, 1988), p.190.
42 This caused soldiers to look elsewhere and slide towards accusations of 'mercenary', for example Sir
Roger Williams was forced to join the Spanish, his erstwhile enemy, through lack of options; Williams,
Actions, p.127. Many individuals would have been enlisted for specific expeditions and disbanded when no
longer needed, particularly in England for Cadiz and the Island Voyage, and later the campaigns ofMansfeld
and the Isle of Rhe. 'The great war ... brought constancy of war, but not constancy of warfare. Frequent
alternation between recruitment, reformation, reduction and dissolution of regiments was common practice in
all European armies during the Thirty Years' War ... ' Bernhard R. Kroener, "The Soldiers Are Very Poor,
Bare, Naked, Exhausted": The Living Conditions And Organisational Structure Of Military Society During
The Thirty Years' War,' in Klaus Bussmann and Heinz Schilling, eds., 1648. War and Peace in Europe
(Milnster/OsnabIiick Conference, 1998), p.285. See also the disbandment of Imperial units throughout the
Thirty Years' War in Peter H. Wilson, The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy (Cambridge, Mass:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), Table 4, p.397.
43 'Training', as distinct from 'musters', can be traced in England to 1573, but ironically only for the militia,
not for those deploying overseas. Lindsay Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia 1558-1638 (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1967), p.13.
44 Humfrey Barwick, A Briefe Discourse, Concerning the force and effect of all manuall weapons of fire
(London, 1592), p.24.
4S For instance the dilution of the well-trained, experienced and fiercely loyal SwedishIFinnish force that
originally landed in Pomerania with thousands oflocal soldiers of varying quality and allegiance.
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periods before moving on to other vocations (Thomas Raymond), for life (Sir Francis
Vere; Sir Roger Williams) or for other indefinite periods (Henry Rich, Earl of Holland; the
young Thomas Fairfax). This led to a range of experience and commitment that would
produce men with differing levels of military knowledge. How long would an individual
have to serve until he was considered 'professional'? There is a question as to whether or
not he was a professional at all: 'As a profession - unlike law or the church - [the
military] did not meet modem criteria; no academies, no diplomas, no initiatory and
exclusive ceremonies such as ordination'. 46 The counter to this: ' ... military society
nevertheless exhibited enough special characteristics to be considered a separate "order"
comparable to the clergy'." Simon Adams introduces the sub-category 'semi-
professional', which he does not fully explain but which presumably relates to those with
some military experience but not full-time soldiers." Redlich, concerned chiefly with the
economics of early modem warfare and mainly in Germany, saw three types of military
enterpriser: he that was tied to home and country and never switched sides; he that
discarded natural loyalties and fought, perhaps treasonably, for another prince, even an
enemy; and those 'unsteady men' who changed sides repeatedly." Redlich grouped the
soldiery, the 'labour force', into two categories of mercenary: he who returned home to his
community (perhaps to face the consequences of his enlistment as the practice was illegal
if unauthorised) and those 'uprooted individuals, belonging to roving folk' who had no .
home.50
What was the nature of military apprenticeship? How long was a military
apprenticeship? The answer to this would be dependent upon the experience and character
of each individual soldier; how intense the fighting had been during his term of service;
how suited he was to his vocation; how quickly he adapted. The point here is that there
can be no firm qualification criteria applied in the absence of formal training standards and
validation. As Francis Markham put it: ' ... the private Souldier who hath served in the
Warres both a Prentice and a Journey-man, will yield more sollide and substantiall reasons
for any undertaking, then many more glorious outsides, whose traffique with the Warres
46 Barbara Donagan, 'Halcyon Days and the Literature of War: England's Military Education before 1642',
Past and Present, No. 147 (May, 1995), pp.65-100.
47 Andre Corvisier, Armies and Society in Europe. 1494-1789. trans. Abigail T. Siddal (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1979), p.129
48 S.L. Adams, 'The Protestant Cause: Religious Alliance with the west European Calvinist Communities as
a Politicallssue in England, 1585-1630', unpublished D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 1973, p.62.
49 Redlich, Military Enterpriser, p.l12.
soIbid, pp.115n.
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hath been more pleasant and easie .. .'51 Another observer commented: 'some men gain
more experience in two years than others in ten'. 52 Whether an individual was a
professional or a mercenary, fighting for honour or just financial reward, and whether or
not his position changed during his service; these are, in the context of this thesis where
modem criteria and definitions have no place, ultimately matters for him and the judgment
of his contemporaries. They had their opinions:
... having so fewe men of experience in these dayes, wee see that every one having
served but a yeere or two, it is a great matter. Nay, if he but crosse the Seas, and
make hys abode but one month, he is accounted a Souldiour. But for my part, I
have served sixteene yeeres in Ireland, and in the Low Countries, and have seene
many peeces of service in both places, and yet I dare not account my selfe a
Souldiour. For the name of a Souldiour is most honourable, and those that beare
the name or title thereof, shoulde be men of understanding and knowledge, and
well experienced in warre, & Martiall discipline. 53
The age of a soldier could be anything from a teenage page to a geriatric general.
Sir Francis Vere was in his forties when he retired and died within a few years, so perhaps
he was old for the period's average. William Garrard had advised that 'a Soldier is
generally to be chosen betwixt 18 and 46 yeares.r" while Barret advised selection 'from
the age of eighteene yeares unto thirtie yeares.' 55 Vere was nevertheless much younger
than some other commanders; his brother Horace retired at 67,56 Tilly was 72 when he was
killed in combat,57 Sir William Brog served in the Netherlands for fifty years,5s and the
remarkable Mondragon served the Spanish Army of Flanders in the field as a
nonagenarian. 59 At one stage the maximum age of recruitment for soldiers serving the
Spanish monarchy reached 70.60
SI Francis Markham, Five Decades Of Spistles Of Warre (London, 1622), p.l63.
52 Edward Bowles, Manifest Truths, or An inversion of truths manifest (London, 1646), p.53.
53 Clayton, Approoved Order 0/Martial Discipline, Epistle to the Reader.
54 William Garrard, The Arte ofWarre (London: 1591), p.2.
55 Barret, Theorike, p.33.
56 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, henceforward ODNB: Sir Horace Vere.
S7 Monro, Expedition, II, p.117.
58 Hugh Dunthome, 'Scots in the Wars of the Low Countries', in Grant G. Simpson, ed., Scotland and the
Low Countries, 1124-1994 (Ease Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1996), p.ll0.
59 C.R. Markham, Fighting Veres, pp. 186; 215n.
60 Geoffrey Parker, The Army 0/Flanders and the Spanish Road (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Second Edition, 2004), p.39. Parker also gives 'over sixteen and under forty' as the rule of thumb but quotes
no source for this, and states the average age of the soldier as twenty-four; Geoffrey Parker, 'The Soldier', in
Rosario Villari, ed., Baroque Personae (Chicago University Press, 1995), pp.33-4.
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Rank and status
The only recorded military actions are those of the gentry and the nobility,
individuals who were acutely aware of their position in society. The focus of this thesis is
the published works of those individuals. The line of argument is that more can be
gleaned from these sources to shed light on the world in which they operated than has been
hitherto accepted. In medieval times, recorded battle casualty figures often only included
men of gentry status and above, so the total number of dead and wounded can only be
guessed through a rough calculation of the ratio of peasants to men-at-arms." While by
the early modem period for the most part all casualties were reported, nevertheless the
accounts were written by, for and about the 'officer' class. Feats of arms and acts of
bravery by common soldiers are noticeably absent, and those singled out for praise as well
as the named casualties are invariably leaders of at least the rank of sergeant, killed or
wounded heroically leading their men. 62
The common man had little hope of economic advancement, and many of the
poorest were to be found in the train of an army, the 'baggage people' as Francis Markham
termed them, and at the very bottom of the pile were the 'Horse Boyes', of whom 'scarce
one lives to boast he is as old as the horse he keepeth'. 63 There was a limited meritocracy
that could see talented individuals rise above their status at birth; Barnaby Rich believed
that' ... every ordinary Souldier that hath served seaven years without reproch, ought to be
accounted a Gentleman'. 64 Nevertheless, the gulf that lay between the educated minority
and the masses should not be underestimated. The majority was not held in esteem, 'so dui
& senseles is the common sort of this nation', commented one Elizabethan soldier.6s
Monro seeks the assistance of Plato when describing 'the rascall multitude'. The people,
according to Monro's version,
are ungrateful, cruell, barbarous, envious, impudent, being composed of a Masse of
fooles, naughty, deboist, and desperate: for all that is spoken by the wise,
displeases the people that are incensed. And Baleus ... writes of Pope John the
twenty third being asked what thing was farthest from truth, he answered, it was the
61 Marilyn Livingstone and Morgan Witzel, The Road to Crecy - The Eng/ish Invasion of France 1346
(Harlow: Pearson, 2005), pp.3IS; 333. Anne Curry, Agincourt: A New History (Stroud: Tempus, 2005),
AppendixC.
62 There is a rare reference to a corporal, one William Winter, who is described as 'a tall souldier' who 'sent
out a very good watch', Thomas Churchyard, A True Discourse Historicall, of the Succeeding Governors in
the Netherlands, and the Civill Warres there begun in the yeere 1565 (London, 1602), p.46.
63F . Mrancis arkham, Epistles, p.95.
64 Quoted in Thomas M. Cranfill and Dorothy Hart Bruce, Barnaby Rich: A Short Biography (Austen:
University of Texas Press, 1953), p.l4n5.
65 Geffrey Gates, The Defence of Military Profession (London, 1579), p.55.
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vulgar opinion, for all things they praise merit blame, what they think is but vanity;
what they say is but lies; they condemne the good, and approve the evil, and
magnifie but infamie ... 66
Monro advises that those 'who would do all things to please the multitude' and 'agree with
the common sort' face the 'fury and rashnesse of the people'. Quoting Plutarch, Monro
believed that 'one man could not be master and servant of the people,.67 He believed a
king was 'above the law', and that class divisions should be maintained. Of Denmark,
whose king he served, he comments:
This Kingdome is also praise-worthy, for the purity of their Gentry, being as
ancient and noble, as any other Kingdome, and can bragge of a purer and cleerer
bloud of Gentility, than many Nations can: for they never ally or enter into
marriage with any inferiour to themselves, be they never so rich, if they be Burgars
or Plebeians, they never marry with them; and if one of their daughters will,
through love, miscarry in her affection, to marry a Citizen, they will not thereafter
doe so much as to honour her with their company, but on the contrary, shee loseth
both her portion and honour, not suffering her to carry the armes of her familie."
There is evidence in the accounts, however, that soldiers were looked after and guarded
against injustice. Perhaps the bond of nationhood was sometimes stronger than class:
A Duch captaine, having out of a mad humour mutilated a souldier of my Captaines
company of one finger. The souldier complaining to me, I made my Lieutenant-
colonell acquainted with the matter, who sent to the Captaine to know his reason;
The Captaine, not repenting of the wrong done, but rather bragging he would
second the first, with a greater: he coming through my Quarters, I being exercising
the company, the Sergeant overtakes him, and almost kill'd him, who made no
defence, neither pressed ever to be repaired of his wrongs.f"
Sir Francis Vere believed in the importance of his leadership as a man of quality,
commenting that at Nieuwpoort, although ill and injured, 'I knew if 1 left my place my
men would instantly quail'. Despite his presence, quail they nevertheless did, and he was
left under his dead horse with 'neither Officer, Gentleman, nor servant about me to give
me help,.7o During his account of the 'Island Voyage' of 1597, he speaks of 'soldiers,
adventurers, officers and their trains.,7) From Vere's and others' texts can be seen that
66 Monro, Expedition, I, p.48.
67 Ibid, I, p.50.
68lbid, I, p.87.
69 Ibid, I, p.2.
70 Dillingham, Commentaries, p.102. The servant in this context is presumably a soldier in attendance to an
officer.
71 Ibid, p.59.
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individuals slotted into extant categories, and were recognisable in their groupmgs,
although terms such as 'officer,' 'NCO' and 'private' in their modern usage may be
somewhat misleading. 'Soldier' can be a generic term that includes all military members
of an army from general to private, or it can refer to the lower orders; the 'rank and file;'
the led rather than the leader, as the latter would be referred to as the 'officers' or
'gentlemen. ' Ideally officers would serve their time in the ranks, 'passing through all the
Inferior places of Command,' 72 and be promoted on merit, thus rising from private soldier,
through corporal and sergeant to ensign, lieutenant then captain and possibly higher.73
'None can command so well, as those which have been commanded,' 74 said one
experienced leader, while another soldier and military theorist advised that generals should
observe these rules in order to avoid nepotism,
... & not to elect him for Captaine who never was Lieutenant; nor him for
Lieutenant, who never was Ensigne: & that the Treasurers of the Campes and
Navies should not set downe place to an Ensigne-bearer, who never was Sergeant;
nor to a Sergeant which never was Caporall: and that this order among them all
should be inviolably observed & kept. .. 7S
It is a common theory, with further advice to 'all young Gentlemen' suggesting they
should 'learne first to obay, the better shall you knowe howe to command.t" Monro also
thought that some soldiers could and did gain senior rank from a lowly start:
Sundry Cavalieres, that carried charge under this Regiment in Denmarke, wee see
in the beginning of this new Warre; for having attained to a little experience under
this Regiment, they are now like the Eagles birds, that how soone they can but flee,
they take command on themselves, and that most worthily, knowing, that it is
ambition grounded upon virtue, makes the meanest Souldier mount from the lowest
centrie, to the top of honour to be a Generall; as some of our worthy Countrimen
have done under the Crowne of Sweden, to their eternal glory.77
This somewhat contradicts his previous comments on the masses, but such ambition was
not necessarily considered rare, one soldier opining that 'there is none worthy to be a
72 Francis Markham, Epistles, p.134.
73 Those that did were worthy of mention; Ernest, count de Montecuculi, 'bad passed through all ranks, from
a pikeman to a general of artillery and commander in Alsatia', James Grant, Memoirs and Adventures of Sir
John Hepburn (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood, 1851), p.58.
7·W"II" D"1 lams, tscourse, p.ll.
75 Barret, Theorike, p.23.
76 Barwick, Breefe Discourse, p.5.
77Monro, Expedition, II, p.l4, probably referring to Alexander Leslie, Field Marshal in the Swedish army.
He also appears to contradict this, saying 'soldiers are ever good servants, but more often cruel masters.'
Ibid, I, p.4R
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soldier, that dooth not thinke to be a Captaine in time, by his valour, knowledge, and good
behaviour'i " It could also be that both are referring to 'gentlemen' soldiers only.
Despite such advice, in effect officers, that is those from a higher social position
and therefore deemed suitable for leadership, would generally start life as an ensign, and
hope to progress from there. Some, like Sir Francis Vere (a relative of the Earl of Oxford),
were captains after a short time and rose to higher rank. Others had slower and less
distinguished careers. Henry Hexham took some twenty five years to rise to captain and
progressed no further.I" The term 'officer,' that is denoting military rank of ensign (cornet
in the cavalry) and above, may also be an anachronism, as the term in this period may have
referred to either somebody with transferable authority, a functionary, or even an NCO.8o
Assessing the manuals of contemporary authors leads me to conclude that it often meant
all of the above. In other words, it was a general label to describe people in authority at
various levels. Monro speaks of officers as 'Commanders and Leaders' (he also speaks of
'the duty of an officer'), John Cruso makes little use of the term but does mention 'the
Colonell ... the Sergeant Major, Provost and all the Officers of the Regiment;' Henry
Hexham includes 'sarjant,' 'corporall,' 'drumme majour,' and 'clarkes' as officers of a
foot company, as well as a 'barber chirurgian,' and 'gentlemen,' although the latter he also
confusingly refers to as private soldiers. He also speaks of 'Officers, Gentlemen, and
Souldiers.' Garrard refers to 'mean offices, as Drums, Fifes, Surgeans, and the Clarke of
the Band,' while Barret speaks of 'every officer ... from the Caporall to the Captain
General. ' Francis Markham, however, moves towards a more modem usage when he
describes the ensign as 'the first great Officer of a private Company: for all the former
(howsoever necessary) are but petty and low places, this only the first of Eminence and
Account. ,81
78 Barwick, Breefe Discourse, p.15.
79 ODNB: Henry Hexham.
80 Hale, War and Society, p.131. Historians seem equally loose with their use of the term. Aberg states
30,000 'officers' deployed to serve Gustavus Adolphus, but this cannot be right as soldiers of all ranks
deployed in that number. Alf Aberg, 'Scottish Soldiers in the Swedish Armies in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries', in Grant G. Simpson, ed., Scotland and Scandinavia 800- J 800 (Edinburgh: John
Donald, 1990), p.91.
81 Monro, Expedition, I, p.37, II, p.98; John Cruso, The Art of Warre (Cambridge, 1639), p.19; Henry
Hexham, The Principles of the Art Militarie (London, 1637-40), pp. 1-7, Venlo, p.31; Garrard, Breefe
Discourse, p.Sl; Barret, Theorike, p.l3; Francis Markham, Epistles, p.73.
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Gentlemen volunteers
'Gentlemen adventurers' or 'gentlemen volunteers' were found in all European
annies.82 They were from a higher social grouping, but took no command position within a
company, unless they declared themselves interested in climbing the military promotion
ladder. Some financed themselves, and so may have represented a wholly chivalric
approach to warfare, 'the military calling in its purest form,' 83 although Clarendon
distrusted such individuals as bored young men who would 'kill one another for something
to do'. 84 Some may have been officers temporarily without command who 'serve
privatlie, untill occasion presents to advance them unto the places they had before'. 85 Such
were known as 'reformadoes'. The Spanish particulares were especially valued by the
Duke of Alva who described them as 'men who win victories ... and with whom the
General establishes the requisite discipline among the troops'. These particulares included
the Treshams, Catesbys and a certain Guido Fawkes, all veterans of the Spanish Army of
Flanders. A Dutchman commented of 'gentlemen-rankers' in the army of the United
Provinces that they were 'the people who bear the brunt of the battles and sieges, as we
have seen on many occasions, and who by their example oblige and enliven the rest of the
soldiers (who have less sense of duty) to stand fast and fight with courage'r" A minister
with the English contingent in Holland had a similarly high regard for such gentlemen,
suggesting that they were treated as ordinary soldiers, commenting on:
... the company of divers Noble volunteers amongst whom that Noble Gentle-man
my Lord Craven, (who hath much honored his nation abroad) must not be
forgotten, who with the first presented him-selfe with his musket, ready to share in
the common condition, whether good or bad.87
Just how much of the 'common condition' Lord Craven shared in would be interesting to
know, as 'gentlemen volunteers' could be a curiously independent element. They could be
trusted with the daily 'watchword' where common soldiers were not. They were also often
tasked with inspecting the sentinels guarding a position, and as such were referred to as
82 The terminology becomes slightly confused, for instance Hexham speaks of' Diverse Volunteres,
Gentlemen, and Souldiers ... ' Hexham, Venlo, pp. 11; 13; 15, and Poyntz describes himself as 'a private
souldier' not a gentleman volunteer, A.T.S. Goodrick, ed., The Relation ofSydenham Poyntz 1624-1636
(London: Royal Historical Society, Camden Third Series, Vol. XIV, 1908), p.4S, thus undermining Trim's
statement that contemporaries 'distinguish clearly between officers, gentlemen and ordinary soldiers';
'Fighting "Jacob's War''', p.283.
83 Frank Tallett, War and Society in Early-Modem Europe 1495-1715 (London: Routledge, 1992), p.l 02.
84 Manning, Swordsmen, p.l2S.
85 wun D'I lams, tscourse, p.24.
86 Quoted in Parker, Spanish Road, p.34.
87 Hugh Peters, Digitus Dei, Or Good Newes From Holland (Rotterdam, 1631), p.S.
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'rounders,' that is those making the rounds.l" They seem to have been able to make their
own call on what and where they would contribute. At Breda a group of them 'putt
themselves under Coronell Gorings command,' while others 'mounted themselves under
the Princes Troupe'. 89 Such independence may have caused some command difficulties,
as this example from Ostend demonstrates:
A French Gentleman disobeying his Serjeant, and thereupon causing a great tumult,
was committed to prison, and eight dayes after, condemned by a Council of War to
be shot to death; but because he was descended of a good House, all the French
Captains interposed their earnest intreaties to General Vere, and begged for his life;
which was granted, upon condition that he should ask the Serjeant forgivenesse ... 90
This does not appear to have been an isolated incident if we read Francis Markham's
comments on the clash of social position with military rank:
.. .it is a customary thinge in the warres that men of great Birth and qualitie doe
usually traile Pikes, and what through the guard of their Captaines favor, the
rashnesse of their owne youthfull wills, the presumption of other mens examples,
and the assuming of an unnecessary freedome from some other perticuler
beholdingnes, they grow oft times disorderly and unruly and will not be
commanded by the ordinary Sergeants ... 91
To the professional soldier, concerned as ever with the discipline of his force, 'Blood hath
no priviledge if once it rebel against Obedience'. 92 Nevertheless gentlemen, particularly
high ranking ones," may have been at times more of a hindrance than a help. The old
soldier who assisted Vere at Ostend was a 'gentleman' and a trusted comrade;" compare
him with C.R. Markham's remarks regarding temporary soldiers visiting from England:
One of the general's [Sir Francis Vere] chief troubles had been the way in which
useless officers were forced upon him by powerful relations at home. These fine
gentlemen did not object to an exiting skirmish, or even to a battle, if they could go
home to swagger about it immediately afterwards. In ordinary times they were
constantly absent. They had a strong dislike to hard work, and were useless as
regimental officers. The general naturally deprecated their presence in his army.
88 Hexham, Art Militarie, p.6.
89 Hexham, Siege of Breda, p.7.
90 Dillingham, Commentaries, p.140.
91 Francis Markham, Epistles, p.143.
921bid.
93 For instance, Hexham speaks of 'the Marquis de Gere a French Voluntier .. .' Venlo, p.22.
94 Vere 'called for an old souIdier, a Gentleman of his company' to carry out an important task; Dillingham.
Commentaries, p.171.
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Among these incumbrances were the Earl of Northumberland ... and Sir
Callisthenes Brooke ... 9S
Steve Murdoch makes a curious comment: 'Some gentlemen, like Sir Thomas
Kellie ... even left Scotland with only their personal servants in attendance to join the anti-
Habsburg armies as private soldiers'. IfKellie was a Private, what were his servants?96
At times such gentlemen formed a disproportionately large part of a force. Of the
three hundred men who deployed to the Netherlands with Thomas Morgan in 1572, over a
third were 'Gentlemen', including 'divers Officers which had commanded before' and
'divers Captaines and souldiers, who had served some in Scotland, some in Ireland and
others in France'. 97 Geffrey Gates was another English volunteer, driven to the Low
Countries purely through religious zeal." David Trim concludes that 'the bulk' of English
and Welsh soldiers in the Low Countries were gentlemen, but this is probably an
overstatement as he appears to have confused volunteers of all types with gentlemen
volunteers. "
Another spin on the word 'volunteer' is the context used by Sir Horace Vere in a
letter to Andrew Newton of 1610 as he prepared to deploy to Cleves-Julich: 'His
Excellencie [Prince Maurice] hath desyred me to wayte upon him which I wold not
refewse, yt is the fyrst tyme that I was a voluntarie synce I was of the profession'. David
Trim comments: 'This is a fascinating remark, indicating a distinction, in contemporary
perception, between volunteers and mercenaries'. 100 Again, there is confusion regarding
Vere's use of the term 'volunteer'. Vere here differentiates between his service on this
particular deployment which was at the direction of the government in England, for which
he had 'volunteered' and was therefore not obliged to follow the orders of the Dutch
commander (at the time of writing, but eventually Maurice was to command the allied
army), and his service for the United Provinces, which was not at the direction of his own
government and where he was obliged to follow the orders of the commander, Maurice.
Vere in his letter is making the point, perhaps with some irony, that he was being asked by
95 C.R. Markham, Fighting Veres, p.306.
96 Steve Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603-1660 (East Linton: Tuckwell
Press, 2003), p.211.
97 W·II·I lams,Actions, p.56.
98 ODNB: Geffrey Gates.
99 Trim, 'Fighting "Jacob's Wars''', p.285; his table at p.282 contradicts his statement as it shows just under
11%, hardly 'the bulk'.
100 D.J.B. Trim, 'Sir Horace Vere in Holland, 1610-1612', Historical Research, Vol 72, 1999, p.349.
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the general who usually ordered due to the change of status. He would, of course, comply,
not least because they would return to the status quo soon enough. Vere was a
'professional' soldier in either camp - it was why he had been asked to command the
English contingent - he was only a 'mercenary' to modem historians who use terminology
in a different context than the early modem.
Rank and file
The last and largest category - the common foot soldier (having divided out the
gentleman element) - is the one about which we know least and the one for whom the
published works provide least detailed information. Common soldiers were rarely authors
and their leaders showed very little care or concern for them, 'of whom in Armies there is
none, or very small reckoning made, save only of Officers, of whom the Sergeant is the
meanest,.101 Drawn from the lower sections of society who, until the industrial age,
remained largely anonymous, we can only observe attitudes towards them through the
policies formed to lead, direct and contain them by the governing elite. The English Privy
Council did at times look to send its ne'er-do-wells abroad to fight, as it believed, with
good reason, that most would not return, and this was certainly true of its policy towards
the Irish.102 In Scotland, the Privy Council supported recruiting drives to fight 'the bludy
and tressonable papistis' in the Low Countries, concerned that the war may spill over into
Scotland, but also aware that food and employment could not be guaranteed for everyone
at home. 103The Stuart expeditions in the 1620s relied upon conscription as the number of
men required could not be had at short notice as there was no standing army and the militia
units had a remit for home defence only. The levies were for greater numbers than during
the Elizabethan period which, by this time, had been largely forgotten. The famed
'masterless' men were fair game for the press, as well as other undesirables, but the
sweeping of prisons does not appear to have been as common as some would have it. That
said, sometimes this was not quite as it seems and statistics can be misleading. Lord
Saltoun in Scotland, knowing that recruits for French service would be drawn from jails,
101 William Lithgow, A True and Experimental Discourse upon the beginning, proceding and Victorious
event of this last siege Of Breda (London, 1637), p.24.
102 C.G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p.19; Geoffrey Parker,
The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, Second Edition (Cambridge
University Press, 1996), p.53.
103 I. Ross Bartlett. 'Scottish Mercenaries in Europe, 1570-1640: A Study inAttitudes and Policies', Scottish
Tradition, Vol. XIII (1984-85), p.l6; M.S. Anderson, War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime 1618-
1789 (phoenix Mill: Sutton, 1998), p.29.
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deliberately had men imprisoned.l'" For the expedition to Germany in 1627, those who
refused to pay the forced loan were pressed into service. lOS Although the physical (and
mental) condition of many individuals would no doubt have been sub-standard.l'" and
their morale and desire to fight must have been low, they nevertheless 'stood their ground
often enough and stoutly' at Rhe and 'were better men than their selectors had any right to
expect' . 107
The largest levy was for Mansfeld's expedition: 'Such a rabble of raw and poor
rascals have not lightly been seen and they so unwillingly that they must rather be driven
than led.,I08 The disasters of Cadiz in 1625 and the Isle of Rhe in 1627 were blamed
largely on the poor quality of pressed troops, and this followed the Elizabethan tradition,
Barnaby Rich saying in 1587: 'In England when service happeneth we disburthen the
prisons of thieves, we rob the taverns and alehouses of tosspots and ruffians, we scour both
town and country of rogues and vagabonds'il'" The reliable and better off were therefore
retained to populate the militia which, although specifically formed to stay at home, at
times was required to augment the 100,000 men who between 1585 and 1603 deployed out
of Bngland."" It was preferable to leave the honest man at home:
The pety constable, when he perceyveth the wars are in hand, foreseeing the toyles,
the infinite perills, and troublesome travayles that is incident to souldyers, is loth
that anye honest man, through his procurement should hazard himselfe amongst so
many daungers; wherefore if within his office there hap to remayne any idle fellow,
some dronkerd, or seditiouse quariler, a privy pricker, or such a one that hath some
skill in stealing a goose, these shall be presented to the servyce of the Prince. III
Volunteer forces tended to be of a different calibre. The soldiers that deployed with Sir
Horace Vere into Germany in 1620 were 'the gallantest for the persons and outward
104 Stephen J. Stearns, 'Conscription and English Society in the 1620s', Journal of British Studies, Vol.l l,
No.2 (May 1972), p.5. Matthew Glozier, 'Scots in the French and Dutch Armies,' in Murdoch, Scotland
and the Thirty Years' War, p.123.
lOS E.A. Beller, 'The Military Expedition of Sir Charles Morgan to Germany, 1627-9', English Historical
Review, No.43 (1928), p.530.
I06Alth ' d ..ough perhaps not as many as one would expect. Steams calculates as a cru e approximation ... as
many as ten per cent pressed were immediately and obviously not fit for duty', Steams, 'Conscription', p.8,
n30. The British Anny has recently announced 20% of the infantry not fit for frontline duties mainly due to
'~hysical and mental illness, or lack of fitness', Anny Briefing Note, 12 January 2010.
I 7 Stearns, 'Conscription', p.23.
108 C.H.Firth, Cromwell's Army (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press edition, from 1911), p.2.
109 Bamaby Rich, A Pathway to Military Practice (London, 1587).
110 Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, pp. 108; 166.
III Bamaby Rich, A Right Excelent and Pleasaunt Dialogue, between Mercury and an English Souldier
containing his supplication to Mars (London, 1574). Firth, p.3.
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presence of men that in many ages hath appeared,' and they showed considerable courage
at Heidelberg, Mannheim and Frankenthal.112
The social divide between these categories of military personnel was, at its widest
point (between volunteer colonel and conscripted private) enormous, although the system
nevertheless adopted a degree of meritocracy. Soldiering was difficult and dangerous and
those who succeeded and showed flair could be rewarded. Despite these internal
groupings, aligned as they were to social rank and status, to a nervous civilian population a
soldier was just a soldier, whatever his rank and regardless of his education, and soldiers
were not necessarily popular people, even in England where the negative effects of
deploying armies on an unwilling population were not felt to any great extent until
1642.113
Elizabethan England before the Annada had been at peace for several decades, and
continued to avoid war on home territory despite the threat of invasion, although some
warned against complacency:
... if Englande stood in the continent of the world environed with mightie nations,
that in the dayes of frendeship would move direction to feare their malice in the
time of controversy: then should it know the value of a soldier and lick the dust off
the feete of her men of prowesse: then would the lawer and the marcheant humble
themselves to the warriers, and be glad to give honour and salary to the martialist:
and shew friendly grace to his page, and favor to his lackey.i'"
What Elizabethan England lacked was military training, and it was believed that with it her
safety would be assured by the superiority of her men 'for in respect of this nation, the
Spanyardes indeede are but peevish weedest.!" Continued national safety lay with the
professional soldier, but to local gentry that meant handing control to 'foreigners' -
individuals from outside the county - and the training, payment and ultimately the
ownership of the militia, the homeland defence force, became the pre-civil war focus for
serious disputes.
112 Firth, Cromwell's Army, p.2.
113 Although the troops raised in the 1620s for the expeditions created something of a stir in localized areas;
Stephen J. Stearns, 'Military Disorder and Martial Law in Early Stuart England,' in Buchanan Sharp and
Mark Charles Fissel, eds., Law and Authority in Early Modern England (Newark: University of Delaware
Press, 2007), p.l 07.
114 Gates, Defence, p.18.
lIS Barwick, Breefe Discourse, p.20. Williams, although he respected their 'good order', believed the Spanish
to be 'the basest and cowardlie sort of people of most others', Discourse, p.8.
110
The Militia
Traditionally the system utilised in England for defence from external invaders had
taken the form of a 'nation in arms', where every man was expected to hold weapons
according to his wealth and social position. Based on the county as the unit of
administration, it was created initially as the Anglo-Saxon 'fyrd', and re-enforced through
later parliamentary enactments, notably the Statute of Winchester in 1285, until extant
laws were repealed by Philip and Mary and a new system was introduced by Elizabeth
which lasted until the advent of the civil wars.116 In the Elizabethan system, Lord
Lieutenants were responsible for organising forces within their jurisdiction, which could be
one or more county. This position had become permanent by 1585, the visible turning-
point towards anti-Spanish policy. These local forces were designed to fight within their
own district, unless the country was subject to invasion (although, as the reason for their
inception was to fight off invasion, to promote the local nature of their deployment could
be seen as disingenuous). Theoretically all able-bodied men from the ages of sixteen to
sixty, below the social position of baron, were mustered at regular intervals. The Privy
Council attempted to impose a suitable level of infantry training, while little is known of
the horse,117in order to produce a force across the country capable of ejecting a hostile
foreigner, who by this time had come to be recognised as Spain, superseding France in this
role. Churches were often used as armouries to store weapons, ammunition and associated
equipment, although magazines were later built for this purpose, and the men would often
march several miles to a central muster location. They were paid for their efforts, but
absenteeism was a constant problem, even though imprisonment for failure to attend, and
even for insubordination whilst attending, remained a very real risk. The centralising
efforts of the Privy Council were often defied by corporate bodies, such as towns that
resisted through their charters or cited ancient privileges, for example the Stannaries of
Devon and Cornwall and the Cinque Ports. There were consistent difficulties in assessing
the quality of the men nationwide. The 300,000 men mustered in 1588 produced a sub-
total of 111,500 who were actually trained. Although the amateur and under-developed
bureaucracy of the Elizabethan government struggled to achieve a standard across the
nation, there were nevertheless many men armed and trained through its efforts. 118
116 Brian Todd Carey, Warfare in the Medieval World (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2006), pp. 69-71.
Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, p.7.
117 Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, p.123.
118 Ibid, pp. 13-50.
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It was generally accepted that these 'trained bands' should attempt to mirror the
new professionalism witnessed in the Continental theatres of war, particularly that of the
Netherlands. Experienced officers were therefore sought, but only to second and advise
the local gentry, who were more often than not military amateurs but extremely protective
of their status within their community. The need for veterans saw the Privy Council active
in allocating captains to counties, committed Protestants all as there was no room for men
with Catholic sympathies regardless of their military prowess.l'" These men became the
'muster-masters' in the counties, usually the only men capable of conducting military
training, but subordinate to the local captains, who were concerned more with their
prestige than any desire to produce an effective fighting force. In an attempt at a military
command structure, in 1588 these captains were overseen by three of the country's most
senior soldiers; Sir John Norris, Sir Thomas Leighton and Sir Thomas Morgan, who each
took responsibility for a group of counties.120 Notwithstanding, the muster-masters were
to become increasingly unpopular, not least because the responsibility for their wages
shifted from central government to the counties, who not unnaturally cried foul. The
soldier who could be seen as a mercenary abroad was to be accused of the same in his own
country.!" However, during times of national emergency, as in 1588 or the late 1590s,
veterans of foreign service were in demand, the Queen ordering their return from the
Netherlands and France. The Earl of Essex valued one hundred veterans to every thousand
of the best-trained bands.122 A veteran of foreign service, Thomas Churchyard was one
such muster-master, serving in Kent in 1584, and he commented in one of his published
works that it was a thankless task.123 Francis Markham was another veteran who also
served as a muster-master, in Nottingham, from 1612 until his death in 1622.124 He
commented on the innate unpopularity of his role:
Muster-masters in the warres were very odious unto Captaines; for in serving of his
Prince truly, and in mustering stricktly he wipeth much undue profit from the
Captaine, and spoyleth him of those pa~es, which it may be he had hop'd should
have relieved many of his necessities ... I 5
119 Ibid, p.101.
120Ibid, p.14S.
121Ibid, p.181.
122Ib'd1 , pp. 153; 162; 19617.
123Thomas Churchyard, The Worthines of Wales (London, 1587). Merrill Harvey Goldwyn, 'Notes on the
Biograpby of Thomas Churchyard,' Review of English Studies, n.s.:17:6S (1966: Feb), p.IS. ODNB:
Thomas Churchyard.
124ODNB: Francis Markham.
12S Francis Markham, Epistles, p.122.
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Following the frenetic and expensrve activity during the latter part of Queen
Elizabeth's reign, the militia fell into a state of moribund decay under James I, although
the latter part of his reign saw some increased levels of activity. In particular was the
alarm caused by the outbreak of the Thirty Years ' War, and the use of military 'grounds'
or 'gardens,' such as the Honourable Artillery Company in London, witnessed some
expansion.F" Hostility continued to grow between the county and its professional muster-
master, who was increasingly seen in many areas as an informer who reported the
deficiencies of the local militia to central government, ironically drawing pay from the
administrative body whose failings he was exposing. This growing resentment often
resulted in open disputes, occasionally the muster-master remained unpaid or was even
dismissed. 127
Charles I attempted to revitalise training in the towns and counties through his
'Exact Militia,' an aspect of the 'thorough' government proposed by the King's advisors
Laud and Strafford, and to do this he looked also to the professionals from the Low
Countries. The short-term attachment of sergeants experienced in continental warfare in
1626,128which lasted from between three months to three years and numbered eighty four
of them in all, was intended to inject the requisite level of enthusiasm and expertise to set
the militia on the right course, maintaining a prescribed standard set by the official 1623
drill book.129 Unfortunately this initiative coincided with a major preoccupation of the
counties, the military expeditions of Rhe and Cadiz,130which, combined with the long
standing resentment of the gentry towards the financial drain and general impositions of
the militia on the county, led to the eventual failure of the Exact Militia. Throughout the
reign ex-soldiers from European campaigns continued to be utilised by the counties to train
their men, but the deteriorating political situation as the authority of central government
crumbled resulted in a parallel deterioration in the condition of the militia. The
professional veteran theoretically still tasked with organising county and town military
training, the muster-master, came to be seen as the representative of a despised
government, and faded from view. By the time the First Bishops' War saw that
126 Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, p.216.
127 Ibid, pp. 224-7.
128 Walter Yonge describes one sent to Colyton, Devon, in a diary entry for 1626. Quoted in Richard Cust,
'News and Politics in Early Seventeenth-Century England,' Past and Present, No. 112. (Aug., 1986) p.71.
129 Anon, Instructions for Musters and Armes, and the use thereof: by order of the Lords of his Majesties
most honourable Privy Counsayle (London, 1623).
130 At times the militia was used as a military police force to maintain discipline over rowdy troops, with
mixed effect. Stearns, 'Military Disorder', p.112.
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government attempt to mobilise the militia, clearly it was far from able to project itself
effectively as fully trained military unitS.13I
Conclusion
To all historians of the period, a soldier who fought outside his own country was
labelled a mercenary. To David Trim, this included those who fought for their own prince
as the receipt of pay categorised him as such, while Roger Manning discounts the pay
theory and replaces it with recruitment by a contractor. Even those historians who accept
that the term may be invalid use it nonetheless. James Fallon states that the Scot who
served Christian IV and Gustavus Adolphus 'was hardly a true mercenary at all, since the
currency with which he was rewarded was frequently no more than that of honour and
reputation', and yet he continues to refer to these soldiers as mercenaries throughout his
thesis.I32 Ian Ross Bartlett has commented that 'the professional soldier may not be a
mercenary, while the mercenary is certainly a professional soldier.' 133 The first part of this
sentence is true, but the second part is not - what of the temporary soldier who fought for
no cause yet had accrued neither sufficient time, training nor experience to classify as a
'professional', and moved on after a short time? His comment is to continue to merge
terms and to give them inadequate definition. The sources reviewed during this thesis are
clear on their understanding of the term 'mercenary', and it can be stated with some
confidence that an individual who spent a lifetime, or at least several years in combat
would be considered a professional. The two terms are not mutually exclusive, but it was
possible, indeed common, to be one without the other.
Those in command were in most cases drawn from the educated section of society,
notwithstanding a certain merit-driven mobility and the occasional illiterate field marshal.
As well as the leaders, many individuals who volunteered to serve as ordinary soldiers
were also 'gentlemen'. Not all gentlemen were leaders, however, and this point has been
confused also. The ranks and position of 'gentlemen', 'private soldiers' and 'officers'
remain somewhat opaque, leading some historians to confuse who belonged to which
category and inflate the numbers of 'officers' (that is as 'leaders' distinct from 'officers' as
J3J Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, pp. 244-295. Ironically those who were trained were retained in the
counties. Firth, Cromwell's Army, p.l3nl.
132 Fallon, 'Scottish Mercenaries in the service of Denmark and Sweden', p.ii.
J33 Bartlett, 'Scottish Mercenaries in Europe'. p.16.
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'gentlemen') .. This is a reflection of the development of armies across the European
battlefield during this time, in conjunction with the extant social distinctions that separated
out those of higher status and continued to employ them in positions of command.
Even though the accounts reflect the retention of chivalry and the code of honour,
nevertheless they demonstrate a high degree of expertise that saw individuals embrace
advances in military technology and tactics.!" It is also clear that most of these men
considered victory over the enemy the pre-eminent goal and this is discussed in the next
chapter. I would have to agree with one of the older generation of historians who reflected
that Francis and Horace Vere 'symbolised the steady professionalism of the command in
the Low Countries'. I3S Chapter Three considers the various early-modem factors that
determined the motivational aspects of an individual's decision to fight through close
analysis of soldiers' works, and Chapter Four draws on the soldiers' accounts once the
decision had been made and they were engaged in combat.
134According to Trim the development was 'in spite' of chivalry; Chivalric ethos, p.287.
m Charles Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1970), p.113.
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Chapter Three
The motivation of soldiers
Introduction
This chapter analyses why individuals chose to become soldiers, and why they
desired to take part in foreign wars. It considers the problems involved in interpreting the
published writings of soldiers. It discusses the extent to which the sources amplify or
modify current understanding of motivation. As a consequence, it suggests that historians'
arguments require revision. In addition to studying in detail the contribution made by the
works of the authors Monro, Poyntz, Vere, Williams, Hexham and others, it draws upon
other contemporary sources, such as Gates's Defence of Militarie Profession.
The various motivating factors within early modem society that drove men to join
armies are not necessarily easy to discern and are certainly not uniform. Probing
motivation is always problematic. Individuals can rationalise their motivation after or
during the event. They may have mixed motives. They may have surface motivations and
subliminal motivations; they may wish to convey a particular motivation to their audience.
The Scots, with such a high proportion of adult males involved in foreign wars, Imay have
been able to justify their involvement with Sweden in the Thirty Years' War through a
number of reasons. These included religious conviction, loyalty to the house of Stuart, the
opportunity to serve in the 'academy' of Gustavus Adolphus, to acquire land, or a
combination of all four. Prior to the battle of the White Mountain such clarity of cause
was not available even though many Scots were nevertheless engaged in the Netherlands.i
The Welsh and English were able to fight for Queen and country after the Treaty of
Nonsuch, but there were those who had fought before it. It is therefore difficult not to
~
consider the possibility that reasons to fight presented themselves as a convenience. They
would have fought abroad, as in many cases their ancestors had done, regardless of the
righteousness of any cause. Economic reasons were more likely to motivate the Scots than
I Some 62,000 in the Thirty Years' War; Steve Murdoch, 'Introduction' in Steve Murdoch, ed., Scotland and
the Thirty Years' War. 1618-1648 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p.19, Table 1. Some 26,000 during the period
1573-1643 in the Low Countries; Hugh Dunthome, 'Scots in the Wars of the Low Countries, 1572-1648', in
Grant G. Simpson, ed., Scotland and the Low Countries 1124-1994 (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1996),
p.116, Table I. It has been estimated that one in five young Scots men went abroad, mainly to continental
Europe and for the most part as soldiers; Patrick Fitzgerald, 'Scottish Migration to Ireland in the Seventeenth
Century', in Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, eds., Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modem
Period (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p.49.
2 Alf Aberg, 'Scottish Soldiers in the Swedish Armies in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', in Grant
G. Simpson, ed., Scotland and Scandinavia 800-1800 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1990), p.96-7.
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their wealthier English neighbours.i although profit from war frequently fell below
soldiers' expectations. Religion was a sound excuse for a martial vocation. The
Englishman Geffrey Gates, in his apology for the military profession in 1579, identified a
combination of religious and secular commitments, cemented with virtuous personal
qualities and regardless of class, which should lead a man to a soldier's calling:
... let every citizen and rurall man, gentle or ungentle, noble or unnoble, riche or
poore, that meaneth to prove himself a good christian, a faithful Englishman,
zealous toward the state pub like of his country, of commendable integrity toward
his prince and servent in the love and maintenance of Gods king dome and glory
upon earth: let every such one I say, imbrace godlinesse: honour, nourish, and
exercise Armes, and learne with diligence, the skill and prudence that doe
necessarily accompany the same."
There are, however, frequent examples in the available texts of the period that,
through lack of religious fervour, indicate that religion could be regarded as a private
matter. It was seen by some as an issue for an individual's 'secret closet of the
conscience,' and apparently Elizabeth I viewed it as such, and therefore a person's loyalty
to a cause may in some cases have contrasted with his religion. S The Scotsman Sir John
Hepburn, for instance, was a practising Catholic who nevertheless fought with much
enthusiasm for the Swedish against the Emperor.f The 'devoted Catholic' William Blandy
supported English intervention in the Low Countries on the side of the Protestant States
General, and became friends with the 'apocalyptic Calvinist' Geffrey Gates, with whom he
wrote a work championing the English military effort in the Netherlands, a friendship and
business partnership somewhat surprising given the passions of the period and an
indication that private religious conviction could still be separated from political opinion,"
Sir Andrew Gray was a Scots Catholic who raised 4,000 men in England and Scotland for
service with the Protestant Frederick V, whose war with the Empire had an important
3 Grant G. Simpson, ed., The Scottish Soldier Abroad 1247-1967 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1992), p.ix.
4 Geffrey Gates, The Defence of Militarie Profession (London, 1579), p.Sl.
, Elizabeth 'would introduce no inquisition to look into her subjects souls'. Susan Doran, Elizabeth 1and
Religion 1558-1603 (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p.S4.
6 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, hereafter ODNB. He resigned from Swedish service and the
reasons are not clear: 'The source of contention may have been Hepburn's adherence to the Catholic faith ... '
Itmay be that Hepburn resigned after an affront given to Charles I by Gustavus Adolphus. Grant can only
offer: 'Of the exact merits of the dispute there is no proper account preserved' , James Grant, Memoirs and
Adventures of Sir John Hepburn (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood, 1851), p.190. Hepburn then
enlisted with the French, a Catholic nation, but continued to fight his enemy, the Catholic Austrian
Habsburgs as they had dispossessed Elizabeth of Bohemia. Matthew Glozier, 'Scots in the French and Dutch
Armies,' in Murdoch, Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, p.l20.
70DNB: Blandy and Gates. William Blandy, The Castle, or picture of policy (London, IS81).
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religious aspect. 8 Even Sir Francis Vere's lifelong career in the service of Protestantism
was preceded by a spell in France with the Catholic Duke of Guise, although he was 'made
to know the error of that course' .9
These are intriguing examples of the ambivalent relationship that could exist
between religion and politics in an age that was prone, when it suited, to couple religious
dissidence with political treason. Loyalty, when considered through the prism of honour,
could be equally ambivalent, and the works of soldiers reflect a number of religious and
secular factors, some of them in conflict, that result in an uneasy balance each individual
formulated to justify his actions. His published work would therefore frequently articulate
a careful vindication of his involvement in martial affairs, with a modest dedication to a
prominent figure with whom the author perceived a common purpose or belief, had served
under previously or had some family connection 10
An overview and critique of historians' interpretations of religious motivation in the
Eighty and Thirty Years' Wars
Historians have generally viewed the Eighty and Thirty Years' Wars as religiously
inspired, as chapters in 'the long and desperate contest between Protestantism and
Cetholicism';!' It seems appropriate to summarise historians' understanding of the role
played by religion in these wars and the evidence they have used to support it. For the
Catholic Habsburg territories at the highest level religious inspiration prevailed, as King
Phillip II of Spain and Emperor Ferdinand II were driven by a desire to expunge the
heretic, and so ignored all opportunities for political compromise.V The anomaly in the
Catholic camp was France, surrounded by potentially belligerent Catholic Habsburgs that
represented a serious threat to its security. Protestants were split into various groups who
talked of unity yet failed to deliver the military potential they threatened. In England,
neither Elizabeth I, James I nor Charles I was prepared to support military alliances
8 S.L. Adams, 'The Protestant Cause: Religious Alliance with the west European Calvinist Communities as a
Political Issue in England, 1585-1630', D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 1973, p.294.
9 ODNB: Sir Francis Vere.
to See Introduction, section on 'Patronage' for examples.
11 Grant, Hepburn, p.1.
u ....most vital of all in Philip's eyes, the key ingredient, was the programme to revive the Catholic Church
in the Netherlands ... ·, Jonathan I.Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise. Greatness and Fall 1477-1806
(Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1995), p.165; while' ... the emperor's Catholic convictions amounted to a
consuming passion,' RJ.W. Evans, 'The Imperial Vision', in Geoffrey Parker, ed., The Thirty Years' War
(London: Routledge, 1987), p.75.
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founded on an overtly religious base. Within the political nation, though, there were those
who considered the religious dimension to be of primary importance. Simon Adams has
shown that a network of aristocratic Calvinists and their clients in England, whom he terms
'political puritans', strove to support and unite their religious 'cause' with the reformed
elements in the Netherlands, France and the Palatinate but argues that they were defeated
by the over-riding political decisions of each monarch that countered or diluted their
religious ambition."
The focus has often been on Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, who led the first
official military contingent of Englishmen to the Netherlands in 1586. Whether for
spiritual or political reasons he was a champion of the English Puritans, and as such
advocated open military engagement with Catholic forces, particularly Spain's as the
dominant, and most threatening, Catholic military power. Close reading of soldiers'
writings indicates that his attitude may have been typical of many, Sir Roger Williams
included. Few appear to have had a burning evangelical mission when compared to some
of the soldiers of the Stuart period but, nevertheless, they showed an awareness of the
religious condition of the nation as part of a cultural whole, possibly manipulating it for
political gain." They may have been spurred on by tales of the 'Black Legend' that
propaganda pamphleteers were keen to create around reports of Spanish atrocity reflecting
the global threat posed by the Spanish King 'ayming at an universall Monarchy'. IS
There can be no doubt that Leicester's circle were keen to portray his expedition to
the Netherlands as deploying in support of the religious 'cause' (,These warrs are
holy' ... 'The quarrel is holy and just'). Not all the officers however were ardent
protestants: Sir William Stanley, Roland Yorke and Christopher Blount participated as
known or secret Catholics." Given that the Queen was still considering negotiating with
Parma at the time of the expedition, it was clear that her support for the venture was
neither unequivocal nor driven through religion. Her comment to Leicester that 'you are
only used for an instrument' reveals her position as a strategist weighing the odds in the
game of realpolitik, a clear message that the supremacy of the practical would win out over
13 Adams, 'Protestant Cause', Abstract; Conclusion.
14 F.G. Oosterhoff, Leicester and the Netherlands 1586-1587 (Utrecht: HES, 1988), pp. 8,20,77.
15 Henry Hexham, A Tongue Combat lately happening between two English Souldiers (London, 1623), p.S,
Schilling, p.224; Israel. p.l8S.
16 Adams, 'Protestant Cause', pp.s6; 73. Simon Adams, 'A Patriot for Whom? Stanley. York and Elizabeth's
Catholics', History Today, Vol. xxxvii, 1987, pp.46-S0.
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the ideological.!" Essex, Leicester's step-son, succeeded as the leader of Leicester's
'party' after the latter's death in the Annada year, so continued war was a clear, if
undeclared reality, but it still lacked the religious dimension as far as the Queen was
concerned. Essex, according to Simon Adams, was now the leading political puritan, but
there were a number of Catholics in his 'party' and it is difficult to see his dissatisfaction
that led to rebellion as religiously motivated.P Efforts to combine an English, French and
Dutch anti-Habsburg coordinated military front failed to materialize largely due to the
Catholicism of the French kings and the political manoeuvring of the EnglishlBritish
monarchs, and any union with German Protestantism failed to take in the disinterested
Lutherans. James concluded a treaty with Spain at the beginning of his reign while
concurrently maintaining military support to the United Provinces, and the realpolitik
continued into the new century much to the disappointment of zealous Protestants. James,
far from being the Lion of the North, was as concerned for the security of his throne as
Elizabeth had been for hers, and sought to protect it from external hostility, internal revolt
and penury by balancing his options and not over committing; certainly not for the sake of
international Protestantism, and he shunned all attempts to bring him into the Evangelical
Union. At the heart of this was James' 'sincere and constant refusal to undertake religious
politics, particularly when they involved war or rebellion' .19 There were times when his
hand was forced, and the hopes of political puritans must have revived during the Cleves-
Jnlich crisis in 1610 when French, Dutch and German forces combined with an English
contingent commanded by the Calvinist Sir Horace Vere against an Imperial force. James'
son Prince Henry, on whom the fortunes of political puritans for a short time rested, saw
this episode as 'the beginnings of a great Protestant crusade'. 20 It was not to be, and the
Palatinate situation after White Mountain was to force the issue and show just how
uncommitted to a religious alliance the Stuarts were and leads Adams to conclude that the
'crucial' event in the Thirty Years' War was the 'conversion of the opposition to the
Habsburgs from international Calvinism to the political alliances manipulated by the
French monarchy'. 21
17 Adams, 'Protestant Cause', p.77.
18 Ibid, p.118, which sees a merging of the religious and political dimensions in Adams' discussion on Essex.
This lack of a clear religious 'side' in an influential courtier is seen again with the rise of Buckingham, ibid,
~.2S3.
9 Ibid, pp.2SS; 288.
20 OJ.B. Trim, 'Sir Horace Vere in Holland, 1610-1612', Historical Research, Vol. 72, 1999, p.346.
21 Adams, 'Protestant Cause', p.346.
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Mansfeld's expedition and the Cadiz Voyage, poorly planned and rashly executed
government ventures, utilised conscripts so the quality and religious commitment of the
soldiery was sub par; the failure at Rhe amid political confusion was equally poor. All
these Stuart military endeavours that the government embarked upon up until 1629 were
developed out of a myriad of political intrigues that had very little to do with religion and
all ended in failure. Concurrent with this was the ascendance of the Laudian party within
the Church of England and the alienation of the reformed churches abroad. There were
those in England who demanded military support for the wider religious family of
European Calvinists and those who volunteered to fight could claim to do so for this
cause.22 Sir Horace Vere was the senior military figure and, despite political opposition,
became general of the English forces in the United Provinces. The wording of Adams'
description of Vere's position is of interest here, as he states that the balance of senior
commanders within the army of the United Provinces ' ... reflected a political/religious
division ... between those like Vere and the Sidneys who were puritan in religion and
advocates of political puritanism, and those whose conception of their role was primarily
professional.r' The inference of what is or was meant by 'professional' is noteworthy.
Horace Vere had been a soldier since a young age, and has been described by a biographer
as a 'professional soldier, pure and simple'. 24 The point that Adams makes though is that
many of his colleagues in the army of the United Provinces with whom Sir Horace Vere
served were of similarly strong religious belief who would fall into his category of political
puritan and who would therefore be able to underwrite their profession with ideological
arguments for the defence of the reformed community. However not all of them were.
'True' religion and the Protestant cause
An examination of the published writings of soldiers furthers our understanding in
several ways. According to Thomas Churchyard, the Spanish Inquisition was 'the ground
22 Adams refers here to the 'curse ofMeroz' ('Curse ye Meroz, said the angel of God, curse ye bitterly the
inhabitants thereof, because they came not to the help of the LORD, to the help of the LORD against the
mighty'; Judges 5.23), Adams, 'Protestant Cause', p.424, 02. This quotes Hugh Peters' Digitus Dei
(Rotterdam, 1631), which has a reference to Judges 5.28. The only reference I can find to 5.23 is Edward
Gee's sermon of 1620, Two Sermons (London, 1620) which does not mention European political issues or
military affairs at all, and Stephen Marshall's sermon, Meroz Cursed (London, 1641) which was written and
published in 1641 and refers to Ireland and drew a response from Edward Symmons, Scripture vindicated
(Oxford, 1644) as a Civil War exchange of words.
23 Adams, 'Protestant Cause', p.439.
240DNB: Sir Horace Vere.
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of al the griefe in the Netherlands, and the original cause of the civill warres there,' 2S thus
giving the conflict a religious base. Whatever the personal reasons individuals from
Britain had for deploying to the Netherlands (economic, in search of adventure, to escape
from something or someone at home), the cause, simply stated, was fighting 'for the
freedome of true Religion' in conflict with the Catholic enemy" encouraged by the
government for whom it was the spread of Popery and the Counter-Reformation that was
feared, rather than the small-time Catholic in the market-place.I' According to Sir Roger
Williams, who was amongst the first to deploy to the Netherlands in 1572, there was an
absence of religious motivation as 'dutie, honor & weIth makes men follow the wars',28
and although he supports Churchyard's view when he rails against 'their [the Spanish]
divelish Inquisition', 29 he makes little comment on religious issues. He does accept,
however, that fighting for religion may make better soldiers where he talks of 'three
hundred French all of the religion, in whom can be no treachery' and 'valiant faithful men
ofwarre, that fought either for religion or reputation'r'" Likewise Robert Barret believed
the 'first principle' of the soldier should be the 'defence of true religion' and that those
who feared God 'fighteth with more bold resolution and courage'. 31 Williams refers to
'divers brawles and bickerings' between 'them of the religion' (Calvinists), 'Martinists'
(Lutherans) and 'Papists' (Roman Catholics),32 in a manner that maintains an aloofness;
these are foreign people of various religious persuasions that do not cloud his own
religious position, which is not sufficiently relevant (or radical) to be stated, and such
debates did not rage at home. There is the odd stray comment regarding the ultimate
omnipotence of God, but these are rare and probably reflect the prevalent manner of
speech rather than any evidence of serious piety; God in this context is Fate rather than the
Father of Christ. 'For all battailes end as pleaseth the great God', 33 he remarks regarding
William the Silent's stand-off with the Duke of Alva, and after that Prince's withdrawal
into Germany, comments 'that the Almighty stirred new instruments to maintaine his
2S Thomas Churchyard, A True Discourse Historicall, of the Succeeding Governors in the Netherlands, and
the Civil/ Warres there begun in the yeere 1565 (London, 1602), p.4.
26 Gates, Defence, p.22.
27 Jonathan Scott, England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European
Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.S6. Martyn Bennett, Oliver Cromwell (Abingdon
and New York.: Routledge, 2006), p.162.
28 Sir Roger Williams, A Briefe Discourse of Warre (London, 1590), p.3.
29 Ibid, p.27.
30 J.X. Evans, ed., The Works of Sir Roger Williams (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p.lxviii; Williams,
Discourse, p.40.
3J Robert Barret, The Theorike and Practike of Moderne Warres (London, 1598), pp.8/9.
32 Sir Roger Williams, The Actions of the Low Countries (London, 1618), p.9.
33 Ibid, p.28.
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cause, and blinded the Spanish in their affaires'r'" He may have stated to Henri IV that
'there can be no greater trial of constancy in this world than religion', but this comment
would have been a reaction to that monarch's conversion to Catholicism, and Williams
knew Henri well and saw him as a military comrade who was switching sides for political
reasons." Williams was aware that the 'cause' to the Dutch was not necessarily always
driven by religion: he speaks of 'a number of Papists honest patriots,36 who loved the
Prince of Orange, principally because they knew that he and his hated the Spaniards'v"
He goes on to say:
Although the Prince [of Orange] were of the religion, his promise was to grant
liberty of conscience being victorious: for which cause he carried many thousand
hearts more than he should have done otherwise. In those daies few of the popular
were of the religion, but all in generall hated the Spanish deadly."
Williams mentions the Protestant/Catholic ratio in the Netherlands more than once,
stressing that in the early years of the revolt 'most of the popular were Papists'. 39 There
was, therefore, an element of toleration towards Catholics during the revolt in the
Netherlands, but it was inconsistent and localised. In Hulst, the civilian population
included in their conditions of surrender the right for Catholics to worship in their own
church, and this was granted by Prince Maurice as he 'would not check an individual's
conscience' ,40 and after the Spanish defeat in the 'citty of Breda, now and alwaies the
exercise of the Catholique Romish Religion shalbe publikly taught in the great Church';"
but at Nieumegen a similar request was denied.42
Protestantism in the Netherlands, like the Empire and the British Isles, was far from
a unified force. Churchyard told his readers of the events in Antwerp in 1566:
34 Ibid, p.30. Evans quotes an anecdote 'as a perfect example of his whole-hearted Protestantism' (Works,
E.lxiv), but notwithstanding Williams lacks the open religious zeal ofGeffrey Gates.
S Evans, Works, p.lxxiii.
36 The soldier and engineer Paul Ive also describes the States General's army as 'the Patriotes'; Paul Ive, The
Practise of Fortification (London, 1589). The word is defined as 'a person who loves his or her country, esp.
one who is ready to support its freedoms and rights and to defend it against enemies or detractors', and the
etymology includes usage by the Earl of Leicester in connection with the Dutch (1587), Ben Jonson in
Volpone (1607) and the King James Authorized Version of the Bible (1611): OED.
37 Willi1 lams,Actions, p.33.
38 Ibid, p.34.
39 Ibid, p.62.
40Anthonis Duyck, Het Journaal van Anthonis Duyck, ed. Lodewijk Mulder ('S Gravenhage: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1862-6), I, p.54; 'dat men niemant in sijn conscientie en soude ondersoucken'.
41 Henry Hexham, A True and Briefe Relation of the Famous Seige of Breda (Delft, 1637), The Articles of
Composition, p.5.
42 Duyck, Journaal, I, p.63.
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... a vile cunning and unchristian brute was raised, that the Calvinists would cut the
Martinists throtes: on which false brute, in one night the Protestants lost much
more than ten thousand men, who joyned as they might with the Papists ... 43
Regardless of the sincerity of the claim, the religious cause was always a sound way of
boosting the argument, and it could certainly be added for effect. Itwas the apparent view
of the second Earl of Essex that fighting foreign wars was a religious crusade, and
England's wealthy subjects ought to submit their 'superfluous expenses' in order to resist
conquest:
Did the godly Kings and religious people, which wee read of in the old Testament,
to maintaine warre, against the enemies of God, sell the ornaments of the Temple,
and the things consecrated to holy uses? and shall wee that have as holy a warre
spare those things we have dedicated to our owne idle, and sensuall pleasuresz"
The Anglo-Dutch Protestant bond
By using contemporary sources we can build up a picture of the role of religion in
the English forces in the Low Countries. Despite acts of violence and treachery such as the
'English Fury' at Mechelen in 1580 and the betrayal of Lier in 1582,45 there was
nevertheless a religious tradition connecting Britain and the Netherlands. This was
particularly so in the Northern provinces as the historical trading links between them were
strengthened by the Protestantism that developed in both areas during the sixteenth
century, and as a result many English and Scottish churches had been established in the
Low Countries." This 'Christian Common-wealth' was a tradition that authors describing
the military experience sought to emphasise." Simon Adams has described the Leicester
expedition as something close to a Puritan crusade and suggested that the soldiers who
43 Churchyard, True Discourse, p.9.
44 George Harwood, Certaine Choise and Remarkable Observations etc (London, 1642), page between E2
and E3.
4S Sir John Norris allowed his troops to plunder Mechelen without restraint: P .-J. van Doren, ed., Inventaire
des Archives de la Ville Malines, Vol V (Malines, 1868), Letters MLX, MLXlI, MLXIlI, MLXIV; Guido
Marnef, Het Calvinistisch Bewind te Mechelen, 1580-85 (Kortrijk: UGA, 1987). The Scots Catholic Sir
William Sempill handed Lier over to the Spaniards: Anthoon Bergmann, Geschiendenis der Stad Lier (Lier,
1973), pp.243-252. ODNB: Sir William Sempill. David Worthington, Scots in Habsburg Service (Leiden:
Brill, 2004), p.54.
46 There were also many exiles from the Netherlands in England; the Jacobean Norwich Militia included 325
Dutch and 282 Walloon commanders in 1611. Mark Charles Fissel, English Warfare 151/-1642 (London
and New York: Routledge, 200 I), p.177. For the extent of Dutch and Walloon migration to England see Ole
Peter Grell, Calvinist Exiles in Tudor and Stuart England (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1996), pp.4-5 and passim.
47 Henry Hexbam, A True Souldiers Councel: An Experimental Discovery Of Spanish Practises (London,
1624) p.9.
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deployed with him were largely religiously driven (notwithstanding the presence of some
Catholics), part of his group of 'friends', and that the religious commitment of this force
was the precursor, the lead as it were, for the men who were to follow after.48 As the
revolt progressed, soldiers came to make a substantial contribution to the size of
congregations in various locations on either a temporary or more permanent basis." By
the middle of the seventeenth century some forty English language churches had been
founded with ministers who had lost their livings at home for their non-conformism.50
Separatist and non-separatist, Protestants of various shades were represented, and all of
them adapted to some extent in order to exist peaceably alongside their Dutch hosts. Often
in the case of Presbyterian churches the Dutch provided financial assistance, so it would
have been unwise to offend them and risk cutting off crucial funding.SI Although the
States General of some provinces often adopted policies of religious toleration (notably in
Hoiland), the Dutch Reformed Church, official religion of the emergent nation, was critical
of the Church of England, and under this umbrella the non-conformist English churches
could harbour from the long and interfering arm of Church of England officialdom
emanating from either Canterbury or the English Ambassador in The Hague. Churches
appeared in many places, serving the English and Scottish communities that permanently
resided there. Other churches, often temporary, supported the military garrisons that ebbed
and flowed with the strategic situation. Many of the ministers in these Anglo-Scottish
churches were considered to be 'Puritan'. The term 'Puritan,' notwithstanding the
broadness or vagueness of its meaning, is generally used through lack of alternatives to
describe those in opposition to the centralizing policies of the Church of England, whether
separatist or non-separatist, and the meaning developed impetus, from Dudley's anti-
Spanish, security-minded political usage, to the Laudian pejorative rhetoric of some
decades later. Indeed, the very broadness of the term may reflect the breadth of belief
within Britain. The irony regarding the management of these churches from the Laudian
perspective is that had these ministers not been expelled from their livings in England, they
would not have been available to promote their Puritanism abroad. Had the Netherlands
not received such large numbers of Englishmen into their territory in their various guises,
there would have been no employment for the Puritan preachers anyway. One fed the
48 Simon Adams, Leicester and the Court: Essays on Elizabethan politics (Manchester and New York:
Manchester University Press, 19870, p.190.
49 'The army ... was to form the largest single element in the English community in the United Provinces and
the dominant influence in the English Church there'. Adams, 'Protestant Cause', p.68.
so Keith L. Sprunger, Dutch Puritanism (Leiden: Brill, 1982), p. ix.
SI Ibid, p.7.
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other, and there was very little effective action the English government could take to
combat it.
Scots intermingled with English, both as congregants and as ministers, and the
relationship between the nations was sometimes amicable, sometimes less so. Perhaps this
was dependant on the personality of the minister, but often relations became strained
through the issues that marked the different traditions and religious development of the two
nations. The church in Amsterdam, although referred to as the English Reformed Church,
had many Scots members who seemed to worship there contentedly. In Rotterdam, a third
of the congregation was Scots and they remained part of the English Reformed Church
until 1642 when, probably as a result of the deteriorating situation in Britain and the
subsequent IndependentlPresbyterian debate, they formed their own congregation.52 The
Anglo-Scots community at Dort was served by Scots, Dutch and English ministers
consecutively, there apparently being no disunity among the congregation. Middelburg
served the English merchant community, while Scots merchants tended to settle a few
miles away at Veere, traditional staple port of the Scots since at least the middle of the
fifteenth century. After 1621, with the departure of the Merchant Adventurers leaving a
much smaller congregation, the Middelburg church had to re-invent itself, and it did so
with English and also Scottish members, despite the presence of Veere in close
proximity. 53
If the civilian element was the first to require English language church services in
the Netherlands, and continued to require them at the end of hostilities, in between - for
eighty years - it was the soldiery who often provided the most souls. Like the civilian
population, the majority was English, but a substantial number of Scottish soldiers were
also present, despite their heavy commitment during the 1620s and 1630s to the Thirty
Years' War. Garrisons with a high concentration of troops set up churches. In Breda,
prior to the Spanish occupation of 1625, the English and the Scots shared the same
building but hired chaplains from their respective nations. When the Spanish lost Breda in
1637, to the English-Scottish split in the church there was added the Laudian-Puritan
controversy. The English brought in Richard Dell, a conforming minister, while the Scots
hired Patrick Forbes, who was to become a Scottish National Covenanter. Dell would read
diligently from the Prayer Book, while Forbes would preach directly against it. Dell was
52 Ibid, p.175.
53 Ibid, pp. 187-9; 206-211.
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heckled and harangued ceaselessly by Forbes, who also mobilized the French Protestants
against Dell; neither were all Englishmen inclined to listen to him, preferring to attend the
Scottish services, until Boswell, Ambassador in The Hague, ordered Forbes to refuse entry
to any English soldiers. 54 English and Scottish regiments employed their own chaplains
of a persuasion acceptable to each Colonel, so disturbances of this nature in the field were
often avoided. 55 Generally reflecting the Puritanism that had 'rooted itself deeply in the
army' in the Netherlands.i'' nevertheless according to one eyewitness the chaplains were
drawn from each end of the Protestant religious spectrum. Thomas Raymond, one-time
soldier on the march with the English contingent of the army of the Prince of Orange in
1633, gives us this account:
Every Sunday momeing a sermon [was] preached by the chap layne to the regiment,
which was then one Mr. Day, a good schollar but a better good fellow. The whole
service being according to the Dutch mode i.e. reading 2 or 3 psalmes, then a
chapter, next a Psalme sung, and then to the pulpett, where he began with a long
prawer of his owne."
Mr. Day may be the Gamaliel Day that Keith Sprunger has traced to English troops in the
area. According to Sprunger, Day 'aspired to use some parts of the Prayer Book in his
services'r" but, possibly because of his colonel's objection, he apparently does not do so
with Raymond's unit. On the other hand, that Mr. Day presented his sermons in the Dutch
fashion did not appear to categorise him as particularly Puritan to this Englishman.
Raymond spoke at some length about the Arminian champion Grotius, whom he describes
as that 'great and excellent scholar', and blames 'phanatiqs' for keeping him out of
England." The other chaplains with Raymond were of a distinctly non-Puritan flavour:
Mr. Goffe ... an excellent scholler and a good fellow He afterwards during the
rebellion in England ... became a Roman Catholic Another of our army
chaplaynes, whose name I have now forgotten but have heard him often ~reach in
the army, I met 2 yeres after this, travailing to Rome in a Pilgrymes habit.
S4lbid, pp. 268-272.
ss 'Their expenses were met by pay from the regimental officers', ibid, p.262.
S6 Ibid, p.264.
S7 Thomas Raymond, Autobiography of Thomas Raymond and the Memoirs of the Family of Guise of
Elmore, Gloucestershire, ed. G. Davies (London: Royal Historical Society, Camden Third Series,
Vol.XXVII, 1917), p.37.
S8 Sprunger Dutch Puritanism, p.299.
S9 Raymond, Autobiography, p.3S.
60 Ibid, p.38. Stephen Goffe was a well-known high Anglican in the Netherlands who pictured himself as 'a
martyr for Anglicanism.' Sprunger, Dutch Puritanism, p.132.
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Long-term garrison towns, however, would employ a permanent minister. Such was the
case in Flushing, an English cautionary town from 1585 until 1616. Here for its last eleven
years until the town was handed back to the Dutch, the minister was one Thomas Potts, as
aggressively Puritan as Dell was placidly conformist. Potts became unpopular with the
officers for frequently supporting the cause of the common soldier, and regaling the
officers for their moral deficiencies."
In Utrecht, the Scotsmen John Douglas (former chaplain to the Englishmen Colonel
John Ogle and Colonel Edward Cecil, although he evidently fell out with the latter) and
George Clark endeavoured to bring the civilians and all the officers of the military units
together 'to make up more formally one Body without schisme,.62 English, Scots, civilian
and military; all worshipping together without argument - rather a tall order, and
unsurprisingly it did not work. The civilians were unsatisfied that the chaplains went into
the field during the campaign season leaving them un-provided for. There were also
apparently 'tensions' between the English and Scots so that, from 1622, the church sought
assistance from the Dutch to set up on their own and employ their own minister. This they
were successful in achieving, although many soldiers remained in the congregation.
Relations between the military and civilian elements of the town could not have improved
when, in 1626 the minister was murdered in the street by a soldier from Cecil's regiment. 63
Throughout the remainder of the war the church in Utrecht continued to show a visible
divide between the civilian and military elements and between the English and Scottish, as
one group never held a clear majority over the other."
Polemics
How did military contemporaries engage with religious issues in Europe? The
Protestant-Catholic dichotomy was a far easier and safer debate for an English layman to
engage in, particularly as' the Puritan and Presbyterian controversies grew deeper and more
emotional as the sixteenth century moved into a new century that presented problems of
growing political and social complexity that, in the British Isles, were to result eventually
in the Civil Wars. A fictional discussion published towards the end of James I's reign
61 Sprunger, Dutch Puritanism, p.198.
62 Ibid. p.213.
63 Ibid, p.216. The minister was the Puritan writer Thomas Scott, see below.
64 Ibid, p.225.
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placed in the mouths of soldiers the issue of political and religious loyalty. The work
states the case for fighting for the Protestant and dynastic cause whilst disparaging those
who would fight for the Papist and Spanish enemy. Written by Captain Henry Hexham,65
a man who described himself as 'a protestant and a Souldier', 66 Tongue-Combat is not
only a strong argument linking Protestantism with patriotism but can also be seen as a
personal vindication of Hexham's choice of vocarion." Many of the themes and issues of
English involvement in the Eighty Years' War are covered in the debate, amongst them the
'truth of the Reformed Religion'. Hexham believed he could now urge others to follow his
example: 'It concemes all Sword-men to sticke to mee, and to vindicate the honour of our
deceased Queene, our present Souveraigne, Religion, the British Nation in generall.' Here
religion and nation are brought together under the present sovereign but with due
diffidence to the Queen due, presumably, to her active engagement with the enemy and a
nod to the present government to follow her example. It is a duty for all men to raise up,
now, or face the wrath of Christ:
It is now a time or never to declare ourselves, and stand together for the truth of
Religion herein oppugned: which hee that shrinkes from, for any wordly or
politieke respect, or any Antichristian ayme, and temporary temptation, shall surely
be denyed hereafter of Christ Jesus, who will publiquely professe to be ashamed of
them before God,who are ashamed of him before men, and to spue those lukewarm
persons out of his mouth, whom the sudden and unexpected alarum of bold, daring,
and desperate opposition to Falsehood, will not awaken from that stupide
Lethargie ... wherein they lye bed-rid, to be as couragious for Truth, as other men
are for lyes, in this Age of Atheisme. The Lord by his spirit kindle this zeale in our
hearts for his Cause ... 68
Now or never? Stand together? What made Hexham write in this vein? Given the
political situation in England at the time, with growing public impatience over apparent
65 The British Library has the work attributed to Thomas Scott, but Hexham signed the Epistle Dedicatory, in
which he hopes the dedicatee, Sir George HolIes, will 'protect my pen,' indicating the work is his. Thomas
Scott, 1580-1626, one time chaplain to James I, was author in 1620 of the anti-Spanish tract Vox Populi
which cost him his job, wherein Gondomar is portrayed as attempting to bring England into subjection to
Spain through the marriage of the Infanta to Charles. The ambitions of Spain as a power bent on conquest
over both the Netherlands and England is a strong theme in Tongue-Combat.
66 Henry Hexharn, A Journall of the taking in of Venlo, Roermont, Strale, the memorable siege of Mastricht,
the Town & Castle of Limburch under the able, and wise Conduct of his Excie: the Prince of Orange, Anno
1632 (Delft, 1633), Epistle Dedicatory.
67 Hexharn, Tongue-Combat, whereby 'Tawny Scarf,' the Protestant, discusses topical issues with 'Red
Scarf,' the Catholic. The book predictably supports the Protestant view, 84 per cent of the discussion being
voiced by Tawny Scarf with Red Scarf at times reduced to providing just the odd provocative comment. By
the time Hexham wrote the dedication, and probably the book itself, he had served the States-General for at
least 22 years.
68 Ibid, Epistle Dedicatory.
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royal indifference to the religious affairs of Europe and an unpopular friendship with
Spain, this may be a direct, incautious appeal for support for the Protestant cause in the
Palatinate:
The King's children, Religion, the Reformed Church, suffered ship-wracke, by the
insulting, cruell, and bloudy Spaniard; and many thousands of Christians were
martyred after a barbarous and butcherly manner ... yea whilst they were kissing the
one cheeke of our King, they were smiting the other; kissing the Prince, as if they
meant to deifie him, and give him all theirs; smiting his royall, loving, and lonely
Sister, and by force taking away all that was hers."
The nation had been offended through the ridicule of its ruling dynasty, and this adds to the
case, but it is not central. This is about the cause of true religion, a call for English and
Dutch Protestants to unite against the Papal Antichrist. It is possible that Hexham may just
have provided the book-buying public with what they wanted, such was the unpopularity
of James' foreign policy. However, when considering Hexham's work as a body, it is
clear that the author followed a strong religious line; the religious tone is undeniable. The
year following Tongue-Combat (1624) Hexham published A True Souldiers Councel,
where he boldly and directly informed James I that he 'ought to be well-advised, before
you stray from the pathes of your predecessours', and his advice was strongly 'against this
mischievous and poisonous peace with Spain'. 70 1624 was to see a radical shift in Stuart
foreign policy away from Spanish entente to one of open war, a shift that some historians
have deemed sufficiently drastic to term revolutionary," but at the time of publication
Tongue-Combat was certainly voicing views contrary to the extant royal policy that A True
Souldiers Councel openly criticised, although both works were reflective of popular
opimon. 1623 was indeed a momentous year, witnessing one of those rare events in
history that can justifiably be labelled truly remarkable as Prince Charles returned from a
dramatic but unsuccessful visit to Madrid to woo the King of Spain's daughter, the Infanta
Maria. In light of these events and the reaction of the population, across the social
spectrum and in all areas of the kingdom;" Tongue-Combat can be seen as reflecting a
very relevant debate and highlighting a topical issue, that is physical, military support for
the Dutch Protestants against the Catholic King of Spain, an issue that it would seem drew
strong support throughout the country. James I had disappointed European Calvinists by
69 Ibid, p.70.
70 Hexham, A True Souldiers Councel, pp.28; 45.
71 Thomas Cogswell, The Blessed Revolution: English Politics and the Coming of War, 1621-24 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989).
72 CSP Venetian, 1623, p.132.
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promoting a pro-Spanish policy, embracing leniency towards Catholics at home and
refusing to commit militarily against the Emperor. But James' policy was aimed at
appeasing both sides; far from being the warrior king, champion of the Protestant cause, he
had taken the non-military role of mediator yet nevertheless allowed some 13,000 of his
subjects to remain in service with the States General, a third of the Dutch standing army,
while concurrently allowing Spain to recruit amongst British Catholics so that there
remained some 4,000 British troops in the Spanish Army of Flanders. 73
Sir Roger Williams had warned in 1585 that the Spanish 'mean either to perish or
to be in England'. 74 Spain continued to be viewed by a large section of the English
political nation as an aggressively expansionist state, that despite its legitimate claim to the
Netherlands through dynastic inheritance, still required to stamp a harsh, physical
(military) and unswervingly Catholic presence on its territories:
Thus the insulting Spaniard thinkes it is not enough, or any thing worth, to have the
addition of Countries by accesse of marriage or any other title, except also hee
comes in by a kinde of Conquest; or, being let in upon termes of peace, proceed to
fasten upon all by force as a Conquerour; otherwise hee thinkes hee cannot lord it
enough, and there is some disparagement to his invincible arrogancie. Let Arragon
and Portugal at home, and Naples and these parts abroad, be witness of this truth,
as also every other place whereupon he sets the print of his feet; let the first
conditions of his entry be what they will, the yssue is Conquest, and the worst that
Conquest can doe."
England could not rest easy, the memory of the Armadas was slow to fade," and political
ambition was constantly linked with religious motivation:
How hath Spaine gotten superioritie over his neighbour-Nations; how hath he made
many intrusions upon Savoy, Navarre, France, Italy? How upon the East and West
Indies? How upon Ireland, and how upon England also, whose purse he would
have taken, whilst you and yours were setters and plotters for the purchase? ..Is
this Catholic doctrine? 77
73 Simon Adams, 'Spain or the Netherlands? The Dilemmas of Early Stuart Foreign Policy', in Howard
Tomlinson, ed., Before the English Civil War: Essays on Early Stuart Politics and Government (Basingstoke
and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1983), p.85.
74 Evans, Works, p.xxv.
75 Hexham, Tongue-Combat, p.23.
76 For instance, Hugh Peters in a publication of 1631 compares the victorious action of that year with the
Armada of 1588: ' ... the Lord can rule and guide, dispatch and overcome workes of this nature so well; since
hee hath thus graciously appeared in 31 as formerly in 88 ... ' Hugh Peters, Digitus Dei, final page.
77 Hexham, Tongue-Combat, p.91.
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To Hexham at least, the Englishmen who fought in foreign lands did so with sound moral
reason, and he trusted the 'wisdome of the States General' to look well upon those English
soldiers and 'to use them not as meere mercenarie and salarie Souldiers, but nobly, freely,
and bountifully as Natives' .78
Hexham had also written accounts of actions in the Netherlands, and it is
noteworthy that this seventeenth-century soldier brings religion into his writings far more
frequently than Sir Roger Williams and Sir Francis Vere, attributing much to God's
providence:
About this tyme it was a very wet season, & greate store of Raine fell, so that the
River swelled, and the Enemye could not forde it over, till our works, double
entrenchments, Ditches, Skonces, Ravelings, and halfe-Moones on the other side of
the River, were defensible, which made us believe, that as God fought for us before
the Busse ['s Hertogenbosche] with drye weather, so now hee did the like by wett
weather, & made the heavens to favour US.79
That prayers were also part of the camp routine is borne out by other contemporary
writings: Thomas Raymond commented on the regular church sermons with the Dutch
army (above), and Francois de La Noue also utilised religious instruction to encourage
discipline." Hexham adds to our knowledge by showing that for those who faced
imminent danger, it was important to impress that God was an ally if one invoked his
support:
This night wee also had orders, that those Companyes which had the watch in the
approches, should draw in Parado every night to the quarter of the Colonell that
commanded, to sing a Psalme, and hear Prayers.81
Rather than just acknowledge the intervention of the Almighty in off-hand, figure-
of-speech phrases in the manner of Sir Roger Williams, Hexham's gratitude takes the form
of prayer:
Thus it pleased God to heare the prayers of his faithfull ones, and to honour the
Land, and his Excie: so, that in the sight of these two Armies which did beleaguer
us on the one side, to take this citie of Mastricht, and to send his Excie: home
(maugre our Ennemies) with Victorie, to this God the Author & giver off all
78 Hexham, Tongue-Combat, p.104.
79 Hexham, Venlo, p.l3.
80 John S. Nolan, Sir John Norreys and the Elizabethan Military World (University of Exeter, 1997), p.ll.
81 Hexham, Venlo, p.7.
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Victorie be given Everlasting praises, Amen.82
Religion and the Holy Roman Empire
Religion was hotly disputed in most of north-west Europe in the seventeenth
century as the Counter-Reformation took effect, and Britons served wherever soldiers were
required, in central Europe as well as in France and the Netherlands. The Empire was a far
larger geographical area than the Netherlands, with a more complex political structure,83
and it lacked the concentration of British civilians that were found in the Low Countries.
The headquarters of the English Merchant Adventurers was, from 1611, located in
Hamburg, but this was the only established British church in Germany and remained
outside the areas occupied by armies. Thus Britons who served in Germany did so with no
imported English or Scottish spiritual infrastructure to support them, and so made their
way as best they could, either as individuals or formed units, as strangers in an alien world.
From soldiers' publications we can discern some information about recruitment and its
underlying motivation.
Many Scots were drawn to the Thirty Years' War. Sir James Turner may have
initially departed his native Scotland
to be, if not an actor, at least a spectator of these warrs which at that time made so
much noyse over all the world, and were managed against the Roman Emperour
and the Catholicke League in Germanie, under the auspitious conduct of the thrice
famous Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden. 84
He goes on to explain how he immersed himself in the religious debates of the day.
Interpreting his message is a challenge. Before leaving Scotland he was careful to read
'the controversies of religion betweene us and the Roman Catholickes ... whereby I might
82 Hexham, Venlo, p.3S. For the relationship between military units and formal prayers and worship in the
Parliamentary armies during the English Civil War, a more emotionally charged religious environment, see
Anne Laurence, Parliamentary Army Chaplains 1642-1651 (Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society, The
BoydeU Press, 1990).
83 For a succinct synopsis of the political complications of the Empire, see C.V. Wedgwood, The Thirty
Years' War (London: Pimlico, 1938), pp. 32-41.
84 Sir James Turner, Memoirs of Sir James Turner, ed. by T. Thompson (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club,
XXVIII, 1829), p.4.
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discern the truth of the Protestant persuasion and the fallacies of the Popish one'. 85 By the
time he returned home he 'had swallowed without chewing, in Germanie, a very dangerous
maxime, which militarie men there too much follow; which was, that so we serve our
master honnestlie, it is no matter what master we serve'. This admission, however, refers
to his decisions on leaving Germany and may have been an attempt at the time of writing
to excuse his Covenanting past to a Royalist present. 86 During the Thirty Years ' War he
consistently served the Protestants and did not change sides. It was on arrival at
Millstrand, in Norway, on returning home that his dilemma struck; whether to board the
ship bound for Hull and King Charles or the one bound for Leith and the Covenanters. 'I
resolved to go with the ship 1 first encountered,' says he, declaring he would 'serve either
the one or the other without any reluctance of mind' .87
Sydenham Poyntz trod a contrary career path: he served several masters when
abroad but only one when at home, that is, until his dismissal. Religious motivation seems
largely absent. His is a predominantly secular account of his experience of the Thirty
Years' War which, for the most part, could reflect a man of no particular faith." He
fought briefly for the Catholic Spanish Army of Flanders before moving on to join the
Protestant John George of Saxony, whom he served both for and against the Emperor,
finally joining the Catholic Imperial army in Hesse. From the start, he was not motivated
by any spiritual calling." His change of allegiance tallies with what is already known, as
in the Empire soldiers often changed sides, perhaps joining the enemy as a consequence of
defeat, perhaps through accepting an offer of improved payor conditions. Colonels and
captains turned their coats under the term 'change of service, a process undertaken with
dizzying frequency,' so unsurprisingly 'army commanders never asked after the faith of
their officers and men'. 90 Generally Poyntz speaks little of religion, and God is seldom
mentioned, although He is thanked for protecting Poyntz at Lutzen: 'I trust God did see
my heart and preserved mee from death in that great battaile (wherin so many did
perish)'." However, Poyntz lived through an era of heightened religious passion, both in
Germany and on his return to England, and where he does expand on the religious theme
his remarks are noteworthy:
85 Ibid, p.3.
86 ODNB: Sir James Turner.
87 Turner, Memoirs, p.14.
88 A.T.S. Goodrick, ed., The Relation ofSydenham Poyntz 1624-1636 (London: Royal Historical Society,
Camden Third Series, Vol. XIV, 1908).
89 Ibid, p.128.
90 Golo Mann, Wallenstein. His Life Narrated, trans. Charles Kessler (London: Andre Deutch, 1976), p.281.
91 Goodrick, Relation, p.75. According to Poyntz some 45,000 lost, p.74.
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Out of his zeale to Gods Church, the Emperour thinking to doe in the Provinces of
Germany, that which hee had donne in Austria and other his owne Inheritance viz.
get all or most of the Religious Land to bee laid to their houses againe as formerly
it had bene before the Warres: but the case was altered, for the Warres had turned
them to be most mens Inheritances and all that many Lay-men had to live on, and
so would rather part with their lives then their livings; it went so farre that most of
the Princes of Gennanie were deeply touched therein, yea Saxonie and Bavaria and
most of them made a stiffe denyall of the motion, and seeing they had gotten them
in these Warres by the sword, so they would hould them."
Thus the Edict of Restitution," and the aggressive reaction it provoked, succinctly
summarized. As an Englishman, Poyntz was often on the 'wrong' side, in that anyone who
fought for a Catholic master could be construed as colluding with the enemy. Poyntz
portrayed himself as fighting loyally for the Emperor, void of religious connection." but,
having escaped from the Turks and having met a party that included a Franciscan friar, he
writes:
At length they broke with mee which was the true Religion, which they proved to
be no other, than that which is commonly called Papistry and their reasons were so
strong joyned with such wonderfull humility and charity towards mee, that I could
not chose but admit of it and follow their advise therein which was to bee made a
member of that holy Church and wherein Gods grace I mean to dy ... 95
Keen to defend his Protestant credentials during the English Civil War as a Parliamentary
general, and by then secure in his Calvinist beliefs, he retrospectively denied any previous
Catholic connection, saying:
There is one great mystery more concerning me revealed, which is that I am a
Papist. Of all the rest I am least troubled at this Rumour, it being in the power of so
many thousands to Vindicate me, who have been witnesses of my constant
Profession which from my first years, according to the Instructions of this my
native Countrey have been in the Reformed Protestant Religion."
92 Goodrick, Relation, p.79.
93 Edict of Restitution, 6 March 1629, whereby all lands reverted to their confessional status as at the Peace
of Augsburg 1555. In effect, large tracts of land and the Free Cities, including the Lutheran Augsburg itself,
would revert to Catholic administration and the principle of cujus regia ejus religio, that the ruler directs the
religion of his populace, would ensure that many thousands of Protestants convert forcibly to Catholicism. A
comprehensive account of the Edict is given in Wedgwood, Thirty Years' War, pp. 239-246, see also Parker,
Thirty Years' War, pp. 88-9.
94 Sydenham Poyntz, The Vindication of Colonel General Poyntz (London, 1646), partly reproduced at
Annex B to Goodrick, Relation, p.l45.
95 Goodrick, Relation, p.54.
96 Ibid, p.145.
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The two statements from the same author appear difficult to reconcile, despite the passage
of time, although it must be stressed that his Relation was not produced for publication or a
wide audience." Perhaps he was temporarily influenced by gratitude. However, it may be
significant that he was associating with English Catholics when he wrote the Relation; this
would indicate a stronger link with Catholicism than his 'Vindication' admits of. That he
fought on both sides may have given him some degree of difficulty later in life, but it
would also support the view that at the time, in Germany, commanders were disinterested
regarding the religion of their men." This policy was underlined when Emperor
Ferdinand II introduced his Edict of Restitution, which, although emphatic in its effect
upon the civilian population, was not introduced into the army.99 There was also a degree
of secularism on the Swedish side: Monro went to some lengths to stress his own
Protestantism, discussed below, but of his commander-in-chief, Gustavus Adolphus, he
commented: 'his Majestie in all places he had taken in, suffered them the free libertie and
use of their Religion untroubled', accepting Catholic soldiers into his army when the
occasion arose.lOO
Not all individuals are so difficult to categorise as Turner and Poyntz: Robert
Monro was a staunch Calvinist, and regarded himself as a soldier of Christ. His account
makes frequent references to the importance of piety to a soldier's success, and his work
finishes with the soldiers' 'Meditations,' twenty-four prayers to assist the Protestant
Soldier of Christ. He advises the soldier to:
... make his acquaintance with God, that if adversitie come, he may be the bolder
with his Maker, by prayer, which is the key to open heaven, and the meanes to
remove our adverstite ...While then we have peace, and quietnesse, I wish we may
be familiar with this King of Kings, the Lord of Hosts, and say in particular, Thou
art my King, 0 God, enter into his Tabernacle, and salute Jesus Christ thy Saviour
and Redeemer.l'"
97 See Chapter One above.
98 'Colonel Hans Georg von Arnim, a Brandenburger by birth, served successively the King of Sweden, the
King of Poland, Count Mansfeld, the King of Sweden again, the Emperor of Wallenstein, the Elector of
Saxony, and again the Emperor. He was moreover an exception, not in changing his master like his clothes,
but as a man given to serious, religious, political reflection.' Mann, Wallenstein, p.281; see also
Worthington, Scots in Habsburg Service, p.l46. Towards the end of the conflict, when even the Emperor had
to accept the concept of religious toleration, the commander-in-chief of the Imperial army, Peter Melander,
was a Calvinist; ibid, p.140.
99 In the case of the Imperial Generalissimo Wallenstein, although he was forced to dismiss his civilian
Protestant staff on his estates, in his army 'the Reform officials were not permitted to pry and he employed
Protestant senior officers from start to finish.' Mann, Wallenstein, pp. 244/S.
100 Robert Monro, Monro: His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment (called Mac-Keyes Regiment)
levied in August 1626 (London, 1637), II, pp.103; 114.
101 Ibid, I, p.S.
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Under Christian IV of Denmark and Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, Monro served
Lutheran monarchs. He tells us that Gustavus Adolphus 'did make no difference betwixt
Protestants [Calvinists] and Lutherans, but made use of them both'. Indeed, the Swedish
King appears to have actively supported religious toleration, as 'we see His Majestie
clemencie towards the Papists, in using no violence against them ... [and he] was pleased to
let them remaine untroubled in their consciences', 102although Monro alleges Gustavus,
had he lived, would have 'crossed the Alpes into Italie, and saluted the Pope within
Rome,.103 Calvinists and Lutherans had traditionally found it as difficult to get along with
each other as with Catholics, but conditions of war softened their enmity.l'" No doubt
Gustavus found it militarily productive to entertain all factions, but Monro makes no
previous or further mention of the opposing Protestant camps, nor is any overt support
given to Monro's particular favourite, excepting his comparison between religion and beer
in which he confirms he lay closer to the Calvinist camp than any other: '[I] ... tasted the
good Calvinist beere at Serbest ... my choice of all beeres is Serbester beere, being
wholsomest for the body, and cleerest from all filth or barme, as their Religion is best for
the soule, and cleerest from the dregs of superstition' . lOS His anti-Catholicism is evident,
though mostly restrained. He speaks infrequently of Protestant designs, but when he does
he is emphatic, and he could well have had an audience in mind of whom, like Hexham' s,
he could have anticipated applause:
Nothing earthly is more pleasant to be seene, than to see brethren in Christ
conjoyned against Gods enemies, for advancing of the glory of God, in promoting
of his Gospell, and for setting at libertie those poor soules (our brethren in Christ)
that were kept long under the yoke and tyranny of the house of Austria, and the
Catholic League their mortall enemies. Who would not then ... be willing ... to
hazard their lives for the weale of the publique, yea more, for the promoting of
Christs Gospell? Surely for my part, I was most willing ... 106
His anti-Catholicism is clearest when he speaks almost sympathetically of peasants riddled
with superstition and driven by priests, describing them as
102Ibid, II, p.77.
1031bid, I, p.6. This may refer to Gustavus' apparent ambition to become Emperor, traditionally crowned in
Rome. Poyntz states that the Elector of Saxony 'was loth the King [of Sweden] should come to bee
Emperour', and on another occasion opines that 'this great King ... did strive to bee Emperour', Goodrick,
Relation, pp.59; 73. .
104Poyntz alleges John George of Saxony continued in enmity: ' ... quoth [John George], this old Emperour
and himself were nerer farre in religion then any Calvinist of them all, for, quoth hee, the Calvinists hate both
our Religions, and the Emperours Religion and myne differ but in small matters ... • Ibid, p.79.
lOS Monro, Expedition, II,p.47.
106 Ibid, II, p.62.
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ignorant Papist-Boores, that have no more knowledge of God, than to tell over their
Beads, being taught, as their best devotion and knowledge of the mysteries of God
tending to salvation, to glory in their ignorance, which makes many of them to
commit any wickednesse whatsoever, to winne damnation to themselves, being
once commanded by a Priest, that can make the poore ignorant beleeve, that to do
wickedly is the way to heaven.l'"
Monro may have sincerely believed that he was hazarding his life for the salvation of his
soul, but he was nevertheless following the tradition of his ancestors, his countrymen and
his clan. The Scots had been involved in many wars over the centuries, and God was
seldom the issue. Monro was a military man from a military family and nation; if he did
not continue the tradition, little else offered itself to him. He may have justified his
vocation on religious grounds, but the justification came after the event. Spiritual cause or
not, he was a soldier, and soldiers required wars to employ them. When the clan chief
called, he went.
Apocalypticism in soldiers' writings
Historians have often drawn attention to the prevalence of apocalyptical thought
during the period. Are there traces of this in soldiers' narratives? In the very first line of
his semi-autobiographical novel Simplicissimus, set during the Thirty Years' War,
Grimmelshausen says of the time in which he lived 'some believe [them] to be the last
days' .108 This belief in the coming apocalypse surfaces in the writings of British soldiers
from time to time. Gates is renowned for his Protestant 'fiery ardour', 109 but it is unclear
how much of his life he served as a soldier and whether he can be categorised as a
professional or whether he remained an amateur 'gentleman volunteer' .110 Prior to official
engagement with the Spanish in the Netherlands, the period during which he served, Gates
warned that England should 'waken it selfe out of senselesse securitie' and prepare for
war, and the warning was unmistakably eschatological:
... a storme will come, and a tempest will fall: for at this present houre, the hand of
the Lord God of hostes is in the seconde time for gathering together of the remnant
of Israel: the yeere of his redeemed is come, and every kingdome that wit not serve
107 Ibid, II, p.124.
108 Johann Jakob Christoffel von Grimmelshausen, TheAdventures of Simplicius Simplicissimus, trans. Mike
Mitchell (Sawtry: Dedalus, 1999), p.17.
109 ODNB: Geffrey Gates.
110 See Chapter Four.
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the Lord, shal utterly perish, from the earth; stand fast therefore, 0 ye people of
England, for the sworde of the Almightie is drawne, and will not be put up till he
hath confounded, and utterly consumed all the enemies of Jacob from the face of
the earth for evermore. III
Despite Trim's comment that 'only Gates has such apocalyptic fervour', 112 he was not the
only soldier of his age to regard the war in which he was involved from an eschatological
viewpoint. In one paragraph, Thomas Churchyard relies heavily on Revelation in his
condemnation of the Pope, whom he regarded as being in league with the King of Spain,
and whose next target he perceived to be Queen Elizabeth of England:
This Antichrist, I say this Romish seaven headed, tenne horned, and triple crowned
Dragon (whose taile draweth the third part of the stares from heaven and casteth
them to the earth) presumeth to approch neere the woman, the Church of God, the
defender of the faith, and watcheth wililie with inward and outward Serpentine
malice to devour the innocent & harmless child: whereupon although this Dragon
send forth his angels to war with this woman, though he send forth his Jesuits the
English fugitives, whom he has [nursed?] up in Popish abhomination manie yeeres,
and though he againe likewise infect,' and enforce the Locusts and Scorpions of the
bottomlesse pit with his infernall furie... yet...these wicked Angels, Locusts and
Scorpions ... were overtaken by Gods power and providence, and cast out into the
earth.l13
Churchyard served the Protestant cause around Europe prior to the Treaty of Nonsuch, and
in common with Gates offers, in this passage at least, a vehement defence of his
involvement in warfare in eschatological terms. It may not be coincidental that both men
were writing prior to the Treaty of Nonsuch and may have believed they had to provide
solid grounds for engaging an enemy not formally recognised as such by the Queen. Such
sentiments are rare, as although there are many references to religion by early modern
military authors, few are so clearly eschatological. Henry Hexham's Protestantism was
strong, as has been noted above, but there is only one paragraph that is overtly apocalyptic,
and that in a religious translation rather than one of his military works:
... onely my ambition is... to have one flurt [a fencing foil- a fleuret] at Antichrist,
and one push at the fall of the great whore of Babylon, and so much the rather,
because mine eyes hath seene some of her fornications, which some others have but
heard.!"
IlIG ates, Defence, p.62.
112 ODNB: s.n. Gates.
113 Churchyard, True Discourse, p.68, quoting Revelation 12, 14, IS, 16.
114 John Polyander, A Disputation against the Adoration of the reliques of the Saints departed, trans. Henry
Hexham (Dordrecht, 1611), f.A3v.
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Francis Markham, while not concerned with the imminent realisation of Revelation,
nevertheless believed in the eventual fulfilment of biblical prophecy:
At the end of the world there shall bee warres and rumours of warres, and therefore
howsoever we are now blest with an heavenly possession of Peace, yet we are but
Tenants at will, and these secure times best fit martiall meditation. lIS
The early modern understanding of honour, chivalry and virtue
According to Roger Manning, honour was chivalry in the medieval sense and
ranked above everything else, including allegiance.!" Sir John Hale, however, sees
chivalry as having developed through the creation of knighthoods to the production of an
elite corps who 'swore to be loyal above all to the ruler'. 117 These two interpretations are
in contention, and the issue of honour can be analysed through soldiers' published works
as a potentially major factor supporting the motivation of individuals to volunteer for
combat. Did those who considered themselves honourable commit themselves to their
ruler, to a ruler, or to an intrinsic system of behaviour wherein loyalty to the prince was
secondary to the pursuit of personal reputation through feat of arms?
A middle English definition of 'honour' is given as 'high respect, esteem,
deferential admiration, glory, credit, reputation, good name', and another as 'nobleness of .
mind and spirit, magnanimity, uprightness, adherence to what is right and correct
according to some conventional or accepted standard of conduct' ,118 There are a variety of
meanings here, and 'deferential admiration' (that an individual may declare towards his
sovereign) would seem some distance from 'glory' (singularly linked with the battlefield).
In the case of Gustavus Adolphus the two are combined as his men saw him as a 'brave
warrior' as well as 'magnificent, wise, just, meeke, induced with learning, and the gift of
tongues.l" These are dictionary definitions, and the writings of soldiers can be used to
enhance them.
lIS Francis Markham, Five Decades of Epistles of Warre (London, 1622), p.3.
116 Roger B. Manning, Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms (Oxford University Press,
2003), p.62.
117 J.R Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe J450- J620 (Phoenix Mill: Sutton, 1985), p.3 7.
118 OED; both are cited as Middle English. Other Middle English definitions for the noun are 'exalted rank
or position; distinction; a source or cause of distinction; a person or thing which does credit to another'.
Additionally, Honour, verb, 1. Pay respect or do honour to by some outward action; do homage to; ME-Ll7.
2. Regard with honour, respect highly, reverence; ME. 3. Confer honour upon, grace; ME.
119 Monro, Expedition, II, p.57.
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'Reputation' covers a wider range including a military context and is a word that
occurred often in the writings of soldiers. Sir Roger Williams wrote of 'resolute valiant
faithfull men of warre, that fought either for religion or reputation', while Sir John Ogle
was concerned that the reputation of his general Vere would be 'plunged in greater
extreamity' through the Ostend parley affair. Monro stated' ... our care should bee onely
for a perpetuall good name to leave behind us' .120 Forming a reputation was in the
forefront of a professional soldier's thoughts, and his wounds, 'the badge of the soldier',
would bare evidence to his valour.121 Monro, however, in an interesting slant on this
subject was keen to substantiate the circumstances surrounding the receipt of a wound. He
believed that some would draw a pension having contributed little to the war effort other
than receive a wound. He cited the episode of one Colonel Axallily, a Swede, and an
officer with 'no charge' but only present in the area of conflict during a visit to Gustavus
Adolphus. He had his leg shot off by a random enemy canon round while sitting at the
dinner table. Rather than sympathize with Axallily's condition, Monro considered it a
matter of 'worldly lucke', commenting that the colonel 'before this, being but meane in
estate and employment, was afterwards made rich by governments'. Clearly Monro
believed this to be somewhat of an issue, as he adds: 'Divers others I could instance under
our Armie, were advanced to riches, after receiving of meane hurts, and on meane
occasions of service, as this was, being but a looker on'. Perhaps Monro can be forgiven
this uncharitable perspective given that during the period of Colonel Axallily's visit his
unit 'sustained more hurt than the rest of the Annie' and experienced 'great losse by [the
enemy's] canon'.122
'Chivalry' is directly connected with medieval knights. It is concerned with
'knightly valour; a gallant exploit', although the idealism of the knight to include
'courtesy' and 'the inclination to defend or help a weaker party' is seen as a later
modification to the theme.123 Like all such terms, it is necessary to go beyond the modern
dictionary definition.l" It has been described as 'the duty to act honourably, even in
120 Williams, Discourse, p.40; William Dillingham, ed., The Commentaries of Sir Francis Vere (Cambridge,
1657), p.149; Monro, Expedition, II, p.63.
121 William Lithgow, A True and Experimental Discourse upon the beginning. proceding and Victorious
event of this last siege Of Breda (London, 1637), p.30.
122 Monro, Expedition, II, pp. 95-96.
1230ED.
124 As Maurice Keen commented, chivalry' .. .is not a word that can be pinned down clearly and succinctly in
a dictionary definition', Chivalry (New Haven and London: University of Yale Press, 1984), p.2.
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war' ,125 but this just leads us back to having to define 'honour'. Gates saw knighthood as
'an honour properly perteining to chivalry', which in turn was attributable to the military
profession and 'not to marchandize, nor to any other occupation'v'f" Virtue, at its most
impressive, can imply 'superhuman or divine power'. At a lower level it can indicate
'physical strength, force or energy' and 'conformity of life and conduct with moral
principles; voluntary adherence to recognized laws or standards of right conduct; moral
excellence; uprightness'i!" Thomas Adams thought that those who chose to do nothing,
in the military sense, could be considered failing in virtue, and those who supported
military preparedness could bring in virtue as a factor to criticise those who did not: 'The
standing water turnes to putrefaction, And virtue is no virtue but in action'. 128
Francis Markham was one early modem professional soldier who published a
lengthy definition of honour.129 Given the considerable time he had spent in combat, and
compared with the main sources that make significant direct or indirect comment on the
issue, his work is most disappointing in that he fails to mention honour in relation to
warfare to the point of seeming to purposefully ignore it. Perhaps he did not wish to
highlight his martial prowess to the many civilian dedicatees as each chapter, referred to as
an 'epistle', is dedicated to a high ranking government or church official. He considered
there to be two types of honour: divine and 'humane' (although, confusingly, he also sub-
divides the latter into 'ecclesiasticall' and 'temporall,).130 The first was in the domain of
religion but also attributable to kings who were anointed by God and therefore had the
power to confer honour of either category on others. To Markham 'honour is an Ensign or
badge by which soever that is honoured, is known to have gotten an opinion of well
doing', it is ' ... nothing but the reward of Vertue'.l" But his divine honour is expressed
as an offering, the height of the 'deferential admiration' discussed above, and phrases such
as ' ... by giving of God his divine honour ... ' and recommendations to ' ... kneele before
God, and offer him their prayers with zeale and thankesgiving' articulate a standard
Christian practice.l" While he mentions reputation (' ... he ever is accounted cruell to
himself, that is carelesse of his reputation ... '), he does not speak of forging it on the
125 Theodor Meron, Bloody Constraint: War and Chivalry in Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998), p.4.
126 Gates, Defence, p.S4.
127 OED.
128 Thomas Adams, The Souldiers Honour (London, 1617), p.18.
129 Francis Markham, The Booke Of Honour. Or, Five Decades Of Epistles Of Honour (London, 1625).
130 Ibid, p.13.
131 Ibid, p.9.
132 Ibid, p.6.
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bartlefield.!" The first mention of war in connection with virtue is not until page 12; he
then recites a tale of a fictional battle that was won through the efficacy of prayer and was
therefore hardly a reflection of his own experience.P" It would appear that Markham does
use honour to separate 'the Worthy from the Unworthy, the Vertuous from the Vitious, and
the Noble from the Base and Vulgar', despite his plea to the contrary.13S Any mention of
warfare is classical, biblical or historical, and there is no claim of fighting for honour, in
the cause of religion or otherwise. This treatise is about the social order, an obsequious
effusion on the efficacy of the system, and the entire work is sandwiched between his
declaration on the absolute authority of the king: Charles, to whom Markham states in his
Epistle Dedicatory, is 'the only one that is only [sic] the absolute King' and his final epistle
where he comments 'an Absolute King - whome above all estates in the world I most
adore,.136
Richard Jones published A Booke of Honor in 1590 with a dedication to Sir
Christopher Hatton. However Jones was a printer and a member of the Stationer's
Company with an interest in aristocratic culture, not a soldier. The work has been
attributed to Sir William Segar, who was not a soldier either, but a herald and scrivener.!"
A large part of this book is a history of the orders of ancient English and European knights,
but unlike Markham's it does have a martial theme, although much of it inclines to the
duel, personal honour in relation to a 'quarrell' and the rules of challenges and
tournaments, rather than warfare and fighting for any cause nobler than personal slight.
Its role of honour contains many soldiers, but the author emphasises that the route to
honour is not necessarily through arms but also open to 'learned scollers,.138
A definition is one thing; its application another. How did honour rank alongside
allegiance? Was it even on the same level and, if not, was it subordinate or superior to it?
Honour was often presented subjectively by those who would use it to support their
position or cause. It had been styled in the fifteenth century as either transmitted through
blood and lineage and reflected on the battlefield, or earned through virtuous acts, the latter
133 Ibid, p.l.
134, ••• whosoever will bee a Founder of true Honour and Nobility, must not only give over vice, and Arts
which are base and Mechanicall, but also apply himselfe to Vertue ... and the Arts Liberall ... by the first he
shall know Warre, and her children ... '; ibid, pp.II-12; 15-16.
135 Ibid, p.33.
136 Ibid, Epistle Dedicatory and p.197. The term 'absolute' here is in the sense of answering to no other
temporal power, like the princes of the Empire to the Emperor, or to the Pope. There are other references to
monarchical government, see for instance pp.29-30.
137 Sir William Segar, Booke oj Honor and Annes (London, 1590). ODNB: Sir William Segar.
138 Segar, Booke oj Honor, pp.72; 101.
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belief an Aristotelian viewpoint supported by contemporaries such as John Knox.139
Although generally seen through a military lens, honour could be achieved away from the
battlefield, but often it retained a close association with violence and its primary
manifestation was through warfare. Traditionally honour was also connected with the
aristocratic right to challenge the authority of a monarch, especially one who had behaved
tyrannically. As such it undermined the concept of unconditional obedience. Tudor
political centralisation and with it the insistence on loyalty to the monarch produced a
challenge to this aristocratic prerogative and the tension this created was put to the ultimate
test by the second Earl of Essex. If by the end of Elizabeth's reign the Essex revolt
demonstrated that the political evolution of England had resulted in an alteration to the
honour code, in that it had perceptibly moved towards the Hale definition and no longer
allowed for aristocratic self-assertiveness that challenged the monarch, the Stuart period
was to witness a return to aristocratic dissatisfaction through political frustration and
disillusionment, only this time with a clearly polarised religious perspective that had not
been a factor in the previous century.140
If aristocrats like the earls of Essex and Leicester took on military leadership
because they believed their rank and position in society demanded it, and brought with
them into war attitudes that conflicted with those of their monarch and created tension
between them, the soldiers who provide material for this study were sufficiently down the
social pecking order to be free of such pretensions. Indeed the appointment of Sir Francis
Vere as sergeant-major general of the English field army in the Low Countries, although
significantly not lieutenant general nor responsible for the garrison troops, may well have
been to alleviate such tension. For all Motley's criticism of Vere regarding his
immodesty.l" Vere was appointed to do as he was bade by the Queen, and ifhe may have
disagreed over tactical details with the high command in the Netherlands, he was never in
a position to challenge the Queen over her policy or strategic direction, and faced her
wrath if she ever perceived his deception.142 These soldiers were known to and advised
the princes they served, but were nevertheless a healthy distance from the presumption of
dissidence towards their own monarch. Their view of honour was focused on the mud of
139 Keith M. Brown, Noble Society in Scotland: Wealth. Family and Culture. From Reformation to
Revolution (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), pp.l; 4.
140 Mervyn James, Society. Politics and Culture: Studies in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), pp.308-314.
141 J.L. Motley, History of the United Netherlands. 4 vols (London, 1876), IV, pp.48-51.
142 Tracey Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands, 1589-1603: A re-evaluation of his career as
Sergeant Major General of Elizabeth I's troops', PhD thesis, University of Hull, 1997, pp.106; 246.
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the trenches rather than the polished halls of the court. Sir Roger Williams was impressed
with the 'valiant' battlefield performance of individuals and national groups,143and honour
to him was encompassed in 'the honor of the poynt', the desire to be part of 'the first
charge' in a battle or siege for which privilege units would throw dice.144 Sir John
Hamilton resigned from the army of Gustavus Adolphus after his troops had been refused
such an honour at Wurtzburg when the Swedes were ordered to storm the enemy 'after he
and his men had boldly hewn out a way for them' .145This comprehension of honour was
to a great extent a separate issue to that of allegiance and the same code of honour could
exist with those individuals whose loyalty was more fickle. For example, Sydenham
Poyntz shared the code as he recounts an episode when he was beaten to first place on
mounting a siege ladder:
[There] was a strife betwixt one and my self for one ladder, whether of us should
goe up first, hee would have the first honour, & I would have it. Hee pleaded hee
was my ancient in service and so hee was, and I let hym goe, a proper young man
hee was and up hee went and I followed hym at heeles.!"
Thus Poyntz, whose changes of side through his own words place him neatly into the
'mercenary' pigeon-hole, nevertheless displays the same attitude to battlefield honour as
the morally upright Williams.
The relationship between allegiance and honour
Historians have shown that Elizabeth I evoked a devotion to her person that
manifested itself in several ways that her Stuart successors could not emulate.l'" The
Virgin Queen became the object of romantic love, portrayed in the poetry of authors like
Spenser and the masques that were enacted for and with her during her summer progress.
Despite her reluctance to face many of the pressing issues of her age head-on, evidenced
through her prevarication over engagement in the Dutch war and a cool position regarding
further religious reformation, England's wealth had continued to grow under her long
reign. The Armadas, not just of 1588 but also 1596-7 and 1599, had seen the nation pull
143 Such as the 'Wallons and French which served most valiantly', and 'This Colonell was expert, valiant and
v~ilant', Williams, Actions, pp.80; 84. A general must be 'resolute and valiant', Williams, Discourse, p.l.
I Williams, Discourse, p.22. Monro too declared: 'I love a man that is modestly valiant', Monro,
Expedition, I, p.21. For use of dice, see also Manning, Swordsmen, p.60.
145 Grant, Hepburn, pp.29-30.
146 Goodrick, Relation, p.IIS.
147 'It was the Stuarts who had to pay the political bill for the exaltation of Elizabeth,' Lawrence Stone, The
Causes of the English Revolution 1529-1642 (London and New York: Routledge, 1986), p.89.
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together in the face ofa common, Catholic, enemy, through all of which she had shown her
resolve as well as proven her Protestant credentials. Such an interpretation is supported
by some of our sources. According to George Harwood, brother of the Low Countries'
war veteran Colonel Sir Edward Harwood, writing a 1642 interpretation of the second Earl
of Essex's ideas, Elizabeth had demonstrated a loyalty to her people that demanded
reciprocity:
Wee, thankes be to God, have a Queene, who hath never beene wastfull in her
private expence; yet will shee sell her plate, and jewels in the Tower, ere her people
shall be undefended: We are a people that will tume our silken coats into iron
Jacks, and our silver plate into coats of plate, rather then our Soveraign shall be
unserved.V"
Thus she became intrinsically and personally linked with patriotism in a unique manner.
Elizabeth, it would appear, disliked soldiers, so military men faced a challenge that may
have affected their response to her direction and fed any gender prejudice they may have
harboured.l'" Attitudes towards her from military men were formed through a fusion of
the ancient concept of a swordsman's 'honour' with the developing, and sometimes
complex loyalty of the professional soldier. The first English soldiers to fight in the Low
Countries did so without the authority of their monarch, the Queen saying that she would
'hang any Englishman in the service of Orange'. ISO These men could not, therefore, claim
to fight for their own monarch or their own country's interest. They could, though, fight
for the sake of religion, such as Gates and Churchyard above, or through their own
individual sense of 'honour'. When Elizabeth finally gave her formal backing to the Dutch
revolt, she enabled her soldiers to combine allegiance (to her), religion (Protestantism) and
freedom (in destroying Spanish tyranny) to form a solid foundation for their noble 'cause',
thus Manning overstates his case when he comments that Elizabeth's lack of support for
European Protestants caused Sir Philip Sidney to 'transfer his loyalties to the Orangist
cause'; in 1586 he was able to fight within the Orangist cause/or his Queen. lSI
Elizabethans, then, after 1585 and until the end of the reign, were able to fight for a
'just' cause against a common enemy. The soldier Robert Barret was able to declare 'to all
148 Harwood, Observations, between p.E and p.E2.
149 Evans, Works, p.xxiii. Another historian commented 'Elizabeth was not friendly to soldiers': J.W.
Fortescue, A History of the British Army Volume J (London: Macmillan, 1910), p.157. However, Sir Robert
Naunton commented that Elizabeth 'loved martiall men'; Fragmenta Regalia (London?, 1641), pAl.
150 Kervyn de Lettenhove, Les Huguenots et les Gueux, Tome VI, May-June 1573 (Bruges, 1883-5). I am not
aware that she ever did so.
151 M .annmg, Swordsmen, p.65.
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men of warre' in 1598: 'Let us love one another, that God may love us all, and give us
true Martiall valour to the service and defence of our dread Soveraigne and deare
Countrie,' just as the soldier Humfrey Barwick was able to talk of his 'dutye towards my
Soveraigne and Country' .152 It was even said by those who fought on the 'wrong' side that
they published their material in order for others to understand the enemy, thus the Catholic
William Garrard could declare for 'the benefit of our Nation' his fourteen years with the
Spanish as 'his chiefest cause' .153 On one level at least, after 1585 Englishmen in the Low
Countries who fought for the States General could now fight with clarity of purpose. Sir
Francis Vere dealt with a disloyal Englishman harshly:
There marched of the enemy... seven or eight hundred men, amongst which was an
English Gentleman, whom for his using unreverent and slanderous speeches of her
Majestie I had long held in prison, out of which he had during that siege [of
Deventer] made escape; he was excepted in the composition, taken from them, and
executed ... 154
On another level, life could become more complicated. Vere had experienced
accusations of conflicting loyalties, which were difficult to avoid given his situation in the
Netherlands. Initially paid by the English treasury, he became highly esteemed by the
United Provinces, who paid him well for his considerable services. Although Elizabeth
approved these payments, he was at times accused of dragging his heels in her service in
contrast to his active zeal with the Dutch.ISS His position being general of the English
Queen's forces but in the pay of the States must have required substantial poise. Many
actions and decisions, particularly the raising of troops, required the Queen's sanction. On
being offered the command of Ostend by the States, Vere reports:
I...was by some principall persons of the State [i.e. States General] encouraged to
accept the same, and to take upon me a journey into England to inform her Majesty
of that purpose, and, with all the necessary circumstances, to frame her liking to the
enterprise, and to induce her to the yielding of the succours of three thousand of her
subjects to be levied, transported and paid at their own charge... 156
It is probably significant that Vere retired from military service after the death of the
Queen. It would not have been easy for a senior professional soldier who had had more
IS2 Barret, Theorike, third Epistle Dedicatory. Humfrey Barwick, A Breefe Discourse. Concerning the force
and effect of all manual weapons of fire. and the disability of the Long Bowe or Archery. in respect of others
0tgreater force now in use (London, 1592), frontispiece.
I 3 William Garrard, The Arte ofWarre, ed. Captain Robert Hichcock (London, 1591), Epistle Dedicatory.
1S4 Dillingham, Commentaries, p.19.
ISS ODNB: s.n, Sir Francis Vere.
1560'11' h1 mg am, Commentaries, p.118.
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than a passing relationship with the Queen to have had any impact on the pacific new
King, treating as James did with the Spanish and disinclined to involve himself with
military affairs.157
Sir Roger Williams was a contemporary of Vere, albeit somewhat older.158 When
in France, he found himself in a similar position to that which Vere was to experience, and
was caught between Elizabeth as 'our Soveraigne Lady and Mistrisse' and Henri IV as 'the
Kings Majestie our maister'. 159 He was obliged to consider the reaction of his Queen
prior to carrying out the orders given to him from the French King. On one occasion he
moved his regiment into a position so ordered without consulting Elizabeth, which he may
have got away with had the younger brother to the Earl of Essex not been fatally wounded
during the operation. For this 'stupendous mistake' he had to beg forgiveness and was
fortunate to come away with just the Queen's disfavour.l'" By his own account, when
passing through Lier, in Brabant, on his way to back to England, Williams was brought
before the Maestro del Campo Julian Romero, who offered him a position. This is a
startling offer for us to comprehend - a request from the enemy to join him - but Williams
accepted: 'Thus I did enter the Spaniards warres, and doo think it no disgrace for a poore
Gentleman that lives by warres, to serve any estate that is in league with his owne'. 161 It is
not clear, and he does not explain, exactly what his 'league' is, but we must assume that
this is an apology for his occupation. Like any other tradesman, he will accept
employment if the contract is lucrative enough or, even if it is not, he will take it through
lack of alternatives. He was, in fact, looking for a job, and as long as there was no conflict
of interest, which he is careful to point out there was not, he would take it:
Having spent all of my crownes, and being loth to retume into England without
seeing something, I promised to stay. Also in those dayes there was no dispute
betwixt her Majestie and the Spanish King, to my knowledge. This was the
manner, and the first hower that I entred into the Spanish service.162
IS7 Clements R. Markham, The Fighting Veres (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1888),
p.346. Markham says ofVere: 'He lived for duty. He devoted his life to the service of his country ... The one
romance ofVere's life was his devoted loyalty to Queen Elizabeth.' Ibid, p.362. Winwood commented that
retirement made 'his lyfe ... unprofitable to the world, and perhaps, as unpleasing to himself.' ODNB.
IS8 Williams described himself as a 'friend' ofVere's, Williams, Discourse, p.58.
IS9 Sir Roger Williams, Newesfrom Sir Roger Williams (Cornwall, 1591), p.3. Although these are possibly
not his words they nevertheless reflect the situation as it existed.
I60E vans, Works, p.lv.
161 W'll' D'1 lams, tscourse, p.30,
162 Williams, Actions, p.l27.
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He certainly did not regard such service as acting against the welfare of the national
interest or that he was in any way disloyal to the Queen, declaring:
True it is, some are to write, some to speak, others to execute. What I want in anie
of those vertues, my bloud shall witnes in others the zeale I beare towards my
sacred Soveraigne and deare Countrey, if occasion presents it. In the meantime,
and alwais, I pray most heartily to the Almightie to preserve her sacred health and
Royall estate to the honour of God, and confusion of her Enimies. 163
There could be other reasons for this decision. Williams may well have been working for
the English government, having joined the Spanish at the suggestion of a Privy Councillor
such as Burghley or Walsingham, but while this may explain an otherwise obscure
decision, there is no evidence to support it.l64
English soldiers in the late sixteenth century after the Leicester expedition, having
had experience of the conflict in the Low Countries, directly related that experience as
service to the Crown, and saw the peace at home in England as fragile. 'The safekeeping
of this blessed peace,' said one soldier 'consisteth in the knowledge of warre, and deedes
of Armes,.16S
The soldiers' narratives support the prevailing interpretation of James I's approach.
The reluctance of James to become formally militarily involved in European affairs
produced a tension which was exacerbated during the subsequent reign when his son
proved religiously ambiguous (partly through his influential Catholic wife), thus the three
critical factors of allegiance, religion and freedom (in whatever context this was construed
but often closely related to the previous two factors), were set apart and placed in potential
conflict with each other. Elizabeth Stuart, daughter of James I, Queen of Bohemia for a
short time and wife of the injudicious Elector Palatine Frederick V, became a revered
female figure as she was exiled as a consequence of her husband's ill-advised actions in
triggering the Thirty Years' War. Colonel Robert Monro dedicated the account of his
experience in the war to Charles Louis, the son of Frederick, saying of his fallen comrades
that: 'they died standing, serving the publique, through their great love to your Highnesse
Royal Mother, the Queene of Bohemia, your Highnesse selfe, and the remnant of the Royal
163 Williams, Discourse, p.62.
164 The suggestion is made by Trim in his ODNB entry for Williams.
165 Giles Clayton, The Approoved Order of Martiall Discipline (London, 1591), Epistle Dedicatory. At the
time of writing, Clayton had 'served your Majestie in lrelande and in the Lowe Countries these sixteene
yeeres.' .
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issue'.166 In this way he could show his loyalty to the Stuart dynasty, which in the opinion
of many Scots had been treated so shabbily by the Catholic Habsburg Emperor who had
forced Elizabeth to become dependent on the charity of others, in a manner that would
have been too ironic if directed towards his king, who had shown only peripheral interest
and exercised poor military judgement in the wars of the Empire. But Monro declared a
dedication towards Elizabeth that surpasses the normal literary convention, stating in the
main text: ' ... with twenty thousand Scots.. .1 would wish to be, to doe service to the
Jewell of Europe, the Daughter of our King the Queen of Bohemia, and to her Princely
issue'.167 Stronger still, and speaking on behalf of his entire regiment, his commanding
officer and the King of Denmark, he declares:
But never men went on service with more cheerfull countenances, than this
Regiment did, going as it were, to welcome death, knowing it to be the passage
unto life, especially fighting in a good Cause, against the enemies of the Daughter
of our King, the Queene of Bohemia, for whose sake, our Magnificke and Royall
Master [Christian IV] did undertake the warres, and for her sake, we resolved to
have followed such a courageous Leader, as the Earth this day affords none stouter,
as mine eyes did witnesse divers times: And for her sake, I perswade my self, our
noble Colonell did engage his estate, and adventure his person, to have don her
sacred Majesty good service.168
The presence of Scots Roman Catholics in otherwise Protestant armies, like Sir
Andrew Gray, Sir John Hepburn, the Earl of Nithsdale, and Lieutenant Colonel John
Henderson is explained through their loyalty to the Scottish Elizabeth Stuart,169and the
zealous Calvinist Monro is able to pay tribute to his Catholic friend, whom he knew from
his youth, referring to the 'valour of Hepbume',17o through his devotion to the 'cause'.
Another Catholic Scot, Colonel Bruce, left the service of the Emperor in order to fight for
the cause of Elizabeth against his former employer.V' Not only Scots felt the pull of
loyalty towards Elizabeth Stuart. Many Englishmen supported intervention in Europe on
her behalf, such as Colonel Sir Edward Harwood, who although a combatant in the
Netherlands rather than Germany nevertheless bequeathed her money and jewels in his
166 Monro, Expedition, Epistle Dedicatory.
167 Ibid, I, p.6.
168 Ibid, I, p.21. See also, for instance: I, p.26; I, p.29; I, p.38; I, p,43; II, p.62.
169 John Mackay, An Old Scots Brigade being the history 0/Mackay's Regiment (Tonbridge: Pallas Armata,
1991), p.2. For Andrew Gray see the database at www.st-andrews.ac.uklhistorylssne; for Gray and his
commitment to the Palatinate see Worthington, Scots in Habsburg Service, p.65. Hepburn 'had first left his
native land to fight for Elizabeth Stuart, and not the Protestant cause'; Grant, Hepburn, p.191. See also Steve
Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603-1660 (East Linton: Tuckwell Press,
2003), p.209.
170 Monro, Expedition, II, p.l16.
171 Worthington, Scots in Habsburg Service, p.148, n17. Murdoch, House of Stuart, p.3.
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will, and she apparently viewed him as 'so faithfull a Servant' .172 This supports the
observation that 'foreign relations were not, in fact, conducted in England's interests, but
in the interests of the House of Stuart'. 173
If loyalty to a monarch or representative of a royal house could be the driver of
honour, it has also been argued that personal honour rose above that allegiance and even
came into contention with it. Roger Manning sets honour against such loyalty, stating that
in 'English martial culture, chivalric values generally continued to favour individual
ambition over public interests throughout the seventeenth century', but then cites an
example of an individual who looked for an opportunity 'to hazard his life in the defence
and service of his country'. 174Fighting for the public interest, the 'common weal', was a
much-declared aim during the period covered by this thesis, and is discussed below. But a
glance at rebellious noblemen may substantiate the Manning view to a degree. A sense of
personal honour could result in dissidence, as in the case of Thomas, Lord Darcy, who
went to the block following the Pilgrimage of Grace by refusing to hand over the rebel
Robert Aske to whom he had given his word, stating in his defence 'for what is a man but
his promise?,175 The revolt of the Earl of Essex at the end of Elizabeth's reign would also
indicate that to some men their sense of personal honour would over-rule their obligation
of allegiance to the monarch. Essex was, or saw himself as the most martial of the
Queen's courtiers, and his propensity to violence was part of the persona that a traditional
honour-seeking aristocrat could portray. Essex was highborn, the Earl Marshal of
England, and as he saw it his birth and position allowed him to judge how the monarch
(whose gender was, to Essex, not insignificant) had been swayed by 'base-born upstart'
advisors, in particular the lowborn Cecils. Many of Essex's followers were soldiers that
had served with him over the years, and several had been knighted by the earl (his
consistent use of the prerogative to confer knighthoods had much annoyed the Queen).176
He was the patron of a group with a military chivalric core, the combination of his lineage
and martial career, both noble, marking him out as the natural leader, aloof from any
religious alignment and reliant on the bonds of honour shared by men of a military
172 Harwood, Observations, p. B2; ODNB.
173 Murdoch, House of Stuart, p.9.
174 Manning, Swordsmen, pp.54-S, my italics.
mQuoted in James, Society, Politics and Culture, p.341.
176 Paul EJ.Hammer, Elizabeth's Wars: War Government and Society, 1544-1604 (Basingstoke and New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), on the relevance of the Queen's gender, p.2; on the Queen's 'evil
councellors', p.2IS; on knighthoods, p.l80.
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calling.l77 In the event, his self-assertive nobility, popularity with the common people and
the honour code itself all proved to be anachronistic. If Essex and the loose group to
which he was patron believed in the right of noble dissidence, it was clear very quickly that
those outside (and some inside) the group did not and the spark failed to ignite a flame in
the public imagination. The revolt was extinguished swiftly and the political nation proved
its unequivocal loyalty to the Queen.178 The situation was to develop further under the
Stuarts, or in a sense regress as once again the nobility began to assert itself in the face of
the perceived tyrannical rule of the monarch,179only this time it fused with a radical
religious agenda which saw the issue of honour over allegiance percolate down the social
order. Cromwell, gentleman by name ifnot always by financial standing, looked to recruit
gentlemen as the purveyors of honour:
Your troopers ... are most of them old decayed serving men and tapsters, and such
kind of fellows, and ... their troopers are gentlemen's sons, younger sons, persons of
quality: do you think that the spirits of such base and mean fellows will ever be
able to encounter gentlemen that have honour, courage and resolution in
them?...You must get men of spirit. .. that is like to go as far as a gentleman will go,
or else I am sure you will be beaten still. ISO
A gentleman's honour, though, was often during the Civil War period strictly
qualified by religion. There was little ambiguity, unlike the 'sides' in Europe where an
individual's religious belief could be irrelevant to the army he joined, and in England the
category 'gentleman' and the worth of his 'honour' was now defined by his 'honesty'.
When the Suffolk committee objected when Ralph Margery raised a troop of horse on the
grounds that he was not a gentleman, Cromwell responded:
If you could choose godly honest men to be captains of horse, honest men will
follow them, and they will be careful to mount such.. .1 had rather have a plain
russet-coated captain that knows what he fights for, and loves what he knows, than
that which lt0u call a gentleman and is nothing else. I honour a gentleman that is
so indeed. I 1
177 James, Society. Politics and Culture, p.43S. This supports Manning's contention that chivalry in this
r,eriod was a secular code; Manning, Swordsmen, p.60.
78 James, Society. Politics and Culture, pp.416-46S.
179 Or more accurately, as in the case of the second Earl of Essex, elements of it; the majority of peers
supported the King. Peter Young and Richard Holmes, The English Civil War (Ware: Wordsworth, 2000),
E·27.
80 Quoted by Austin Woolrych, 'Cromwell as a Soldier" in John Morrill, ed., Oliver Cromwell and the
English Revolution (London and New York: Longman, 1990), p.94, my italics.
181 Woolrych, 'Cromwell'. p.9S, my italics.
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Cromwell wanted men of honour, but the definition had altered and had become aligned
with the cause, just as the Englishmen in the Netherlands post 1585 and the Scots in the
Empire post 1618 had been able to re-align their honour to suit their cause.
Honour and the 'common weal'
A phrase often penned by British soldiers and to which they saw themselves
committed was that of the 'common' or 'public weal.' This was something alien to
subjects of the Emperor as there was no concept of a commonwealth of citizens in the
Empire as the interests of the Emperor, or any prince within the Empire, were simply his
and his family's.182 In this respect loyalty to the public weal could be seen as a block to
the absolutism of the ruling dynasty. Our authors add to our understanding of the concept,
which has been much discussed by historians in other contexts. Monro stated that men
were 'ready to serve the common cause, to die and live with his Majesty, in the defence of
the publique', 183and he believed that even kings 'are but servants (though more splendid)
for the common-weale', with military service being 'nothing els but a free mans
calling,.184 Monro linked this loyalty to the public weal to fealty to the dynasty,
commenting that soldiers risked their lives 'as servants of the publique, if not for their
country, yet at least, as cannot be denied, for the liberty of their Kings Royall Issue'.18S
Elizabethan soldiers also related to the public weal, Geffrey Gates declaring: 'The fruite
that I purpose, and hope hereby to reape, is the weale of my Countrye,' with William
Blandy commenting that a monarch is 'to be diligent, and busie for the weale of all'. 186 It. .
could also be used at the local level, with Sir John Ogle commenting that it was Sir Francis
Vere's concern for 'the publick service', that is for the greater good of the garrison and the
success of the mission that led to the controversial parley at Ostend.!" There were times
when it was reciprocated. Parliament and Privy Council supported veteran and disabled
soldiers' requests for back-pay and pensions on the grounds that inadequate treatment of
this group would bring 'dishonoure to the Realme, in comparison with other Countries',
182 Mann, Wallenstein, pp. 29; 250.
183 Monro, Expedition, II, p.lli.
184 Ibid, I, p.35.
18S Ibid, I, p.26.
186 Blandy, The Castle. pp. 2;13.
187 Dillingham, Commentaries, p.147.
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and old soldiers were not to be treated like the poor but as members of 'the community of
honour' .188
There was a perceived necessity to commit to the nation's cause, which should be
seen as synonymous with the Queen's, and a lack of honour and virtue existed within the
nobility which should be put at the country's disposal:
The greater part of our English Gentilitie is not onelie ignorant what honor and
virtue meaneth, but consequentlie disdaineth (or at least wise lightly regardeth)
those labours whereby they might and ou,ht become comfortable to friends, and
serviceable to their Prince and Countrie.18
Honour and the professional soldier
Richard Lovelace combined the careers of metaphysical poet and professional
soldier. He had followed the Lovelace family military tradition by becoming a soldier (his
father and grandfather fought in the Netherlands and he may have been born there), and he
spent many years in the service of the United Provinces.l'" Through his combination of
artistic talent and military experience, however, he shows us that honour in the field was an
issue for the professional soldier as much as it was to the chivalric amateur:
Tell me not (Sweet) I am unkinde,
That from the Nunnerie
Of thy chaste breast, and quiet minde,
To Warre and Armes I flie.
True: a new Mistresse now I chase,
The first Foe in the Field;
And with a stronger Faith imbrace
A sword, a Horse, a Shield.
Yet this Inconstancy is such,
As you too shall adore;
I could not love thee (Deare~so much,
Lov'd I not Honour more."
188 Geoffrey L. Hudson, 'Disabled Veterans and the State in Early Modern England', in David A. Gerber, ed.,
Disabled Veterans in History (University of Michigan, 2000), p.l21.
189 Segar, Booke of Honor, p.71, my italics. Evans, Works, p.cxviii.
190 ODNB: Richard Lovelace.
191 Richard Lovelace, Lucasta: Epodes, Odes, Sonnets, Songs etc. To Which Is Added Aramantha, A
Pastorali (London, 1649), p.3.
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The idea that chivalry, virtue and honour were not part of the professional soldier's creed
is brought into serious contention by men such as Lovelace, Monro and Williams, all
soldiers who have indicated, either in elegant poetry or through 'the writings of the
shallow-brained Souldier', 192 that such terms were acutely relevant to their situation and
not undermined by their status as professionals. But, as professionals, they also fought for
the aims and objectives of the general or prince whom they served, and their performance
dictated the level of honour they achieved. Such individuals challenge Roger Manning's
statement that an English professional soldier 'cared not about military victory or defeat or
the achievement of stated military objectives' .193 Of course he did, because to the soldier
on the ground combat was always about winning. Only the true mercenaries of the early-
modem and previous ages would remove themselves in the midst of battle following the
death or departure of their paymaster. Even in a civil war the enemy had to be defeated,
and one historian of the English Civil War is left with 'the overwhelming impression ... that
when soldiers fought they normally fought to win'. 194 The early modem English martial
memory extended as far back as Crecy, during the so-called age of chivalry, where the
English had ignored the 'rules' of combat in destroying the French 'quality' men-at-arms
with their yeoman archers, by firing their arrows into their horses and killing the knights
on the ground.!" These English martial men that rose to such supremacy in France and
Scotland in the Middle Ages did so with the very clear aim of winning, and while their
understanding of honour was to commit themselves with resolution on the battlefield, if an
advantage could be gained at the expense of the enemy, then it would be explcited.!" But
honour still had to be fought for and continued to be into the early modem period and
beyond - it has never been honourable to fight in order to lose. Roger Manning believes
that soldiers 'were more concerned with their reputations than with winning and losing a
battle' and quotes La Rochefoucauld: 'Most men take sufficient risks in war to maintain
192 Monro, Expedition, 'To the Reader'. False modesty was, of course, a literary convention of the time; see
Introduction above.
193 Manning, Swordsmen, p.79. It is not entirely clear which group of people constituted Manning's
'martialists;' it may be he refers to part-time soldiers, the noblemen that irritated Sir Francis Vere at
Nieuwpoort (see the section 'Rank and Status' in Chapter Two), but as he refers to Sir Roger Williams, who
was certainly not in that category, it is unlikely. Even part-time noble 'martialists' such as the Earl of
Leicester looked for military success as a route to achieving honour; failure has never been an achievement,
whether as an individual or the leader of a collective effort.
194 Barbara Donagan, 'The Web of Honour: Soldiers, Christians and Gentlemen in the English Civil War',
The Historical Journal, Vol.44, No.2, p.387.
195 Charles Aleyn, The battailes of Crescy and Poictiers under the fortunes and valour of King Edward the
third of that name, and his sonne Edward Prince of Wales, named the Black (London, 1633). At Crecy, 'the
whole ethic of knighthood and of honour in war was challenged;' Peter Reid, By Fire and Sword: The Rise
and Fall of English Supremacy at Arms: 1314-1485 (London: Constable, 2007), p.l67. Actually, it was the
rules of combat that had changed as one side gleaned an advantage through superior tactics, but honour
through victory was still paramount.
196 Ruses and the use of intelligence are discussed at length in Chapter Four.
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their honour, but few are willing to take the further risk necessary to achieve victory' .197
But La Rochefoucauld said this in the eighteenth century, in an entirely different age. It is
clear men such as Sir Francis Vere and Sir Roger Williams, whom Roger Manning
includes as 'gallants' searching solely for individual honour, were profoundly concerned
with the outcome of their engagements with the enemy. Vere did not support fighting
purely for honour without the aim of victory, as there was no glory in a foolhardy death:
Which is an errour that many the like cases fall into, to their utter destruction; when
fear to have their valour called in question, maketh them against all reason fight
against a stronger enemy, and engage themselves, where they have neither purpose
nor hope to obtain victory. 198
Vere, it has been shown in Chapter TWO,199was careful to separate the glory of his
victories from the debacle of others' defeats. Williams deplores the 'ignorance' of the
commanders and soldiers when describing the early days in the Netherlands that saw the
inexperienced English force suffer several defeats, and although he praises their courage it
is clear the honour of their efforts has failed to achieve the aim of victory. Williams writes
in terms of beating the Spanish, and refers to the defeat of the Spanish Armada, so to him
war was not a matter of just taking part, it was a matter of winning.2oo To Monro, he and
his men were fighting for the right cause through serving the relevant leader. Fighting to
win, even, or especially, if the effort resulted in death, was an act of supreme honour:
Thou must resolve to shew thy self resolute, couragious, and valiant, going before
others in good example, choosing rather to dye with credit standing, serving the
publique, than ignominiously to live in shame, disgracing both thy selfe and thy
Countrie. Who would not then at such times choose virtue before vice; glorie,
honour, and immortall fame, before an ignominious, shameful, and detestable
life?20I
It was not soldiers who committed themselves to battle without concern for the
collective victory, but it may well have been the aim of their civilian leaders, to strike a
strategic balance of power rather than achieve outright success against one enemy only to
leave the nation open to an erstwhile ally.202 Elizabeth I had been brought up to view the
197 Manning, Swordsmen, p.66.
198 Dillingham, Commentaries, p.l30.
199 See section on 'Caesar's Commentaries'.
200 Evans, Works. p.xv; Williams, Discourse, pp.8-9.
201 Monro, Expedition, II, p.93.
202 Hammer, Elizabeth's Wars, p.253.
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traditional enemy as France, but it was clear that Spain's massed armies in the Netherlands
and the stated aims of the 'universal monarchy' and activities of the Catholic Inquisition
posed the most immediate and dramatic threat to Protestant England's security. Towards
France and Spain the Queen had to enact her foreign policy on a knife-edge, in the words
of Howell Lloyd, by 'manipulating their mutual hostility'. 203 The Dutch, too, were to be
viewed with suspicion, as a republic in rebellion against their legal sovereign and growing
rivals in trade and colonial expansion. These political factors explain why Elizabeth was
as concerned about outright victory as she was abject defeat, and she admonished Sir John
Norris for his overly aggressive tactics in striving for success in battle:
... so would we have liked best, you had remembered our particular direction, given
unto you to stand upon a defensive war ... For that our meaning in the present action
is (as we have publicly notified unto the world) to defend.
In similar vein, she directed the Earl of Leicester 'to make a defensive than an offensive
warre, and that you seeke by all meanes you mai to avoide the hazard of a battaW.204
These would have been impossible orders for a military leader to carry out in the field: to
be told, in effect, to hold the line indeterminately but not offensively. While Vere was
swept along by the momentum of the States General (at times clearly to the annoyance of
the Queen), the commanders who answered to her directly during expeditions, such as
Norris and Leicester, were subject to her parsimoniousness and the constraints of her
cautious non-committal born out of mistrust for her allies. It was not these military
commanders who did not wish to succeed in the field; indeed they perceived honour in that
course of action, but rather their political superior in London.
What was honourable and what was not could be the subject of some debate, such
as Sir Francis Vere's anti-parley at Ostend, and sometimes one method of achieving an aim
could be considered more honourable than another. For instance, one English gentleman
volunteered for the Portugal expedition rather than serve in the Netherlands as he believed
the former to be an offensive campaign, and therefore more honourable than the defensive
warfare fought in the Low Countries.i'" Hexham gives us another example when he offers
two ways of laying a siege, describing' ... the difference betweene a Towne blocked up,
which is a languishing death, and a Towne bravely beseiged, & taken in by Approaches,
203 Howell A. Lloyd, The Rouen Campaign 1590-1592: Politics. Warfare and the Early Modern State
(Oxford University Press, 1973) p.22.
204 Quoted in Adams, 'Protestant Cause', pp.5l; 54.
203M • Sannmg, wordsmen, p.12l.
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which in a Souldiers opinion, is accounted more honorable'i?" Hexham goes on to
compare the tactics of Frederick-Henry, who won the city of Breda in 1637 through
aggression, with those of the Spanish during the first siege, who starved the city into
submission:
The Marquesse Spinola... came and satt downe before [Breda], on the 28 of August
1624, and having sustayned the losse of a great many brave men before Bergin,
fearing to attempt the same by Approches, (commanding a mightie Armie) choose
rather to block it up on all sides, and so knowing that many mouths, must eate
many victualls, sought rather to famish it out.207
Elizabeth herself realised that her commanders had views of their own about which
course of action was advisable. She suspected her commanders of joining the fray too
readily, as her leaders charged into enemy positions at the head of their troops in order to
further their personal honour, perhaps without due regard for their safety and to the
detriment of a wider strategy. During the amphibious action at Peniche (Portugal), the Earl
of Essex, always keen to subject himself to hand to hand combat,
... was the first man landed ... Seaven Ensignes with him at that pointe wheareto
ympeach the landing of our men. Theare weare 5000 Spaniards and PortugaIs
assembled, but in thend they wear by our men driven to flighte, whearen Captains
Palmer, Jackson, and Baskerville behaved themselves very valiantly at the push of
pike.208
Contemporary sources suggest that perhaps the Queen had a point. Her commanders often
had an adventurous spirit and the operational aim could be blurred by the hunt for glory
and the desire for booty. But they all nevertheless fought a clearly defined enemy, not a
personal foe but an enemy of the state, and they fought to win. The expedition to Spain
and Portugal in 1589, in which the Earl of Essex was an unauthorised participant (and de
facto leader), is one affair where the aims of the field commanders seemed to have been in
direct contention with that of their supreme commander, the Queen. Although she, too,
looked for the pecuniary gain an interception of the treasure fleet at the Azores would
bring, her most pressing objective was the destruction of the remnant of the Armada that
had returned from its defeat off the coast of England and at that time was awaiting refit on
Spain's northern coast at Santander and San Sebastian. Whatever the Queen may have
206 Hexham, Siege of Breda, Epistle Dedicatory.
207 Ibid, Information to the Reader.
208 Fissel, English Warfare, p.l60.
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directed, the many backers for the enterprise had commercial reasons for supporting the
scheme, and in the event the Spanish navy was to remain unmolested, although much to
the Queen's chagrin so too was the treasure fleet.209 Under the influence of the
unauthorised Earl, the force headed for Portugal, via Corunna where the commanders were
attracted by the supposed arrival of two hundred laden merchantmen that did not
materialise. They returned home with very little to satisfy their commercial backers and,
strategically far more significantly, had allowed the Spanish fleet to remain a serious threat
to England's defence. For this they faced the wrath of the Queen, and yet they clearly
viewed their actions independent of any wider strategy and worthy of renown despite the
lack of any long-term effect on the Spanish. In their view they had taken the war to the
enemy, unlike the defensive policy in the Netherlands that saw only slow progress through
attrition. As one participant commented, ' ... so much is the journey to be preferred before
those defensive wars', and the honour of the actions, though without strategic impact, were
nevertheless of great national value: 'For the gain of one town or any small defeat giveth
more renown to the assailant than the defence of a country ... the fame of all wars [is laid]
upon the invader'.2Io Likewise Sir Roger Williams, appealing to 'all the Captaines of
Europe' to judge rather than unappreciative civilians, who regarded the overthrow of a
much larger force by their army of 'smal meanes & great crosses' an act of 'valor' worthy
of 'an 100 times more praise' than the Spanish Armada, with its far superior assets and
resources and yet shamefully defeated. The courage of the soldiers despite harsh
conditions and disease was itself intrinsically worthy of praise; they had defeated the
enemy despite over-whelming odds on his own territory, and the strategic impact and the
bigger picture were somewhat irrelevant to that achievement. 211
Dishonour
To some professional soldiers, such as Williams, dishonour was 'more to be feared
than death'.212 There is, nevertheless, the poor reputation of soldiers to consider and it is
perhaps the opposite end of the 'honour' spectrum that historians have tended to highlight.
The sources for a negative view are unimpeachable:
209 R.B. Wemham, ed., The Expedition of Sir John Norris and Sir Francis Drake to Spain and Portugal,
J 589 (Aldershot: Temple Smith, 1988), pp.xix; xxxix.
210 Ibid Anthonv Wi .1 , ony ingfield's discourse, p.247.
21 I Williams, Discourse, pp.8-9. Also quoted in Wemham, Expedition, pp.224-S.
212F • Mrancis arkham, Hooke of Honour, p.l.
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Can honour set-to a leg? No. Or an arm? No. Or take away the grief of a wound?
No. Honour hath no skill in surgery, then? No. What is honour? A word. What is
in that word 'honour'? What is that 'honour'? Air. A trim reckoning! Who hath
it? He that died 0' Wednesday. Doth he feel it? No. Doth he hear it? No. 'Tis
insensible then? Yea, to the dead. But will it not live with the living? No. Why?
Detraction will not suffer it. Therefore I'll none of it. Honour is a mere
scutcheon.213
Thus Falstaff, an over-indulgent, incorrigible rogue and coward who 'misused the King's
press damnably' for his own ends.214 Shakespeare's character has been taken as
representative of English captains (during Shakespeare's age, not Falstaff's), and modem
historians of the English land forces for this period, of which there are few, have tended to
emphasise the potential for dishonesty in the company commander's role.21S Cruickshank
wrote of the power of the captains to swindle both the government and their men, and who
stood accused 'doubtless for good reason' of dismissing men while pocketing their pay,
selling their arms and enrolling freebooters in their stead.216 Indeed the reaction of the
Privy Council to the riots in London of 1589 and 1592, which saw soldiers demanding
back pay, was to hold the 'captains' responsible for not sufficiently equipping, feeding and
paying the troops.217 Sir Roger Williams recognised that these dishonourable officers
existed and what damage such individuals could do:
He careth not what wrong he doth to recover wealth, cause men to ende their dayes
in everie light skirmish, wearie others with wants and discurtesies, keepe the
Officers of his Annie in pickes and quarrels, cause them to disgrace one another,
lay al the fault on his fellowes, spare neither friend nor foe to recover wealth, it is
unpossible for such a Chiefe to end any action honorablie: for he respects the least
of his bagges, more than his best Captaine; and values his crownes too good for his
best Souldiers. A multitude are not to be contented, without consuming great
treasure; the sight of his gold, & departing with his treasure wil cause him to [sic]
with all his troupes dead to recover their dues. In short time he will discredit his
Estate and action.i"
213 J Henry IV, Act 5 Scene 1, Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor, eds., William Shakespeare: The Complete
Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Falstaff goes by the original name of Oldcastle in this
version.
2141 t.rrtenry IV, Act 4 Scene 2.
21S See, for example, Henry J. Webb, 'Falstaff's "Tardy Tricks"', Modern Language Notes, Vol. 58, No.5,
(May, 1943), pp. 377-9.
216 C.G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp.39, 132; Hammer,
Elizabeth's Wars, p.7.
217 Hudson, 'Disabled Veterans', p.l20.
218 wns D' 21 lams, tscourse, p. .
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It has been commented that the swindling of soldiers was widespread, by historians who
quote 'available records' and contemporaries who crafted indignant protests.219 There
were regulations against it, but no doubt it continued to an extent in all armies.220 In fact,
profit from war was a rare experience, and if Vere was to benefit from the financial
reforms of the Dutch and receive due reward from the English, there are many instances of
financial hardship brought on by leaders whose primary responsibility, that they clearly
took very seriously, was the welfare of their men.
The taint of dishonourable actions was not contained within the middle-ranking
field commands, the company captains responsible for the management of the rank and
file, but could extend further up the chain of command. There were times when those in
high command drew back from full commitment, in other words from striving for total
victory and treating with the enemy, as generals such as Wallenstein in Germany and the
Earls of Essex and Manchester during the civil wars in England were accused of doing.221
There was no perception of honour in their actions - Essex and Manchester were sacked,
Wallenstein murdered as a consequence.222
Duelling
One manifestation of a gentleman's concept of and desire for honour is thought to
have been his propensity for duelling. A duel was considered a challenge that required a
high degree of physical courage due to the very real risk of death. There are two
discernible categories of duel: the challenge of a commander or his second to fight his
counter-part on the enemy's side thus avoiding battle and the inevitable 'effusion of much
bloud',223 and the brawling of 'gentlemen' on the same side as the result of a perceived
219 Evans, Works. p.xciii; Sir John Smythe, Certain Discourses (London, 1590), Proem Dedicatorie. Smythe
lambastes many aspects of modem warfare in this treatise, which was suppressed by Burghley.
220 For instance: 'Any Officer that does presume to defraud the Souldiers of their pay, or any part of it, shall
be cashiered', Of the Duties of Commanders and Officers, III, Anon, Lawes and Ordinances ofWarre
(London, 1642).
221 J.V. Polisensky, The Thirty Years War, trans. Robert Evans (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1971), p.212; Woolrych, 'Cromwell', p.l0l; Ian Gentles, The New Model Army: In
England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645-1653, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pA.
222 Some wars were fought without enthusiasm and as such became military non-events: during the Bishops'
Wars 'the Scots remained reluctant to strike against their English brethren,' whilst the English anny was to
be large enough to fight the Scots 'if necessary'. Fissel, English Warfare, pp.278/9.
223 Segar, Booke of Honor, p.l. Although perhaps that was not necessarily the pre-eminent reason; Williams
comments that in a battle 'the more dyes, the more honour to the fight', Actions, p.80; and Monro, having
lost 500 men at the defence of Stralsund, comments: 'Who will say, but that bloud was better lost than kept,
when it retumes with advantage, having bought credit to themselves and Country? Let none then moume for
the loss gotten so honourablie', Monro, Expedition, I, p.80.
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personal slight or other infringement of the unwritten, and very subjective, code of
personal honour. The writings of soldiers to an extent bear out this view. Although the
former seems to have died out by the time of the civil wars in Britain, it was certainly
evident in the Elizabethan era.224 Sir Roger Williams was prone to offer such challenges,
and respected the practice in others, recounting from the Portugal expedition: 'Where the
Earle of Essex sent his Trumpet, to dare their Generall the Countie of Fuentes, to find
himselfe in the head of his troups, to change the blowes of the pikes, giving him signall of
his attire and feathers ... ,225
Such challenges could be interpreted as matters not only of personal honour but
also patriotism, and Anthony Wingfield would seem to support this view, describing Essex
in this example as a man 'preferring the honour of the cause, which was his country's,
before his own safety' (although, arguably, not before his own honour).226 Roger Manning
and Sir John Hale represent two very different perspectives; whether an individual fought
for his own individual reputation regardless of the outcome of the wider conflict or even of
the cause, or whether his entire raison d' etre was for the greater good and his personal
sacrifice subordinate to the final outcome of the war for the benefit of Queen and country.
Essex, who had also challenged the governor of Rouen to a duel, is regarded by Roger
Manning as an amateur gallant who had no time for set military objectives and who went
about his own private battles purely to gain personal honour. While this may be true to an
extent of Essex, the self-assertive high-born noble who believed he had the lineage and
position, that is the right, to challenge the policies of the ruler,227 this is not so of the
professional soldiers with whom he associated. Roger Manning includes Vere and
Williams in his category of 'amateur gallant' alongside Sidney and Essex, professing that
they held 'the mentality of the late medieval knight' and that to them 'public war was
hardly distinguishable from ... private war'.228 It is incorrect to class Vere and Williams as
amateurs. They were full-time members of an increasingly professional army, and if their
recourse to flamboyant leadership, always from the front with feathers flying from
224 Of the English Civil War: ' ... that battles might be decided by single combat between commanders acting
as champions seem to have been met by bemusement and mockery'; Donagan, 'Web of honour', p.370. That
said, a parliamentary pamphleteer thought it worthwhile to report that 'Heroick, Brooke, offered to deside the
contraries quarrel, by a Lordly combat', quoted in James, Society. Politics and Culture. p.406.
225 wnu D'I lams, tscourse, p.9.
226 Evans, Works, p.xviii; Wembam, Expedition, p.276, my italics.
221 Richard McCoy discussed these 'fundamental contradictions' between Essex as aristocrat and his
monarch in: The Rites of Knighthood: The Literature and Politics of Elizabethan Chivalry (Los Angeles and
London: University of Califomia Press, 1989), p.89.
228M'Sannmg, wordsmen, pp.65; 7l.
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morions,229was somewhat medieval in style and their collection of wounds in keeping
with the signs of honour,230they nevertheless survived long enough to prove that they
could not have been overly reckless. Neither did they 'hinder [the] acceptance of the
principles and practices of modern warfare',231as Williams was voluble in his criticism of
the conservative Smythe, and Vere was open to the modernisations of Prince Maurice.
Those with an over-developed sense of honour (or an under-developed professional
caution) were likely to risk too much and die prematurely, as in the case of Sir Philip
Sidney.
Brawling amongst quarrelling gentlemen was the one aspect of combat that was not
turned against the enemy, and was therefore frowned upon by governments who
understandably did not wish their military commanders and men of quality to kill each
other and yet whose members were tied to the same unwritten code, thus an ambiguity
existed that saw few duellists punished.232 However there were measures taken against
duelling: the ever-practical Gustavus Adolphus stamped out the practice by threatening to
execute the survivor,233while Elizabeth I was capable of punishing combatants severely as
she did when exiling Sir Thomas Lucas234 and James I issued a declaration of his
displeasure on the subject.235Still it flourished, and there are duelling episodes throughout
the period studied. Sir Francis Vere skilfully navigated around the puerile challenges of
the Earl of Northumberland, who believed he had been treated with disdain by Vere whilst
at Ostend (and probably had been given that general's impatience with glory-seeking
aristocrats).236 Monro also discounted the practice:
My cozen Lieutenant Andrew Monro being killed in combat [Le. a duet237],I have
more then reason to condemne and disallow of that miserable sort of fight, where
oftimes the victorious puts himselfe in a worse case, both of soule and body, than
he that is killed.238
229 E IIr ks .vans, rror , p.XXVl
230M . S dsannmg, wor: men, p.S2.
231Ibid, p.79.
232Francis Markham comments: ' ... that many old Lawes for the defence and tuition of [honour], have
admitted duels, unlawful (otherwise) altogether .. .'; Booke of Honour, p.l.
2J3 Christopher Hill, 'The Duel in European History,' in England's Turning Point: Essays on J 7th century
English history (London: Bookmarks, 1998), p.2S3. For a more recent discussion, see Markku Peltonen, The
Duel in Early Modern England: Civility, Politeness and Honour (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003).
234M . S dsannmg, wor: men, p.194.
235 Anon, A Publication 0/His Majesties Edict and Severe Censure against Private Combats and Combatants
(London, 1613). Manning, Swordsmen, p.l93nl.
236C.R. Markham, Fighting Veres, pp.334-7.
237'A Combat, is a single fight of one man against another, for trial of truth ... ',Segar, Booke of Honor, p.l.
238 Monro, Expedition, I, p.83.
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The complexities of loyalty
An uncomplicated loyalty to a monarch, simply because that individual was seen as
the personification of the nation or that he or she would act selflessly and fairly on behalf
of his or her subjects, or that he or she was divinely sanctioned, may have existed and
motivated individuals: it would go some way to explain the loyalty shown to Charles I by
individuals who found him personally disagreeable.r" One of his followers wrote of the
King's dealings with Catholics:
How much I am unsatisfied with the proceedings here I have at large expressed in
several letters. Neither is there wanting daily handsome occasion to retire, were it
not for grinning honour ... lfthere could be an expedient found to salve the punctilio
of honour, I would not continue here an hour. The discontent that I and many other
honest men receive daily is beyond expression.i"
Perhaps a belief in the innate nobility of military service has existed throughout the ages
and was no less ascendant in the early modem period, and perhaps some individuals served
because they accepted the order of things as they had little choice. Robert Monro said
bluntly: 'He that serves a master, must obey',241 and according to his account his own
soldiers responded well to strong leadership regardless of creed or cause:
I cannot passe over with silence the love that ordinarily is seene betwixt Officers,
and their followers: being once put under good discipline they will undergo any
thing for love of their Commanders and Leaders, who have taken paines and
diligence in excercising them in the perfect use of their Armes, and in leading them
bravely on occasions before their enemies, in making with exercise their bodies
strong, and their hearts valiant, then I say, what will they not undertakefor the love
of their Leaders?242
Thus the soldiers, trained and disciplined to follow their officers, although the
views of the men are unrecorded. But what of the officers? Francis Markham believed
that a captain should fight for 'the Church, their Countrie, King and the oppressed,' 243
(presumably in that order), thus giving considerable scope, so who, then, did these British
professional military officers actually fight for? Perhaps for their own monarch in some
239 Edmund Verney wrote to his brother: '1 beseech you consider that majesty is sacred; God sayetb "Touch
not myne anointed"', quoted in Christopher Hibbert, Charles I (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p.184.
240 S.R. Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War (London and New York: Phoenix, 2002), Vol I, p.25.
241 Monro, Expedition, I, p.ll. This would be as true at home regarding the clan chief as in the field under a
foreign master.
2421bid, I, p.37.
243 Francis Markham, Epistles, p.74.
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way defending the 'freedom' of others in order to keep the wolf from their own door? Or
just as mercenaries for a foreign employer, merely after personal gain but using dynastic or
religious arguments if they conveniently presented themselves? Monro believed the wolf
existed and had to be stopped, and that it was Catholic, observing:
... how few of our Nation are induced to serve those Catholic Potentatesr'" and for
my part, I finde the reason good: for if we have any enemies in Europe, it must be
those, that would not onely overthrow our estates at home (if they could) but also
would force us (if it lay in their powers) to make shipwracke of our consciences, by
leading us into Idolatry.24s
Vere, we have seen, had difficulties at times convincing his own government whose side
he was on (English or Dutch; never the enemy's), and Williams, despite his change of
employer, would certainly not have described himself as a mercenary; as has been noted he
spoke disdainfully of them. Monro discussed the topic through an issue concerning the
regiment's colours when serving with Christian IV of Denmark:
The Regiment mustered received colours, wherein his Majestie would have the
Officers to carry the Danes cross, which the Officers refusing they were summoned
to compeare before his Majestie at Raynesberge, to know the reasons for their
refusals; at the meeting none would adventure, fearing his Majesties indignation, to
gainstand openly his Majesties will, being then his Majesties sworne servants: and
for the eschewing of greater inconvenience, the Officers desired so much time of
his majestie, as to send Captaine Robert Ennis into England, to know his Majestie
of Great Britaines will, whether or no, they might carrie without reproach the
Danes Crosse, in Scottish colours: answere was returned, they should obey their
will, under whose pay they were, in a matter so indifferent.246
Two points are noteworthy here: the view of the officers, in that they wished to be seen as
representatives of their own nation, and the view of Charles I who considers the issue
unimportant and appears to snub them as mercenaries. Although to be fair to the King, his
father, as James VI of Scotland, had experienced none of the complexities of command
and financial manoeuvring that dominated Elizabeth's relationship with her English troops
and the States General in the Low Countries. As James had had no say over Scottish
244 In the l620s the Earl of Argyll could not find recruits for the Spanish army, 'the common view being that
service in the Spanish army would be against the best interests of the house of Stuart,' particularly after the
Stuart-Orange campaign. Worthington, Scots in Habsburg Service, pp.72/87.
245 Monro, Expedition, II,p.75.
246 Ibid, I, p.2.
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soldiers employed by the Dutch or any other government, so it is possible that his son's
natural reaction would be one of indifference to such issues.247
An Englishman, serving in the Netherlands at about the same time as Monro served
the Danes in Germany, also believed action abroad for the sake of religion should be
appreciated back home. His message to the King is a plea for recognition:
It would bee a great incouragement to his Subjects to follow the warres, to inable
themselves to doe him service, though to their cost and charge, when they have to
hope, that though they serve a strange Prince, or State to their no advantage, yet
thereby inabling themselves to doe their owne King service, they may in time bee
provided for in. their owne Countrey; whereas if charges of commands,
advancements of honour may bee had better cheape, by staying at home and
following their pleasures, there will but few ever take the paines and labour, or bee
at the charges to inable themselves by following the warres abroad ... 248
Serving abroad and balancing the commitment to a foreign lord against an
obligation to one's own countrymen and native monarch were sometimes too difficult to
reconcile. Vere just about achieved the balance and he certainly retired a wealthy man,
whereas the Scot Colonel John Clark did not. Clark commanded a troop of horse in
Danish service against the Swedes (possibly his former employers) in the early 1560s, and
was then given the task of recruiting one thousand men in Scotland who he would
subsequently command on behalf of Frederick II against Sweden. This Clark duly did, but
at the end of the war in 1570 managed to fall foul of both the Danish and Scottish
authorities and faced a court-martial in Denmark. He was accused of allowing, or at least
not impeding, the defection of elements of his force to the enemy (two men had previously
been executed for allowing 84 others to defect to the Swedes), of obstructing Danish
recruiting drives (other than his own) in Scotland, and of using his men (or, more to the
point, Frederick II's men) against Queen Mary. The charges were very serious: hindering
recruitment for the Danish war effort, and potentially embroiling Denmark in a civil war
abroad. Added to these accusations were the discrepancies in Clark's accounts and the
consequential implication that he had defrauded the Danish treasury. Scotland, when
under the new Protestant regime of James VI, was to intervene on his behalf, but as
negotiations for his release dragged on, he died incarcerated at Dragsholm Castle having
247 D le,uyc Joumaal, I.p.347.
248 Harwood. Observations, p.D2.
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been in prison for some six years.249 The Clark affair presents a complicated series of
events and accusations on which to assess culpability, but it nevertheless exposes the
pitfalls that faced soldiers attempting to straddle two nations concurrently. Clark had one
leg in a Scotland preoccupied with internal strife and the other in a Denmark openly at war
with Sweden, and the loyalty he showed to one nation, or faction within that nation,
provoked the enmity of the other.
Another issue that could present itself was the loyalty further down the chain of
command, between different levels of command. Sir John Norris, commander of the
English regiment in the Low Countries in 1582, had a serious disagreement with Sir Roger
Williams and as a consequence the latter removed his company from Norris' command and
put it at the disposal of the French. This was not considered mutiny as Williams'
commission was to levy a company of volunteers to serve in the Low Countries and it did
not specify under whom.25o Some years later Williams was ordered to redeploy his troops
from their position in Normandy to Brittany and fall under Norris' command. While
protesting to the Queen 'my zeale toward your sacred service alwaies' and that he would
'hazard ... myne owne carcasse for your service', he nevertheless stayed in Normandy and
failed to link up with Norris, a dereliction that was, after a pause, sanctioned by the
Queen.i"
Changing sides
In numerous instances soldiers had to justify to themselves and to others their
decision to change sides. Sir Edward Harwood commented: 'All men [are] led, either by
honour, or profit, or both', and Sir Roger Williams wrote: 'Dutie, honor & weIth makes
men follow the wars: when Generals rob their inferiors of all three, often it makes honest
mindes quit their service, & the dishonest to serve their Enemies. ,252 William Garrard, an
Englishman who served the Spanish Army of Flanders for fourteen years, saw no excuse
for changing sides, and offered the following advice to the trainee soldier: 'He ought
likewise to beware, under paine of great punishment, for running from one campe to
another, for what occasion soever that urge him to it, but is bound to serve that partie with
249 Thomas Riis, Should Auld Aquaintance Be Forgot ... (Odense University Press, 1988), pp.86; 88-94.
250 Evans, Works, p.xxi. Nolan, Sir John Norreys, p.S4.
251 Evans, Works, p.xlvi.
252 wun D'1 lams, tscourse, p.3. Donagan, 'Web of honour', p.366.
167
which he doth first place himselfe, even until the ende of the warres,.253 Given Garrard's
position in the 'enemy' camp, his comments could be seen as an attempt to vindicate
himself in that he stuck with his chosen masters and was, therefore, no mercenary.254The
Elizabethan soldier Humfrey Barwick combined service to the state with earning a living,
declaring: ' ... when I was young I did seeke to serve, both in England, Fraunce, and
Scotland, to that end I may better doo my Prince and Countrye service, and also to sustaine
my self, who otherwais was not able to live as I did desire to doo ... ,255
Sydenham Poyntz was an Englishman whose changing loyalties caused him some
difficulties in later life. Unlike Vere, Williams and Monro, Poyntz described himself at the
outset as 'a meer Soldier of Fortune'. 256He appeared initially to have no particular flag to
fly, for either a religion or a dynasty, although he did believe in the innate nobility of the
soldier's profession, stating 'to live and dy a souldier would bee as noble in death as
Life'.257 As we have seen, Poyntz changed sides several times, and although this was
certainly not uncommon it was less so for officers. It was usual practice that, following
defeat, 'Souldiers were made to take service, and their Officers made prisoners,.258 Poyntz
tells us of a clash between Wallenstein and the Elector of Saxony, where following the
Imperialist victory the consequence of defeat for the Saxons was that 'the Souldiers were
to serve the Emperour but the Officers were conducted to Saxonie with the
Commaunder' .259 In principle, changing sides was treason, in any theatre of war at any
time, and the soldier was advised to consider the severity of the crime:
Hee shall keepe unspotted his fidelity to his Prince, and although there befall him
many disgustos, and insufferable toyles, yet shall he not passe to the enemies
campe, for not to be tatched a traytor, a foule and odious offence, rigorously to be
punished amongst all nations, from all ages and times; and never yet traytor to his
Prince made ever any good end, whereof too many examples do abound; The
treason may be liked, but the traytor never beloved nor trusted.26o
However in practice it was a common occurrence, and one that often went unpunished, for
example those at Breda who 'had forsaken the service of the high and mightie Lords the
253 G d,arrar Arte of Warre, p.19.
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States General, and had taken entertaynment on the Cardinals side' were nevertheless
allowed to depart 'without any molestation'."! One German soldier changed side many
times. Enlisting initially with the Venetian army, on dismissal he moved to Parma to join
that Duke's forces. He later enlisted in Pappenheim's regiment, but after the defeat at
Straubing he was absorbed into the victorious Swedish army. Two years later following
the Swedish defeat at Nordlingen, he ended up back in his Imperial regiment. Some years
on he faced the French, whose soldiers, once defeated in battle, all joined his side. This.
was followed by defeat of the Imperialists by the French, whereupon his men joined the
French but he, as he was by now an officer, was allowed to return to his side. He relates
this merry-go-round of side changing dispassionately.if High numbers of enemy soldiers
seemingly switched sides as a matter of course, as formed units rather than individuals,263
and presumably as a matter of survival rather than personal choice. Although on the last
occasion this soldier was allowed to go free, for an officer becoming a prisoner was
perceived as a potentially unpleasant, ifnot a fatal, experience:
I rather choose to die honourably, then to live and to be prisoner to a churlish
fellow, that perhaps would keepe me in perpetuall bondage, as many brave men are
kept; or otherwise, at my taking, to be scurvely used, being stripped naked by a
Villaine, and then, if I lacked monies about me, to be cut and carved, and at last,
poorely put to death ... 264
Monro, however, for his part seems to have treated his prisoners rather well. At
Nuremberg, the officers of the Scots Imperialists were promised by Gustavus Adolphus
that he would 'within three dayes .. .let them loose againe Ransome-free. Neverthelesse,
they were kept for fives weekes with us their Country-men, where we made merry as
friends'.265 For ordinary soldiers, though, who could be in considerable numbers
following defeat in battle, the simplest solution was to absorb them into the victor's army
and there may well have been soldiers from the same nation fighting on both sides that
they could join. 266 The alternative could be far worse: at Mentz, Monro reports the enemy
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was 'put all to the sword, except the Officers that were taken Prisoners'. 267 This is more
than literary convention, as discussed in Introduction and further investigated in the section
'Rules of War' in Chapter Four. Having assessed the odds, sometimes troops declined the
fight, preferring to swap sides before a battle. During an action in Brandenburg, Monro
reports: 'Upon the Castle were seaven Companies of Colonell Holks Regiment, who
fearing to be blowne up by a Mine, entred in treaty, and were content to take service under
his Majestie ... ,268 In the Netherlands, the terror induced by the Duke of Alva, who had a
grim reputation for executing his foes whether military or civilian, forced some soldiers to
change allegiance. Following the surrender of Haarlem, Alva allowed the Germans in the
pay of Orange to live, rather than be executed as was his norm, as they had 'compounded
for the most part to serve the King'. 269 After the battle of Breitenfeld, Monro asked to
replenish his depleted ranks by selecting the British (including Irish) from the 'three
thousand foote prisoners that were willing to take service'. Gustavus Adolphus directed
his general Baner to allow the Scots to take them, but Monro was to be disappointed:
I was overjoyed, thinking to get a recreut of old Souldiers; and the Cavalier having
declared his Majesties will unto the Generall, the Generall said with all his heart I
should have them, and when I had made tryall to finde out the number; there were
but three Irish amongst them all, and being disappointed of a strong Recreut, I did
over-see those, to follow their Camerades; and being returned, his Majesty asked
me how I sped; I told his Majesty, Britaines were so farre addicted to his Majesty
and the cause, that few of them served the Emperour ... 270
Despite Monro's rose-tinted view that British soldiers did not fight for the Emperor, which
mirrors an account from Holland during the same period that makes the similar claim that
Englishmen did not fight for the King of Spain,271 there were many officers and soldiers
who did fight for the enemy and changing sides was commonplace. In the Low Countries,
Churchyard reports that in 1574 'five Ensignes of those English souldiers were constrained
to step aside to the enemie, contrarie to their promise to the States', 272and outside Ghent
Sir John Norris was 'assailed by English Rebels,.273 On taking a town near Frankfurt,
Monro reports 'the Souldiers [of the enemy] for the most part tooke service [with us]', 274
267 Monro, Expedition, II, p.lOl.
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and in Silesia there were 'two thousand taken prisoners that tooke service'. 275 Poyntz tells
us that the Duke of Saxe-Weimar at Goppingen, on facing a superior force 'gave up the
Towne with his whole Regiment to the service of the King of Hongary,.276 Sometimes
subsuming prisoners into an opposing army did not work. Monro was at Donauworth,
where 'a thousand ... were forced to take service with the Regiments, but being Papists of
Bavaria, as soone as they smelt the smell of their Fathers houses, in lesse than ten days
they were all gone,.277 Monro reports another, similar incident on crossing the Rhine after
Oppenheim:
... they willing to take service were all disposed by his Majesty to Sr. John
Hepburn, who was not only a Colonell to them, but a kinde Patron, putting them in
good Quarters till they were armed and clad againe. But their unthankfulnesse was
such, that they stayed not, but disbandoned all, in Bireland; for having once got
the warme ayre of the Summer, they were all gone before Winter.278
Subsistence and reward
A constant theme when studying the wars and soldiery of the period is that of pay
and the perceived link between salaries and mercenaries. Manning contends that
gentlemen in the pursuit of honour would pay their own way and distance themselves from
'the taint of profit seeking', although, in an almost immediate and direct contradiction to
this, he also states that they 'believed that valour entitled them to ransom and booty as
well,.279 In effect, few gentlemen had the means of supporting themselves through a
protracted period of warfare, and in fact rather than provide for themselves could draw
higher wages than the rank and file.28o Those who did have the means to assist the
Queen's treasury found that she was aware of their financial position and was more than
content to allow them to spend their own money on her forces and thus withheld
government funding. Lord Willoughby spent over £7000 out of his own pocket to support
Elizabeth's armies in the Netherlands and again dipped into his own resources for the army
in France, much of it never recompensed. There was income from neither ransom nor
booty to offset this expenditure, but he did earn the Queen's gratitude and the respect of his
27S Monro, Expedition, II, p.l 02.
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men from which it can be assumed he felt duly rewarded.f" The Earl of Essex frequently
paid out of his own pocket to keep an army from disintegrating, which eventually led to his
bankruptcy, and he would encourage gentlemen to follow his example and serve without
pay.282 The Earl of Leicester paid out an initial outlay of £35,000 of his own money in
1586 and went on to sell property and raise further loans, dying two years later in
considerable debt. 283 Rarely did an expedition realize a profit. The Cadiz raid of 1596 did
bring home a significant quantity of loot, but Essex and the Queen got little of it.284 The
senior soldiers themselves, the 'adventurers', contributed financially to the expedition to
Portugal in 1589, clearly anticipating a return on their money, and although they received
little they could nevertheless content themselves with the glory and honour they bought. 285
Whatever a soldier's loyalty, whether he considered himself on a Calvinist crusade
against Antichrist or had been pressed into service as a vagrant, he could not continue in
his task unless he was paid or had some form of income in order to subsist. Sir Edward
Cecil was well aware that money was required to affect discipline over men: 'It is one of
the daungerest pointes in commaund to commaund without money, and to have little to
content them, for there is nothing that will make a man more hated or slandred than that,
for to punish and not to paye is ever receaved in an armie for tirannie', 286
The wars between Denmark-Norway and Sweden did not have a religious
dimension, and the sixteenth-century Scot Captain David Moncur 'undertook to serve
Frederick II loyally as long as his wages were paid him' .287 Whether a war was fought out
of arguments over Christian belief or just between Christian belligerents, financial
practicalities and hardships dictated the methods utilized by leaders to augment their
depleted treasuries. Money had to be raised so tax, in one form or another, had to be paid
somewhere. What does a study of the published writings of soldiers add to our
knowledge? The contribution system whereby armies drew from their immediate vicinity
was dependent on the wealth of the countryside and, besides, according to Poyntz, 'the
281 DDNB: Peregrine Bertie. Wernham, Expedition, p.xxiii.
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souldiers got but little of it' .288 Turner tells us that, after the siege of Hamlin, despite being
on the victor's side and in a camp that was 'plentiful enough', he nevertheless existed on
bread and water 'from want of money' .289 Poyntz also tells us of the Elector of Saxony
'that he drayned the whole country dry of mony to pay hym his Composition,' therefore by
the time his army reached Prague, he had to think of something else to satisfy the men. He
and his Swedish ally, Baner, therefore bribed the soldiers with promise of plunder:
' ... encouraging their souldiers and promising them pillage, whereof the souldiers in hope
were so joyfull, the Duke telling them how hee sped there that they cast away their upper
Garments that they might bee the lighter to run up to skale the Walles ... ,290 Shortly after
this the Elector of Saxony himself changed sides, for the second time, and set himself
against his erstwhile ally, Baner. Again the promise of pay was offered: 'if wee did beat
the Ennemy out of the Country hee would give us two Moneths pay'. 291 In other words,
soldiers who had fought side by side with an ally yesterday were today being paid to kill
him. In this situation, it could still be argued that the soldiers held the continuity of serving
the same leader, regardless of the change of enemy, in this case, Saxons serving their
Saxon prince.
Poyntz also gives us a glimpse of the other side of the plundered coin. Not having
enough to live on was one thing, but being over-burdened with stolen goods could sap an
individual's will to fight. Tilly's army had, apparently, taken so much gold from Leipzig
that the following day, at Breitenfeld, they were disinclined to risk losing their new found
wealth and lacked the motivation to fight. Poyntz concludes: 'a rich souldier will never
fight well' .292 If riches were difficult to come by and more difficult to hold onto, there are
rare references to men who did make a profit from war. One such individual was Colonel
Edmond, who, for 'deeds of valour' subsequently 'acquired great wealth' with Maurice of
Nassau, under Gustavus Adolphus 'amassed great wealth' and to his daughter 'left a
magnificent fortune'. 293
Although the Dutch were to achieve a comparative financial mastery during their
war with the Spanish rarely achieved elsewhere in Europe, at the initial phase of the Revolt
the States struggled to pay their foreign contingents. Flemish and Dutch citizens of
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London helped to finance the deployment of English troops in the early 1570s, although
this proved unreliable, and at one stage Captain Thomas Morgan reported to Burghley that
'the country is poor and out of money, and unless some prince of better ability [than
William the Silent] takes the matter in hand' the troops will be forced to depart.294
However after these initial difficulties the Dutch were to draw sufficient credit from their
trading activities to finance their war effort; significantly the Spanish were not. Their
campaigns in the Low Countries were dogged by mutinies caused through lack of pay, the
effects of which were hugely detrimental to their ability to consolidate successful military
initiatives. Mutinies were not lightly decided upon, and the soldiery would have spent a
protracted period without pay before resorting to them as a means to convey their
displeasure. Some forty-five mutinies occurred in the Spanish Army of Flanders during
the period 1573 to 1607 and, whilst grim conditions and harvest failures exacerbated the
situation, the fundamental grievance of the soldiers' was lack of pay. These mutinies were
carried out with considerable organization, the soldiers selecting a leader, an electo, to
represent their case to the Spanish High Command. Significantly, they did not change
sides as mutiny was not treason, and an electo led his mutinous troops into battle at
Nieuwpoort under Spanish command against the Anglo-Dutch in 1600.295 They could,
though, form a neutral force of belligerent men that remained a dilemma for the Spanish
until they were paid off. At Hoogstraten, for instance, mutineers set up what was in effect
an independent military state between 1602 and 1605, demanding contributions from the
countryside far and wide. On one occasion, this force was escorted to safety in Holland by
the Dutch army when threatened by a loyal element of the Spanish Army of Flanders.296
It is the premise of the historian Maury Feld that once the United Provinces had
organised their finances in the efficient manner for which they are famed, the regular wage
contract that resulted from this signified a fundamental shift in the relationship with its
soldiers that saw the eroding of the aristocratic ethos and an undermining of the honour
code. This, combined with the modernising of its structure and tactics, led to a
professionalizing of the army away from the reliance on chivalry and allegiance. This
view is in line with the Manning theory that the emerging professionalism, with its
formalised training and the clarifying of set objectives, no longer allowed for individual
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and localised displays of personal virtue.297 The medieval system of honour relied on
morale whereas this modern approach, with its drill coordinated firearms and emphasis on
logistics, saw mechanical controls and technique claim ascendancy over chivalry. Feld
claims that this shift 'was analogous to the change, in industrial production, from a craft to
an assembly line mode,.298
The above view, however, fails to take into account those who executed these
changes. Men like Vere and Williams served in Maurice's army, not as throwbacks to a
previous age, but as the cutting edge leaders in the field. The integration of the English
forces with the Dutch occurred with Vere as the contingent commander, a general who
would insist on leading from the front, as generals would continue to do throughout the
Eighty and Thirty Years' Wars. For example, in 1632 Sir John Hepburn and Sir James
Lumsden, the brigade commander and a regimental commander, advanced personally to
the gates of Frankfurt (Oder), under siege by Gustavus Adolphus, and placed the petards
that blew a breach through which the troops advanced. They declared their allegiance to
the house of Stuart and continued to build their reputations through acts of valour despite
their senior rank.299 Honour cannot be discerned in one historical period and denied in
another as a result of technical or financial improvements. The soldiers reviewed in this
thesis, all the main sources regardless of background, theatre of war or period, have
demonstrated that respect for courage in the face of the enemy was part of their psyche,
and that ruses, artillery, tactics and modernisation could all be employed if it assisted the
main task of defeating the enemy but could not replace the valour inherent in confronting
that enemy. The Dutch for all their advanced financial arrangements continued to rely on
the commitment of the individual, men like Francis the Gurmer, 'an excellent Cannonier,
which [sic] had been the death of many a Spaniard'. 300 It should also be noted that for all
the modernizations of the Dutch and Swedish armies, the enemy remained steadfast. In the
Netherlands there were few battles through which to practise the new drill movements and
Maurice, the great innovator, was involved in only two, one of which was a chance
skirmish.t" In Germany one victory in a battle did not produce the winner of the war, and
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after its initial successes the Swedish army was to suffer crushing defeats against an
Imperialist army not famed for its modernisation.
Conclusion
Historians have debated the motivations of the soldiery, and whether participation
was driven by religious or secular factors. When we examine the publications of soldiers
we read of the motivations that they wished to declare and with which they wished to
convince. On occasion we are able to suggest the accuracy or otherwise of such
declarations. Sometimes we are able to indicate why such motivations were emphasised.
More often than not, however, we are forced to accept their statements at face value,
merely issuing a caveat that this is what we are doing.
An exploration of the published writings of several individual soldiers has allowed
us to consider further what constituted a soldier's honour, how the word seems to have
been understood in the early modem period, and which individuals adhered to the
definition. We have also discussed how honour related to extant concepts of loyalty, and
whether or not the two phenomena were in contention, as maintained by Manning. Sir
John Hale saw the soldier's honour directly linked to his loyalty. The use historians have
tended to make of these words and their handling of the issues appears somewhat
perfunctory, as they seek to support a seemingly inevitable and transparent progression
from medieval to modem. The Dutch are seen as progressive in military affairs, with the
modernizations of Maurice generally recognised as 'revolutionary', and the effect on the
soldiery therefore equally radical. If we step back from the historians' 'modernising'
interpretation, we can see that in fact, the Dutch forces suffered setbacks as well as
victories, and their final, arguably partial victory was eight decades in the making. Honour
still played a vital part in motivating the individual, regardless of new drill movements and
scientific manuals: war was becoming scientific but it was nevertheless still an art. We
may demonstrate this by using an under-used source: the published works of soldiers. To
the soldiers whose writings we have studied, for whom warfare was permanent
employment and who had witnessed many years of frightful combat, fighting potentially to
the death was the most honourable of vocations, and their commitment was total and often
tested through the penury they were forced to endure. Often little else other than honour
justified continuance in the profession; even the stout-hearted Williams came close to
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quitting on occasion, but out of frustration and poor conditions, not through fear of being
killed.302 For some, notably Monro, honour was matched by a fierce loyalty, a need to
underwrite their efforts with a substantial cause. Poyntz, unable to suitably justify his
raison d'etre or articulate a worthwhile cause, nevertheless fought with the same selfless
courage. Williams and Vere acknowledged the authority of their Queen; there is no hint of
dissidence, and they fought, for the most part, for her allies and certainly never for her
enemies. Their loyalty was sound, but largely unconnected with their performance on the
battlefield. With the possible exception of Hexham, whose personal involvement at push
of pike we have no real visibility, they were courageous to the extent that an explanation
must be sought for their actions, and that explanation is their acute perception of honour.
The perspectives expressed by the main sources are those of officers who had a
firm enough opinion to record their view for posterity (or who, as in the case of Hexham,
had a potentially profitable second career as a writer). What of the soldiers under whom
they served? Were the conceptions of honour and loyalty similarly shared? Given the.
many accounts of bloody assaults on fortified positions by large numbers of rank and file,
seemingly they were. There was also a recorded case of 'simple soldiers' preventing the
desertion of their officers to the enemy.303 But these British soldiers, and many of their
European colleagues, were not fighting on home soil, and for all the multi-national forces
and religious movements that claimed European-wide membership, and created the great
cultural melting pot that was the Europe of which the British Isles were part,304
nevertheless a notable localism prevailed.i" It is clear that loyalty often had to be bought,
and I have commented on the tendency for units and individuals to change sides. Of note
are the Scots and English attacking their Danish allies, and the financial difficulties the
English experienced with the Dutch. There are several other examples during the period of
alliances not working effectively, where cooperation between national groups had the
potential to affect the turn of events but failed. Strategically, the Protestant Union failed
on a large scale. At a more tactical level, the Spanish contingent that landed at Smerwick
in Ireland in 1580 and built a fortification subsequently all died defending it without any
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support from the Irish.306 At a local level but with strategic consequences, at Kinsale in
1601 the Spanish force did not engage the English army, even though the combined forces
of Don Juan del Aguila and Hugh O'Neill outnumbered Lord Mountjoy's army
significantly: Mountjoy defeated the Irish who stood alone, subsequently forcing the
Spanish to surrenderr''" Individuals were able to identify with their 'country' rather than
just their monarch or county, particularly when abroad. 'They die as fast as if God were
not well pleased that a stranger should command our nation', 308commented one English
officer of the Mansfeld campaign in Germany. Those who left home to fight abroad left
behind their 'county' but could still be serving their 'country'. They may have ended up
serving with men from other parts of Britain, who, after overcoming the initial difficulties
with accents at least spoke English whereas most Europeans could not, and shared a
common heritage. Despite these very real challenges to any grand strategy that sought to
bind soldiers from differing national, linguistic, religious and political backgrounds, and
above all despite the lack of funds that were required for them to subsist, there nevertheless
existed a common belief in the concept of honour. This concept sometimes combined with
a loyalty to an individual, house or cause and sometimes not, and it regulated the behaviour
of the individuals within armies as much, if not more than the martial law they were all
subject to. Perhaps this comment by Monro, describing the collapse of Protestant unity in
Germany, brings together the elements to which a professional soldier, but certainly not a
mercenary, owed his creed:
But when our fellowes in friendship faile us, as the Evangelists one after another,
for a skurvy losse, quit the Crowne of Sweden, the great Duke of Saxon having left
them first, breaking his oath and promise, in prejudice of the pub/ique peace,
excluding the Protestants impiously for his owne aimes, he did prejudice the
Gospell, his country, and confederates, and by his evill example: for plaine
necessity, while a storme should blow over the townes of the Upper Circle of the
Empire, as Strasburg, Ulme, Nurenberg & Francford did accept of an unsetled
peace, contrary to their mindes, in prejudice of the publique, losing themselves and
the publique, for the losse of one day, being without their head, which first brought
them together.i'" ,
306 Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World 1494-1660 (London and New
York: Routledge, 1979), p.l43.
307 Colm Lennon, Sixteenth-Century Ireland: The Incomplete Conquest (Dublin: Gill &Macmillan, 1994),
p.300.
l08Q d' Firth C 'uote m .Cromwell s Army, p.2.
309 Monro, Expedition, II, p.l 06, my italics.
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Chapter Four
The experience of soldiers
Introduction
This chapter focuses on what the published writings of soldiers reveal of the
realities of war, the 'micro-experience' of early modem soldiers and the extent to which
their world view was dominated by the conflicts in which they were embroiled. I It
analyses the information provided by those individuals personally involved in military
affairs at various levels and shows how that information was conveyed through print. It is
not concerned with the closed political information of state papers or the correspondence
of civilian government officials, vying for favour at court or intriguing within factions.
Instead it concentrates on information about life in the field, at the front line confronting
the enemy. This information was available to contemporaries who could read and were
inclined to learn about the subject. Concern over the defence of the nation was a major
issue for all during the reign of Elizabeth, which led to the increase in demand for military
literature. In the relative peace of the Stuart era the European conflicts still resonated at
home, with Robert Ward commenting as late as 1639: ' ... our neighbours house is of a
light fire, their Townes and Towers bume like Beacons: We know not howe soon their
flame may catch hold of our owne buildings' .2
In the previous chapters it has been shown how these authors indicated through
their accounts how much they believed God played a role in the outcome of their
endeavours, to what extent their loyalty was retained in the face of considerable adversity
and to what degree, if at all, their commitment was shaken by their experiences. Even if
these beliefs were not genuine, and usually there is no reason to suspect them, we know
that the authors thought it appropriate to express them. Practical matters regarding the
manner in which armies were recruited, formed, administered and fought are also to be
found within these accounts. Soldiers tell us from their own point of view how the military
units in which they served presented themselves for their tasks, and how effective they
were in applying current tactics and using available equipment. The approach of this
1 The phrase is used by Jeremy Black, in an article on early modem military change where he encourages 'a
more cultural approach, for example on the experience of war'; 'Was there a Military Revolution in Early
Modem Europe?', History Today, July 2008, Vol. 58, Issue 7, pp.34-41.
2 Robert Ward, Animadversions OfWarre (London, 1639), Epistle to the Earl of Warwick.
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chapter, as with the thesis as a whole, is to view warfare from the experience of life at the
front-line, and such an approach must draw its information from the soldiers themselves.
However, historians have used alternative sources to describe contemporary warfare, and
this chapter will attempt to show where the works of soldiers verify, contradict or
challenge an account based upon those other sources. Historians, it has been said, have
'too often and too easily removed the individual soldiers and their leaders from the military
historical equation', 3 and it is the aim of this thesis, and this chapter specifically, to present
the view of the actual participants in war and, where appropriate, to compare that view
with the opinions historians have formed from other, wider and more traditional sources.
Order of battle: the structure and arming of early-modern armies"
From the information contained within soldiers' printed works, we are able to
discern how contemporaries viewed their organisation, equipment and effectiveness. The
soldier Robert Barret tells us that most of his contemporaries of the period were foot
soldiers, without horses except 'for some officers and sick persons' ,5 infantrymen who
carried a pike or a firearm (arquebus or musketj.f The pike, 'the Queene and mistresse of
weapons',' was an eighteen foot long spear,s used in a defensive holding role not thrown,
and the most widely deployed weapon of the sixteenth century. By the seventeenth
century its dominant position had been challenged by firearms, the wheelock replacing the
3 Kelly DeVries, 'Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs: Towards a Redefinition of 'Effectiveness' in
Premodern Military Technology', War in History, 1997, Vol. 4, Issue 4, p.4S4-470; quote p.4S4.
4 Although all armies on the continent were multi-national, companies were formed in national groupings.
By way of an exception proving this rule, Williams said of the defenders of Harlem: 'Amongst whom were
some 200 English, in sundry Companies; without an Ensigne of their owne'. Sir Roger Williams, The
Actions of the Low Countries (London, 1618), p.88.
S Robert Barret, The Theorike and Practike of Moderne Wa"es (London, 1598), p.lOl. Barret's experience
was 'after the Italian & Spaniard ...with whom I have most frequented and served', p.1S.
6 Although there may not have been a difference between the two types of firearm: David A. Parrott,
'Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War', in Clifford J. Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution Debate:
Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p.229,
n30.
7 Barret, Theorike, p.3S.
8 The pike was ideally 'of ground Ashe, of seventeen or eighteen foote long at the least,' ibid, p.34, although
it was often made shorter by, and for the convenience of, pikemen.
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matchlock arquebus as the century wore on." This weapon, difficult to handle but,10
crucially, able to pierce armour, had a very limited range, although as far as Sir Edward
Cecil was concerned in 1621 it was entirely adequate: '200 paces is as much as a mans
ayme will serve to hitt any reasonable mark in the world and that our musquets will reach
and what showld we then doe with longer, except it be for somm particular occasions or
sortS?,11 The infantry, or 'foot', would walk between locations or, whenever possible,
embark a vessel arranged by the general in order to deploy by river or along the coast
because of the difficulty particularly in wet weather of navigating the roads.12 Dragoons
and cavalry, the 'horse,' would deploy on horseback, the dragoons dismounting to fight
while the cavalry, on heavier horses, were intended to charge the enemy infantry." The
use of the pike by infantry units was intended in large part 'to receyve the violent charge of
Horsemen.t " and they were effective in this regard," hence the comparative decline of
cavalry during the early modem period in Europe. Mounted soldiers also attacked enemy
supply lines and formed the reconnaissance element of an army, thus providing a
commander with much of his intelligence regarding the location and strength of the enemy.
Sir Roger Williams explained:
...the service of all Light horsemen, consists chieflie in marching great marches ...to
surprise Companies a farre off in their lodgings, or marches; likewise to defeat
convoyes, & to conduct convoyes, as much to say, direct it to spoyle necessaries
that come to furnish their enemies, & to conduct necessaries to furnish their own
9 Andrew Cunningham and Ole Peter Grell, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Religion, War, Famine
and Death in Reformation Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.IIS.
10 Exercising with the musket required training and dexterity; Jacob de Gheyn, The Exercise of Armes
(London, 1607) shows demonstrations of the movements, as does Henry Hexham, The Principles of the Art
Militarie Practised in the Warres of the United Netherlands (London, 1637); 143 different command words
were required according to Bernhard R. Kroener, "'The Soldiers Are Very Poor, Bare, Naked, Exhausted":
The Living Conditions And Organisational Structure Of Military Society During The Thirty Years' War,' in
Klaus Bussmann and Heinz Schilling, eds., 1648. War and Peace in Europe (Miinster/Osnabrilck
Conference, 1998), p.28S.
IIQuoted in Lindsay Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia 1558-1638 (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul,
1967), p.114.
12 As much use as possible was made of inland waterways, often the flow of a river dictating strategy or a
commander's objective; Paul Scannell, 'Water in Warfare: Obstacle or Aid in Early Modem Europe?'
British Army Review, Spring 2006, No. 139. Although safer than the open sea, inland waterways were not
always reliable, one German soldier reporting the sinking of a ship on the Rhine with only five survivors out
of 120 on board, Ein Sokinerleben im Dreissigjdhrigen Krieg (Berlin: Academie Verlag, 1993), p.lS7.
13 Sir James Turner commented that, although on horseback, 'their service is on foot, and is no other than that
of musketeers'; Peter Young, Edgehill1642 (Moreton-in-Marsh: Windrush, 1995), p.l9. Dragoons were
able to carry out surprise attacks due to their superior mobility; Kroener, 'Soldiers Are Very Poor', p.286.
14 William Garrard, The Arte of Warre, ed. by Captain Hichcock (London, 1591), p.7.
15 But, as one veteran pointed out, only if the pike was longer than the cavalryman's lance, the pikeman's
habit of shortening his pike to make it more manageable being detrimental to his cause in battle. Humfrey
Barwick, A Breefe Discourse, Concerning the force and effect of all manuall weapons of fire, and the
disability of the Long Bowe or Archery, in respect of others of greater force now in use (London, 1592), p.34.
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camp or service. Also to scout and discover, to spare the armed men, I mean the
Lautiers, & the other horsmen, likewise both to conduct & spoile forragers...
The works of John Cruso some forty years later would indicate that little had changed:
[The cavalry] must principally be employed to travell and molest the enemie,
sometime by hindering him from his victual, sometime by endamaging his
forragers, sometime by sending some troops even up to his campe to take some
bootie, by that means to draw him forth, and to make him fall upon some
embuscadoe disposed beforehand in some fitting place.
Parma used his cavalry to confuse the enemy prior to laying a siege, by sweeping across
the countryside, fmally settling on the chosen town and cutting it off from its neighbours."
Early-modern readership would have been aware of the rising importance of
infantry over cavalry in the previous century as the methods of waging war developed out
of the Italian Wars,17 and soldiers' writings provide emphatic evidence of the traditional
rivalry between cavalry and infantry units during this period. Cavalrymen were required,
if not to supply a horse at least to be able to ride one, so they tended to be drawn from a
higher position in society than those enlisted into the infantry. There was also a pecking
order in the infantry. 'The pike' claimed Robert Monro, in agreement with Barret though
writing some forty years later,was 'the most honourable of all weapons, and my choice in
day of battell'. 18 Monro, as Barret, was probably reflecting the social distinction that
placed the pike firmly above the musket as officers trained soldiers in its use, while 'the
Musquet is 'in the Office of the Serjeant'." In the late Elizabethan period pikemen were,
16 Sir Roger Williams, A Briefe Discourse of Warre (London, 1590), p.33. John Cruso, Military Instructions
for the Cava/lrie (Cambridge, 1632), p.89. Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early
Modern World 1494-1660 (London: Routlegde, 1979), p.73. J.X. Evans, ed., The Works of Sir Roger
Williams (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p,cxii.
17 Bert S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder. Technology. and Tactics
(Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), esp. Chapter 6, 'Firearms in Warfare (II): The
Sixteenth Century', pp.1 56-200. !
18 Robert Monro, Monro His Expedition With The Worthy Scots Regiment (Called Mac-Keyes Regiment)
levied in August J 626 (London, 1637), II, p.192.
19 Francis Markham, Five Decades of Epistles of Warre (London, 1622), p.79. It could also be argued that,
with 'the Colours flying upon the head of them,' pikes would be a rallying point, and hence a command post
in battle, as suggested by Richard Elton, The Compleat Body of the Art Military (London, 1659), Book 1,
p.2. Contrarily, the clergyman Donald Lupton in his A Warre-like Treatise of the Pike (London, 1642), Sect
XI, recommends use of the musket and half-pike over the traditional pike.
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apparently, 'for the most part gentlemen'r" Whatever the case, Monro served on foot and
regarding infantry over cavalry he stressed both tactical and financial advantages."
... Horse-men are usefull many times ... yet in my opinion, in their service, they are
not to be paralleled to foot: For at the taking in of Townes, and in the hilly and
mountainous Countries, that are straight by nature, they are not usefull, neither can
they doe but little service, yet for their great charges, they are much harder to be
entertained: Therefore my choice shall be ever, as most credible to command on
foote, and if! were worthy to advise a King .. .I would wish him to esteeme more of
his foot Officers, than of his horse: then fewer would serve on horsebacke, and
more on foote, and as his Charges should be lesse, his profit should be the more, his
Annie the stronger, his Countrey lesse spoyld, his contribution to maintaine his
Annie, the better paid, his treasure richer, his Victories more frequent, and more
durable, his Conquest the better maintained.f
There was no love lost between the two: on boarding vessels bound for Denmark
following the retreat from Oldenburg, Monro and his infantry attacked their own cavalry,
who were about to take up much of the shipping space with their horses: 'I advanced with
our Colours alongst the peere, our Pikes charged we cleared the Peere of the
Horsemen ... until such time as the most part of our Regiment were shipped... ,23
Sir Francis Vere, when not defending a siege, served on horseback. He was further
up the chain of command than Monro, which may explain why he rode into battle. He
also, however, commented that 'most commonly in battels the successe of the foot
dependeth upon that of the horse', although he admitted that at the battle ofNieuwpoort in
1600 the victory was 'clean contrary' to that theory." However, it should be remembered
that Vere, despite being a veteran of many years service and several sieges, had little
experience of battles. Turnhout in 1598 was his only previous encounter though a large
skirmish rather than a major battle, and one that was carried solely by the horse." Vere's
lack of battle experience is a reflection on the age. The Eighty Years ' War saw few
engagements that have been labelled 'battles,.26 If Turnhout is considered a skirmish,
Vere experienced the only pitched battle, at Nieuwpoort, that occurred during his time at
20 Barwick, Breefe Discourse, p.23.
21 Certainly at times he was mounted, as he recounts a fall from a horse which left him seriously injured;
Monro, Expedition, II, p.173. It is probable that a horse to Monro was a form of transport that he enjoyed as
an officer, rather than a factor that defined his method of combat.
22 Ibid, I, p.24.
23 Ibid, I, p.27.
24 William Dillingham, ed., The Commentaries of Sir Francis Vere (Cambridge, 1657), p.IOO.
2S Ibid, pp. 77-79.
26 There were, of course, only sixty-eight years of actual combat, as the Twelve Year Truce has to be taken
into account.
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war.27 Robert Barret commented that 'the conduction of our warres now a dayes, doth
consist more in surprises, assaults, and batteries, then open field fight'. 28 So these primary
sources confirm Sir John Hale's eloquently phrased comment that battles in this period
were 'infrequent arias within the long-drawn-out recitatives ofwar,.29 In the Thirty Years'
War, clashes between large armies were more common, but nevertheless equally
indecisive. After Gustavus Adolphus crushed Tilly at Breitenfeld, where the Imperialist
general lost two-thirds of his force, he was still able to raise another army and challenge
the Swedes at Rain the following year." Monro reports that Tilly, having had his army
shattered on 7 September 1631, was able to check Gustavus' army a month later at
Wurtzburg Castle with 50,000 men."
These authors also had something useful to say about what they understood of army
organisation and how they viewed it. Men were formed into companies, commanded by a
captain, who in turn served his colonel; the colonel thus commanded a number of
companies that formed his regiment. This regimental commander would also have his own
company within the regiment, responsibility for which he devolved to another officer,
usually a captain-lieutenant. In the Netherlands it was not unusual for a colonel to
command both an infantry regiment and a troop (or 'comet') of horse, with such pluralism
leading to unavoidable absenteeism. There were between one hundred and three hundred
men in a company, 32but this could be reduced through enemy action and disease; Hexham
reports companies 'not above ten or twelve men strong' at Ostend." Monro's regiment
was decimated at the battle of Lutzen, with only enough survivors to form one company."
The early seventeenth-century French army saw the ideal number for a company as 100,
27 Williams, Actions, pp. 16/17; 22123. Dillingham, Commentaries, pp. 81-117. L.L. Doedens, ' "The Day
the Nation was Born." The Battle of Heiligerlee, 1568,' in Marco van der Hoeven, ed., Exercise of Arms:
Warfare in the Netherlands (1558 -1648) (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp.62-68. Clements R. Markham, The
Fighting Veres (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1888), pp. 256-260; 296-302. J.P.
Puype, 'Victory at Nieuwpoort, 2 July 1600,' in Van Der Hoeven, Exercise of Arms, pp. 97-111. C.V.
Wedgwood, William the Silent (London: Phoenix, 1944), pp.IOS-I08.
28 Barret, Theorike, p.94.
29 J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450 -1620 (Phoenix Mill: Sutton, 1998),
E·128.
o Geoffrey Parker, ed., The Thirty Years' War (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 113-116.
31 Monro, Expedition, II, p.79.
32 Monro gives the ideal strength ofa company at 150; II, p.183. Williams gives the strength ofa Spanish
comet as 100; Briefe Discourse, p.18. The fluctuations of company size in Scots units in the Netherlands is
discussed in James Ferguson, ed., Papers lI/ustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the Service of the
United Netherlands 1572-1782 (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1899), p.xiv. A theoretical full-
strength company during the Thirty Years' War was 300, although this was rarely achieved, Kroener,
'Soldiers Are Very Poor', p.286.
33 Dillingham, Commentaries, p.167.
34 Monro, Expedition, title page.
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. but accepted the reality of 60.3S The recommendation of Francis Markham was also that
companies should be 100 strong (although 'it is in the Captaines power to make his
Squadrons bigger or lesse at his own pleasure'), with the smallest administrative unit being
the section, or camarado commanded by a 'deputie corporall' or lanspesado, 'each
containing twelve persons, that is to say, ten sentinels, one Gentleman, and a Lanspesado.'
The 'corporall' then commanded a 'squadron' of two camarados containing twenty-four
men, four squadrons making the company, with one sergeant responsible for two
squadrons." The captain commanded the company, assisted by his lieutenant and a
number of ensigns. 37 The term 'captain' was also generic, referring to a senior soldier who
commanded, or had commanded, a unit thus confusingly a colonel of a regiment could also
be referred to as 'captain'. 38
Weapons and wounds
The narratives of these military men fully express how soldiers were expected to
incapacitate the enemy, the dangers they faced from that enemy, and the effectiveness of
their equipment. Weapons continued throughout the period to be a mix of blades and
firearms, and there was no standardization by weapon type." Despite an increasingly
effective use of artillery, discussed below, and a growing ratio of muskets over pikes as the
period progressed, there were no great advancements in technology where possession of a
particular weapon type determined the outcome of battle. One historian has observed that
'no one living...in the early modem period looked at the weapons which they used and
described their effectiveness with the words "decisive", "invincible", or "revolutionary'" .40
But they did, as will be seen, describe certain weapons as either modem or outdated.
Indeed one sees the soldiers actively engaged in a debate about the pros and cons of
35 Parrott, 'Strategy', p.230.
36 Francis Markham, Epistles, pp. 61-72; quotes from page 65. He later contradicts the figure of 100, giving
200 as the ideal strength ofa company; p.l62.
37 Ranks may have been becoming more clearly defined by Markham's day, or perhaps his work is an effort
to clarify a potentially blurred system. In the Elizabethan era, Churchyard muddies the water by describing
the lieutenant colonels of the (Navy) Squadrons and the Corporals of the Watch all as captains. Thomas
Churchyard, A True Discourse Historicall, of the Succeeding Governors in the Netherlands. and the Civi/l
Wa"es there begun in theyeere 1565 (London, 1602), p.113.
381t is incorrect to describe Sir Roger Williams as having the 'double rank' of captain-colonel; he was a
senior military leader (a 'captain') who at times commanded as a 'colonel'; Evans, Works, p.cxli. Perhaps
the term 'captain' in this wider sense should be read as the early modem equivalent to today's term 'officer'.
39 'But one thing I doo wish, that the Collonelles should take such order with their Captaines, that every
severall band be armed and weaponed alike ... ', Barwick, Breefe Discourse, p.8.
40 DeVries, 'Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs', p.470.
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particular weapons. Thus they may reflect a contemporary debate about the respective
advantages of various weapons, and this is discussed below.
A blade remained a weapon until it was broken, but gunpowder and lead would run
out after prolonged engagements without re-supply. At the siege of Ostend, when firearms
became ineffective as ammunition ran low with the Anglo-Dutch force, the defenders
utilised anything that was capable of inflicting fatal or debilitating injury on the enemy:
... upon the top of the breach, and along the curtain of the old town were set firkins
of ashes to be tumbled down the wall upon the enemie to blinde them; also little
firkins with frize-ruyters, or quadrant tenter-nails, three flicking in the ground, and
one upright; which were likewise to be cast down the rampier to prick them, when
they sought to enter. Then many great heaps of stones, and brick-bats, which the
souldiers brought from the old Church they had shot down, to throw amongst them:
then we had ropes of pitch, hoops bound about with squibs and fireworks to throw
among them; great store of hand-grenadoes, and clubs, which we called Hercules-
clubs, with heavy heads of wood, and nails driven into the squares of'them."
The major technological change from medieval warfare was the ascendancy of
firearms over bows, which was confirmed by the start of this period. However, a curious
ambivalence displayed by central and county government in England, and the open
hostility of gentlemen such as Sir John Smythe towards firearms saw a background debate
continue for many years.42 This debate, central to the discussion of the 'military
revolution' theory posited by certain historians, can be traced through the printed works of
soldiers. Smythe, a soldier in his early years, published a defence of the bow in 1590.43
Smythe hailed from an older generation who would have seen the bow in action, operated
by well-trained archers brought up in its use. Drawing on his experience during the 1550s
and 1560s in France, the Low Countries and Hungary,44he could not accept the 'vaine and
frivolous objections against our Archerie', nor accept that 'newe fashions and fancies'
should undermine its continued deployment.45 He argued that the bow had a faster rate of
41 Henry Hexham's account of the siege of Os tend in Dillingham, Commentaries, p.170.
42 Paul Scannell, 'From Bow to Musket: The Development of the Early Modem Personal Weapon,' British
Army Review, No. 136, Spring 2005, pp.64-82.
43 Sir John Smythe, Certain Discourses (London, 1590). He had his supporters; Barwick believed 'very
many [were] addicted to the opinion of Syr John Smith', Barwick, Breefe Discourse, Dedication to Lord
Carey. The supportive publication by R.S., A Briefe Treatise, To proove the necessitie and excellence of the
use of archerie (London, 1596), Cockle suggests was produced on behalf of the bowyers and fletchers,
'whose trade was declining as fire-arms were improving'; Maurice J.~. Cockle, A Bibliography of English
Military Books up to 1642 and of Contemporary Foreign Works (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton,
Kent, 1900 - General Books Edition), p.62.
44 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, hereafter ODNB: Sir John Smythe.
45 Smythe, Certain Discourses, Proeme Dedicatorie.
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fire, that it was not subject to misfire through wet weather or incompetent handling, had a
greater range and better accuracy, and that all these factors resulted in the archer having
more impact on the enemy when compared with 'Mosquettiers' and 'Harquebuziers'i'" It
would appear a logical and sound argument, and at least one historian has commented that
the longbow was replaced at a time when it was still a superior weapon to the available
firearms that superseded it.47 It was also a debate that extended beyond purely military
circles. Roger Ascham, who was not a soldier but a scholar and one-time tutor to
Elizabeth I, wrote a defence of archery for Henry VIII, himself a champion of the bow.
This work was reproduced in 1571 and 1589.48 There was a fear in some circles that a
deterioration in morality would accompany the withdrawal of the bow, as 'unlawful
games' such as bowls, dice and cards came to replace archery practice on church
holidays." This view was supported at the highest level, with a printed proclamation
issued by Elizabeth I four times during her reign directing all those responsible for children
from the age of seven to purchase 'bowes and arrowes' for them and ensure they practised
regularly. Similarly worded proclamations were issued by James I and Charles I, with the
last dated 1632.50
One issue central to the demise of archery was lack of training, the reduction in
Sunday practice through boyhood that was required in order for an adult archer to release
an arrow accurately and with full, armour-piercing power. Such practice had largely
disappeared, probably due to 'living in long peace without any...exercises Militarie', 51 and
that resulted in the 'greatlie decaied' number of archers over a period of some three or four
decades since Smythe's active service.52
The works studied to some degree show a generational difference regarding this
issue. To the professional soldier who had not been brought up since childhood practising
archery or seen the effect of arrows in battle from men who had, firearms were the modern
weapons of continental warfare and no argument based on history and tradition (Smythe
46lbid, pp.20-29.
47 Thomas Esper, 'The Replacement of the Longbow by Firearms in the English Anny', Technology and
Culture, 6:3 (1965: Summer), pp.382-393, quote p.393.
48 Roger Ascham, Toxophilus, The Schole of shoo tinge conteyned in two bookes (London, 1545). ODNB:
Roger Ascham.
49 Esper, 'Replacement of the Long Bow', p.392.
so These are listed at SerialS of Appendix 3. This conservative reaction could be a symptom ofa wider,
cultural reluctance to adapt: Jeremy Black, War and the Cultural Turn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012),
~.l59.
1 Smythe, Certain Discourses, p.2S.
s2lbid, p.27.
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drew on memories of Crecy, Agincourt and Poi~iers53) could discontinue their use. Sir
Roger Williams well understood that trained archers were hard to fmd: ' ...among 5000
bowmen, you shall not find 1000 good Archers', reducing in a short period of time in the
field so that one could 'hardlie finde of 5000 scarce 500 able to make anie strong
shootes' .54 Williams also denied that an arrow could pierce armour, a crucial negative,
and believed that arrows were hard to come by and that 'ill weather weakeneth the
bowes,.55 Both Smythe and Williams published in 1590; two years later the soldier
Humfrey Barwick compared the two works in his own publication. Barwick claimed to
have experience of archery in battle (as an observer, not an operator), and yet still argued
the superiority of firearms, believing bows led to more bloodshed as the belligerents closed
on each other whereas firearms kept them apart. S6 Muskets and arquebuses, Barwick
maintained, had a faster rate of fire, were more accurate and more reliable in bad weather,
although he did acknowledge the need for training as to fire the arquebus 'is but folly
without exercise';" To Barwick, Sir John Smythe was on the wrong side chronologically
of the 'military revolution', and should consider that 'thinges in times past, and now in
these our times doo differ' .58
Attempts at innovative ideas with traditional weapons such as William Neade's
'double-armed man', which suggested the combination of the bow with the pike, had little
impact on the increasing reliance on gunpowder and firearms. S9 The bow as a mainstream
weapon seems to have remained in use in Scotland, where the Highlanders were equipped
with it during the Bishops' Wars and the Civil Wars, but elsewhere it had become obsolete
by this time except for specific tasks such as attaching propaganda leaflets to arrows and
firing them into besieged towns in order to lower morale or setting thatched roofs alight; 'it
is good to have certain strong bows to shoot fiery shafts' advised the gunner Thomas Smith
in 1627.60
53 Ibid, pp.31-33.
54 Williams, Briefe Discourse, p,46.
S5 Ibid, p,47.
56 Barwick, Breefe Discourse, Dedication 'To all skilfull Captaines and Souldiours': 'I entered to be a
souldier at the age of 18...at which time our English Archers were in force and greatly used'. The paragraph
on 'the cause of more bloodshed' is somewhat illogical but infers an increase in the rate of fire from firearms
(a discussion found in the main text) which would keep the two sides apart.
57 Ibid, pp.17-2I, quote p.17.
58 Ibid, Dedication 'To all skilfull Captaines and Souldiours'.
59 William Neade, The Double-Armed Man (London, 1625).
60 Thomas Smith, Certaine Additions to the Booke of Gunnery (London, 1627), p.55. Roger B. Manning, An
Apprenticeship of Arms: The Origins of the British Army 1585-1702 (Oxford University Press, 2006), p.25 I.
Nolan claims Sir John Norris had bowmen who were designated as scouts: John S. Nolan. Sir John Norreys
and the Elizabethan Military World (University of Exeter, 1997), p.23; Scannell, 'Bow to Musket'. p.66.
Gunpowder was produced by mixing sulphur, charcoal and saltpetre, and there
were many recipes involving the addition of a variety of other ingredients in the early-
modem period." It had been around long before the advent of the 'military revolution'
period, although its inconsistent usage has caused historians a degree of difficulty in
accurately determining its progress and assessing its wider effects on the formation of the
early-modem state.62 Examination of the soldiers' own writings could be helpful here.
Although generally considered to be the invention of the devil, those who used it held an
enormous advantage over those who did not or had run out.63 It was subject to decay, in
that the elements separated after periods of time or exposure to wet weather, which
rendered it useless, but while it was active it was notoriously unstable, and there are many
examples of accidental explosions. Sir Francis Vere tells of the death of Count Meurs,
governor of Gelderland, who was 'so sorely burnt' following an explosion 'that he died
within few dayes after;,64 ten barrels of gunpowder were accidentally ignited at the action
at Fort Crozon, Brittany, in 1594, burning fifty Englishmen;65 and Robert Monro was
'pittifully burnt' and a hundred others killed when powder exploded in the church of an
Imperial town that was being taken by Danish forces." Soldiers carried powder in
bandoliers thrown around themselves like sashes, and 'when they take fire, they commonly
wound and often kill him who wears them, for likely if one bandolier takes fire all the rest
do in that collar'. 67 Goodrick sounds a note of caution regarding the reporting of these
events: 'Such explosions occur with irritating regularity, as an excuse for defeat, in every
battle of the Thirty Years' War,.68 Nevertheless many of these accidents were
undoubtedly genuine and gunpowder represented a significant danger if used inexpertly.
Soldiers were abundantly and painfully aware that the weapons and techniques
themselves could present a greater danger to the operator than to the enemy. At Breda a
61 For instance, see Robert Norton, The Gunner, Shewing the Whole Practice of Artillerie (London, 1628),
E·I44.
2 Kelly DeVries, 'Gunpowder Weaponry and the Rise of the Early Modern State', War in History, Vol 5 (2),
1998, pp.l27-4S.
63 J.R Hale, Renaissance War Studies (London: Hambledon, 1983), p.217; Evans, Works, p.cxxxiii;
Scannell, 'Bow to Musket', p.67.
64 Dillingham, Commentaries, p.3.
6S R.B. Wernham, 'Assault on Spain's Atlantic Economy', in D.J.B. Trim and Mark Charles Fissel eds.,
Amphibious Warfare 1000-1700: Commerce, State Formation and European Expansion (Leiden: Brill,
2006), p.l99.
66 Monro, Expedition, I, p.S 1.
67 Lord Orrery, quoted in C.H. Firth, Cromwell's Army, Second Edition (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press,
facsimile from 1911), p.82.
68 Introduction to A.T.S. Goodrick, ed., The Relation of Sydenham Poyntz (London: Royal Historical
Society, Camden Third Series, 1908), p.3S.
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mine being activated 'made not that operation as was expected, for it sprung backward in
the worke to our owne great disadvantage;' and later at the same siege 'wee shott a great
Granado of 180 pound weight, which flew into the Towne almost as farre as the great
Church, and breaking with a great violence, a peece of the bullet rebounded, and flew back
againe into our Home-workc'.P When Charles I entered Newcastle in 1633 one of the
guns fired in his honour exploded killing three men and wounding several others."
These authors also commented on the impact of new weapons on the types of
injury suffered by soldiers. The increase in gunpowder usage and associated projectile
weapons saw the nature of wounds change. While swords and pikes remained staple
weapons throughout the period, the injuries inflicted on soldiers by musket balls and
artillery rounds were horrific in comparison to blade strikes. Complex fractures were
occasioned through bullets, artillery shells and hand-grenades," and often the rudimentary
medical profession rendered them untreatable (see below).72 Historians seeking detailed
descriptions of injuries sustained need look no further than Henry Hexham's account of
Maastricht in 1632:
Captaine Edmund Manly ... received a shott throw his left arme by his shoulder,
which brake his bone, and another throw the same arme a litle above his Elbow,
which likewise broke his bone asunder, & another shott through his right thygh
among his synowes, whereof ... he died ... Lieutenant Colonel HolIes was also hurt
with a granado on his foote: Captaine Cave shott throw his right-hand, the bones
all to peeces, and Captaine Peyton throw his left-hand. Capt. Dudley at push of
pike with the Ennemy was runne into his brest, and his Lieutenant Reade shot
through one of his hands the bones all to shatters. Captaine Sandall received a cruel
shott, whereof ... he died. Capt. Sydenham hurt also with a granado, and diverse
Gentlemen and Souldiers of my Lord Vere his two Companies slayne and hurt.73
69 Henry Hexham, A True and Briefe Relation of the Famous Siege of Breda (Delft, 1637), pp. 33; 41.
70 Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992),
~.779.
I Lithgow described hand-grenades thus: 'Hand-garnads, Bullets of three pounds weight, and being empty
within, they are filled with Powder, Pitch, and Sulphur .. .', William Lithgow,A True and Experimental
Discourse upon the beginning, proceding and Victorious event of this last siege Of Breda (London, 1637),
p.28. The early modem hand-grenade was 'a powder-filled sphere of cast-iron, bronze, thick glass
(especially fashionable among the Spaniards), pottery or even wood'; Duffy, Siege Warfare, p.98.
12ln 1589 they were still considered a novel development in England. Following the Portugal expedition,
Captain Anthony Wingfield wrote: 'For our English surgeons (for the most part) be unexperienced in hurts
that come by shot because England hath not known wars but of late ... '; 'Anthony Wingfield's Discourse',
reproduced inR.B. Wemham, ed., The Expedition of Sir John Norris and Sir Francis Drake to Spain and
Portugal, 1589 (London: Navy Records Society, 1988), p.255. They would have had to learn quickly as
gunshot wounds fast became the most common of battle wounds; Geoffrey L. Hudson, 'Ex-serviceman's
Own Stories in Early Modem England', in Roberta Bivins and John V. Pickstone, eds., Medicine, Madness
and Social History: Essays in Honour of Roy Porter (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2007),
~.1l2.
3 Henry Hexham, A Journall of the Taking in ofVenlo (Delft, 1633), p.31.
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Earlier, at the siege of Ostend, Hexham had described the death of one Master Tedcastle,
gentleman of Sir Francis Vere's horse, 'slain ... with two musket-bullets chained
together' .74 Such was siege warfare. Storming the breach against spirited resistance
would produce many casualties. An assault on a well-defended position during the siege
of Ostend was repulsed 'with the effusion of much bloud', with the final tally for the
attempt being over two thousand Spanish attackers lost for the price of 'on our side ... slain
between thirty or forty souldiers, and about an hundred hurt' .75 At Stralsund, Monro's unit
paid a high price: 'our Regiment did lose neare five hundred men, and of the remnant
escaped, both of Officers and Souldiers, I do not thinke one hundred were free of
wounds';"
Monro drew attention to the role of the smper in early-modem warfare. He
discovered this to his cost at Nurenberg: ' ... the enemy commanded out a single man, with
a long peece, who from a tree aiming at me, shot me right above the Hanch-bone .. .'77
Sometimes, however, attempting to scale the walls could still be an experience to which a
medieval soldier would have been able to relate, as Sydenham Poyntz reports of his time
attacking Nordlingen as he mounted a siege ladder:
So soone as hee came to the Top of the Walles, his head was no sooner peeped
above the Walles, but it seemes one thrust at hym with a Halberd and thrust of his
Bever, his Bever was no sooner of but with a sword one strucke of his head [which]
fell to the ground. The head being of, the body falls upon mee and there it lyes
very heavy upon mee and blooded mee wonderfully that I was almost smothered
with blood. I not knowing what was the cause cryed what the Devil ayld you that
you doe not mount higher, but what with the weight and with the blood I could hold
no longer and downe wee fell together and what with my fall upon the stones and
hee in his armour upon mee that I knew not whether I was alive or dead."
Likewise, during the siege of Ostend, the eye-witness Henry Hexham tells of an incident
where the Anglo-Dutch defenders had run out of ammunition, but continued to hold their
line, as the Spanish and Italian attackers
could no sooner come up to the top of the breach to enter it, or peep up between
74 Henry Hexham's account of the siege of Ostend in Dillingham, Commentaries, p.177.
75 Ibid, p.176.
76 Monro, Expedition, I, p.80.
77 Ibid, II, p.149.
78 Goodrick, Relation, p.llS. I have amended punctuation to aid comprehension. Note this incident may not
have been at Nordlingen; see p.116, n1.
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Sandhil and Schottenburch, but they were either knocked on the head with the
stocks of our muskets, our Hercules-clubs, or run through with our pikes and
swords. Twice or thrice when they strived to enter, they were beaten off, and could
get no advantage upon us.79
Equally at Breda nearly forty years later, he was to witness 'the Ennemy defending the
topp of the breach with clubbs, flailes, stones'. 80
Sir Francis Vere, who served for over twenty years mainly in the Netherlands, was
wounded many times during his career. Sometimes they were blade wounds, as at
Rbeinberg:
Where at the first encounter my horse being slain under me with the blow of a pike,
and falling on me, so as I could not suddenly rise, I lay betwixt both troops, till our
men had made the enemy give back, receiving a hurt in my leg, and divers thrusts
with pikes through my garments.
At the battle of Nieuwpoort: 'At my first coming I got one shot through my leg, and a
quarter of an hour after another through the same thigh, which I neither complained nor
bragged of, nor so much as thought of any Chirurgeon ... ' During the battle he was
suffering from an illness as well as coping with his wounds, so afterwards he reports: '[I]
began to care and provide for my self, who all this while having been undressed, the bloud
leaking from me at four holes, together with a dangerous disease that had long held me,
had made me extream weak and faint'. Vere had to be evacuated out of Ostend, the
defence of which he commanded during the early stages of the siege, due to a serious
wound to the head occasioned by a cannonball, and during his last action, at Grave, he was
shot in the face, just below the right eye, and was in a critical condition for several
weeks." Vere, 'covered with honourable wounds and prematurely aged by exposure and
hardships of all kinds,' must indeed have looked every inch the veteran, having
experienced the complete spectrum of physical misfortune that the early modem soldier
faced: disease and wounds from blades, cannonballs and musket bullets. He was only in
his forties when he retired, but 'his health was failing, he was covered with wounds,
riddled with bullets, and they had left their effects on his powers of endurance and of
application. Exposure, incessant toil, attacks of ague, and mental strain had done their
79 Dillingham, Commentaries, p.l73.
80 Hexham, Siege of Breda, p.34.
81 Dillingham, Commentaries, pp.7; 102; 104; 132.
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work,.82 He died at the age of 48. Looking at it from another perspective, he was lucky to
have survived for so long. Many young men lost their lives in the European contlicts,"
and yet some old soldiers lived through decades of combat. Remarkably Captain Henry
Hexham served for over forty years without ever being wounded.f"
Several of the military authors show that the effect of massed artillery could be
emphatic, and that the development of lighter field pieces capable of tactical manoeuvre on
the battlefield was in their view a significant addition to the traditional large, slow-moving
siege artillery." The random impact of artillery, from a distance of over a thousand yards,
could increase fear as well as cause significant casualties," and if ammunition was in short
supply for the guns, anything would suffice as a projectile: in Antwerp in 1566, there were
'24 great pieces ... rammed full of stones and chaines ... ,87 Monro, in a holding position by
Ingolstadt, reported that 'at one shot I lost twelve men ... being all taken alike with the
Cannon,' adding 'who would sweare he was not affrighted for a shot, I would not trust him
againe"." Hexham while a defender at Ostend reported that 'the enemy had shot upon and
into the town, above an hundred sixty three thousand two hundred Canon-shot,' with the
result that little was left standing. He continues:
... that day till evening he shot upon Sand-hil, and the curtain of the old town above
two and twenty hundred Canon-shot; insomuch that it might rather have been
called Yron-hil than Sand-hit; for it stuck so full of bullets, that many of them
tumbled down into the False-bray, and others, striking on their own bullets,
breaking in pieces flew up into the aire as high as a steeple."
The Walloon soldier Christophle De Bonours, on the outside with the Spanish Army of
Flanders looking in, reported that Ostend was so densely populated during the siege that
the Spanish artillery had a hit with every shot.90 Because of this, Vere moved part of the
82 C.R. Markham, Fighting Veres, pp.338; 339; 345; 352.
83 An estimated six hundred thousand died during the Thirty Years' War; Geoffrey Parker, 'The Soldier', in
Rosario Villari, ed., Baroque Personae (Chicago University Press, 1995), p,48.
84 '[God] hath preserved mee the space of two and fourtie yeares through many dangers: and though I have
bin present inmany hott services in this Land: yet he has not given the Ennemy so much power, as to draw
one drop ofbloode from mee'. Henry Hexham, An Appendix Of the Lawes, Articles, & Ordinances,
establishedfor Marshall Discipline, in the service of the Lords the States General of the united Provinces,
under the Commaund of his Htghnesse the Prince of Orange (Delft, 1643), Dedication.
8S Kroener, 'Soldiers Are Very Poor', p.286.
86 Simon Pepper, 'Aspects of operational art: communications, cannon, and small war', in Frank Tallett and
OJ.B Trim, eds., European Warfare, 1350-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.192.
87 Thomas Churchyard, True Discourse, p.8.
88 Monro, Expedition, II, p.120.
89 Dillingham, Commentaries, pp.l65; 167.
90 Christophle de .Le Memorable Siege d'Ostende (Brussels: Jean de Meerbeek, 1628), p.l38.
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population outside the ramparts. Significantly such overwhelming destruction did not
bring about the surrender of the town. Far from it, as the resolve of the defenders hardened
and they held out for a further two and a half years. Contrarily, Prince Frederick-Henry
fired over 23,000 canon balls into Breda over a seven week period, after which it
surrendered."
Monro also gives us an account of the effects of artillery on buildings:
... stone houses are vaine defences against cannon: where the once pierc't, those
within are in worse case then if they stood on plaine fields. Therefore at such
times, it is better to adventure forth unto the fields out of reach, then to be
smothered within the walles, as were many within this house both of horse and
foote.92
Artillery barrages were becoming commonplace by the time Sydenbam Poyntz
became involved in the Thirty Years' War, and not just in siege situations. Poyntz says of
Breitenfeld: 'The Duke of Saxony... began with his canon to play upon Tilly, and the like
they did to us, which did last two or three howers wherein was many slayne'. Again, at
Rain, shortly before the death of Tilly: 'Tilly lying along the Waterside with Skonse upon
Skonse, there playing with their Canons one upon another, doing great hurt in both
Armyes'i'" Hexham, fighting along the River Maas, describes another artillery action:
The Enemye played cruellye upon the Frenches from their Batteryes,which
flanckered that place, and their Cannon bullets raked through the French
Companies, slew many of them, and shott of the Armes and leggs of divers of
them, & some of them were shott with Muskett bulletts, from over the River.94
The published writings can also help to document the perceived secondary risk
from artillery fire. This was described by Monro, also in action against Tilly: ' ...many
were made to lie dead by our cannon, for those that were not hurt by the Bullets, they were
lamed by branches and trees, cut by the cannon, being they stood in a thicke wood ... ,95
Horace Vere was injured at Ostend in such a manner, 'hurt in the leg, with a splinter that
91 Hexbam, Siege of Breda, Articles of Composition, p.16.
92 Monro, Expedition, II, p.ll 5.
93 Goodrick, Relation, pp. 58; 64. According to Monro, also at Breitenfeld, 'Our losses ... did not exceed
three thousand men, which for the most part were killed by the enemies Cannon'; Monro, Expedition, II,
p.67. Breitenfeld was the first major Protestant victory of the war: 'Seven thousand six hundred Imperialists
lay dead on the field, most of them killed by Swedish gunfire,' thus the cold facts corroborate the soldier's
account; Parker, The Thirty Years' War, p.1l3.
94 Hexbam, Venlo, p.l2.
95 Monro, Expedition, II, p.117.
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flew from a Palizado'. 96 Soldiers still ran the risk of close-quarter blade injuries, such as
those received by Poyntz's colleague on the wall at Nordlingen (Poyntz himself was
wounded at Gertruydenberg 'on the right side by a pike,97), and Vere on the beach at
Nieuwpoort. Clearly there was now the additional major risk of missiles exploding,
indiscriminately, within a company's lines, in battle as well as during sieges. Shots fired
from muskets from across rivers may have been acts of random opportunism on the
operators behalf, such was the inaccuracy of the weapons, but to be on the receiving end of
a bullet could be incapacitating, if not lethal, whether it was intentionally directed or not.98
The psychological (,shell-shock') effect of noisy and effective artillery fire discharged
from distance can only be guessed at (although one veteran refers to the 'terrour, fury, and
execution' of the musket"), adding to, rather than replacing, the frightening prospect of
meeting the enemy face to face.
Medical care and welfare support
The sources are extraordinarily rich in descriptions of the wounds inflicted upon soldiers
but are far less so in describing the care they received. Historians' views of the subject
have been formed largely on the basis of medical texts. Given the very high rates of
wounding, injury and sickness, whatever medical support was in attendance would
presumably have been in great demand. Elizabeth's armies were for most of the reign
authorised one surgeon for every one hundred soldiers. The government acknowledged the
need for reform, and an increase in pay from the Privy Council to correspondingly increase
the quality of individuals, and a restructuring of the manpower, led to improvements.
Those individuals who made up the medical contingent may have considered
themselves a profession but there was little science involved. Many surgeons created their
own ointments. The treatments used may have hastened a patient's death, such as the
common practice of cauterising gunshot wounds with boiling oil. A main complaint of
soldiers was that their injured comrades died all too frequently from only minor wounds. 100
96 Dillingham, Commentaries, p.l77.
97 Goodrick, Relation, p.46.
98 Some weapons were far more accurate than a soldier's musket. InGermany the peasants defended
themselves from plunder with their 'fowling-pieces,' and marksmen in England used similar 'birding-pieces'
during the civil wars. Firth, Cromwell's Army, pp. 88; 91.
99 Barret, Theorike, p.2.
100 According to Margaret Pelling, medical practitioners of this period were 'entirely at odds' with the
'characteristics of the professional as usually defined'; 'Medicine: trade or profession?' in Peter Elmer and
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The French sixteenth-century surgeon Ambroise Pare through an unintentional trial of
comparable treatments, one cauterising the wound using the accepted method and the other
utilising dressings made with 'the yolke of an egg, oyle of Roses, and Turpentine' , noticed
that the traditional method not only failed to work but increased suffering while the other
was more effective and reduced pain. These empirical observations were made in 1536but
were not published in England until significantly later.'?' A frightening alternative was to
treat gunshot wounds with 'arsenik and rusty Bacon' .102 The 'science' such as it existed
was a combination of the ancient Galenic belief in a balance of the body humours and
fluids, with the ideas of sixteenth-century Paracelsus who advocated the targeting of
specific diseases with chemicals and drugs.103 It was generally believed that the four
humours of blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile should be kept in balance, and
exposure to inclement weather or climates, unusual or poor diets and excessive exercise
could produce permanent damage to the body. Soldiers were consistently exposed to all
these extremes.'?' Some surgeons took their responsibilities seriously. William Clowes
was an enlightened individual who accepted that more men were probably lost through
incompetent medical practitioners than direct enemy action. lOS John Woodall found
everlasting fame by being the first man to recommend citrus juice as a treatment for
SCUrvy.l06 Although Clowes and Woodall published their findings, the medical literature
in English for the period is very limited. It must be assumed that those involved as
practitioners combined word-of-mouth training with old wives tales that resulted in high-
risk treatment, which any wounded soldier would have been fortunate to survive.
If the English medical world was slow to develop, a variety of sources reveal that
government at least recognised its responsibility to the wounded. The period witnessed
government initiatives to provide for men who had served and were wounded and could
Ole Peter Grell, eds., Health, disease and society in Europe 1500-1800 (Manchester and New York:
Manchester University Press, 2004). p.34.
101 Arnb .roise Pare, The Method of Curing Wounds made by Gun-shots, trans. Walter Hammond (London,
1617), p.5. See also 'War and medicine in early modem Europe" in Elmer and Grell, Health, disease and
society in Europe, p.257, and Cunningham and Grell, Four Horsemen, pp.l26-134.
102 Franciscus Arceus, Most excellent and compendious method of curing woundes in the head, and in other
partes of the body, trans. John Read (London, 1588); Evans, Works, p.cxxxvi.
103 Eric Gruber von Ami, Justice to the Maimed Soldier: Nursing, Medical Care and Welfarefor the Sick and
Wounded Soldiers and their Families during the English Civil Wars and Interregnum, 1642-1660 (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2001), p.3.
104 Hudson, 'Ex-servicemen's Own Stories', p.109.
105 C.G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p.121. Clowes also used
rose oil to treat gunshot wounds and published 26 years prior to Hammond's translation of Pare; William
Clowes, A Proved Practice/or All Young Chirurgians (London, 1591), p.5.
106 John Woodall, The Surgions Mate (London, 1617); J.D. Alsop, 'Warfare and the Creation of British
Imperial Medicine, 1600-1800', in Geoffrey L. Hudson, ed., British Military and Naval Medicine, 1600-1830
(Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2007), p.25.
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therefore no longer serve or work. Pensions were paid to wounded soldiers, and on
occasion the widows of men who had died overseas, for the first time in Europe following
an act of Parliament in 1593 (and amended in 1598 and 1601 to include rate increases),
prior to which such disabled veterans had to rely on charitable donations in the same
category as the 'impotent poor'. Since 1586 the soldiers who deployed to the Netherlands
were in the service of the state, which was morally obliged to assist them. More
importantly, 'England's soldiers needed to be treated decently so that others would be
willing to serve' .107 Other changes to assist in the medical recovery and welfare of
soldiers were introduced: those soldiers who needed to return to England to convalesce
were permitted sick leave without loss of pay. It also became possible in the 1590s for a
wounded man to return to England for treatment, on full pay. lOS Hospitals developed out
of 'guest houses' in the Netherlands, private dwellings where injured or sick soldiers were
cared for by the owners. The lead for the expansion of this system was taken by the
Spanish with the establishment in 1585 of a permanent hospital at Mechelen with 330
beds, although English military hospitals did not materialise until well after the period
under study.109 Field hospitals, that moved with the troops as the war ebbed and flowed,
were the initiative of Gustavus Adolphus.'!"
There were many medical conditions the soldier was subject to well before he
encountered the enemy. Seasickness followed by bad food, constant marching and cold,
wet living conditions exacerbated the reaction to a change of climate and saw many fall
ill.111 Disease, such as typhus, remained the most deadly threat to soldiers until it was
succeeded by enemy action in the twentieth century.112 Men were evacuated en masse
when disease became epidemic within the camp, such as out of the Low Countries during
107 Geoffrey L. Hudson, 'Disabled Veterans and the State in Early Modem England', in David A. Gerber, ed.,
Disabled Veterans in History (University of Michigan, 2000), pp.119-120. Hudson argues that the moral
obligation was in the form of an acknowledgment that there was a social responsibility to protect those from
the lower orders. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, p.128.
108 Evans, Works, p.cxxxv. Von Ami states (p.5) that this was not decreed unti11654, and quotes
Cruickshank. Cruickshank however states that paid sick leave was authorised in 1594; p.123. Whereas von
Ami stresses the negative, reflecting 'a view that soldiers were cannon fodder and casualties disposable
assets of the state', Cruickshank states 'there was a marked improvement in the treatment of sick and
wounded men during [Elizabeth's] reign'.
109 A hospital was founded in Buckingham for 36 'maimed, unmarried soldiers' in 1599 but this was a home
for the disabled rather than a location to treat the wounded; Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, p.126. The
English Civil War saw the creation of the first hospitals at the Savoy and Ely House; Firth, Cromwell's Army,
~.262.
10 Von Ami, Justice to the Maimed Soldier, pp. 5-6.
111 Much was made of a change of climate, particularly to hot areas such as Spain and Portugal. George
Wateson, The Cures Of the Diseased in remote Regions. Preventing Mortalitie, incident in Forrein Attempts,
of the Eng/ish Nation (London, 1598); Alsop, 'Warfare and the Creation of British Imperial Medicine', p.24.
112 Cruikshank, Elizabeth's Army, pp.l18-130; Frederick F. Cartwright and Michael Biddiss, Disease and
History, Second Edition (Phoenix Mill: Sutton, 2004), p.95.
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Leicester's deployment or out of France during Willoughby's support to Henri IV, but
once back in England the men and their carers died in large numbers.!"
The printed sources analysed for this thesis disappointingly make very little
comment on medical services. Barret advises that the Sergeant Major should ensure that
sick and wounded' ...may be caried with all care, unto the hospitals or such places deputed
for the same', 114 while Monro when taken illwith 'the infection' in Brandenburg 'banished
death by imagination'. 115 Presumably the less said the better.
Mobility: geography, topography, meteorology and logistics
The mobility of an army, regardless of the strength of the cavalry, was dictated by
the speed an infantryman could walk and the distance he could cover. Given the weight of
his equipment and that much of it, particularly his footwear, could be in poor condition,
that he was very often hungry and thirsty, and that he was frequently in ill-health, some of
the speeds achieved and distances covered over difficult terrain were quite remarkable.!"
Geoffrey Parker has calculated that units moving to join the Spanish Army of Flanders
crossed the Alps, made their way along the Spanish Road at an average of twelve miles per
day.1I7 Hot weather was deemed to be equally dangerous as cold, thus some Spanish
veterans in May increased their speed to fifteen miles per day in order to avoid the
impending summer. Some units even travelled in the middle of winter, marching at an
average rate of twenty miles per day.!" Wallenstein also drove his armies hard; in the
march from Zerbst to Olmiltz he deployed his entire army, soldiers and baggage train, a
distance of over 370 miles in only twenty two days, a rate of more than eighteen miles
J J3 Smythe, Proeme Dedicatorie; Evans, Works, p.xciii; von Ami, Justice to the Maimed Soldier, p.S.
114 Barret, Theorike, p.1lO. After Breitenfeld Monro reports that 'the wounded were convoyed unto Dorpes,
where Chirugians were appointed to attend their cure', Monro, Expedition, II, p.71.
ns Monro, Expedition, II, pA8.
116 'The foot soldier of the seventeenth century probably carried a heavier weight than [sixty pounds]. For
both the pike and the matchlock were cumbrous and weighty weapons. The ammunition of the musketeer,
taking into account flask, match, bandoliers, and the pouch with its heavy bullets, must also have been
proportionately heavy. The helmet and the corslet of the pikeman must have been an intolerable burden on a
long march, and the abandonment of the pikeman's defensive armour was due to this fact. Finally, both
pikemen and musketeers had their knapsacks in which they frequently carried as much as seven days'
provision, and during their campaigns in Ireland and Scotland they sometimes carried in addition a portion of
a tent'. Firth, Cromwell's Army, p.107.
117 In order for the King of Spain to defend his territory in the Low Countries, he had to dispatch Spanish and
Italian troops who would march from Milan to Namur, a distance of some 700 miles, which included
traversing the Alps. Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659, Second
Edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
118 Parker, Spanish Road, p.87 and Annex D.
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every twenty-four hours, which seems to have been matched by the Swedes.119 The
Imperial general Tilly was equally hard-pressed, on one occasion covering two hundred
miles in ten days with a cavalry regiment and three infantry regiments; a considerable
achievement in winter.120 The record for endurance seems to be held by the hardy Scottish
Highlanders, who were apparently capable of marching sixty miles in one day, although
they would have been lightly armed independent detachments without the burden of an
artillery train or modem equipment, moving in loose formation.l'"
The soldiers confirmed through their writings that life in an early modem army was
nothing if not mobile. Robert Monro calculated that he had travelled some 770 miles on
water and 140 miles on land during three years with Christian of Denmark,122 and 180
miles on water and 623 miles on land in four years with the Swedish army.123 One recent
study concluded that the mobility of such armies was greatly assisted by the use of maps,
'for positional tactics - whether siege based, or turning on the movement and manoeuvre
of field armies - depended heavily upon military geography and its chief instrument, the
accurate map' .124 But this article identifies senior command as utilizing maps; there is no
clear evidence that officers on the ground had them.12S Few soldiers in this study refer to
the use of maps. 126 Goodrick concludes of Poyntz: 'It is plain that he never consulted a
map',127 and nearly two hundred years later the army of Napoleon that approached
Waterloo did so without the assistance ofmaps.128 Given the information available in the
works of these soldiers, I would conclude that local knowledge, borrowed, bought or
coerced, was as much responsible for the tactical direction of an army as the commander's
map.
119 Golo Mann, Wallenstein: His Life Narrated, trans. Charles Kessler (London: Andre Deutsch, 1976),
p.290. James Grant, Memoirs And Adventures Of Sir John Hepburn: Knight, Governor Of Munich, Marshall
Of France Under Louis XIII, And Commander Of The Scots Brigade Under Gustavus Adolphus, Etc
(Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood, 1851), p.26.
120 Mann, Wallenstein, p.S44.
121 Manning, Apprenticeship, p.376.
122 Monro calls them German miles. John Mackay calculates 20 German miles equate to 70 English; John
Mackay, An Old Scots Brigade being the history of Mackay's Regiment J626-J 634 (Pallas Armata: 1991),
f:.9.
23 Monro, Expedition, un-paginated pages prior to Part II. Monro's figures for water and land movement do
not add up, the Danish totals being out by 12, the Swedish by 24.
124 Pepper, 'Aspects of operational art', p.l88.
125 In the seventeenth century, maps 'were concentrated in the hands of the commanders and members of the
higher staff'. Bjorn Gafvert, 'Maps and war: the Swedish experience during the Thirty Years' War',
Bussmann & Schilling, 1648, I, p.309.
126 Barret states that' ...it importeth much to have drawne plats, mappes, and models ... ' showing
to,p0graphical features and details of military interest; Barret, Theorike, p.173.
12 Goodrick, Relation, pA2.
128 lowe this point through conversation with Professor Etienne Rooms of the Royal Military Academy,
Brussels.
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An apparent characteristic of the 'military revolution' was the increase in the size
of armies, although there were many regional variations and it was not always the case
depending which conflicts are compared. The publications by military men showed keen
awareness of both increase in size and variation. Barwick, in 1592, commented of the
1550s: ' ..in which time there were greater armies, greater matters accomplished than these
broiles betwixt Subjects and Subjects'. 129Sometimes they were precise in description and
sometimes vague. Some of the more detailed descriptions were given of the Thirty Years'
War: in that conflict armies grew considerably, although the numbers engaged in battle at
anyone time were substantially smaller than the total strength required to garrison towns
and hold areas of land. Given that additional assorted civilians could make an army
'anywhere between fifty and a hundred and fifty percent of its own size,' 130 the 100,000
soldiers of Wallenstein's army would have swollen to something in the region ofa quarter
of a million 'mouths'. 131 This would make it larger than the largest city but in motion,132
and consuming water, food and fodder while it moved. Henry Hexham gives us an idea of
the logistic 'train' that could develop on a deploying army:
We had with us 83 peeces of ordnance great and small, 14 or 15 hundred wagons,
whereof one hundred of them was laden with chests full of Bisket, each chest in in
[sic] it 1000 pound, which made all a hundred thousand pounds ofBisket ... Twelve
Boats for to make a Bridge, layd upon carriages, and drawne with some 20 horses,
and had many waggons laden with great store of ammunition, and divers materials
ofwarr.133
Officers would be allocated a number of carts for their possessions: at Breda there were
'two captains to a Waggon,.134 Artillery, described above, was a developing element
within early modern armies, as more and more guns were considered necessary to produce
a desired increase in firepower, and therefore represented a growing logistical burden.
Some of the very best descriptions of logistical problems are to be found in these accounts.
Pulling a gun was no mean feat:
129 Barwick, Breefe Discourse, p.29, although he had not been involved in the 'broiles' of the Eighty Years'
War and seems a little scathing of them.
130Martin van Creveld, Supplying War:Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge University Press,
1977), p.6.
131 Graham Darby, The Thirty Years' War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2001), p.49. Parker, Spanish
Road,p.79.
J32 ' ••• the whole Campe may be like an uniforme and handsome built Cittie ... ' Francis Markham, Epistles,
p.127.
133H hex am, Venlo, p.3.
134 Hexham, Siege of Breda, p.4.
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To draw a Cannon of the greatest size, they used to put 24 horses or oxen in faire
weather, and in foule 30. And for a demy Cannon 18 or 20. And to draw a
Culverine in faire weather, 24, and in foule weather accordingly. To draw a Saker
12 or 14 beasts; and for a Falcon 8 beasts, &c. A good cart, waine, or wagon, will
carry 60 Cannon shot... and are drawne with 6, or 8 horses: and after the same
order and waight, go the other carts and carriages with powder, leade, match, iron,
iron-tooles, armour, and all other munition.l"
There was a considerable list of additional equipment, the 'other munition,' and as there
was no separation of artillery stores from infantry and horse as it was all considered
'ordnance', it all fell to the charge of the officer of artillery to manage and move:
... Cannons for Batterie, from the least to the greatest size; as from sixe to tenne
inches in board or height, and carrying bullet from forty foure to seaventy pound
weight; demie-Cannons which carry bullet from twenty four to thirtie pound
weight; Cullverins from sixteene to twenty pound, Demie-Culverines, Faulcons,
Faulconers and Sakers; Quintalls of Cannon-powder and other powder, and Oxe
hides to cover and defend the same, Shot of Iron, Leade, and stone in great
quantitie and for al manner of Peeces, Match in great abundance, Iron shovells,
Mattocks, Pickaxes, Axes, Hatchets, Hookes, Planks, Boards, Maunds, Baskets,
Nails for Tyres, and all other purposes, Sawes, Sledges, Iron barres, Crowes,
Augers, Engines for all purposes; Chargers, Ladles, Rammers, Spunges, Chaines,
Cart-clouts, Weights, all sorts of Smiths tooles; Horse-shoos and Nails, Cordage,
Coffers, Candles, Lanthorns, Ceare-cloathes, Soape, Tarre, soft Grease, Scalling-
ladders ... small shot as Musquets, Dragoones, Pistolls and the like; with all manner
of implements belonging unto them either for Horse or Foote; also all sorts of
Launces, Pikes, Murrions, Corslets, Swords, Daggers, Girdles, Hangers,
Bandeleers, Bullet-bagges, Flaskes and Touch-boxes for Horsemen, Carbines or
Petronells ...
In order to keep and maintain all this diverse equipment, the officer had several tradesmen
under his command, including 'Mine-masters, Smiths, Founders, Coopers, Carpenters,
Wheele-wrights and the like'. 136
These publications can also provide valuable information concerning the precise
climatic conditions in which particular early modern armies operated. The climate is
believed to have been generally colder during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
135 Barret, Theorike, p.136, although managing the teams was more complex than just the providing of the
correct quantity: '1 do not mean to say that twenty-four horses were required to pull each canon; rather,
twenty-four horses were allotted to one canon to permit change of teams during the march, replacement of
disabled horses, and, in emergencies, the transfer of horses to another piece', quoted in Evans, Works,
p.cxxxiii, n2. When possible equipment would move along inland waterways, see for example:, Anthonis
Duyck, Journaal van Anthonis Duyck, ed. by L.Mulder (s'Gravenhage: 1862-5), p.xxlv; Scannell, 'Water in
Warfare', pp.62-67.
136 Francis Markham, Epistles, p.119.
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century than it is now, a period referred to as the 'Little Ice Age.' 137 Certainly early
modem winters saw widespread frosts, and skaters were used as messengers along the
frozen inland waterways.l" There are several references in the primary sources to bad
weather and the effects this had on soldiers. Monro writes that during' ... tempestuous cold
weather, with hard frosts and snow, we lay downe on the fields, having no shelter, but
some bushes by the side of the Rhine'. 139 There are further references to ' cruel
tempestuous weather for frost and snow... ,,140 ' ... extreme cold ... ,,141 and also ' rainie
weather, which spoyled both our Armes and Cloaths for a whole fortnight together ' 142
The Dutch estuaries froze in the 'unusually cold' winter of 1624/5,143 ships froze at anchor
in the Amsterdam winter of 162617,144 although this emphasis on isolated cold snaps
would of course indicate that in general winters were normally less severe. Whereas
freezing weather could make waterways temporary roads, more commonly wet weather
would make roads impassable. The weather could have a direct effect on military
operations, for instance the rain and ice contributed to the raising of the siege of
Steenwick, 145 and Williams tells us that at the siege of Alkmar: ' ... the raine fell in great
aboundance in such sort, that they raised their siege in few daies; and lost divers peeces of
battry which they could not hale out of the marish'. 146 Such conditions had the additional
effect of ruining crops, as during the Thirty Years ' War: 'A cold spring had deepened into
a bitter summer; snow fell in June and the drenched crops rotted in the ground'. 147 Thus
the weather conditions contributed to the famine and disease cycle in the affected area that
made life unpredictable for soldiers and civilians alike.
Intelligence
What do the soldiers' writings tell us about military intelligence? That they
thought it crucial to military success is clear. 'The farther our wings are spred without us,'
said Robert Monro, 'our Body is the better guarded by good intelligence,' and Sir Roger
Williams commented: 'true intelligence is the best part of an enterprise, and worth alwaies
137 Geoffrey Parker, Europe in Crisis 1598-1648 (London: Fontana, 1979), pp. 21-23.
138 Wedgwood, William the Silent, p.l33.
139 Monro, Expedition, II, p.91.
140 Ibid, II, p.94.
141 Ibid, II, p.175/6.
142 Ibid, II, p.131.
143 Manning, Apprenticeship, p.l 06.
144Ib'dI ,p.58.
145 Nolan, Sir John Norreys, pA5.
146 wnu1 lams, Actions, p.l 06.
147 C.V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years' War (London: Pimlico, 1938), p.206.
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halfe an army'. 148Armies throughout the ages have endeavoured to find out information
about their enemy in order to out-manoeuvre him and keep one step ahead. Those that
have managed to do so have frequently gained the upper hand, but often information was
woefully inaccurate or hard to come by, certainly by fair means of observation and
assessment. There are several examples of failures in military intelligence, for example the
Spanish having no idea of the whereabouts of Prince Maurice on his chaotic march through
Flanders prior to the battle of Nieuwpoort (and vice versa). It was easier (for the general
who gave the order, if not the individual who risked his life) to infiltrate the enemy's ranks
than to try to guess his next move, and in a world of international armies (on Continental
Europe, all of them), churches (the Roman Catholic) and religious movements
(Protestantism), where men from the same nation fought on both sides, it was far easier to
do than in modem times where wars have been fought between nation states. Spies, of
course, were employed in the twentieth century, but it was feasible for, say, an overt
Scotsman in the army of the United Provinces to feed information to the Spanish Army of
Flanders whereas an overt German acting as a spy in the British Army during the Second
World War would have been impossible.!"
Their accounts provide considerable detail, perhaps because this subject was as
popular with early modem readers as it is with twenty-first century but also because the
authors considered it important. Spies in the early modem period were certainly plying
their trade. The term 'scout' seems to have been synonymous with spy: Churchyard refers
to 'scoutes or espials'. ISO Even before the English government became actively involved
in the Low Countries war, an Englishman was caught spying on the Spanish Army of
Flanders in Antwerp. lSI Sir Roger Williams described 'espy-ails' used by Mansfeld in the
Duke of Alva's camp,152and Vere reported an 'espiall' at Turnhout informed him that the
enemy had neither entrenched his position nor had any intelligence on the whereabouts of
the Anglo-Dutch force, information that led to Vere's attack and subsequent victory.153To
148 Monro, Expedition, II, p.lO. Williams, Actions, p.l20.
149 During the siege of Os tend Archduke Albert was handed 'a map, that a Scottish captain had brought from
Holland a couple of days earlier, and it contained some enemy fortifications ... ' De Bonours, Ostend, p.96.
In another incident, De Bonours reports that three Scottish turncoats were kept by the Spanish as guides, and
that they wished to attack a certain weak spot in the cities defences. However a spy warned Vere, who
consequently took evasive action; De Bonours, Ostend, p.l72.
ISO Churchyard, True Discourse, p.30.
lSI John Lee, an agent of Burghley, was caught in November 1572. Robert Hutchinson, Elizabeth's Spy
Master: Francis Walsingham and the Secret War that Saved England (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson,
2006), p.83.
IS2 Willi A' 13I lams, ctions, p. .
IS3 Dillingham, Commentaries, p.72.
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gain vital knowledge, Robert Monro recommended a commander 'must have some secret
friend with the enemy, for giving him secret intelligence'. 154 Sometimes such an
individual may have been unaware of his role: the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom was raised
when an English deserter in the pay of the traitor Sir William Stanley, disguised as an
Italian and going by the name of Swegoe, was unwittingly used to feed false information to
the besieging Spaniards, who were consequently drawn into a trap and defeated. ISS A
Walloon soldier with the besieging Spanish army at Ostend reported great concern over the
actions of spies:
In our camp all possible action was taken to find the spot where enemy spies
returned to the city. But nevertheless we were informed that almost every three
days somebody delivered new intelligence, giving the Governor details on our
defence systems, numbers of troops, number of killed and wounded. 156
Francis Markham informs us that it was a 'maine' duty of the Provost-Marshal of
an army 'to discover the lurking subtilties of treacherous spies,' a reflection on how
common they were in early modem forces.IS7 The information brought from spies was
often specifically military in nature, giving precise figures of the enemy's capability, as the
Englishman Henry Hexham tells us of the campaign along the Maas:
Tuesday the 29 [June, 1632]: the Enemy marched from his quarters, in the sight of
our Army towards the heath. A spye which marched with them three dayes brought
intelligence, that their Army consisted of 178 Companies of foote, 76 troopes of
horse: 70 peeces of ordnance great and small, and 900 waggons, and marched in
Phalanges and e= Battalions, with their Carriages, baggage, and wagons after
every Battalion. 58
Other information could give an insight into the ability of the enemy to last out a siege,
which could be profoundly important to a besieging army that may, itself, be experiencing
great hardship. Duyck reports that at the siege of Breda a coded letter discovered on the
body of an enemy soldier described the dramatic condition of the besieged, being low on
food and ammunition.P" and Hexham tells us that at Maastricht
154 Monro, Expedition, II, p.20 1.
ISS C.R. Markham, Fighting Veres, pp. 128-131.
1560 Be ODOurs,Ostend, p.149.
IS7 F . Markhamrancis ,Epistles, p.I07.
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... a Souldiers wife ... was now a second time tyme apprehended, and brought to his
Excie: but noe letters could be found by her, yet at last being strictly examined, and
thretned to be hanged she ingeniouslie confessed, that shee had swallowed two
Copper-boxes, with two letters ... The States Doctor over night gave her some pills
in the which wrought so well with her, that the next morning they were found,
washed, opened, and [the] letters found in them: the letters (they say) were to this
effect, that unless they were presentlie relieved (wee being so neare to them) it was
unpossible for them, to hold out the towne any longer.l'"
It was not uncommon for women to be utilized in this manner, nor to risk internal bodily
damage through swallowing containers in a way that we would identify with modem day
drug traffickers:
A woman was taken coming out of the towne ... shee confessed, shee had
swallowed downe a bullet, wherein was a letter, which after a purge shee voyed, &
the letter was found: the letter being wrapped together in a little hollow bullet, &
baked in paste. 161
Hexham gave several other examples, though the nature of the intelligence gleaned is not
divulged: 'This daye five women were taken coming out off the towne whereof one had a
packet ofletters found about her,;162 'A woman also was apprehended, and taken goeing
with a letters [sic] to the Spanish Army',163 and, showing that women did not have the
monopoly, 'This day two pesants were taken coming out of the towne, whereof one off
them had letters found about him'.I64
Surgeons were generally regarded as non-combatants, and as such potentially had
access to both camps. The unscrupulous Colonel Hippesley disguised himself as a surgeon
to spy on a fortification in Ireland, and the information he obtained resulted in the
successful taking of the castle, the storming party of which he led.16s
Monro had no doubt that the use of friendly locals could influence a battle. On one
occasion, a local blacksmith navigated Monro's force through shallow waters thus
successfully surprising the enemy:
160 Hexharn, Venlo, p.23.
161Ibid, p.22.
162Ibid, p.l5.
1631bid, p.16.
164Ibid, p.l8.
165 Firth C, romwell's Army, p.254.
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Here also wee see the goodness of intelligence; for had his Majestie not gotten the
Black-smith, or some other like unto him, to have been intelligencer and guide to
winne through the shallow Trinkets he led us, to the Damme upon the head of their
Watch, who were surprized; hardly could we have overcome this Towne, on such a
sudden, for without this good of intelligence, which is so necessary, and of so great
a moment in warres, nothing, or very little can be effectuated in unknown places.
For good intelligencers are so requisite in an Annie; that no meanes ought to be
spared on them, providing they be trustie; for one designe or secret of our enemies
well knowne, may bring all the rest we desire to a wished end, or at least, preserve
us and ours from danger.166
Intelligence, by its nature an inexact discipline, had its comic side. At the siege of
Breda in 1637 the Chief Engineers of both sides met incognito while attempting to survey
the other's line:
The Prince on our side... commanded Monsieur Percevall, the ... chiefe
Inginier ... to take upon him the habit and quality of a Sarjant, with a halbert in his
hand, and to goe out, and entertaining discourse with the Ennemies Officer, which
should come out on their side, should cast his eye about him now and then, to
discover how the ground lay, and the Ennemies workes, that he might the better
know, which way to run his approches towards them: neither was the Ennemy
failing herein: for they sent also out of the Towne, their chiefe Inginier, to espye
how our line, and Trenches lay. These two chiefe Inginers meeting together, the
Ennemies men to show their curtesy, brought out their Homeworke good Renish
wine, and the best Bredaes Beere they could gett, and there they dranke two or
three healths, to the CardinalI Infantes, the Prince of Oranges, and at last the
Ennemies Inginier enquiring how Monsieur Percevall did, dranck a health unto
him, who unknowne unto the Ennemies Inginier, pledged his owne health.167
Pioneers
The soldiers' narratives provide important information about the status of men
behind the lines. Mobile armies required a labour force to carry out many vital supporting
tasks that fell short of actual combat yet enabled engagement with the enemy, and that
manpower pool was often the category termed 'pioneers'. This group is of particular
interest as their employment wavers between the task of the soldier and the task of the
civilian labourer. Their existence, and the many references to them through the primary
sources, shows that men could be recruited for work within an army, be maimed or killed
as a consequence of that employment, and yet not be considered soldiers. The Spanish
used pioneers attached to their artillery in order to clear roads for the movement of guns,
166 Monro, Expedition, II, pp.39;41.
167 Hexham, Siege of Breda, p.13.
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and the Duke of Alva sent an engineer with three hundred pioneers to work on the passes
in the Alps along the Spanish Road.168 The army of the States General also used them for
road clearance:
The Ordinance [Le. artillery] marches first with all the Carriages, and the Pyonniers
are alwaies by them, having noe other waggons mingled amonge them, and so
march in their order onely with one waggon before them, laden with spades,
showels, Axses, hachets, and biles, and other instruments to make the wayes, and
explaine the ground and ditches, after which is drawne an Instrument, which doth
make a rut upon the waye, to show which way the Canon is to passe.169
Often such troops were required to labour in support of the chief engineer, a captain
'very expert in fortifications ... and in all sorts of engines concerning a campe,' being
employed in areas such as mining and the construction of defensive positions and bridges.
Robert Barret described their tasks in some detail:
... the General of the Artillery hath under his charge, a great number of labourers or
Pioners, which ... follow an Army, to make trenches, Rampiers, Minings,
Countermines, ditches, caves; to make plaine wayes for the army to march; to
accommodate the passages for the Artillery to passe; to raise mounts to plant
ordinance upon; to place and fill the gabbions; to digge earth for the same; to
undermine wals, and townes, and to raze those of any gained places down; to cut
bury and cast therein, the garbedge, filthinesse, and offalls of the campe... 170
The military status of this workforce may have been set apart from the soldiery, as
room had to be made, in addition to the soldiers, 'for victuallers, pioners, and others
following the campe,.171 They required a separate armed element to guard them from
enemy action as they worked, 'the poore Pioner is in great danger, as often slaine.' 172
Barret explained:
These Pioners do go before the campe with a sufficient band of souldiers for their
guard, carrying with them mattockes, spades, shovelIs, pikaxes, crowes of iron,
barrells, baskets, hampiers, and such other tooles; and over every three or foure
hundred Pioners a Captaine.173
Francis Markham believed pioneers to be 'a rascally, rude, ragged, and uncivill regiment
of barbarous and ill-taught people,' and certainly set them aside from the main army,
168 Duffy, Siege Warfare, p.64. Parker, Spanish Road, p.71.
169 Henry Hexham, The Second Part of the Art Militarie (London, 1639), p.14.
170 Barret, Theorike, pp. 13617.
171 Ibid, p.l54.
I72F . M khrancis ar am, Epistles, p.l30.
173 Barret, Theorike, p.137.
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describing them as 'a confused masse of labouring people, brought up only to digge and
delve the earth, without any civill nourture, or indeed decent humanitie, and therefore are
not reckoned Souldiers' .174 Pioneering was not popular work, but despite the early modem
snobbery that persisted throughout the period and notwithstanding the comments above,
such tasks often fell to the soldiers. In October 1583 the Dutch States General attempted to
raise one thousand pioneers, but by February 1584 they had mustered just thirty men, and
so ordered vagabonds to be arrested and used in lieu of volunteers.i" Initially the Dutch
believed that the building of siege works was considered humiliating for soldiers, and often
civilian builders were hired or farm workers pressed into service as soldiers took a great
deal of persuading.V" Later the Dutch adopted the system of requesting military
manpower through the regimental quartermasters, and volunteers were forthcoming
because the pay was substantial, on occasion rising to twenty times the normal rate.
Pioneering to the Dutch was, therefore, important enough to become an expensive affair.177
Low level engineering tasks requiring substantial manpower were a standard for the
age as trench warfare was very common in the campaigns of the early modem period:
Duke d'Alva being arrived [near Mons], incamped on the river side betwixt the
meadows and the hills, from the wayes towards Valentia downe to the Cloyster.
Along this river he made strong trenches, which assured his armie towards the
fields; towards the towne he made large deepe trenches, impossible to be entred.
This man would commonly assure himself with trenches, although the enemies
were lodged three dayesjoumey from him.178
Important though this activity was, soldiers regarded such work as degrading and
were often unenthusiastic labourers.179 William Garrard, in his military treatise, advised
that inefficiency should be punished by forcing a miscreant into pioneering:
A Souldier ought ever to retaine and keepe his Armes in safetie and
foorthcomming, for hee is more to be detested then a Coward, that will loose or
play away any part thereof, or refuse it for his ease, or to avoid paynes: wherefore
such a one is to be dismissed with punishment, or made some abject Pyoner.180
174 Francis Markham, Epistles, p.l29.
175 Duffy, Siege Warfare, p.65.
176 Duyck, Journaal, p.xxiv.
177 Duffy, Siege Warfare, p.Sl.
178 Williams, Actions, p.42. Churchyard also refers to Alva's entrenchments: ' ... the Dukes Campe within
two houres was intrenched ... ', Churchyard, True Discourse, p.14.
179 'Another symbol of the divide between gun and trader's scales, sword and spade, was the successful
insistence of soldiers that if called on to dig fortifications they should get extra pay in compensation for
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Sir George Carey said much the same to his militia on the Isle of Wight, threatening that
lazy soldiers would be 'degraded to the pickaxe and shovel, amongste the pioneers' .181 In
a letter to the Privy Council Sir Roger Williams describes how he dealt with a group of
deserters:
The next daie I caused to be honge the new elected officers and doe keep the reste
of the villanes in one great chaine with bread and water, assuringe them there beste
usage will be [as] pyoners, unless her Majesty or your Lordships in her highnes
name comandes the contrary.182
In Ireland, an English soldier who married a local woman 'shall be cashiered from his foot
service, and to serve onely as a Pionier,.183 Pioneering could be regarded as women's
work:
They caused also about sixe hundred Burgesses to carry armes; besides two
thousand and more of allsorts of people, sufficient to supply the place of pioneers:
of which some three hundred women, all under one Ensigne. The womens Captain
was a most stout dame, named Captaine Margaret Kenalt. 184
Comments made after the battle of Nieuwpoort in the English camp reflect this theme,
where 'the Ennemie had bragged heretofore that our men were good Spade-men, but durst
not fight a sett battell in the field'. 18S The Spanish Army of Flanders also experienced
difficulties in tasking soldiers as labourers. At Ostend, the Burgundians, Walloons and
Germans refused to build fortifications, and many of the officers attempted to return their
commissions, stating that they were combatants, not labourers. The situation was
exacerbated by the fact that Spanish, Italian and Irish troops were not required to do such
manual work. On one occasion the troops were offered an extra 20 ecus, and although
work was further delayed while this was considered, many soldiers accepted the extra
money.186
181 Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, p.26.
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209
This lack of enthusiasm for manual, non-combatant labour seems to have been the
reason behind a scolding received by Monro from Gustavus Adolphus himself:
His Majesty ... coming before day to visit the workes, and finding them not so farre
advanced as he did expect, he falls a chiding of me, notwithstanding of my
diligence used the whole night, in keeping the Souldiers still at worke, with the
small number of materialls we had to worke with ... the truth is, our Country
Souldiers cannot endure to worke like the Dutch; neither when they have taken
paines, can they worke so formally as others.187
Monro, though, was to come to respect such menial duties:
Here also we found by experience, that the spade and the shovell are ever good
companions in danger, without which, we had lost the greatest part of our
followers. Therefore in all occasions of service, a little advantage of ground is ever
profitable against horse, foote, or Cannon. And for this it was, that the best
Commanders made ever most use of the spade and the shovell, and that in such
ground as was found most commodious for their safeties. 188
Francis Markham also concluded of pioneering that 'the service it selfe is both noble and
necessary', and observed that the Dutch 'caused all their common souldiers in generall to
tume Pioners, making them weare both Swords and Spades,.189 Certainly by the 1637
siege of Breda the Dutch were employing a combination of civilians ('there came a matter
of some 3 or 4 thowsand Boores, or hus-bandmen out of Holland, who made an out ditch')
and soldiers ('250 workemen of every English, and French Regiment, and proportionally
of every Regiment of the whole Army') to work as pioneers.l'" In the English trained
bands, without a visible enemy and subject to the status-driven conditions of local society,
there was a clear pecking order: 'Propriety expected that gentlemen fought with pikes; the
'nimblest' men with firearms; the clumsiest with bills; and the blockheads with pick and
shovel, as pioneers'. Nevertheless, it was calculated that there should be twenty pioneers
for every one hundred soldiers: although whether that reflected the labour requirement or
just the ratio of nimble men to blockheads is not made clear.191
187 Monro, Expedition, II, p.39.
188 Ibid, II, p.42.
189 Francis Markham, Epistles, p.130.
190 Hexham, Siege of Iireda, pp.S; 6; 10; 12.
191 Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, pp. 101; 113.
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The rules of war
It has been common for historians to accept the traditional view that the Thirty
Years' War witnessed a descent into military lawlessness that resulted in widespread
despoliation and terror across central Europe. Matthew Waxman, in an essay focussing on
the 'extraordinary' restraint shown in a letter from Philip II to his governor-general in the
.
Low Countries regarding endorsement of certain measures used to combat the rebels,
comments on ' ...the apparent lack of restraint in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
warfare. This is not to say that certain codes of conduct were nonexistent; rather, the codes
were both loose and frequently circumscribed or pushed to their extreme'. 192
The primary sources would indicate that this interpretation is far from the mark,
although certainly the Duke of Alva's time in the Low Countries was marked by his hard
line on treating all rebels as traitors and heretics rather than enemy soldiers. That violence
and cruelty occurred, particularly during the Thirty Years' War must be readily
acknowledged, although the scale and frequency of such horror deserves further
discussion. Whatever the outcome of that debate, and prior to the formal international
agreement signed at The Hague in 1899, rules of war nevertheless existed in all European
theatres including the Empire, and contemporaries knew when they had been broken.
Sydenham Poyntz related an account of the Swedish taking Haselberg before the battle of
Nordlingen, during which action the Swedes took some Spanish prisoners: 'Some of the
principall officers they gave Quarter unto: but the next morning brought those Spaniards
before the whole Army and shot them to death contrary to the Lawes of Armes'. 193
Perhaps Poyntz' account is inaccurate as much of his Relation is, and possibly overtly anti-
Swedish considering they were his enemy, but judging by his use of the first person in the
text, he was present on this particular occasion and it is usually second hand accounts that
reflect gossip and myth. The point is, true or untrue, Poyntz feels able to refer to the
'Lawes of Armes' without irony.
There are sufficient examples in the accounts of soldiers to conclude that rules
certainly existed, that all parties comprehended them, and that they were often applied.
192 Matthew C. Waxman, 'Strategic Terror: Philip II and Sixteenth-Century Warfare', War in History,
Vol. 4(3),1997, pp.339-347, quote p.341.
193 Goodrick, Relation, p.l l l, InEngland a regulation was published stating 'None shall kill an Enemy who
yields, and throws down his Armes', Anon, Lawes and Ordinances of Warre (London, 1642),Of Duties in
Action, V. Clearly Poyntz believed it should have been the case in this instance.
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Thomas Churchyard tells us of the Spanish surrender to Sir John Norris near Arnhem in
1585:
... the enemies knowing the want of abilitie to withstand his [Norris'] force, and
being without hope of helpe, voluntarily appealed to the law of Armes, that they
might depart with bag and baggage: and so they surrendering the Sconce into his
hands, the said General with no small credit to his countrie and honour to his name,
yielding humble and heartie thankes unto God for his clemencie, entered the said
Sconce of Arnhem ... l94
When Major Dunbarre refused the parley at Bredenburg by saying 'that so long as there
was bloud in Dunbarres head, that house should never be given over,' his answer 'so
incensed the enemy against them, that they sware, if they got the upper hand over them,
they should all die without quarters'. The Imperialists had been made to pay a high price
for taking their objective due to the robust defence of the Scots. According to the rules of
war, Dunbarre had held out too long, refused the parley, and so invoked the justifiable ire
of the enemy. Retribution was harsh:
The Enemy ... with a generall storme, scorned all quarters, and being entred, cruelly
put all to the sword, making no difference of qualitie, age, nor sex, but all alike
cruelly put to death: so that five or six at most escaped... The Enemy before this
house was taken, as I was informed, lost above a thousand men, which made the
Enemies crueltie the greater; and of our Regiment were killed above three hundred.
And it is reported, that after the fury was past, they made inquisition into the
Majors body, and having found it, they ript up his breast, tooke out his hearte,
sundered his gummes, and stucke his heart into his mouth; the~ also killed the
Preacher, who being on his knees, begging life, was denied mercy. 9S
If a staunch defence would result in a ferocious enemy attack, there was nevertheless little
respect for slackness in enemy discipline. Those who failed to secure their lines deserved
to face serious consequences. InNew Brandenburg, Monro reports:
... in the Castle there lay above sixe hundred men of the Imperialists, that might
have foughten for good quarters, but being carelesse of their Watch, our
commanded Musketiers, having past the Bridge, were suffered to enter within the
Castle, before the Garrison could get to their Armes, and being thus surprized, they
got worse quarters. then if they had fought.!"
194 Churchyard, TrueDiscourse, p.72.
195 Monro, Expedition, I, p.39.
196 Ibid, II, p.lS.
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Assessments had to be made, of both the enemy's strength and the length of time an
invested garrison could hold out. In a siege situation, of which there were many during
this period, a garrison commander had to consider the timing of his surrender carefully.
Surrender was not in itself an act for which he would necessarily be condemned and his
honour impugned.i'" If he got it right, he could march out with his troops and equipment:
'The souldiers to depart with bag and baggage, flying colours, Bullet ith [sic] mouth and
burning matches'. 198 If he declared too soon, he could be branded a coward and face the
wrath of his superior.l'" If too late, or if he refused completely, the enemy, once they
carried the inevitable breach, would put the garrison, and possibly the civilian
population,200 to the sword, as with the case of Major Dunbarre. The Swedish surrender of
Brandenburg is another example:
General Tilly hearing the King was marched, and fearing some great design, he
pressed Brandenburg so much the harder, with continuall shooting of Cannon until
a Breach was made, and then out of time Kniphowsen did send his Lieuetenant
Colonell with a Drummer to the breach, to desire a Parle, but being neglected by
the enemy, as too late. The Parle refused, Lieuetenant Colonell was killed, the
enemy having given Orders for a generall storme which going on, Lieutenant
Colonel Lindesey and Captaine Moncreiffe were both killed, and Lieutenant Keith
and Ensign Haddon, were also cut downe in the fury, with many a brave Souldier
besides, who being denied Quarters, fought valiantly to the last man .... 201
The besieged, then, needed to weigh the odds and if they were heavily against him he
either committed his men to die gloriously or, if he wished to avoid slaughter, he needed to
act cautiously in order to make the best of a poor situation. Churchyard again comments
on an action involving Norris, this time during the Portugal voyage when he was besieging
Corunna 'high town': 'The same day (in parley time) a Spaniard shot at an Englishman,
and was hanged by the Enemie: In this parley the Enemie desired to have faire warres with
US'.202
197 • ••• so long as surrender was not premature, treacherous, or cowardly, it did not bring dishonour'; Barbara
Donagan, 'The Web of Honour: Soldiers, Christians and Gentlemen in the English Civil War', Historical
Journal, Vo1.44,No.2, pp.365-389, quote p.368. See section on 'Honour' in Chapter Three above.
198 Goodrick, Relation, p.l04. This refers to the Swedish surrender of Regensburg.
199 For example Baron Hemart, Governor of Grave, who was executed by Leicester for surrendering to Parma
after just one day of bombardment; Nolan, Sir John Norreys, p.93, and the Spanish commander at Cascais for
'&!elding tamely'; Wernham, Expedition, p.liii.
2 The condition of the civilians, through hunger and the possibility of the enemy's retribution, could cause
friction between the townspeople and the military; see, for instance, R. Fruin, The Siege and Relief of Leyden
in 1574, trans. Elizabeth Trevelyan (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1927), p.73.
201 Monro, Expedition, II, p.23. See also I, p.39, for an example of 'no quarter' being given following a
refusal.
202 Churchyard, True Discourse, p.llS.
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Inevitably sometimes, the sources make clear, the rules were broken. A German
soldier, following surrender to the Swedes after the siege of Straubing, believed he would
be released with all his belongings in accordance with the terms of the surrender, but
instead found himself pressed into Swedish service with most of his possessions seized.203
Often once the rules had been broken it was only a matter of time before the shoe would be
on the other foot. This collective memory is demonstrated in the case of Magdeburg,
where the destruction of the city by fire and consequent death of some 20,000 people was
seen by the Protestant world as a deliberate act of Imperialist cruelty and reported on
graphically:
... the whole City was in 12 houres space wholly turned to cinders, excepting 139
houses. Sixe goodly Churches were burnt, 20000 people at least were here killd,
burned, and smothered. 6000 being observed drowned in the Elve. Tilleys
Wallons, and Crabats would give Quarter to few, so that all were killed.204
The magnitude of the event led to a revenge factor being added to the soldiers' mentality,
either that or a degree of justification for merciless acts: 'Years later, imperialist soldiers
crying for quarter would be met with the answer 'Magdeburg quarter' as they were shot
down,.20s Monro, at Frankfurt on the Oder, gives us another example:
After us entered Generall Banier, with a fresh body of Musketiers, he following the
enemy in one street, and Lumsdell and I in another, having rancountred the enemy
againe, they being well beaten, our Officers tooke nine Colours of theirs, which
were to be presented to his Majestie, and the most part of the Souldiers were cut
off, in revenge of their crueltie used at New Brandenburg, but some of their
Officers got quarters, such as they had given to ours.206
Sometimes the besieged commander was at pains to ensure the rules were fair on both
sides even if that meant harsh justice for his own men; at Corunna during the Portugal
expedition, corroborating Churchyard's account, Wingfield reports:
The same day the General, having planted his ordnance ready to batter, caused the
town to be summoned, in which summons they of the town shot at our drum.
Immediately after that there was one hanged over the wall and a parley desired,
wherein they gave us to understand that the man hanged was he that shot at the
203 Anon, Ein Soldnerleben, p.143.
204 Anon, The Invasions of Germanie, Withall the Civill and bloody Warres therein (London, 1638),
~aragraph 56.
os Wedgwood, Thirty Years' War, p.292. See for comparison Monro, Expedition, II, p.50.
206 Monro, Expedition, II, p.33.
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drum before, wherein also they entreated to have fair wars, with promise of the
same on their parts. 207
It was also wise for the garrison commander to read the small print. Poyntz leaves us an
interesting account of the Swedish surrender to Imperial forces at Frankfurt:
... the Governor began to parley and at length it was agreed hee should march away
with flying colours, bullet in the Mouth, bag and baggage 5 pieces of Canon and 6
Wagons of Amunition and convoy for himself to Mentz where the french Army
lay. This halfe Towne thus yielded and hee marching out with all his souldiers,
baggage &c hee thinking to have a convoy for all his 2000 men, our Generall
caused his souldiers to stand and with our 8000 men made a Ring about them and
there our Generall showed hym the Accord which was made betwixt them, wherein
hee had forgotten convoy for his men and mentioned it onely for himself which
was given hym, but his Officers and souldiers were faine to take the kings pay and
so lose all his bag and baggage which fell to our horsmen. The Canons and
Amunition was sent backe to the Towne and their colours to the Emperour.j'"
At Manheim, Sir Horace Vere was besieged with fourteen hundred men over an extended
line: 'He had no money and no supplies. When he was reduced to extremities he retired
into the citadel, and capitulated on honourable terms in the end of September. He and his
brave garrison marched out with all the honours of war' .209
Henry Hexham reports local ceasefires in order to evacuate the dead, as at
Maastricht: 'A parley was had for a certain tyme to fetch of the Alferus [Spanish Ensign]
his body, and other prisoners', and again, later 'a parley was beaten for the fetching off of
our dead bodies on both sides,.2Io By no means all sieges resulted in the violence reported
by Monro, above: ' ... those of Venlo came to parley and shooting was left on both sides
for a while'. All ended peacefully, with the agreement 'that the Officers and Souldiers
should march out with flying colours, light matches, bullets in their mouths, and with bagg
and baggage ... ,211
Sir Francis Vere frequently played the rules to suit his ends. In an action at the
castle of Litkenhoven, Vere decided to assault first, parley later, and he describes the
positive effect this had:
207 'Anthony Wingfield's discourse' in Wernham, Expedition, p.260.
208 Goodrick, Relation, p.l19.
209 C.R. Markham, Fighting Veres, p.419.
210H xhe am, Venlo, pp. 9; 32.
211 Ibid. pp. 4/5.
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... the Governor of the fort by a drum wrote me a letter, complaining that against
the ordinary proceedings of men of war, I assaulted before I summoned; and that
drum in mine ear told me, that if I would but do them the honour to shew them any
piece of ordnance, I should quickly have the fort.212
During the siege of Ostend, some of Vere's tactics came In for criticism. Most
controversial was his parley with the Spanish, conducted only to buy time while he awaited
the arrival of reinforcements and supplies, and therefore judged to be insincere. This
parley was 'of most eminent note, and as most noted, so most and worst censured, and that
by sword as well as gown-men.'213 In short, Vere started negotiations with the Spanish
without sharing his intentions with his own officers or the States General, and broke them
off with the arrival of the supply vessels: 'whilest we were about to conclude upon the
Conditions and Articles, there are arrived certain of our ships of warre ...so that we cannot
with our Honour and Oath continue the Treaty.'214 It was afterward conjectured that if the
vessels had not arrived in time, Vere would have conceded the town. While the truth of
that particular contention shall probably never be known, the result of the 'anti-parley',
though, was that he succeeded in buying the time he needed. He also provoked the wrath
of the Archduke Albert and his army, who consequently prepared for a major assault, and
Vere and his garrison, with their newly arrived reinforcements and provisions, prepared to
defend themselves. Perhaps Vere' s conduct was not gentlemanly - but it was not that
uncommon. Deception was not necessarily cheating, but how one viewed it generally
depended on which side of the deception one sat.2lS As a result of the 'anti-parley,' 'the
enemy,' according to Hexham, 'had sworn all our deaths,'216 and so the ferocious attack
was repelled with equal ferocity. Heat of battle aside, there was little intention of quarter
being offered. Vere had called for an experienced veteran, 'an old souldier, a Gentleman
of his company,' to keep watch and let him know when he saw the enemy advance.
Shortly this gentleman ventured to Vere: 'My Lord (said he) I smell good store of gold
chains, buff-jerkins, Spanish-cassocks, and Spanish-blades. Ha, (sayes Sir Francis Vere)
sayest thou me so? I hope thou shalt have some of them anon' .217 Vere' s use of water as a
weapon was innovative here: assessing the next Spanish attack would come at low water,
212 Dillingham, Commentaries, p.16.
2J3 So wrote Sir John Ogle, Vere's lieutenant colonel. Ibid, p.l44.
214 Letter from Vere to Archduke Albert, in ibid, p.162.
215 C.R. Markham, predictably, states that there had been 'no breach of faith', C.R. Markham, Fighting
Veres, p. 323, n 1.Trim, in his biographical notes, states that 'there is no doubt that the whole thing was a
ruse,' but also comments that 'such negotiations, aimed simply at spinning out time, were common in
seventeenth century warfare', ODNB: Sir Francis Vere.
216Dillingham, Commentaries, p.170.
2171bid, p.171.
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' ... at high-water [Vere] shut the West-sluces, and engrossed as much water as possibly he
could into the old and new town'. 218 Having beaten off the assault,
General Vere perceiving the enemy to fall off, commanded me to run as fast as ever
I could to Serjeant-major Carpenter, and the Auditour Fleming, who were upon the
Helmont, that they should presently open the West-sluce, out of which there ran
such a stream and torrent down through the chanel of the West-haven, that upon
their retreat it carried away many of their sound and hurt men into the sea; and
besides, our men fell down our walls after them, slew a great many of their men as
they retreated, and took some prisoners, pillaged and stript a great many, and
brought in gold-chains, Spanish-pistols, buff-jerkins, Spanish-cassocks, blades,
swords, and targets; among the rest, wherein was enameled in gold the seven
Worthies, worth seven or eight hundred gilders, and among the rest, that souldier,
which Sir Francis Vere had sent out to discover, with as much booty as ever he
could lug, saying, That Sir Francis Vere was now as good as his word.219
There are several recorded instances of fooling the enemy through ingenuity and
ruses. It could have a significant effect, as Hexham tells us of General Stackenburch on
the Maas:
Hee had with him some 80 horse, & some 80 firelocks, and tooke with him many
trumpets, and Drums, which were to sound, and to beate a charge in sundry places,
and coming neere them, hee fell on with his horse, & firelocks, the trumpets
sounding, & the Drums beating, gave them such a terrible allarume, that the Enemy
supposing (as the runewayes and prisoners reported) that his Excie had given on
with his whole Army, did so pusle them, that they run too, and fro, like men
amazed, and could not get into Armes: Monsr Stackenburch broke into their trench
and cut off a corps de Guard, wherein a Spanish Captaine was slayne, and takeing
diverse prisoners, returned back to his quarters.220
Prince Maurice and Sir Francis Vere managed to put the considerable Spanish presence at
Turnhout to flight by giving the impression their force was greater than it actually was.
They killed three hundred and took six hundred prisoners with a total Anglo-Dutch force
of less than eight hundred.F! Duyck tells us of Vere's ploy in the Zutphen campaign,
where in order to seize Rhenen, five soldiers were dressed in women's clothes, four as
farmers, who entered the village to sell produce and successfully surprised the thirteen
defenders.222 During the Bishops' Wars the Earl of Holland was fooled by the veteran
Alexander Leslie with a trick the latter learned in the Thirty Years' War. Driving cattle
218 Ibid, p.l67.
219 Ibid, p.174.
220 Hexham, Venlo, p.l4.
221 Dillingham, Commentaries, pp. 73-81; C.R. Markham, Fighting Veres, pp. 257-261.
222 Duyck, Journaal, I, p.6.
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behind his infantry, a huge cloud of dust was created giving Holland to believe that
Leslie's force was far larger than it actually was.223 The Prince of Orange Frederick-
Henry was not beyond such tactics; understanding the Spanish believed his offensive to be
targeting Flanders:
... his highnesse Caused two hundred empty ships, with the shippers onely, and
some fewe drummers in them, to Saile up the ScheId, and along the Land of Waes,
to make shew of landing there, which gave the Enemy So strong an alarme in all
those parts, that they never thought of his coming any where else, his highnesse in
the interim kept his course towards Bergin up zoom... 224
We can assume that the Duke of Alva was breaking the rules when he hanged one
of two trumpeters sent to him by William the Silent at Valenciennes in 1568.225 He
ordered 'no quarter' and 'hang all prisoners' at Heiligerlee, as he 'would not accord the
decencies of war to rebels and traitors'. 226 The Alva era at the beginning of the Dutch
revolt was a particularly bloody period, but ultimately his severe approach did not work
and he returned to Spain with his standing in court much diminished.
These examples, although interesting, do not detract from the fact that there were
rules. An army had to attempt to maintain discipline and follow its own rules. Several sets
of regulations were published in this period. The Swedish produced Articles of War in
1621 based on the Dutch military code of 1591,227Leicester produced his Lawes and
Ordinaunces when in the Low Countries,228 and in addition to the Lawes and
Ordinances,229 produced in 1642 as England moved towards war, Henry Hexham
produced his Appendix so that the warring parties in England could benefit from the
martial discipline of the United Provinces.23o Appendix 3 lists the orders and ordinances
that were printed during the period.
223 Mark Charles Fissel, Eng/ish Warfare, 1511-1642 (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p.278.
224 Hexharn, Siege of Breda, p.3.
22S Willi A' 2 .I lams, ctions, p. 7.
226 Wedgwood, William the Silent, p.lOS. 'The question was complicated enough in wars between states, but
in a civil war it was necessary at some point to decide whether to treat opponents as hostile soldiers or as
rebels to whom standards of honour were irrelevant' , Donagan, 'Web of Honour', p.387.
227 Roger B. Manning, 'Prince Maurice's School of War: British Swordsmen and the Dutch', War & Society,
Vo1.2S, No.1, May 2006. pp.l-19, detail from p.16.
228 Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, Lawes and Ordinances Militarie (Leiden, 1586).
229 Anon, Lawes and Ordinances Of Warre, Established for the better Conduct Of The Army (London, 1642).
230 Hexham, Henry, An Appendix Of the Lawes, Articles, & Ordinances, established for Marshall Discipline,
in the service of the Lords the States General of the united Provinces, under the Commaund of his Highnesse
the Prince of Orange (Delft, 1643).
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Conclusion
In this chapter we have discussed the contribution made by soldier-authors to our
knowledge of early modem warfare. Sometimes the detail provided amplifies our existing
information; sometimes it adds something entirely new. The issue surrounding the
presentation of such material by soldier-authors remains unresolved. Did they provide
information incidentally as they sought to tell an engaging and potentially commercially
profitable tale? Or did they intend to use their narrative to persuade an elite and influential
audience? Or to justify poor performance? These deficiencies are problems for the
historian but are no excuse for ignoring soldiers' publications. Certainly these sources
contribute considerably to the modem debate about change in the army. For many
historians, early-modem soldiers engaged in combat were fighting during a period of
'military revolution'. Barwick and Williams, it has been noted above, regarded that
revolution as being the completed progression from bows to firearms, and Robert Barret
agreed.231 Following many years of discussion, John Childs announced the death of the
debate on this 'military revolution' .232Arguing that revolutions are 'sharp, sudden events'
of limited duration that do not occur over a protracted period, he has refuted the
terminology used by other historians such as Michael Roberts and Geoffrey Parker,
describing the changes in military technology and tactics as evolutionary rather than
anything more dramatic.233 Technological change was slow and slight, and whether
tactical structural changes are regarded as revolutionary or evolutionary, wars became
enduring and, as a result, soldiers through their long experience became skilled at fighting
them. Deadlock was the over-riding characteristic of the French, Dutch and later German
theatres of war. The 'brables of Ireland,'234despite drawing an almost consistent English
and Scottish military presence, remained a low-level guerrilla affair fought in the main
outside the interest or participation of continental Europeans which inspired little strategic
or tactical review worthy of export, and the nature of the Irish wars saw little synergy with
231 ' ... the warres and weapons are now altered from them dayes [of bow and bill], and we must accommodate
ourselves to the now used weapons, order, and time ... ', Barret, Theorike, p.4.
232 John Childs, Warfare in the Seventeenth Century (London: Cassell, 2001), p.22. Apparently the
discussion continues; Tallett and Trim, European Warfare, pp.7-9 and passim.
233 Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution. 1560-1660 (Belfast: Queen's University Press, 1956);
Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise ofthe West 1500-1800
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1988.
234 Barret, Theorike, p.l.
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the conflicts in Europe.235 Knowledge of 'modem' warfare came to the English court
largely through the involvement of volunteers fighting on the continent, who reported to
the government on the events in Europe, predicted those conflicts to advance onto home
territory, and made recommendations for the defence of the realm. Apart from the limited
military activity in Ireland, which did not directly threaten the security of the homeland
(until 1641), England and Scotland had been at peace for as far back as living memory
extended. To the professional soldier peace itself could be regarded as an unwelcome
interregnum within the 'perpetuall warre' that raged throughout the history of the world,236
as peace produced a woeful lack of readiness when war inevitably returned:
For long peace hath bred Securitie; Securitie, carelesse mindes; carelesse mindes,
contempt of warre; contempt of warre, the dispising of souldiars and Martiall
discipline .. .let us consider the [Ancients], so long as they maintained Martiall
discipline, ruled each the Monarchie in their times, but discipline neglected,
disorders grew on, new Martialists sprung up, and overturned their wealth, state,
and kingdomes, with a finall ruine of their names and Nations.237
Martial men regarded peace as a careless attitude of mind, which dwelt in the towns
and counties as much as in the circles of government. In England, despite this prevalent
opinion, held not least by the Queen herself, elements within Elizabeth's government were
forced to consider the implications of war, as was even the pacific James towards the end
of his reign; fighting the enemy abroad was a much preferred option to awaiting his arrival
on home turf. They were aware that there were 'manie brave men of our nation which
have long followed the warres, both in the Low Countries, France, and other places, ,238
thus, informally and unofficially, ensuring the continuance of the English military tradition
and keeping pace with European technological and tactical developments.
Early modem warfare was extremely hard and dangerous work for those deployed
in its execution. Observations and conclusions about the lack of quick and sweeping
235 The expertise gained in amphibious warfare in Ireland was retained in that theatre, and can be set against
the unimpressive English amphibious assaults against Spain. Mark Charles Fissel, 'English Amphibious
Warfare, 1587-1656,' in Trim and Fissel, Amphibious Warfare, p.217.
236 Monro, Expedition, I, p.52. .
237 Barret, Theorike, p.2.
238 Ibid, p.24.
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success in battle (as well as a corresponding absence of unmitigated and total defeat) has
been presented by historians from material mainly drawn from political documents and the
correspondence of civilians. Such sources shed a great deal of light on the issues over
which wars were fought, the expense of creating armed forces, and the effect of warfare on
the economy and the state. However they rarely show what was felt, physically and
acutely, by those who did the fighting, and it is through these men that we witness the true
experience of warfare. For those with their boots in the mud, warfare was logistically
complex, physically demanding and often psychologically harrowing; it required men to
subject themselves to potentially fatal disease as well as lethal or permanently debilitating
wounds from firearms and blades without adequate medical support, in addition to penury,
excessive exercise, bad food and trying weather conditions. The early modem military
tradition of Britain was not created and maintained at home, but developed abroad as part
of a pan-European activity. For Englishmen, Welshmen and Scots their combat experience
for this period was entirely in foreign lands (as to them Ireland was certainly foreign), with
alien climate, diet and language with which additionally to contend.
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Conclusion
This thesis has argued that many of the aspects of early-modem warfare can be
understood from the printed evidence of soldiers themselves, and that their accounts often
provide the detail that enhances and enriches our understanding of war during the period in
ways that substantially augment the information contained in state documents and
correspondence, the main sources for historiographical debate. Knowledgeable and
experienced professional soldiers such as Robert Monro, Henry Hexham, Francis Markham
and Sir Roger Williams published books that were a response to public interest in military
affairs, an interest that is reflected in the dramatic rise in the number of editions of military
publications shown in Table 2 in the Introduction. Such men presented, in the main, accounts
that reflect personal experience of the difficulties in forming, deploying and administering an
army as well as facing the enemy in combat. They may have written to augment a meagre
income, such as Barnaby Rich and possibly Monro, or perhaps to enhance their reputation,
such as Sir Francis Vere, but they nevertheless believed they had relevant first-hand
information on topical subject matter that was much in demand. The nature of that demand is
evidenced through the growth in the number of military works detailed in the appendices.
Often the accuracy of the information contained within the works can be reasonably assumed:
it can be seen that Monro's account was drawn from extensive notes taken on campaign such
is the accuracy and detail of his information, and Hexham in the main published shortly after
the events to which he was very probably a frequent eye-witness. Both authors survive cross-
referencing with other sources. Even Vere's controversial account has been corroborated by
other eyewitnesses and was not condemned by contemporaries as inaccurate. I It is difficult to
discern any political bias towards a certain influential individual to whom a work was
dedicated, such as Humfrey Barwick seeking leverage from his powerful governor Henry
Carey, or if a work may have been purposefully directed in line with public opinion, such as
Hexham regarding his challenge to the pacifist policy of James I, but either way the opinions
1Borman's criticism of Vere's Commentaries is ambiguous; she tends to support the Dutch historiography which,
unsurprisingly, attributes victory to Dutchmen rather than Englishmen, but she nevertheless accepts his military
competence. Tracy Borman, 'Sir Francis Vere in the Netherlands, 1589-1603: A re-evaluation of his career as
Sergeant Major General of Elizabeth I's troops', PhD thesis, University of Hull, 1997, pp.32-4.
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of the authors can generally be accepted as legitimate: their political, religious and military
views were logically aligned and the only unknown factor is to what extent a bias may have
influenced their work. 2 And yet problems remain with the use of such sources. The original
manuscript texts will have gone through a publishing process that will have included a degree
of editing, for political or practical reasons, particularly when works were published after the
death of the author, and it is not easy to discern changes to an author's intent; these aspects are
discussed in Chapter One. Another major factor that would affect our judgement of a work is
visibility of the contemporary reaction to the printed material; often the peer reviews of such
works are lost to us. Unless there was a direct or obvious reference to a work, such as
Barwick and Williams in their response to Smythe as discussed in Chapters One and Four, it is
difficult to gauge the consensus of professional opinion and assess the impact and perceived
value of a printed book.
Nevertheless, and despite such unknown factors and their potential to influence our
assessment, the works of the soldier-authors have been analysed, and from them conclusions
drawn on the soldiery of the British Isles and the wars in which they fought. Considering the
tens of thousands who were engaged in these wars, there are very few existing accounts
available, leaving only a snapshot view of the period from which to assess the roots of their
motivation and subsequent development. There is therefore a mountain of opinion lost to
sight. Not only are there very few accounts available but all the accounts have been produced
by the educated and therefore literate classes, the leaders, and often the terminology they use
is directed towards and about their own class or higher. Although through this thesis a
'mercenary' can now be distinguished from a 'professional' soldier and a 'soldier of fortune'
from a 'gentleman adventurer,' these terms have invariably described 'gentlemen,' a term that
itself has been used by contemporaries to stretch from yeoman to upper gentry. Reference to
the common people, the rank and file, is rare, access to their opinions almost non-existent.
Considering cavalry and pikemen were drawn from a higher social strata coupled with the
proliferation of 'gentlemen adventurers' scattered through units, the early modern army can be
seen to be an organisation that was still based on the medieval concept of honour and chivalry
in that 'gentlemen' felt obliged, and had the opportunity and desire, to go to war.
2 See section on 'Reasons for publishing' in Chapter One above.
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Armies required vast numbers of men when compared with other professions or
vocations so are by nature a melting pot of good and bad, zealous and apathetic, veteran and
novice .. The soldiers analysed throughout this thesis, from the first Welsh volunteers who
deployed to the Netherlands at the beginning of the Dutch revolt through to the Scots returning
from Germany at the start of the British Civil Wars, were individuals who came from differing
backgrounds with diverse prospects and who held varying religious and political views. They
were all men of their times who adapted as best they could within the prevailing climate of
change. With one notable exception they were not mercenaries, and even Poyntz fought with
honour.
As Chapter One indicates, the published writings of soldiers fitted into a number of
contemporary traditions, while emerging genres within the military sphere are also evident.
These include the use of dialogue after Machiavelli, adopted by Hexham,' Barret," and
Blandy;S Monluc and Vere's Commentaries after Caesar;" and the writings of travellers such
as William Lithgow." There were also new military genres appearing: the text-book
instruction manuals of which Peter Whitehorn's was the first in English but de Gheyn's one of
the most widely published.l and also an amalgam of autobiographylhistory narrative as
produced by Williams,9 Hexham," and Monro.'! The latter produced what was in effect the
first regimental history, through autobiography, in any language.12 The categories of writings
are not necessarily easily discerned, and this is discussed throughout Chapter One above, and
below in the 'Notes to Appendices'. The sources are not transparent and the historian must
use whatever tools he or she can to penetrate them. Modem work on education, literacy and
the history of the book has proved especially valuable. The intentions and motivations
3 Henry Hexham, A Tongue-Combat lately happening between two English Souldiers (London, 1623).
4 Robert Barret, The Theorike and Practike of Modeme Warres (London, 1598).
S William Blandy and Geffrey Gates, The Castle. or picture of pollicy (London, 1581).
6 Monluc, The Commentaries of Mess ire Blaize de Montluc, Mareschal of France, trans. Charles Cotton (London,
1674); William Dillingham, ed., The Commentaries of Sir Francis Vere (Cambridge, 1657).
7 William Lithgow, A True and Experimental Discourse upon the beginning. preceding and Victorious event of
this last siege Of Breda (London, 1637).
8 Peter Wbitehome, Certain Waies for the orderyng of Souldiers in battelray (London, 1562); Jacob de Gheyn,
The exercise of Armes For Calivres, Muskettes, and Pikes (The Hague, 1607).
9 Sir Roger Williams, The Actions of the Low Countries (London, 1618).
10 Hexham was the most prodigious of soldier-authors, see Serial 92 of Appendix 1.
II Robert Monro, Monro. His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment (called Mac-Keyes Regiment) levied in
August 1626 (London, 1637).
12 William S. Brockington Jr, ed., Monro. His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment called Mac-Keys
(Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1999), p.ix.
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underlying the production and dissemination of soldiers' narratives have been analysed, in so
far as the evidence permits. Close reading of the actual texts can, however, reveal a good deal.
Additionally, the study has sought in Chapter Two to disentangle historians' debates
about the extent to which the military matched twentieth- and twenty-first century definitions
of profession and professionalization from what contemporary soldiers meant by the terms
'professional', 'profession of arms' and 'mercenary'. Contemporary views of the various
categories of soldier are important. The thesis concludes that while there have been attempts
by historians to clarify the correct terminology for soldier categorisation those attempts have
invariably fallen short of accepting the evidence of early-modem printed works and continued
to refer to all British soldiers involved in continental wars as 'mercenaries'. This catchall term
ignores the complex arguments that soldiers articulated, sometimes clearly sometimes
subliminally, for going to the wars; arguments that historians have themselves acknowledged
yet continually failed to 'offer a prescriptive definition of what constitutes a mercenary'v'!
This reflects the ambiguities of the term and the difficulties associated with its application;
that historians consistently struggle with a defmition indicates how inherently problematic the
classification of soldiers is and points to this term as the epicentre of any discussion on the
motivation for, and contemporary views on the morality of, early-modem soldiering. The
soldiers should be categorised with care, and Chapter Two has drawn conclusions based on
soldiers' texts, and these conclusions have attempted to clarify a previously opaque picture.
An attempt has been made throughout the thesis to relate information provided by
these texts to the debates and narratives constructed by historians on the basis of different
categories of source. The negative view held by the older generation of twentieth-century
historians such as Fortescue and Firth is in itself a reflection of the frustrations of mounting
land operations in the sixteenth and seventeenth century." They suggested that soldiers from
the British Isles, who were a long way from home and seldom reported back on any
meaningful successes, rarely seemed to change the course of foreign affairs for the better.
Unlike sailors, whose image was enhanced by the enormous success of defeating the Spanish
13 David lB. Trim, 'Fighting "Jacob's Wars". The Employment of English and Welsh Mercenaries in the
European Wars of Religion: France and the Netherlands, 1562-1610', PhD thesis, University of London, 2002,
p.30.
14 See Introduction above.
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Armadas, soldiers drained the tax-funded treasury through the military stalemate they had
produced.
Recent historians have taken a closer, more critical look at the historiography and
found the older generation's thesis to be somewhat misguided. This revised view is supported
by the present analysis of soldiers' works, which shows that soldiers were for the most part
underfunded, which had a seriously negative effect on their ability to wage effective warfare.
They faced an enemy over which they had no technological, financial or moral superiority. In
fact their enemy was in many respects identical to them: indeed sometimes they faced soldiers
from their own nation. These soldiers expended enormous physical effort and sometimes
personal financial outlay in attempting to beat that enemy for the good of the 'public weal' as
their aim was invariably in line with public opinion if not necessarily openly-stated royal
policy.
A constant thread through the thesis is the relationship between the composite parts of
the British Isles, and between those areas and Europe. Through this discussion the complex
relationship between military culture and the development of a proto-nationalism can be
discerned. The use of gunpowder and its connection to the evolution of the nation-state has
been discussed by historians and is touched upon in Chapter Four," and a tandem debate is
the notion early-modem soldiers had of 'nationhood'. The issue of loyalty and honour is
discussed at length in Chapter Three, and through this it can be seen that there was a variety of
opinion, ranging from a Welsh soldier's fierce loyalty towards an English Queen (Williams) to
a Scotsman's devotion to his ruling House which he now perceived as 'British', even though
'Great Britain' was still largely only a political concept beneath the person and foreign policy
(and imagination) of the reigning monarch (Monro). Still there were soldiers who fought for
the 'wrong' side against their 'nation' in the modem view, such as Barret and Garrard, and
they were able to do so without impeachment and their works were openly published and sold.
Clearly there was a historical and traditional antipathy between Scots and English, but the
publications reveal to a large extent that soldiers from both nations when on the Continent,
working together in difficult circumstances, developed far closer relationships with one
IS See, for instance, Kelly DeVries, 'Gunpowder Weaponry and the Rise of the Early Modern State', War in
History, 1998, S (2), pp.l27-4S.
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another than did the courtiers who despised each other in London. Monro's account of the
soldiery in Germany indicates that the two nations were brought together through professional
empathy, no doubt assisted by linguistic compatibility, and Williams' account for the Low
Countries a generation earlier explicitly supports this. Englishmen and Scots were comrades
in arms abroad. As such, the sources present an image of British unity that historians have
generally ignored, preferring to highlight the differences between the two nations and the
independent actions of Scots. In Germany Protestantism and/or the condition of the British
dynasty could be championed. Either that or a Briton could stand aloof from the quarrels of
foreigners and fight for either side through the lack of any alternative vocation, although it was
likely that over time he would feel an allegiance to the side he had most frequently or latterly
served which could be held against him on return home, as in the case ofPoyntz. For the most
part Englishmen had fought alongside Scots in a pan-European Protestant effort to combat
what they perceived to be a militant and resurgent Catholicism. Financial impoverishment,
extended lines of communications, difficult terrain, military defeat and the complexities of
politico-religious developments all contributed to the pressure on an individual, thus some
soldiers were forced to change sides in the Thirty Years' War, a common trend in that conflict
if not the Dutch Revolt, although for the most part the soldiers analysed in this thesis stuck
with their first employer with whom they often discerned a spiritual, religious or political
bond.
The issues for the Welsh, as discussed in the Introduction, very much mirrored the
issues of the English, and if they were to become notable for their Royalism during the Civil
War, this was a stance of which perhaps Sir Roger Williams would have approved given his
declared do-or-die attachment to the English monarch.l'' Such loyalty when combined with
the honour code by which Williams clearly lived, and which is shown through his writings,
indicates a flaw in the argument of historians who believed that honour was separate from and
superior to loyalty, and that the two were in contention. Chapter Three has considered this
through the work of Williams and others and shown that the two were very much
complimentary and that neither affected the professional soldier's ability to modernise.
16 Ronald Hutton, The Royalist War Effort 1642-1646 (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p.lS. Kevin
Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), p.772.
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The Irish were in significant aspects a case apart, as explained in the Introduction.
Viewed as barbaric and troublesome, their English overlords regarded military subjugation as
the only solution to their perceived dissolute ways and entrenched Catholicism. They
presented a threat to homeland security that an enemy, notably the Spanish, could exploit, thus
their territory remained an area that the English felt they needed to physically dominate with a
military force, unlike Wales and Scotland after the Union of the Crowns which remained
benign self-administrating areas at least until the Cromwellian occupation as a consequence of
the Civil Wars. The Irish were to provide many thousands of soldiers to, almost exclusively,
the Catholic powers, be that the Empire, Spain or France. That said, and inevitably for this
historical period, there are exceptions to this rule and there were groups of Irish Catholics who
found themselves fighting for the Danish against the Empire alongside Protestants from their
home district, although there exists an element of confusion over how many of these troops
were Irish and how many Scots."
All of these British 'nations' had historical and contemporary links with Europe:
trading, political and religious. The latter, particularly through the confessional stand-off
between Calvinism and Counter-Reformation Catholicism, saw each bloc develop a cross-
border international identity which clashed on the battlefields of France, the Low Countries
and Germany, but in the case of the reformed Calvinist church its component member nations
were not sufficiently united or coordinated to overthrow the Catholic enemy and this has been
discussed in Chapter Three. The British Isles witnessed the final phase of these religiously
inspired conflicts in its Civil War, when the military tradition that had continued to develop on
the Continent was transferred to home territory, as foreseen by some of the soldier-authors."
In large part the armies that faced each other in the British Isles employed men who had
learned their trade abroad: the third earl of Essex; Sir Thomas Fairfax; Philip Skippon; Sir
William Waller; Sir Jacob Astley; Sir Nicholas Byron; Sir Thomas Glemham; Sir Ralph
Hopton; Baron Goring and George Monck were famous leaders of the Civil War from the
European school. Also the sources for this thesis, Monro, Poyntz and Turner returned to fight.
Hexham, possibly due to his age, did not. The result was an army of the 1650s that, through
17 Steve Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-Norway and theHouse of Stuart, 1603-1660 (East Linton: Tuckwell Press,
2003), p.205.
18 Such as Robert Ward, discussed in the 'Introduction' to Chapter Four above.
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war experience and its European-trained leadership, could consider itself second to none at the
time and represented the beginning of a lengthy British Army tradition.
There have been examples of Britons, in groups and as individuals, who took to
soldiering all over Europe, and a main effort of this thesis has been to clarify their motivation,
largely through the themes of religion and personal loyalty. This was a violent society." To
some extent, Britons abroad found a reason to fight once they were there. They did not all
head for the Protestant armies, as the account of Sydenham Poyntz informs us. Those who did
could write pages on the good old Protestant (Calvinist) cause whilst fighting alongside
Catholics and for a Lutheran monarch, as in the case of Monro. The Lutheran and Calvinist
divide was to be subject to an amnesty in the Empire as they combined, eventually, to face the
Catholic forces of the Emperor. The issue of loyalty and religious belief, and the relationship
between the two, was to become a far more complex issue for Britons as the political situation
crumbled in the British Isles during the 1640s. Sir James Turner's dilemma is
comprehensible. Those returning from the Netherlands could say with some certainty that
they had been fighting Counter-Reformation Catholicism, and while this was somewhat more
problematic in the Empire there were nevertheless discernible religious 'sides' if it suited an
individual to identify them. But unless it was seriously believed that King Charles was
fighting for the Pope (which it seems few did despite the Parliamentarian propaganda effort
and the King's injudicious diplomatic moves towards the See of Rome20), how would their
previous employment aid them in their decision making when they got home? The whole
issue of personal loyalty was to be set in stark relief in 1642, and is still subject to lengthy
historical debate today. The soldiers' careers reviewed in this thesis would indicate that the
selection of a side on return to Britain was not a straightforward affair. Although religion may
have enabled an initial decision to have been taken, the development of the wars and the
complexities of the issues witnessed none of our main authors remaining with their chosen
side throughout the Interregnum. Nevertheless, and for the sake of balance, there were those
who were constant: Philip Skippon resolutely fought for Parliament despite some apparent
19 See, for instance, the section on 'Duelling' in Chapter Three above. For the representation of violence in the
plays of Shakespeare, see: R.A. Foakes, Shakespeare and Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003).
20 Mark Charles Fissel, English Warfare 1511-1642 (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p.276. Foreign
perceptions are noteworthy; in Sweden Axel Oxenstiema believed Charles I to be both a Catholic and 'a great
tyrant,' while Queen Kristina 'felt that Charles only held sway with the Catholics in his kingdoms'; Alexia
Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance: Scotland and Sweden 1569-1654 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp.198; 207.
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misgivings along the way, and his motivation would appear to have been his strong yet
individual (Independent) Protestantism and possibly his close association with London, the
geographic, spiritual and financial centre of Parliamentarianism.
The widest, and potentially the most complex theme is attempting to place people and
their motives for fighting into a wider context that takes account of a variety of influences on
their decision making process and their perception of the world about them. Religion was a
matter of enormous importance, but nevertheless not everyone was godly. Warfare was a
topical subject and one which had developed its own growing genre of literature, but there
were few, as a proportion of the population, who were skilled at it. The combination of
religious belief and warfare led to an eschatological viewpoint for some, and Brigadier Young
reminds us that the un-planned battle at Edgehill was fought in the Vale of the Red Horse, and
thus took on an eschatological aspect to those who would wish it to, like the Puritan John
Vicars:
The Rider is Truth, the Red-Horse, Gods vindicative-wrath, the Great Sword, the great
destruction to be made, Peace taken from the Earth, that is, from the wicked and
Idolaters of the Earth. Thus Mr Brightman, and thus say I, here was Truth in our
Parliaments Army riding on the Red-Horse, this Meadow so called, with a great Sword
or slaughter of just revenge, taking peace and comfort from those wicked Earthen-
Cavaliers, and Romish Idolaters, there combined and banded together against God and
his Truth. And was not here a most remarkable mistery, thus made clear unto us in this
Meadow? let the judicious and godly judge. 21
Such views are not common, but glimpses of this apocalyptic backdrop have been seen
through the writings of Thomas Churchyard and Geffrey Gates.
Money, whether as the 'sinews of war' or the soldier's 'pelf,' was always relevant. All
soldiers needed it in modest quantities in order to survive, whatever their cause, and all leaders
required a system of acquiring it in large quantities in order to maintain an army and thus
make war. A cynical view may be that money always lay behind the seventeenth-century war
effort. The small print at the very end of Hexham' s account of Breda compares the two sieges
of that city, the first 'cost his Majestie, the King of Spaine Eight Millions of Gilders' whilst
21 Quoted in Peter Young, Edgehi111642 (Moreton-in-Marsh: Windrush, 1995), p.xvii.
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the second only 'Cost the States 500,000 Gilders'. 22 It is possible to contend that with the
Dutch, trading as they did with the enemy and supporting the Spanish war effort for financial
gain (arguably to support their own), economic motivation was the strongest of all. That said,
at the very top of the political pyramid outside the United Provinces financial gain was seldom
the issue. Elizabeth spent her money wisely and stretched every penny, but spend it she
nevertheless did. Her issue was national defence, and that set her apart from her predecessors.
It was the continuous insistence of consecutive Spanish kings on committing enormous sums
out of the wealth of the Americas in order to expunge the heretic from the Low Countries,
consistently their highest priority over all other political and administrative issues in the
Netherlands, that allowed the conflict in that area to continue for so long, thus the kings' issue
was religion not profit. In the Empire the religiously inspired Edict of Restitution saw the
tables turn against the victorious Catholics (but Poyntz has advised us to consider the reaction
to it as an issue of reduced wealth through loss of land rather than religion}.23 In Britain King
Charles, with haphazard funding reliant at times only upon voluntary contributions, put his
'honour' above all other considerations thus bulldozing his way through negotiation and
compromise to war.24 To him, honour could not be compromised at any price.2S Thus the
economy, religion and honour, and as their leaders were committed to fight for each, so was
the soldier: money in order to live, God in order to save his soul, and honour that he may gain
the respect of his peers.
Writing in 1851 about the Thirty Years' War Scots soldier Sir John Hepburn, James
Grant considered the production of a memoir on an individual 'a more pleasant mode of
illustrating the manners of an age than can be achieved in narrating the more cumbrous annals
of a nation'. 26 To use literature produced by the participants in any historical period as the
basis for a thesis is to accept the inevitable subjectivity that comes with it, but that makes the
investigation into its veracity all the more compelling. The main soldier-authors of the
narratives used in this study have produced works that reflect their lives in combat. Their
22 Henry Hexham, A True and Briefe Relation of the Famous Seige of Breda (Delft, 1637), final page.
23 See section on 'Religion and the Holy Roman Empire' in Chapter Three above.
24 On the relevance of the King's honour see Sharpe, Personal Rule, pp.918; 940; 954. See also Fissel, English
Warfare, p.280.
25 Roger B. Manning, Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), p.lO.
26 James Grant, Memoirs And Adventures Of Sir John Hepburn: Knight. Governor Of Munich. Marshall Of
France Under Louis XIIL And Commander Of The Scots Brigade Under Gustavus Adolphus. Etc (Edinburgh and
London: William Blackwood, 1851), Preface.
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experiences were broadly similar, with the exception of Hexham. Hexham rarely speaks in the
first person singular, the only notable occasion being the part he apparently played at Ostend
in taking Vere's order to Carpenter and Fleming to open the sluice gates during a Spanish
attack. 27 Other than that he could be mistaken for a passive observer. That he was never
wounded together with his unusually slow progress to the rank of captain are also indicative of
a man who was never quite immersed in the thick of things. Nevertheless, he has collated his
information and presented his accounts as well as any historian of the period. His version of
Nieuwpoort borrows in part verbatim from Vere's account in the Commentaries. Whether
Hexham was actually present at the battle or not is unclear; he was certainly at Ostend as a
young page a year later. Hexham combines several of the literary genres discussed above. He
wrote on the military art and was influential in England; he was certainly familiar with, and
contributed to, Dillingham'S collation on Vere despite its publication after his death; he
presumably kept diary notes although his works were usually published within a year of the
events they retell; and although he was probably an eyewitness to everything he writes this is
not clearly reflected in the text so there is no obvious autobiographical content. He ends his
accounts of s'Hertogenbosch, Breda and Venlo with a prayer, underlining his belief in the
righteousness of the cause.
Monro provides the most comprehensive account of the experience of warfare. He,
like Poyntz, personally received the full onslaught of the Thirty Years' War.28 Throughout the
period amongst the grimmest of conditions, during which time he witnessed wholesale
slaughter, he appears to have never lost his Calvinist faith, and his 'Meditations', as well as
other paragraphs in the main text, bare witness to his deeply held Protestant belief. His
account, thorough and accurate in terms of events and details, gives many subjective opinions,
particularly on religion, individuals and national groups, but he does not attempt to over-sell
his abilities as a soldier and leader. His claim to have known Gustavus and to have disagreed
with him on occasion is plausible, not least because he relates that the King insisted on having
his way and ridiculed Monro in the process, a show of humility that Monro did not need to
27Dillingham, Commentaries, p.174. Excepting this occasion he uses 'we' and 'our' but rarely 'I'.
28For instance at Alte Feste, where Monro was shot: ' ... the Hill was nothing els but fire and smoke, like to the
thundering Echo of a Thunderclap, with the noise of Cannon and Musket. ..we losing our best Souldiers, grew so
weak in the end, that the Briggads of foote had scarce bodies of Pikemen to Guard their Colours, the Musketiers
being almost vanished and spent through the continuance of hot service ... ', Monro, Expedition, II, p.148.
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share with an audience." Criticised for verbosity, Expedition nevertheless contains a mine of
information for those who have the patience and interest to analyse it. For any study of British
involvement in the Thirty Years' War it is an important work that shows little sign of editors'
interference.
Vere, for all the reasons discussed above, has produced a work that seems to be a true
reflection of his position on the battlefield as he saw it. His style has produced an historical
debate which, for the most part, ignores the evidence and misses the point: that he was a
skilled and active commander; that he was well respected by his men; that both the English
and the Dutch rewarded him handsomely for his efforts; that even his critics accept that he was
an efficient leader. He was not a Caesar. He was neither high enough in the chain of
command nor politically motivated, but he produced the type of military report based on
Caesar's model written in the factual, no-nonsense style of the soldier. He does not need to
cite God and requires no reason to justify his reason for being where he is or for fighting his
enemy: he fights for his Queen and her allies, and they both pay him. In return he subjects
himself to constant danger and bodily harm. It is the ancient contract between soldier and
prince and all parties are content with it.
Williams' three publications require a slightly closer look to verify their intent and
authenticity. Briefe Discourse, produced as a military advisory manual, appeared in his
lifetime and was therefore presumably as he intended it. Actions was produced several years
after his death, but the editor goes to some lengths to convince the reader that it remains as
Williams produced it, and to be fair it has the ring of Williams to it. Newes, a small
publication of twenty pages, is curious in that it has been written-off as a work of Williams
and yet it appeared in his lifetime; perhaps he was paid for the use of his name. The two main
publications, Actions and Briefe Discourse, can therefore be taken as authentic works. Sir
Peter Manwoode compared the Actions to Caesar's Commentaries, but in fact it begins as a
history in that Williams has no personal experience of the Alva years. It continues as a history
although it moves into a period where Williams himself was involved and yet, like Hexham,
the reader is never quite sure how close Williams is to the events he is describing. Despite
Evans' observation that the letters of Williams contain 'abundant evidence of zealous
29 Monro replaced an officer appointed by Gustavus with his cousin, David Monro, and Gustavus ridiculed him in
front of General Baner. Ibid, II, p.12.
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Protestantism', he nevertheless admits 'most Englishmen shared these sentiments' and that in
'searching for evidence that Sir Roger was a Puritan we come away empty-handed',"
The 'rogue' amongst them is Poyntz, in that he admits the mercenary code whilst the
others most emphatically do not, and his memoir was clearly written without the intent of
publication or even limited distribution in manuscript as to have done either would have
courted a world of problems for him; these observations make it all the more fascinating. And
yet there is common ground between Poyntz and the others. Chapter Two looks at the code of
honour adopted by this soldier of fortune and he compares favourably with the general (Vere),
the Calvinists (Hexham and Monro) and the Queen's loyal professional (Williams). Poyntz
was a brave soldier, who started out a mercenary; he did not develop into one. His journey
took him the alternative route, from a man with no creed to one who appears to have tried very
hard to adopt one, and as his course altered so he struggled with the principles that
underpinned his actions. In the end the passions of the time in war-tom England would not
entertain a Catholic past and so Poyntz was obliged to deny his previous religious
meanderings, and instead he took another radical, and ultimately equally unacceptable
religious stance. He was destined never to find a compromise and died in the far-off
Caribbean with whatever version of Christianity he found solace in. His Relation appears
honestly told, if full of errors; perhaps a reflection of the man himself.
Penetrating the sources to reveal the motivations of soldiers in going to war is fraught
with difficulties. Nevertheless, the sources suggest that soldiers from the British Isles went
abroad to fight for one specific or a combination of several reasons, that they served for
varying duration, that they were generally but not always religiously aligned if not necessarily
zealous and that they were in sufficient numbers to ensure the continuance of a centuries-old
martial tradition. Not all soldiers were volunteers, and the poor quality men that were the
focus of an earlier generation of historians, discussed in the Introduction, were often pressed
into service and, as such, became a potential mob of unruly civilians that required discipline
and order. The law that drew them into service was of questionable legitimacy, and although
challenged in relation to the Stuart expeditions of the 1620s it did not feature in the Petition of
Right of 1628. That law also governed their actions and was ambiguous and largely
30 J.X. Evans, ed., The Works of Sir Roger Williams (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p.156. Oxford Dictionary
of National Biography: Sir Roger Williams.
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ineffective, and attitudes towards it from the gentry changed as the Elizabethan period of
national self-preservation evolved as the threat ebbed into one of concern over monarchical
tyranny. Martial law then was generally seen as the Army's way of maintaining discipline
while abroad, or during a domestic emergency, when engaging the enemy (the 'Rules of War'
are discussed in Chapter Four and military regulations are listed at Appendix 4). While in
England during peacetime soldiers were subject to common, not martial law (although
desertion was a crime under common law), but which law was applicable was not always
entirely clear. Due to the very real prospect of foreign invasion during the 1580s and 1590s it
appears that martial law was applied in a much broader context when compared with the
1620s, when the King's expeditions were deeply unpopular and the idea of martial law in
England met with strong opposition." The soldiers' accounts rarely refer to published legal
texts, and their understanding of what was right and wrong tended to be embedded in their
concept of what was and what was not honourable.
This thesis has shown that the view of warfare presented by historians, notably Sir
John Hale, Paul Hammer, David Trim and Roger Manning can be substantially supported and
upheld through more detailed evidence provided by the soldiers themselves, and that much of
that evidence could be viewed by the reading public of the time. The thesis has also crafted
for the first time clear definitions of soldiers' categories, again drawn from contemporary
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century terminology through the printed works of soldiers. In sum,
those collective works reflect the growing professionalism that resulted from protracted
warfare, and the interest that warfare generated with the reading public. Historians have
discussed the relationship between war and the development of the nation state, and the
evidence of the participants in warfare through their published material is a major contribution
to a deeper understanding of the issues that influenced change in a volatile world.
31 Stephen J. Stearns, 'Military Disorder and Martial Law', in Buchanan Sharp and Mark Charles Fissel, eds.,
Law and Authority in Early Modern England (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2007), pp. 117-13S. There
is considerable reference material on the issue of common and martial law in notes 7S through to 109, which
include the primary source works of Francis Markham and Matthew Sutcliffe. Mark Charles Fissel also looked at
the legal aspects of war: English Warfare 1511-1642 (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), pp.l l l ; 150;
281.
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Notes to Appendices
The tables at Appendices 1, 2 and 3 take as their base Cockle's Bibliography,' and
Webb's list.2 However, they also include other works omitted from both.' Appendix 1
shows, alphabetically, those works produced in English by known or unknown authors. The
list of anonymous authors, the first 46 serials, has been entered chronologically. Appendix 2
shows publications in chronological order from an author's first work, translated out of
another language, possibly but not always the original. The works have been produced by
known or unknown foreign authors, and translated by known or unknown English translators.
Appendix 3 is a chronological list showing orders, in the form of proclamations, laws,
ordinances and instructions given by a stated level of authority. Appendix 4 lists news
pamphlets concerning European warfare published mainly, but not exclusively by Nathaniel
Butter and Nicholas Bourne during the period 1622 - 1640. It is not exhaustive and further
work will be necessary to produce the full list. Except for those mentioned in the
accompanying notes to The Swedish Discipline (London, 1632),4 shown in Serial 144 of
Appendix I, Cockle did not include these news reports in his Bibliography.
The first three appendices are broken down by type of author: firstly, private English
language, secondly, private or historical foreign and, thirdly, declarations of authority from or
on behalf of the state. The subject matter of titles within Appendices 1 and 2 can be further
broken down: news or reports of incidents prior to the corantos of the seventeenth century
(for example Appendix 1 Serials 4 - 8; 15 - 18; 23; 28); informative, instructional or drill
manuals (Appendix 1 Serials 34; 36; 47; Appendix 2 Serial 49); religious treatises (Appendix
1 Serials 56; 57; 98); contemporary debate (Appendix 1 Serials 55; 131); the art of horse
riding (Appendix 1 Serial 59; Appendix 2 Serial 16); duelling (Appendix 1 Serial 128;
Appendix 2 Serial 29); fencing (Appendix 1 Serials 89; 129; 136; Appendix 2 Serial 34);
historical narrative (Appendix 1 Serial 24; Appendix 2 Serial 36); the art of gunnery
IMaurice J.D. Cockle, A Bibliography of English Military Books up to J 642 and of Contemporary Foreign
Works (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, 1900).
2 Henry 1. Webb, 'English Military Books, Laws, and Proclamations Published from IS13 to 1610', Philological
Quarterly, 23 (1944), pp.116-128.
3 Appendix 1: Serials 13.2; IS; 23.2; 27; 2S; 29; 30; 35; 37; 3S; 39; 40; 42; 48; 61; 62; 63; 64.1,4; 79; 92.1 to
92.6; 101; lOS; Ill; 117; 121 (manuscript until 1905); 123 (manuscript until 1917); 126; 13S; 140.2(manuscript
unti11829); 142; 146.2; 147. Appendix 2: Serials 2; 17; 26; 39; 42; 46; 47; 4S; 52; 60. Appendix 3: Serials 4;
16; 22. .
4 Cockle, entry 12S, p.90.
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(Appendix 1 Serials 114; 125; 130; Appendix 2 Serial 20); and mathematics (Appendix 1
Serials 71; 73). The four medical treatises included in Appendix 1 do not purely focus on
battle wounds. George Baker (Serial 51) did not, to my knowledge, serve in an army,
although his treatise does include the treatment of arquebus shot wounds. William Clowes
(Serial 66) was at Le Havre and deployed with Leicester in 1586 so he had experience of the
advice he published. Thomas Gale (Serial 80) had experience with the army of Henry VIII
and also covers the treatment of gunshot wounds. John Woodall (Serial 149) was with
Willoughby in France and his treatise was written specifically with the army in mind. S To
have produced appendices for each category would have created a fragmented picture of the
whole, and some titles are difficult to categorise or fall within more than one category. For
instance The Mansion of Magnanimitie (Appendix 1 Serial 25) is an 'encouragement' for
loyalty to the monarch and was published (and possibly written) by a lawyer, contains
passages on the history of England (Holinshead; Camden), quotes from the ancients (Virgil;
Seneca; Cicero), and has anti-Catholic biblical content, while only some passages are
militarily relevant to the period (the 'cruelty' of the Spanish in the Low Countries, laws to
which officers and soldiers should be subjected and advice on what horses and equipment
subjects of a certain status should maintain). Some works could be placed in an alternative
appendix, for instance Sir Clement Edmondes translated parts of Caesar's Commentaries but
added so much of his own comment that I have placed his work in Appendix 1 not Appendix
2. Likewise Peter Whitehorne included pages of translation from Zanchi but this forms only
part of his work therefore he also is included in Appendix 1.6 Appendix 2 is restricted to those
works that are clearly advertised as translations without embellishment from the translator.
The practice of incorporating the work of others and whether or not this constituted plagiarism
is discussed in Chapter Two above.
As this thesis is concerned with land warfare," the appendices show English language
military works only; naval works are not included unless they contain a land component, such
as Anthony Wingfield's Discourse (Appendix 1 Serial 147). The works of soldiers on other
5 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: Baker, Clowes, Gale and Woodall.
6 Martin Biddle, 'Introduction' to Paul Ive, The Practice of Fortification: London. /589 (Farnborough: Gregg
International, 1972), p.iii. W.H. Schukking, ed., The Principal Works of Simon Slevin. Volume IV: The Art of
War (Amsterdam, C.V. Swets & Zeitlinger, 1964), p.36, n24.
7 Notwithstanding J.S. Corbett's comment that 'it is doubtful whether the naval and the military history of
England should ever be written apart'; The Successors of Drake (London: Longmans Green, 1900), p.vii.
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subject matter are not included; for instance, Barnaby Rich's Farewell to Militarie Profession
. (London, 1574) is not included, as it does not, despite its title, contain information on early-
modern warfare. Published sermons that preach on subjects to do with warfare are not
included either, and where they are used in the text of the thesis they are shown in the
Bibliography, but the religious treatises that were listed by Cockle and Webb are included as
to leave them out would create unnecessary gaps between these appendices and the
CocklelW ebb lists."
Works are published in London unless specified elsewhere. Works printed abroad are
assumed to have circulated in Britain for the British market as well as among British soldiers
serving in continental Europe, as they were printed in English and few continental Europeans
could speak or read English.
8 Appendix 1 Serials 56; 57; 98.
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